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2014 DIGILAW 490 (PAT)

Ashwani Kumar v. State of Bihar

2014-04-23

ADITYA KUMAR TRIVEDI

body2014
JUDGMENT : ADITYA KUMAR TRIVEDI, J.:–Appellant, Ashwani Kumar who has been found guilty for an offence punishable under Section 304(B), 201 of the IPC vide judgment dated 21.02.2012 and sentenced to undergo R.I. for 10 years as well as R.I. for three years along with fine appertaining to Rs.1000/- in default thereof, S.I. for two months additionally with a further direction to run the sentences concurrently order judgment dated 23.02.2012 by Additional Sessions Judge, FTC-IV, Khagaria in Sessions Trial No.43 of 2003 / 221 of 2010 has challenged the same under instant appeal. 2. Arvind Kumar Choudhary (PW-8), maternal uncle of deceased Reena Kumari had filed written report on 13.04.2001 alleging inter alia that his sister?s daughter Reena Kumari, aged about 23 years was married with Ashwani Kumar, son of Rama Nand Sharma of village-Panchkhuti (Rahimpur) about five years ago. Since after her marriage father-in-law Rama Nand Sharma, mother-in-law Asha Devi, sister-in-law Rupam Kumari, husband Ashwani Kumar and her brother-in-law began to demand a motorcycle as well as colour T.V. in lieu of dowry and for that, she was regularly treated with torture and cruelty and for that, she used to inform her Naihar. Anyhow, motorcycle was given on the following year however colour T.V. was not given and on account thereof, they all have committed murder of his sister?s daughter on 11.04.2001 and concealed her dead body at Ganga Diyara. The aforesaid information was given by unknown person on 12.04.2001 on account of which he along with others came at Rahimpur and had gone to the house of accused who were found absconding. They engaged themselves in searching out the dead body and on account thereof, they could not met with police official at an earlier occasion. It has also been submitted that the father of girl has gone to his relative. Therefore, he along with uncle Ram Vinay Singh came at Police Station for the purpose of filing of case. 3. On the basis of the aforesaid written report, Khagaria P.S. Case No. 116 of 2001 was registered under Section 304(B), 201, 120B of the IPC whereupon investigation commenced followed with submission of charge sheet ultimately leading trial whereunder appellant has been convicted, happens to be the subject matter of instant appeal. 4. 3. On the basis of the aforesaid written report, Khagaria P.S. Case No. 116 of 2001 was registered under Section 304(B), 201, 120B of the IPC whereupon investigation commenced followed with submission of charge sheet ultimately leading trial whereunder appellant has been convicted, happens to be the subject matter of instant appeal. 4. From the mode of cross-examination as well as from the statement of the appellant recorded under Section 313 of the Cr.P.c. the defence plea as adopted by the appellant happens to be complete denial of occurrence. However, by way of suggestion it has also been flashed that deceased was suffering from ailment for which she was properly treated as well as during course of cooking the stove burst leading to her accidental death and to support the same had examined DW-1, father of deceased. 5. In order to substantiate its case, the prosecution had examined altogether nine PWs out of whom PW-1 is Ram Binoy Singh, PW-2 is Chandan Kumar Singh, PW-3 is Ajay Kumar, PW-4 is Hare Ram Choudhary, PW-5 is Sanjay Kumar, PW-6 is Binod Kumar, PW-7 is Dilip Choudhary, PW-8 is Arvind Choudhary and PW-9 is Amarnath Kumar as well as also exhibited endorsement over formal FIR-Ext.1, Postmortem Report- Ext.2 and formal FIR as Ext.-3. As stated above defence had also examined one DW, DW-1, Ramashray Singh without any exhibit. 6. It has been submitted on behalf of appellant while assailing the judgment of conviction and sentence rendered by the learned trial court that it is based upon conjecture and surmises. To support the same, it has been submitted that without having examination of doctor and having the postmortem exhibited by a formal witness, the learned trial court had taken cognizance of finding recorded by the doctor with regard to cause of death. Therefore, the appreciation of learned trial court happens to be illegal as well as contrary to the spirit of law. 7. Furthermore, it has also been submitted that I.O. had not been examined. Due to non-examination of I.O. interest of appellant is found prejudiced because of the fact that there happens to be consistent version of the defence that dead body so recovered from ‘Gandak Diyara’ was not the dead body of the Reena. 7. Furthermore, it has also been submitted that I.O. had not been examined. Due to non-examination of I.O. interest of appellant is found prejudiced because of the fact that there happens to be consistent version of the defence that dead body so recovered from ‘Gandak Diyara’ was not the dead body of the Reena. Had there been examination of Investigating Officer, the inquest report would have been exhibited which certainly have given light over physical condition of the dead body to the extent of whether it was identifiable or not. At the present moment, it has also been submitted that on account of non-examination of doctor the physical status of the dead body could not come on the record. Therefore, consistent suggestion of defence could not get legal recognition in the background of non-examination of Investigating Officer as well as doctor which happens to be sufficient one to give benefit to the appellant. 8. Now coming to ingredients of Section 304(B) of the IPC, it has been submitted that prosecution had not divulged as well as proved by cogent and reliable evidence all the ingredients so prescribed for attracting application of Section 304(B) of the IPC. Furthermore, it has also been submitted that taking into account the evidence of DW-1 who is non else than the father of the Reena along with non-examination of doctor and Investigating Officer as well as the infirmity persisting in the evidence of the witnesses coupled with its conjoint effect it is apparent that prosecution could not be able to substantiate its case, hence the appeal is fit to be allowed. 9. On the other hand, the learned Additional Public Prosecutor while supporting the finding recorded by the learned trial court submitted that inconsistent plea of the appellant regarding death of Reena is found adverse to his interest in the background of obligation having over his shoulder under the garb of Section 106 of the Evidence Act. Deceased, being un-controverted, was residing at her Sasural being wife of appellant and as per own admission by way of DW-1 died of burn injury at her Sasural but cunningly suppressed as well as concealed the fact whether she died within seven years of marriage or beyond seven years of marriage. Deceased, being un-controverted, was residing at her Sasural being wife of appellant and as per own admission by way of DW-1 died of burn injury at her Sasural but cunningly suppressed as well as concealed the fact whether she died within seven years of marriage or beyond seven years of marriage. Be that as it may, from the consistent evidence of the prosecution, it is evident that deceased died within 7 years of marriage more particularly within 5 years of marriage which, even examining the father of Reena as DW-1 has not been controverted. As such death of Reena within 5 years of marriage in an abnormal circumstance is found admitted. In likewise manner, no cross-examination was made on behalf of appellant to the prosecution witnesses more particularly PW-1 the uncle, PW-2 the brother and PW-8 the maternal uncle of Reena who consistently stated regarding demand of dowry in form of motorcycle as well as colour T.V. and for that consistently tortured her as well as fulfillment of partial demand of dowry by providing motorcycle and then murdering the deceased Reena for colour T.V. was not challenged. Therefore, all the ingredients are visible on the record. Consequent thereupon, the judgment of conviction and sentence did not require any sort of interference. 10. In Suresh Kumar Vs. State of Haryana reported in 2014 CRI. L. J. 551 the Hon’ble Apex Court had elaborately dealt with the ingredients of 304(B), requirements to be satisfied during course of trial to attract applicability of Section 304(B) of the IPC in following way:– “Ingredients of Section 304-B of the IPC. 25. Learned counsel for Suresh Kumar made two submissions. It was firstly contended on the merits of the case that there was nothing to suggest that his client was guilty of an offence punishable under Section 304-B of the IPC. Secondly it was contended that the High Court ought not to have lightly interfered against an order of acquittal. 26. The actual words used in Section 304B of the IPC are of importance. Secondly it was contended that the High Court ought not to have lightly interfered against an order of acquittal. 26. The actual words used in Section 304B of the IPC are of importance. This section reads as under:– “304-B. Dowry death.–(1) Where the death of a woman is caused by any burns or bodily injury or occurs otherwise than under normal circumstances within seven years of her marriage and it is shown that soon before her death she was subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or any relative of her husband for, or in connection with, any demand for dowry, such death shall be called “dowry death”, and such husband or relative shall be deemed to have caused her death. Explanation.–For the purpose of this sub-section, “dowry” shall have the same meaning as in Section 2 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 (2* of 1961). (2) Whoever commits dowry death shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than seven years but which may extend to imprisonment for life.” 27. In a large number of decisions, this Court has indicated the ingredients of Section 304-B of the IPC, which are now broadly accepted. In Pawan Kumar Vs. State of Haryana, (1998) 3 SCC 309 : ( AIR 1998 SC 958 : 1998 AIR SCW 721) the ingredients were identified as: “(a) When the death of a woman is caused by any burns or bodily injury, or (b) occurs otherwise than under normal circumstances (c) and the aforesaid two facts spring within 7 years of girl’s marriage (d) and soon before her death, she was subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or his relative, (e) this is in connection with the demand of dowry.” 28. The ingredients of Section 304-B of the IPC were rephrased in Kans Raj Vs. The ingredients of Section 304-B of the IPC were rephrased in Kans Raj Vs. State of Punjab, (2000) 5 SCC 207 : ( AIR 2000 SC 2324 : 2000 AIR SCW 2093) in the following words: (a) the death of a woman was caused by burns or bodily injury or had occurred otherwise than under normal circumstances: (b) Such death should have occurred within 7 years of her marriage: (c) the deceased was subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or by any relative of her husband; (d) Such cruelty or harassment should be for or in connection with the demand of dowry; and (e) To such cruelty or harassment the deceased should have been subjected soon before her death. 29. The expression “otherwise than under normal circumstances” was explained to mean “death not in the usual course but apparently under suspicious circumstances, if not caused by burns or bodily injury.” 30. A somewhat recent exposition is to be found in Hira Lal Vs. State (Govt. of NCT). Delhi, (2003) 8 SCC 80 : ( AIR 2003 SC 2865 : 2003 AIR SCW 3570) wherein this Court held that to attract the application of Section 304-B of the IPC, the essential ingredients are as follows:— “(i) The death of a woman should be caused by burns or bodily injury or otherwise than under a normal circumstance. (ii) Such a death should have occurred within seven years of her marriage. (iii) She must have been subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or any relative of her husband. (iv) Such cruelty or harassment should be for or in connection with demand of dowry. (v) Such cruelty or harassment is shown to have been meted out to the woman soon before her death.” 31. More recently the ingredients of Section 304-B of the IPC have been abbreviated in Bakshish Ram Vs. State of Punjab, (2013) 4 SCC 131 : ( AIR 2013 SC 1484 : 2013 AIR SCW 1914) in the following words: “(a) that a married woman had died otherwise than under normal circumstances; (b) such death was within seven years of her marriage; and (c) the prosecution has established that there was cruelty and harassment in connection with demand for dowry soon before her death.” 32. This ‘formula’, though framed in different words by this Court, from time to time, conveys the same meaning of the essential ingredients of an offence punishable under Section 304-B of the IPC. 33. Importantly, Section 304-B of the IPC does not categorize death as homicidal or suicidal or accidental. This is because death caused by burns can, in a given case, be homicidal or suicidal or accidental. Similarly, death caused by bodily injury can, in a given case, be homicidal or suicidal or accidental. Finally, any death occurring “otherwise than under normal circumstances” can, in a given case, be homicidal or suicidal or accidental. Therefore, if all the other ingredients of Section 304-B of the IPC are fulfilled, any death (whether homicidal or suicidal or accidental) and whether caused by burns or by bodily injury or occurring otherwise than under normal circumstances shall, as per the legislative mandate, be called a “dowry death” and the woman?s husband or his relative “shall be deemed to have caused her death”. The Section clearly specifies what constitutes the offence of a dowry death and also identifies the single offender or multiple offenders who has or have caused the dowry death. 34. The evidentiary value of the presumption is stated in Section 113-B of the Evidence Act, 1872 (the Act). The key words in this Section are “shall presume” leaving no option with a court but to presume an accused brought before it of causing a dowry death guilty of the offence. However, the redeeming factor of this provision is that the presumption is rebuttable. Section 113-B of the Act enables an accused to prove his innocence and places a reverse onus of proof on him or her. 35. Section 113-B of the Act reads as follows:- “113-B: Presumption as to dowry death.–When the question is whether a person has committed the dowry death of a woman and it is shown that soon before her death such woman has been subjected by such person to cruelty or harassment for, or in connection with, any demand for dowry, the Court shall presume that such person had caused the dowry death. Explanation.–For the purpose of this section„ dowry death shall have the same meaning as in Section 304-B of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860).” 36. Explanation.–For the purpose of this section„ dowry death shall have the same meaning as in Section 304-B of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860).” 36. That the presumption under Section 113-B of the Act is mandatory may be contrasted with Section 113-A of the Act which was introduced contemporaneously. Section 113-A of the Act, dealing with abetment to suicide, uses the expression “may presume”. This being the position, a two stage process is required to be followed in respect of an offence punishable under Section 304-B of the IPC: it is necessary to first ascertain whether the ingredients of the Section have been made out against the accused: if the ingredients are made out, then the accused is deemed to have caused the death of the woman but is entitled to rebut the statutory presumption of having caused a dowry death.” 11. Now coming to the evidence, it is evident that apart from raising the plea, appellant had not remained consistent over identification of the dead body. Furthermore, on account of non-examination of doctor the finding whatsoever been incorporated in the postmortem report cannot be looked into but postmortem was conducted over a dead body belonging to that of Reena happens to be out of controversy in the background of the fact that appellant even cross-examining his own co-villager who had gone volte-face to prosecution failed to elicit from their mouth that the dead body so recovered was not that of Reena. That also happens to be with regard to DW-1, the father of Reena (deceased). Furthermore, from the evidence of PW-1, PW-2 and PW-8 it is apparent that defence could not be able to shake their testimony on this score. At the present moment, the submission raised on behalf of learned Additional Public Prosecutor is found with some weight-age that deceased being at her Sasural met with unfortunate incident resulting his death was to be explained properly at the end of the appellant because the aforesaid fact happens to be within the exclusive knowledge of the appellant and none else. Even, while examining father of deceased as DW-1 should have hawed the prosecution version that dead body so recovered was not that of Reena. Even, while examining father of deceased as DW-1 should have hawed the prosecution version that dead body so recovered was not that of Reena. Because of the fact that occurrence had committed within four corner of the house belonging to appellant as such in terms of Section 106 of the Evidence Act was incumbent upon appellant to explain the same. As such, the death of deceased within seven years of marriage and the dead body that of deceased Reena is found out of controversy and in likewise manner, as a resultant of other than normal circumstances. 12. Now coming to demand of dowry followed with cruelty and torture for procurement thereof. It is evident right from written report that soon after marriage accused along with his family members began to insist upon procurement of motorcycle as well as colour T.V. in lieu of demand of dowry and out of the same motorcycle had already been given. However, in the background of non-providing of colour T.V., Reena was done to death. Surprisingly, the reason best known to the appellant none of the material witness that means to say PW-1 Ram Binoy Singh and PW-2 Chandan Kumar Singh the brother, and PW-8 the maternal uncle have been cross-examined on that very score at least to contradict the assertion. In the aforesaid background, as the appellant himself failed to hail upon the evidence of witnesses as stated above, he is found precluded to raise any sort of grievance on that very score. 13. Now the last question remains whether for fulfillment of demand of dowry the deceased was subjected to torture soon before her death. Section 304(B) of the IPC has not classified any period soon before death of victim and that happens to be reason behind that time without number it has been explained as soon before death of victim should be considered being a relative factor having some sort of variance in the background of factual aspect. That means to say, soon before her death is to be perceived in the background of facts of the case. There cannot be any universal a straight jacket formula propagated therefor which could be allowed to apply in its uniformity in each and every case. 14. In State of Rajasthan Vs. That means to say, soon before her death is to be perceived in the background of facts of the case. There cannot be any universal a straight jacket formula propagated therefor which could be allowed to apply in its uniformity in each and every case. 14. In State of Rajasthan Vs. Girdharilal reported in 2014 Cr.L.J. 41 at para-12, it has been held:— “In the present case there is no evidence on record to come to the definite conclusion that soon before her death, Babita was subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband Girdharilal for, or in connection with any, demand of dowry. In absence of such ingredient the presumption that Girdhari Lal had caused the dowry death cannot be drawn. The prosecution thereby cannot take advantage of Section 113(B) of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872.” 15. Now coming to the facts of the case, it is evident that marriage of deceased was consummated five years ago. It has also been disclosed that soon after marriage the husband, father-in-law, the mother-in-law, the sister-in-law, the husband, the brother-in-law began to demand motorcycle as well as colour T.V. in lieu of dowry and it has also been disclosed that following year motorcycle was given, while their demand was not fulfilled so far colour T.V. was concerned and since thereafter, as is evident from the evidence of PW-1, PW-2 and PW-8 there happens to be vagueness in their evidence regarding subsisting act of torture and cruelty. 16. In written report, there is disclosure in uncertainty that all the family members murdered his sister’s daughter as colour T.V. was not given. PW-2 in para-3 had stated that when they came at Rahimpur, they came to know that her Sasuralwala had committed murder by strangulation and concealed the dead body. In para-4 had stated that as demand of colour T.V. was not honoured hence murder was committed. PW-2 at para-4 had stated that his sister was murdered on account of non-fulfillment of demand of dowry. They were demanding colour T.V. as well as motorcycle. Motorcycle was given a year thereafter his sister had complained regarding harassment. PW-8 had in para-1 deposed that demand of motorcycle was fulfilled but as the demand of colour T.V. was not fulfilled hence Reena has been murdered. They were demanding colour T.V. as well as motorcycle. Motorcycle was given a year thereafter his sister had complained regarding harassment. PW-8 had in para-1 deposed that demand of motorcycle was fulfilled but as the demand of colour T.V. was not fulfilled hence Reena has been murdered. So, from conjoint reading of evidence of aforesaid three material witnesses, it is evident that the theme of torture regarding demand soon before death of Reena is lacking and on account thereof major plank of 304(B) IPC is found oblivious. 17. However, from the evidence available on the record, it is evident that death within seven years of marriage in abnormal circumstance is conclusively proved. It is also apparent from the evidence that appellant had not taken recourse of informing the prosecution party nor the law enforcing authority. It is also evident that dead body, on of Reena was recovered from ‘Gandak Diyara’ and for that there happens to be no explanation at the end of appellant and on account thereof certainly by such action to screen themselves attracting there application of Section 201 of the IPC and for that appellant has rightly been convicted and sentenced for. It is also perceived that the sentence so inflicted by the learned trial court against the appellant against Section 201 IPC happens to be just, legal and proper. Hence with the aforesaid modification, instant appeal is dismissed. Appellant is under custody hence is directed to serve out the remaining part of sentence. ?