Research › Search › Judgment

Punjab High Court · body

2014 DIGILAW 491 (PNJ)

Gram Panchayat of village Minian v. Kishan Kaur

2014-03-10

PARAMJEET SINGH

body2014
JUDGMENT Paramjeet Singh, J. This regular second appeal is directed against the judgment and decree dated 16.01.2009 passed by learned Civil Judge (Jr. Divn.), Moga whereby suit for declaration with consequential relief of permanent injunction filed by appellant plaintiff has been dismissed and against the judgment and decree dated 27.07.2011 passed by learned Additional District Judge, Moga whereby appeal preferred by the appellant plaintiff has been dismissed. For convenience sake, reference to parties is being made as per their status in the suit. The detailed facts are already recapitulated in the judgments of the courts below and are not required to be reproduced. However, the brief facts, as pleaded in plaint are to the effect that the plaintiff filed suit for declaration to the effect that he has become owner of the suit land by way of adverse possession to the extent of 52 kanals 8 marlas and also on the basis of four separate sale deeds dated 11.12.1980 and 08.12.1980. This land was purchased out of the land bearing khasra nos.37//1/2, 3, 8, 9, 12, 13, 18, 19, 22/1, 23, 24/2, 51//3, 4, 7/1 in khewat nos.704 and 705, khatauni nos.1093 and 1094, situated in the revenue estate of village Minian, Tehsil Nihal Singh Wala, District Moga. Consequential relief of permanent injunction restraining the defendant from encumbering, alienating or transferring the same in any manner, has also been sought. It was pleaded that the plaintiff had purchased the suit land to the extent of 52 kanals 8 marlas for valuable consideration from Pal Singh @ Gopal Singh. Pal Singh was entitled to one half share of land and rest of the land belonged to Lal Singh, who has not been heard for the last more than 40 years. It was further pleaded that the defendant had filed suit no.187 dated 30.04.1989 and in that suit, the defendant had admitted the possession of the plaintiff over the suit land. The plaintiff has been in possession of the suit land since 1980 and by way of adverse possession, he has become owner of the suit land. It was further pleaded that Section 14 of the Punjab Security of Land Tenures Act denotes the status of the cultivator. In case the cultivator is not paying any rent, he cannot be termed as a gair marusi and, therefore, status of the plaintiff is that of an owner by way of adverse possession. It was further pleaded that Section 14 of the Punjab Security of Land Tenures Act denotes the status of the cultivator. In case the cultivator is not paying any rent, he cannot be termed as a gair marusi and, therefore, status of the plaintiff is that of an owner by way of adverse possession. The defendant had allegedly threatened to alienate the suit land. Hence, suit was filed. Defendant resisted the suit and filed written statement taking various preliminary objections. It was denied that the plaintiff had purchased the suit land as alleged. The defendant was the only heir of Lal Singh and Pal Singh. Civil Court decree in Civil suit no.187 had been upheld in appeal and rapat roznamcha no.193 dated 16.01.1997 clinches the issue. The defendant was held to be owner of the suit land. Partition proceedings were already pending. Other averments in plaint were denied. Replication was filed reiterating the assertions made in plaint and controverting those of written statement of the defendant. On the basis of pleadings of parties, the Court of first instance framed following issues: “1. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to declaration as prayed for? OPP 2. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to injunction as prayed for? OPP 3. Whether the suit is barred by principle of res judicata? OPD 4. Relief.” After appreciating the evidence, the Court of first instance dismissed the suit. Feeling aggrieved, the plaintiff preferred an appeal which has also been dismissed by the lower Appellate Court. Hence, this second appeal. I have heard learned counsel for the appellant and perused the record. Learned counsel for the appellant has referred to following substantial questions of law suggested in the grounds of appeal for consideration by this Court: (i) Whether the oral as well as documentary evidence has not been properly read by the courts below? (ii) Whether the learned courts below have ignored the law laid down in 2003(1) PLJ 366? Learned counsel for the appellant has contended that both the courts below have failed to appreciate the evidence properly. The plaintiff has been in possession of the suit land since 1980 and, thus, by way of adverse possession, he has become owner of the suit land. The findings of both the courts below are based on surmises and conjectures. I have considered the contentions of learned counsel for the appellant and perused the record. The plaintiff has been in possession of the suit land since 1980 and, thus, by way of adverse possession, he has become owner of the suit land. The findings of both the courts below are based on surmises and conjectures. I have considered the contentions of learned counsel for the appellant and perused the record. Both the courts below have recorded concurrent finding that certified copy of rapat roznamcha dated 16.01.1997 (Ex.D4) reveals that Kishan Kaur was delivered symbolic possession of the suit land in execution proceedings filed in the Court of Civil Judge, Moga on the basis of judgment and decree dated 27.08.1993 (Ex.D2 and Ex.D2/A). In civil suit no.187 dated 30.04.1986 filed by defendant Kishan Kaur, it was held that Kishan Kaur was the only legal heir of Lal Singh and Pal Singh and she is entitled to half share in the suit land. The said judgment having attained finality is binding upon the plaintiff. It has also been rightly held that in view of judgments and decrees (Ex.D2 as well as Ex.D2/A and Ex.D3 as well as Ex.D3/A) and copy of rapat roznamcha (Ex.D4), the plaintiff has got no right and interest in the suit land. Reliance of learned counsel upon BonderSinghandothersvs.NihalSinghandothers2003(1)PLJ366(SC)is misplaced as facts of the present case are different. Learned counsel for the appellant could not show that the said findings are perverse or illegal or based on misreading, nonreading or misappreciation of the material evidence on record. Consequently, concurrent findings of fact recorded by both the courts below do not warrant interference in regular second appeal. No question of law, muchless substantial question of law, as alleged, arises for adjudication in this second appeal. No other point has been urged. Dismissed in limine.