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2014 DIGILAW 490 (CAL)

Hiralal Shaw v. Ganga Shaw

2014-06-06

TAPAN KUMAR DUTT

body2014
JUDGMENT : Tapan Kumar Dutt, J. This Court has heard the learned Advocates for the respective parties and has also considered the materials on record placed before this Court. 2. The facts of the case, briefly, are as follows: The hearing arose out of an application under Section 24 Civil Procedure Code wherein the plaintiff/petitioner has made a prayer for transfer of the Ejectment Suit No. 61 of 2003 pending in the Court of the learned Judge, 2nd Bench, Small Causes Court at Calcutta to the City Civil Court at Calcutta. 3. It appears that the plaintiff/petitioner has instituted the said ejectment suit against the heirs and legal representatives of one Govind Shaw who was the original tenant in respect of the suit premises. It appears that the original tenant Govind Shaw died sometime in the year 1995 and the ejectment suit was filed in the year 2003 against the opposite parties who are the heirs and legal representatives of the said Govind Shaw. The said suit was filed on the grounds of default in payment of rent, nuisance and annoyance and also reasonable requirement of the suit premises for own use and occupation of the plaintiff/petitioner. 4. It appears from the application under Section 24 C.P.C. that the defendant Nos. 2 and 3 filed written statement denying the allegations made in the plaint but ultimately the defendant/opposite party No.3 is contesting the suit by adducing evidence. The deposition of the parties in the suit have been concluded and the suit was fixed for argument on 30.01.2013. It has been stated in the application under Section 24 C.P.C. that while the learned Advocate for the plaintiff was preparing himself for arguments it transpired that due to efflux of time for more than 5 years from the date of commencement of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1997 following the death of the original tenant the learned Small Causes Court has lost its inherent jurisdiction to proceed with the suit and thus the application under Section 24 C.P.C. has been filed for transfer of the suit. It further appears from the statements made in the said application under Section 24 C.P.C. that the defendants/opposite parties are no more tenants in respect of the suit premises in view of the provisions of Section 2(g) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1997. It further appears from the statements made in the said application under Section 24 C.P.C. that the defendants/opposite parties are no more tenants in respect of the suit premises in view of the provisions of Section 2(g) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1997. It has been stated in the application that the original tenant having died in the year 1995, that is, quite sometime before the commencement of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1997 (hereinafter referred to as the said Act), that is, 10th July, 2001, the present opposite parties have lost their status as tenants in view of the said Section 2(g) of the said Act as 5 years have elapsed from the date of commencement of the said Act and the plaintiff has not entered into any fresh agreement with the opposite parties. Mention has been made in the said application with regard to the provisions of Section 12A and Schedule IV of the said Act. 5. The defendant/opposite party No.3 has contested the said application by filing affidavit-in-opposition wherein the material allegations made in the application have been disputed. It has been contended in the said affidavit that the petitioner has all along proceeded before the Small Causes Court at Calcutta having jurisdiction over the matter and only at the stage of argument the petitioner has invoked the jurisdiction of this Court for transfer of the suit. It has also been stated in the said affidavit-in-opposition that the bar of five years as contemplated under the said Act is not applicable to the opposite parties. The said opposite party has denied that the defendants have lost their status as tenants in view of Section 2(g) of the said Act or that the defendants are entitled to continue as tenants for 5 years only from the date of commencement of the said Act. 6. The learned advocate appearing on behalf of the petitioner submitted that the original tenant, Govind Shaw, died sometime in the year 1995 and the ejectment suit was filed in the year 2003 against the opposite parties who are heirs and legal representatives of the said Govind Shaw. 6. The learned advocate appearing on behalf of the petitioner submitted that the original tenant, Govind Shaw, died sometime in the year 1995 and the ejectment suit was filed in the year 2003 against the opposite parties who are heirs and legal representatives of the said Govind Shaw. The said learned Advocate submitted that since the said Act came into force on 10th July, 2001, the present opposite parties have lost their status as tenants in view of Section 2(g) of the said Act as five years had elapsed from the date of commencement of the said Act and the plaintiff did not enter into any fresh agreement with the opposite parties. According to the said learned Advocate, the said five years had completed on and about 9.7.2006 and the opposite parties became trespassers in the suit property since 10.07.2006. 7. The said learned Advocate cited a decision reported at 2013(1) CHN (Cal) 336 (Goutam Dey v. Jyotsna Chatterjee) wherefrom it appears that a learned Single Judge of this Court has been pleased to dispose of two revisional applications which arose out of two misc. appeals in connection with a prayer for ad interim injunction. A learned Single Judge of this Court has been pleased to observe in the said reports that the said Act of 1997 has not been given retrospective effect so as to bring within its coverage death of tenants occurring prior to July 10, 2001 and a different intention does not appear on a reading of the Act of 1997 so as to affect any right or privilege that has been acquired or has accrued in favour of the specified heirs of the deceased tenant under the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956, since repealed. According to the said reports, a vested right that accrued in favour of an heir or a tenant who died in the year 1997 in that case cannot be abrogated. His Lordship was also pleased to observe that the period of five years mentioned in Section 2(g) of the said Act of 1997 automatically would have application only in respect of death of tenants occurring on and from July 10, 2001. His Lordship was also pleased to observe that the period of five years mentioned in Section 2(g) of the said Act of 1997 automatically would have application only in respect of death of tenants occurring on and from July 10, 2001. It appears from a perusal of the said reports that the Hon'ble Judge was of the view that in the event the original tenant dies before July 10, 2001 it will be the said Act of 1956 that will become applicable and the tenancy would be governed by such Act, and the tenancy being heritable, the heirs of such tenant would be justified in claiming tenancy right subject to fulfillment of the residence requirement in Section 2(h) of the said Act of 1956 but unfettered by the stipulation of five years appearing in Section 2(g) of the said Act of 1997. 8. However, the said learned Advocate submitted that there cannot be any binding effect of orders which arose out of interlocutory proceedings. In support of his contention the said learned Advocate cited the decisions reported in 1995 Supp(IV) SCC 214, AIR 1964 Supreme Court 993 and AIR 2005 MP 159 . 9. It appears that in 1995 Supp(IV) SCC 214(Commissioner/Secretary to Government Health & Medical Edu. Deptt. Civil Sectt., Jammu v. Dr. Ashok Kumar Kohli) the Hon'ble Court was pleased to observe that the High Court concerned in the said case would not be justified in calling upon the Government to implement the interim direction as the controversy is yet to be decided. 10. In AIR 1964 Supreme Court 993 (Arjun Singh v. Mohindra Kumar & Ors.) the Hon'ble Supreme Court was pleased to observe, inter alia, to the effect that there are interim orders which do not decide in any manner the merits of the controversy in issue and such orders are certainly capable of being altered or varied subsequently. 11. In AIR 2005 Madhya Pradesh 159 (Bhagchand v. Administrator Municipal Corporation, Indore & Others) the Hon'ble Court was pleased to observe that while determining the issues in the suit a Court is not justified in making use of the order on the application for temporary injunction and any observations made in the proceedings connected with the prayer for temporary injunction have no relevance whatever in passing of the final verdict after the trial of the suit. 12. 12. The learned Advocate for the petitioner submitted that since the decision reported at 2013(1) CHN 336 arose out of an interlocutory matter the observations made in the said reports cannot be considered to be a binding precedent. 13. The said learned Advocate submitted that the right of tenancy is not a vested right and in support of such submission the said learned Advocate cited a decision reported at 2001(8) SCC 397 (Ambalal Sarabhai Enterprises Ltd. v. Amrit Lal & Co. And Another) with (Ambalal Sarabhai Enterprises Ltd. v. Amrit Lal & Co. And another). It appears from Paragraph 14 of the said reports that the Hon'ble Court was pleased to consider the case of D.C. Bhatia v. Union of India wherein it was observed that in the said case the legislature has decided to curtail or take away the protection of the Delhi Rent Control Act from a section of the tenants. It was further observed in the said case that the tenants had not acquired any vested right under the Delhi Rent Control Act, but had a right to take advantage of the provisions of the repealed Act so long as that law remained in force. In Paragraph 15 of the said reports the Hon'ble Apex Court was pleased to hold that a tenant under the Rent Act had no vested right. In paragraph 17 of the said reports the Hon'ble Court was pleased to hold that the Rent Act merely provides a protection to a tenant as against the unbridled power of the landlord under the general law of the land. The Rent Act gives protection to the tenant from being ejected except on the grounds referred to under the Rent Act. The Hon'ble Court was pleased to observe that the right of a tenant under the Rent Act at the best could be said to be a protective right, which cannot be construed to be a vested right. 14. The learned Advocate for the petitioner submitted that the said reports 2001(8) SCC 397 was not placed before the Hon'ble Judge who decided the case in the reported decision 2013(1) CHN (Cal) 336. 15. The learned Advocate for the petitioner submitted that a heritable tenancy right may be accepted or abandoned or relinquished by the heirs of the original tenant and this may be done either expressly or by conduct of the parties. 15. The learned Advocate for the petitioner submitted that a heritable tenancy right may be accepted or abandoned or relinquished by the heirs of the original tenant and this may be done either expressly or by conduct of the parties. According to the said learned Advocate, the heirs of the original tenant in the instant case did not exercise their right of tenancy after the death of the original tenant. In support of such contention the said learned Advocate cited the decision reported at 1989(II) CHN 390 (Smt. Sumilita Bhattacharjee & Anr. v. Smt. Nila Chatterjee) paragraph 7 and 2012(1) CLJ (Cal) 143 (Ashoke Kumar Nandi v. Digbijoy Sinha & Ors.) (Paragraph 19). 16. The learned Advocate for the petitioner submitted that for the purpose of properly construing the provisions of the said Act of 1997 it is necessary that the intention of the legislature should be ascertained. The said learned Advocate cited a decision reported at AIR 1957 SC 907 (Kanai Lal Sur v. Paramnidhi Sadhukhan) wherein it has been observed, inter alia, that it has to be borne in mind that the first and primary rule of construction is that the intention of the legislature must be found in the words used by the legislature itself, and, if the words used are capable of one construction only then it would not be open to the Courts to adopt any other hypothetical construction on the ground that such hypothetical construction is more consistent with the alleged object and policy of the Act. It has been further observed in the said reports that the words used in the material provisions of the statute must be interpreted in their plain grammatical meaning and it is only when such words are capable of two constructions that the question of giving effect to the policy or object of the Act can legitimately arise. When the material words are capable of two constructions, one of which is likely to defeat or impair the policy of the Act whilst the other construction is likely to assist the achievement of the said policy then the Courts would prefer to adopt the latter construction. 17. When the material words are capable of two constructions, one of which is likely to defeat or impair the policy of the Act whilst the other construction is likely to assist the achievement of the said policy then the Courts would prefer to adopt the latter construction. 17. The said learned Advocate cited the decision reported at 1972(3) SCC 717 (G. Narayanaswami v. G. Pannerselvam & Others) and referred to paragraph 19 of the said reports wherein a passage from Crawfords "Construction of Statues" has been quoted to the effect that even where the meaning of the Statute is clear and sensible, either with or without the omitted word, interpolation is improper since the primary source of the legislative intent is in the language of the Statute. 18. The said learned Advocate cited another decision reported at 2011(9) SCC 707 (C. Venkatachalam v. Ajitkumar C. Shah & Others) in support of his contention that where the words of a Statue are plain, precise and unambiguous, the intention of the legislature is to be gathered from the language of the statute itself and no external evidence such as parliamentary debates etc. is admissible to construe those words. But, however, if a statutory provision is open to more than one interpretation, the Court has to choose that interpretation which represents the true intention of the legislature. 19. The said learned Advocate cited another decision reported at 2011(11) SCC 334 (Grid Corporation of Orissa Limited & Others v. Eastern Metals & Ferro Alloys & Ors) in support of his contention that where the words used in a statute are capable of bearing two or more constructions, it is necessary to adopt purposive construction to identify the construction to be preferred, by posing the following questions: (I) What is the purpose for which the provision is made? (II) What was the position before making the provision? (III) Whether any of the constructions proposed would lead to an absurd result or would render any part of the provision redundant? (IV)Which of the interpretations will advance the object of the provision. 20. (II) What was the position before making the provision? (III) Whether any of the constructions proposed would lead to an absurd result or would render any part of the provision redundant? (IV)Which of the interpretations will advance the object of the provision. 20. The said learned Advocate cited another decision reported at 2012(9) SCC 332 (Commissioner of Central Excise, Mumbai v. Flat India Private Limited & Another) in support of his contention that whenever the legislature uses certain terms or expressions of well-known legal significance or connotations, the Courts must interpret them as used or understood in the popular sense if they are not defined under the Act or the Rules framed thereunder and that the normal rule of interpretation is that the words used by the legislature are generally a safe guide to its intention. 21. The said learned Advocate cited another decision reported at 2013 (3) SCC 1 (State of Gujarat And Another v. Justice R.A. Mehta (Retired) And Others) in support of his contention that a statute must be construed in such a manner so as to make it workable and the Courts must state what meaning the statute should bear, rather than rendering the statute a nullity, as statutes are meant to be operative and not inept. 22. The said learned Advocate cited another decision reported at 2010(9) SCC 385 (Jai Singh And others v. Municipal Corporation of Delhi And Another with Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Jai Singh And Others) and referred to Paragraph 15, 16 and 42 of the said reports. In paragraph 15 of the said reports the Hon'ble Supreme Court was pleased to observe while dealing with the High Courts power to exercise jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India that the correctional jurisdiction can be exercised by the High Court in cases where orders have been passed by subordinate Court or Tribunal in grave dereliction of duty or in flagrant abuse of fundamental principles of law or justice. In Paragraph 16 of the said reports it has been observed, inter alia, that the High Court cannot lightly or liberally act as an appellate Court and reappreciate the evidence and the power to reappreciate evidence would only be justified in rare and exceptional situations where grave injustice would be done unless the High Court interferes. In Paragraph 16 of the said reports it has been observed, inter alia, that the High Court cannot lightly or liberally act as an appellate Court and reappreciate the evidence and the power to reappreciate evidence would only be justified in rare and exceptional situations where grave injustice would be done unless the High Court interferes. In Paragraph 42 of the said reports the Hon'ble Court has been pleased to take into consideration the Estralla Rubbers case (2001 (08) SCC 97) wherein it has been observed, inter alia, that the exercise of the power by a High Court while interfering with the orders of Subordinate courts or Tribunals is restricted to cases of serious dereliction of duty and flagrant violation of fundamental principles of law or justice. 23. The said learned Advocate also cited a decision reported at AIR 2012 Supreme Court 2728 ( U.P. Power Corporation Ltd. v. Rajesh Kumar & Ors with State of U.P. v. Brij Bhushan Sharma & Anr.) and drew the attention of the Court to Paragraph 14 of this reports wherefrom it appears that the Hon'ble Court was pleased to consider that the decision reported at AIR 1991 SC 1893 in which while dealing with the question of judicial discipline the Hon'ble Bench concerned was pleased to express, inter alia, that "the Judges are bound by precedents and procedure. They could use their discretion only when there is no declared principle to be found, no rule and no authority." It has also been observed, inter alia, that the "judicial decorum and legal propriety demand that where a learned Single Judge or a Division Bench does not agree with the decision of a Bench of co-ordinate jurisdiction, the matter shall be referred to a larger Bench." 24. The learned Advocate submitted that the provisions of Section 24(5) Civil Procedure Code is applicable in the present case as because the Small Causes Court concerned has now lost its jurisdiction to decide the said suit. The said learned Advocate submitted that the Small Clauses Court concerned lost its jurisdiction to try the said suit during the pendency of the suit. According the said learned Advocate, the provisions of Order 7, Rule 10 with regard to the return of plaint cannot be applied to the facts and circumstances of the instant case. 25. The said learned Advocate submitted that the Small Clauses Court concerned lost its jurisdiction to try the said suit during the pendency of the suit. According the said learned Advocate, the provisions of Order 7, Rule 10 with regard to the return of plaint cannot be applied to the facts and circumstances of the instant case. 25. The said learned Advocate cited a decision reported at AIR 1997 Calcutta 340 (Vivekananda And Others v. Smt. Ashima Goswami) wherein it appears that in the said case the suit was filed before competent Court who had the jurisdiction try the suit before the plaint was amended but because of the amendment effected during the pendency of the suit the jurisdiction of the Court was outsted. In Paragraph 10 of the said reports the Hon'ble Court was pleased to observe that until and unless a specific order under Order 7, Rule 10 C.P.C. is passed directing return of plaint it must be held that the suit was pending before the learned Court concerned and, therefore, the power under Section 24 C.P.C. could be exercised by the learned District Judge concerned in the facts and circumstances of the said case. 26. The said learned Advocate cited another decision reported at 1980(1) SCC 601 (Baselius Mar Thoma Mathews I And Others v. Paulose Mar Athanasius And Others) in support of his contention that the jurisdiction under Section 24 C.P.C. could be exercised by this Court to cut short the delay and promote social justice. 27. The said learned Advocate cited another decision reported at AIR 2005 Delhi 219 (M.K. Modi v. K.K. Modi) in support of his contention that since the Small Cause Court had the jurisdiction to entertain the suit when the same was filed but has lost such jurisdiction during the pendency of the suit itself when the said Act of 1997 had to be given effect to by considering the fact that five years have elapsed from the date of commencement of the Act, the provisions of Order 7, Rule 10 C.P.C. cannot be invoked in such a case but the provisions of Section 24 C.P.C. have to be applied. 28. The said learned Advocate cited another decision reported at AIR 2005 NOC 88(AP) (Dr. 28. The said learned Advocate cited another decision reported at AIR 2005 NOC 88(AP) (Dr. S. Chandra Sekhar Rao v. M/s. VST Constructions and others) in support of his contention that even if the plaintiff does not seek to return of the plaint it can invoke the jurisdiction of the Court concerned under Section 24 C.P.C. 29. The said learned Advocate cited another decision reported at AIR 2001 AIHC 445(ALL) (Amar Nath Swami v. Ramdeo) in support of his contention that when one procedure is adopted out of two or more procedures prescribed, the contesting opposite parties cannot be said to have any right to oppose since it will not cause any prejudice with regard to the merit of the case. According to the said learned Advocate, even if both the provisions of Order 7, Rule 10 and provisions of Section 24 C.P.C. can be resorted to, resorting to one of such procedures would be legal and thus, the petitioner is fully justified in making the application under Section 24 C.P.C. 30. The learned Advocate appearing on behalf of the contesting opposite parties submitted that the submissions made by the learned Advocate for the petitioner are not supported by the pleadings of the petitioner in the plaint. The said learned Advocate referred to a copy of the plaint in respect of his aforesaid contention. In Paragraph 1 of the plaint it appears that the plaintiff/petitioner has pleaded that the predecessor-in-interest of the defendants, that is, the said Govind Shaw was a tenant in respect of the suit property and upon the death of the said Govind Shaw the defendants became joint tenants in respect of the suit property and the plaintiff became the owner of the suit property by purchase thereof. The said learned Advocate referred to Paragraph 2 of the plaint wherefrom it appears that the plaintiff/petitioner has pleaded that by a notice of ejectment dated 7.02.2002 under Section 6(4) of the said Act of 1997 addressed to the defendants, the defendants were called upon to quit and vacate the suit property on the expiry of the last day on the month of March 2002 or whenever their tenancy month would expire next. It further appears that in Paragraph 2 of the said plaint it has been pleaded that the said notice was sent to the defendant No.1, one of the joint tenants, and the said defendant received the same and that the defendant No.1 being one of the joint tenants the said notice is binding upon the remaining joint tenants, that is, defendant Nos. 2 to 4. It further appears that in Paragraph 3A of the plaint the plaintiff has pleaded that the defendants became defaulters in the payment of rent at least from January 2002 and in spite of willingness of the plaintiff to accept rent personally from January 2002 the defendants did not pay rent from the said month. In Paragraph 4 of the plaint it has been pleaded that the cause of action of the suit arose on 1st April, 2002 at the suit premises and the same is continuing from day to day ever since. 31. Thus, from the aforesaid pleadings it will appear that there is no pleading to the effect that the defendants have lost their right of stay in the suit premises owing to the expiry of five years as contemplated under the said Act of 1997. It will also appear that the plaintiff/petitioner has stated that he was willing to accept rent from January 2002, that is, after the said Act of 1997 came into force and the cause of action of the suit arose on 1st April, 2002, that is, immediately after the expiry of March 2002 in terms of the eviction notice. The learned Advocate appearing for the contesting opposite parties, thus, submitted that the argument put forward by the learned Advocate for the petitioner in support of his application under Section 24 C.P.C. do not have any foundation in the pleadings made in the plaint and, thus, such arguments cannot be accepted by this Court. The said learned Advocate submitted that when the argument in the suit started in the Small Causes Court concerned the petitioner came forward with the present application under Section 24 C.P.C. The said learned Advocate further submitted that the pleadings of the plaint will make it clear that the plaintiff/petitioner has accepted the defendants/opposite parties as tenants under the plaintiff/petitioner under the said Act of 1956 and the defendants have been described as joint tenants in the plaint. The said learned Advocate emphasised the fact that it has never been pleaded in the plaint that the defendants right of stay in the suit premises as tenants expired with the expiry of five years from the date of commencement of the said Act of 1997 or that the defendants have become trespassers after the expiry of such five years and the Small Causes Court concerned has lost its jurisdiction to try the suit. The said learned Advocate submitted that there is no doubt with regard to the fact that the said Govind Shaw died in the year 1995 and the plaintiff has himself stated in the plaint that he was willing to accept rent from the heirs of such Govind Shaw even in the year 2002. The said learned Advocate also submitted that the said Act of 1997 came into force in the year 2001 and even if the argument of the learned Advocate for the petitioner is accepted such tenancy according to the learned Advocate for the petitioner should have ended sometime in the year 2006 but the suit continued for a long time thereafter and the plaint has not been amended to the effect that the tenancy came to an end in the year 2006. He further submitted that even though the plaint has been amended on other grounds no ground was taken in this regard and, therefore, on the basis of the present pleadings the prayer for transfer as made by the petitioner cannot be allowed. The said learned Advocate further submitted that even in the affidavit evidence in chief of the plaintiff the plaintiff has not stated that the defendants are liable to be evicted as five years have passed from the date of commencement of the said Act of 1997. The said learned Advocate further submitted that even in the affidavit evidence in chief of the plaintiff the plaintiff has not stated that the defendants are liable to be evicted as five years have passed from the date of commencement of the said Act of 1997. The said learned Advocate for the contesting opposite parties referred to a decision reported at 2008(3) SCC 659 (Kulwinder Kaur Alias Kulwinder Gurcharan Singh v. Kandi Friends Education Trust And Others) and relied upon Paragraph 23 of the said reports in support of his contention that in the suit since there is no issue with regard to the question as to whether or not the tenancy of the defendants have expired with the expiry of five years from the date of commencement of the said Act of 1997, and such point is not involved in the suit as it now stands, the prayer made in the application under Section 24 C.P.C. cannot be allowed. 32. The said learned Advocate cited another decision reported at 2005(13) SCC 439 (N.K. Nair And Another v. Kavanugal Aanattu Radhika) in support of his contention that since the suit is now at its final jurisdiction prayer as made by the petitioner should be refused particularly when there is no foundation in the pleadings of the petitioner in support of such prayer for transfer. 33. The said learned Advocate for the contesting opposite parties cited a judgment reported at 1997(1)SCC 502 (Joginder Tuli v. S.L. Bhatia And Another) while contending that even if the prayer of the petitioner is allowed the City Civil Court will have to proceed from the point at which the suit stands transferred and on the basis of the pleadings and evidence on record but in the present case in the absence of the necessary pleadings and evidence on record the City Civil Court will not be able to try the suit. The said learned Advocate submitted that in the present case the Prabir Kumar Jalans case (supra) cannot be of any assistance to the petitioner. The said learned Advocate submitted that Goutam Deys case (supra) supports the case of the contesting opposite parties. According to the said learned Advocate, the right of tenancy has already vested upon the defendants/opposite parties on the death of the original tenant under the said Act of 1956 and such right cannot be affected by the subsequent legislation. The said learned Advocate submitted that Goutam Deys case (supra) supports the case of the contesting opposite parties. According to the said learned Advocate, the right of tenancy has already vested upon the defendants/opposite parties on the death of the original tenant under the said Act of 1956 and such right cannot be affected by the subsequent legislation. The said learned Advocate submitted that Section 6 and Section 8(c) of the Bengal General Clauses Act, 1897 will have to be taken into consideration. 34. The said learned Advocate cited a decision reported at AIR 2004 SC 4778 (Bharat Petroleum Corporation Ltd. and another v. N.R. Vairamani and another) and referred to Paragraph 9 of the said reports wherein it has been observed that the observations of Courts are neither to be read as Euclids theorems nor as provisions of the statute taken out of their context but these observations must be read in the context in which they appear to have been stated. It has also been observed that the judgments of Courts are not to be construed as statutes. 35. The said learned Advocate cited another decision reported at AIR 2008 SC 946 (Sarva Sharmik Sanghatana (K.V.) Mumbai v. Sate of Maharashtra & Ors) in support of his contention that the observations made by Courts in the judgments should not be read as provisions of a statute and that the Judges can interpret words of Statutes but the words of a judgment cannot be interpreted as statutes. 36. The said learned Advocate cited another decision reported at AIR 2009 Supreme Court 187 (Nagar Palika Nigam v. Krishi Upaj Mandi Samiti & Ors) in support of his contention that a Court should not read anything into a statutory provision which is plain and unambiguous and the language employed in a statute is the determinative factor of legislature intent. 37. The said learned Advocate cited another decision reported at AIR 1992 SC 81 (R.S. Raghunath v. State of Karnataka and Another) in support of his contention that the Court should not defeat the intention of the legislature by overlooking it and it is for the legislation to choose the method to indicate its intention. 38. 37. The said learned Advocate cited another decision reported at AIR 1992 SC 81 (R.S. Raghunath v. State of Karnataka and Another) in support of his contention that the Court should not defeat the intention of the legislature by overlooking it and it is for the legislation to choose the method to indicate its intention. 38. According to the said learned Advocate reading of Section 2(g) of the said Act of 1997 would indicate that it contemplates death of a tenant on 10.07.2001 or thereafter and if the tenant dies prior to 10.07.2001 then the said Act of 1956 would apply. According to the said learned Advocate, if the argument made by the learned Advocate for the petitioner is accepted then in that event an anomalous situation would arise if one takes into consideration the provisions of Section 26 of the said Act of 1997. According to the learned Advocate for the contesting opposite parties, if the argument made by the learned Advocate for the petitioner is accepted then the heirs of the original tenant who might have inducted sub-tenant will loose tenancy right after the expiry of five years but the subtenant who is elevated to the status of a tenant will continue thereafter as a tenant. 39. The said learned Advocate cited another decision reported at AIR 1970 Supreme Court 789 (Fateh Bibi etc. v. Charan Dass) in support of his contention that in the instant case the succession opened to the defendants in the suit when the original tenant Govind Shaw died. The said learned Advocate submitted that the rights of the opposite parties are protected under the said Act of 1997 and such right cannot be taken away. 40. The said learned Advocate cited another decision reported at AIR 2009 SC 187 in support of his contention that the language employed in a statute is the determinative factor of legislative intent and the legislative intent in a statute has to be ascertained. 41. The said learned Advocate cited another decision reported at AIR 2001 SC 3630 (Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay and others v. Hindustan Petroleum Corporation and another) in support of his contention that the word vested does not have a fixed connotation and it may be also understood in a limited sense, as it may be indicated in the context in which it might have been used in a particular piece of legislation. 42. 42. The said learned Advocate cited another decision reported in AIR 1968 SC 303 (K.L. Gupte v. The Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay and others) and referred to Paragraph 27 of the said reports which is quoted below: "In all such cases, where large powers are given to certain authorities the exercise whereof may make serious inroads into the rights of property of private individuals, we have to see whether there is any guidance to be collected from the Act itself, its object and its provisions, in the light of the surrounding circumstances which made the legislation necessary taken in conjunction with well known facts of which the court might take judicial notice." 43. The said learned Advocate for the contesting opposite parties submitted that the right vested in the opposite parties under the said Act of 1956 cannot be taken away under the said subsequent Act of 1997 unless it is specifically provided in the subsequent Act. The learned Advocate for the petitioner submitted that the subsequent Act of 1997 has taken away the opposite parties rights in the suit premises. 44. The learned Advocate appearing on behalf of the contesting opposite parties cited a decision reported at AIR 1966 SC 459 (Ishverlal Thakorelal Almaula v. Motibhai Nagjibhai) in course of his submission that the right vested in the opposite parties under the said Act of 1956 cannot be taken away by the subsequent Act of 1997. 45. The said learned Advocate for the contesting opposite parties cited a decision reported at 2013(3) ICC 635 (Mary George v. N.D.H. Enterprises, A Co-ownership in respect of estate of late N.D. Hanumantarayappa) in support of his contention that since tenancy right had vested in the opposite parties under the said Act of 1956 and the said Govind Shaw had died long before the new Act of 1997 came into force the right of the heirs of the said Govind Shaw had vested under the said Act of 1956. 46. Having heard the learned Advocates for the respective parties one fact that clearly emerges is that there is no pleading at all in the plaint to the effect that the contesting opposite parties have lost their right of tenancy in the suit premises on the expiry of five years from the date of death or from the date of coming into force of the said Act of 1997, whichever is later. As discussed above, it will appear that the reading of the plaint indicates that the contesting opposite parties were asked to vacate the suit premises with the expiry of March 2002 or whenever tenancy month expires next but not on the expiry of five years as contemplated under the said Act of 1997. As discussed above, it will also appear that the plaintiff was willing to accept rent from January 2002. The learned Advocate for the contesting opposite parties also submitted that in the affidavit of evidence-in-chief the plaintiff/petitioner did not make out any case as contemplated under the said Act of 1997 in so far as the right of having protection from eviction for a period of five years as contemplated under the said Act of 1997 is concerned. The learned Advocate for the contesting opposite parities was right in submitting that even if the prayer made in the application under Section 24 C.P.C. is allowed the City Civil Court concerned cannot decide the suit in the absence of the necessary pleadings. The said learned Advocate was right in submitting that on the basis of the pleadings as its stands the prayer for transfer cannot be allowed. It is difficult to say, on the basis of the pleadings in the plaint, as pointed out by the learned Advocate for the contesting opposite parties, that the Small Causes Court concerned has lost its jurisdiction. It is true that the learned Advocates for the respective parties have made their submissions, as already noted above, but this Court is of the view that the matter can be disposed of on factual basis that the argument made by the learned Advocate for the plaintiff/petitioner is not supported by any appropriate pleading in the plaint. 47. In view of the discussions made above, the prayer for transfer as made in the application under Section 24 of the Civil Procedure Code is rejected and the said application under Section 24 C.P.C. is, accordingly, dismissed. 48. There will be no order as to costs. Urgent certified Xerox copy of this order, if applied for, shall be given to the parties on compliance of usual formalities.