Judgment : Rajiv Sharma, Judge: This appeal is instituted against the judgment dated 13.12.2013, passed by learned District Judge, Shimla, H.P., in H.M.P. No. 48-S/3 of 2011/2006. 2. “Key facts” necessary for the adjudication of the appeal are that the petitioner/husband (hereinafter referred to as the petitioner for the sake of convenience) filed a petition under Section 13 of the Hindu Marriage Act 1955 against the respondent/wife (hereinafter referred to as the “respondent” for the sake of convenience) for dissolution of marriage by decree of divorce, on the grounds of cruelty and desertion. According to the averments contained in the petition, marriage between the parties was solemnized on 29.4.1998 according to Hindu customs and rites. They lived together and cohabited as husband and wife at Kandoria Niwas near Laxmi Niwas, Pateog, Sector-I, New Shimla. One daughter, namely, Anchal was born out of the wedlock. She was seven years old at the time of filing of the petition. According to the petitioner, attitude and behaviour of the respondent remained cordial for about one year after marriage and thereafter, her behaviour towards petitioner was cruel and abnormal. She used to abuse him. Sometimes, he had to sleep without food. He was not permitted by the respondent to go to native village. Respondent even did not allow his parents and relatives to come to his house at Shimla. Respondent filed complaint against the petitioner vide FIR No.179/ 2004 under Sections 498-A, 323, 506 of the Indian Penal Code. A case under Section 125 Cr.P.C. was also filed, which was dismissed on 8.6.2006 by JMIC (4) Shimla. He was arrested by respondent on 8.9.2004 in case FIR No.179/2004 and was released on bail next day. He was not allowed to take apparels and luggage. He stared living separately at Totu. According to him, the respondent was also charged with the offence under Section 228 of the Indian Penal Code. She was taken in custody on 24.8.2005 and was remanded to judicial custody. She remained in custody for 1-2 nights in Model Central Jail, Kanda, Shimla. According to petitioner, the respondent deserted him. 3. The petition was contested by the respondent. According to the preliminary objections raised by the respondent, the petition was filed by the petitioner with an ulterior motive to get rid of her. According to the respondent, after 3-4 months of marriage, petitioner and his family members started demanding dowry from her. According to petitioner, the respondent deserted him. 3. The petition was contested by the respondent. According to the preliminary objections raised by the respondent, the petition was filed by the petitioner with an ulterior motive to get rid of her. According to the respondent, after 3-4 months of marriage, petitioner and his family members started demanding dowry from her. Her entire savings and gold ornaments were taken by the petitioner on one pretest or the other. She denied that she ever ousted the petitioner forcibly from the house and that the petitioner’s parents were not allowed to visit the house at Shimla. The petitioner used to beat her. He did not even contribute a single penny towards household articles and to bring up daughter, Anchal. She was constrained to file a petition under Section 125 Cr.P.C. against the petitioner for maintenance. Petitioner himself left the house. She never treated the petitioner with cruelty. She also never deserted him. 4. Rejoinder was filed by the petitioner. 5. Learned District Judge framed the issues on 28.11.2008 and dismissed the petition vide impugned judgment dated 13.12.2013. Hence, the appeal. 6. Mr. Ajay Kumar, learned Senior Advocate, has vehemently argued that the learned court below has not correctly appreciated the oral as well as documentary evidence. According to him, respondent was guilty of treating the petitioner with cruelty and she also deserted him. 7. Mr. N.K. Thakur, learned Senior Advocate, has supported the impugned judgment dated 13.12.2013. 8. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and have also gone through the impugned judgment and record carefully. 9. According to PW1, Suresh Kumar, his marriage was solemnized with the respondent on 29.4.1998 according to Hindu rites and custom. They started living at New Shimla after marriage. One daughter was born out of the wedlock. Behaviour of the respondent was normal for a period of one year and thereafter, she started abusing him. She used to say that she did not want to maintain any relation with him. He had to sleep without food some times. She used to pick up quarrel with him, due to which he had to go to his friends’ house. She never permitted his parents and relatives to come to his house. She used to stop him from going to his native place. She filed a case against him under Section 498-A of the Indian Penal Code on 8.9.2004. She used to pick up quarrel with him, due to which he had to go to his friends’ house. She never permitted his parents and relatives to come to his house. She used to stop him from going to his native place. She filed a case against him under Section 498-A of the Indian Penal Code on 8.9.2004. He was arrested. He remained in custody for one night. Thereafter, he was enlarged on bail. He was acquitted on 1.8.2006. She also filed a case against him under Section 125 Cr.P.C.. It was also dismissed. She also misbehaved with the Presiding Judge on 8.9.2004. She was taken into custody and was sent to jail on the direction of Court No.4. He was not permitted by the respondent to collect his belongings after he was enlarged on bail. He started living in a separate accommodation at Totu. In cross-examination, he deposed that it was love marriage. His daughter Anchal was born in the month of March 2000. She was living with the respondent. He did not know where respondent was living. He admitted that he had not maintained his daughter after he started living separately from the respondent. He denied the suggestion that the respondent was willing and ready to live with him. He categorically admitted that he did not lodge any complaint with the police that the respondent used to threaten him. 10. PW2, Madan Lal, deposed that the petitioner is his brother-in-law. According to him, the marriage between the parties was solemnized in the year 1998 and one daughter was born out of the wedlock. He used to visit their house at New Shimla. The respondent never talked to him. No quarrel ever took place in his presence. She used to harass the petitioner and used to tell him not to go to his native place. He was not permitted to visit his parents. The respondent had told him that she did not want to live with the petitioner. 11. PW3, Kartar Chand, deposed that he was running a shop. The petitioner is his cousin brother. According to him, the parties were residing at New Shimla. The respondent used to harass the petitioner. They were living separately since September 2004. She used to tell him not to bring his relatives in the house. 12. RW1, Vinod Kumar, produced copy of compromise, Ext.RW1/A. 13. The petitioner is his cousin brother. According to him, the parties were residing at New Shimla. The respondent used to harass the petitioner. They were living separately since September 2004. She used to tell him not to bring his relatives in the house. 12. RW1, Vinod Kumar, produced copy of compromise, Ext.RW1/A. 13. RW2, Amar Singh, deposed that he knew the parties. According to him, house of the parties was situated at a distance of 15 feet from his house. The police had recorded his statement. In cross-examination, he deposed that he did not know final outcome of the criminal case. 14. RW3, Naresh Thakur, deposed that he was running a Karyana shop at New Shimla. He knew Subhadra for the last fifteen years. She used to make payment of ration. 15. RW4, Prabhu Devi, testified that Anchal remained in her crutch for about four years. 16. RW5, Ram Swaroop, deposed that in the year 2002, he accompanied the respondent to locate Suresh Kumar at Dhanda. 17. RW6, Lachhmi Singh, deposed that Anchal Bhardwaj was admitted in 5th Standard in JCB Public School on 15.3.2010. A sum of Rs.25,000/- was deposited as boarding and lodging charges on 16.3.2010. Similarly, school fees amounting to Rs.10,600/- and Rs.15,000/- was deposited on 2.7.2010 and 4.12.2010 respectively. 18. RW7, Subhadra Kumari, led her evidence by way of filing an affidavit, Ext. RW7/A. According to averments contained in the affidavit, Ext.RW7/A, after about 3-4 months of marriage, petitioner and his family members started demanding dowry and torturing the respondent. Her entire savings including gold ornaments were taken by the petitioner. The petitioner did not contribute any amount for bringing up Anchal. The petitioner himself left her company. He filed the divorce petition in order to avoid his liability to maintain her and daughter Anchal. In cross-examination, she admitted that their marriage was solemnized in the year 1998. She denied the suggestion that she used to pick up quarrels with the petitioner. She denied that the appellant had to sleep without food outside the house. She admitted that she is in government job and drawing salary of Rs.15,000/- per month. She used to accompany the petitioner to his native village. She denied that parents of the petitioner did not visit her house at Shimla. She also denied that she did not permit relatives of the petitioner to visit house at Shimla. She admitted that she is in government job and drawing salary of Rs.15,000/- per month. She used to accompany the petitioner to his native village. She denied that parents of the petitioner did not visit her house at Shimla. She also denied that she did not permit relatives of the petitioner to visit house at Shimla. She further denied that she did not allow the petitioner from going to his native village. She filed a criminal case against the petitioner on 8.9.2004, which led to his arrest. She admitted that after filing criminal case, they are living separately. She admitted that criminal proceedings under Section 228 of the Indian Penal Code were initiated against her. However, she denied that she was convicted and sentenced under Section 228 of the Indian Penal Code. 19. RW8, Gian Chand, deposed that the respondent is his sister. According to him, the petitioner used to hurt the respondent and used to leave the matrimonial house. Once, he brought the petitioner to the matrimonial house, however, he again ran away from the house at 11.00 P.M.. The respondent was maintaining her daughter. In cross-examination, he deposed that the parties never quarrelled in his presence. 20. RW9, Anchal, deposed that she was residing with her mother (respondent). She was got admitted in the school by the respondent. She never saw her father (petitioner). In cross-examination, she deposed that she studied upto 4th standard in Holy Heat School, Kotkhai and now she was studying in 7th standard in JCB school. 21. What emerges from the facts, enumerated here-in-above, is that the marriage between the parties was solemnized on 29.4.1998 according to Hindu customs and rites. One daughter, namely, Anchal, was born out of the wedlock. The parties are in government employment. Relations between the parties remained cordial for one year after marriage. It has come in the evidence that the respondent lodged a complaint under Sections 498-A, 323, 506 of the Indian Penal Code against the petitioner vide FIR No.179/2004. He was arrested on 8.9.2004 and was released on bail on 9.9.2004. According to the petitioner, respondent used to pick up quarrels with him. He was also not permitted by the respondent to bring his relatives and parents to his house at New Shimla. Respondent used to restrain him from going to native village to meet his parents. Respondent denied the allegations levelled against her. According to the petitioner, respondent used to pick up quarrels with him. He was also not permitted by the respondent to bring his relatives and parents to his house at New Shimla. Respondent used to restrain him from going to native village to meet his parents. Respondent denied the allegations levelled against her. She never stopped the petitioner to bring his relatives and parents to his house at New Shimla. She never stopped him from going to his native village. According to her, after 3-4 months of marriage, the petitioner along with his family members started demanding dowry from her. The petitioner took away her entire savings and gold ornaments. The appellant admitted in his cross-examination, that he has not paid even a single penny towards upbringing of his daughter, Anchal, who has been admitted in school by the respondent. Respondent paid all the school dues of Anchal. Even Anchal did not know the petitioner. She never saw him. The petitioner has started living separately. The petitioner cannot be permitted to take advantage of his own wrong. The allegations levelled against the respondent do not constitute mental as well as physical cruelty. Rather behaviour of the appellant towards his wife and daughter was cruel. It was his duty to maintain his wife and daughter. Respondent was constrained to file a petition under Sections 498-A, 323 and 506 of the Indian Penal Code when she was harassed and beaten up by the petitioner for dowry. 22. Mr. Ajay Kumar, learned Senior Advocate, has laid great stress that the respondent was punished under Section 228 of the Indian Penal Code. This conduct of the respondent will not help the petitioner. 23. It has come in the statement of the petitioner while appearing as PW1 that he did not want to live with the respondent. Since he did not want to live with the respondent, it cannot be said that the respondent has deserted him. It was necessary for the petitioner to prove that the respondent has left his company without any sufficient cause. It is the petitioner, who has left the company of the respondent leaving the respondent and a school going daughter in lurch. Even PW2 Madan Lal deposed that he had never seen the parties quarrelling in his presence. PW3 Kartar Chand has not given exact date, month and year when the respondent picked up quarrel with the petitioner. It is the petitioner, who has left the company of the respondent leaving the respondent and a school going daughter in lurch. Even PW2 Madan Lal deposed that he had never seen the parties quarrelling in his presence. PW3 Kartar Chand has not given exact date, month and year when the respondent picked up quarrel with the petitioner. Even it has come in the statement of RW3, Naresh Thakur that the respondent used to pay money for the purchase of grocery articles. According to RW8 Gian Chand, no quarrel took place between the parties in his presence. It has come in the statement of respondent, while appearing as RW7 that the petitioner along with his family members used to demand dowry from her. The petitioner has not led any cogent evidence to prove desertion. 24. Their Lordships of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Bipinchandra Jaisinghbai Shah versus Prabhavati, AIR 1957 SC 176 have held that two essential conditions must be there to prove the desertion: (1) the factum of separation, and (2) the intention to bring cohabitation permanently to an end (animus deserendi). Their Lordships have held that desertion is a matter of interference to be drawn from the facts and circumstances of each case. Their Lordships have held as under: “What is desertion? "Rayden on Divorce" which is a standard work on the subject at p.128 (6th Edn.) has summarized the case-law on the subject in these terms:- "Desertion is the separation of one spouse from the other, with an intention on the part of the deserting spouse of bringing cohabitation permanently to an end without reasonable cause and without the consent of the other spouse; but the physical act of departure by one spouse does not necessarily make that spouse the deserting party". The legal position has been admirably summarised in paras 453 and 454 at pp. 241. to 243 of Halsbury's Laws of England (3rd Edn.), VoL 12, in the following words:- "In its essence desertion means the intentional permanent forsaking and abandonment of one spouse by the other without that other's consent and without reasonable cause. It is a total repudiation of the obligations of marriage. In view of the large variety of circumstances and of modes of life involved, the Court has discouraged attempts at defining desertion, there being no general principle applicable to all cases. It is a total repudiation of the obligations of marriage. In view of the large variety of circumstances and of modes of life involved, the Court has discouraged attempts at defining desertion, there being no general principle applicable to all cases. Desertion is not the withdrawal from a place but from the state of things, for what the law seeks to enforce is the recognition and discharge of the common obligations of the married state; the state of things may usually be termed, for short, 'the home'. There can be desertion without previous cohabitation by the parties, or without the marriage having been consummated. The person who actually withdraws from cohabitation is not necessarily the deserting party. The fact that a husband makes an allowance to a wife whom he has abandoned is no answer to a charge of desertion. The offence of desertion is a course of conduct which exists independently of its duration, but as a ground for divorce it must exist for a period of at least three years immediately preceding the presentation of the petition where the offence appears as a cross-charge, of the answer. Desertion as a ground of divorce differs from the statutory grounds of adultery and cruelty in that the offence founding the cause of action of desertion is not complete, but is inchoate, until the suit is constituted. Desertion is a continuing offence". Thus the quality of permanence is one of the essential elements which differentiates desertion from wilful separation. If a spouse abandons the other spouse in a state of temporary passion, for example anger or disgust, without intending permanently to cease cohabitation, it will not amount to desertion. For the offence of desertion, so far as the deserting spouse is concerned, two essential conditions must be there namely, (1) the factum of separation, and (2) the intention to bring cohabitation permanently to an end (animus deserendi). Similarly two elements are essential so far as the deserted spouse is concerned: (1) the absence of consent, and (2) absence of conduct giving reasonable cause to the spouse leaving the matrimonial home to form the necessary intention aforesaid. The petitioner for divorce bears the burden of proving those elements in the two spouses respectively. Here a difference between the English law and the law as enacted by the Bombay Legislature may be pointed out. The petitioner for divorce bears the burden of proving those elements in the two spouses respectively. Here a difference between the English law and the law as enacted by the Bombay Legislature may be pointed out. Whereas under the English law those essential conditions must continue throughout the course of the three years immediately preceding the institution of the suit for divorce, under the Act, the period is four years without specifying that it should immediately precede the commencement of proceedings for divorce. Whether the omission of the last clause has any practical result need not detain us, as it does not call for decision in the present case. Desertion is a matter of inference to be drawn from the facts and circumstances to each case. The inference may be drawn from certain facts which may not in another case be capable of leading to the same inference; that is to say, the facts have to be viewed as to the purpose which is revealed by those acts or by conduct and expression of intention, both anterior and subsequent to the actual acts of separation. If in fact, there has been a separation, the essential question always is whether that act could be attributable to an animus deserendi. The offence of desertion commences when the fact of separation and the animus deserendi co- exist. But it is not necessary that they should commence at the same time. The de facto separation may have commenced without the necessary animus or it may be that the separation and the (animus deserendi) coincide in point of time; for example, when the separating spouse abandons the marital home with the intention, express or implied of bringing cohabitation permanently to a close. The law in England has prescribed a three years period and the Bombay Act prescribed a period of four years as a continuous period during which the two elements must subsist. The law in England has prescribed a three years period and the Bombay Act prescribed a period of four years as a continuous period during which the two elements must subsist. Hence, if a deserting spouse takes advantage of the locus poenitentiae thus provided by law and decides to come back to the deserted spouse by a bona fide offer of resuming the matrimonial home with all the implications of marital life, before the statutory period is out or even after the lapse of that period, unless proceedings for divorce have been commenced, desertion comes to an end, and if the deserted spouse unreasonably refuses to offer, the latter may be in desertion and not the former. Hence it is necessary that during all the period that there has been a desertion, the deserted spouse must affirm the marriage and be ready and willing to resume married life on such conditions as may be reasonable. It is also well settled that in proceedings for divorce the plaintiff must prove the offence of desertion, like and other matrimonial offence, beyond all reasonable doubt. Hence, though corroboration is not required as an absolute rule of law the courts insist upon corroborative evidence, unless its absence is accounted for to the satisfaction of the court. In this connection the following observations of Lord Goddard CJ. in the case of Lawson v. Lawson, 1955-1 All E R 341 at p. 342(A), may be referred to :- "These cases are not cases in which corroboration is required as a matter of law. It is required as a matter of precaution....... " With these preliminary observations we now proceed to examine the evidence led on behalf of the parties to find out whether desertion has been proved in this case and, if so, whether there was a bona fide offer by the wife to return to her matrimonial home with a view to discharging marital duties and, if so, whether there was an unreasonable refusal on the part of the husband to take her back. 25. Their Lordships of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Lachman Utamchand Kirpalani versus Meena alias Mota, AIR 1964 SC 40 have held that in its essence desertion means the intentional permanent forsaking and abandonment of one spouse by the other without that other’s consent and without reasonable cause. It is a total repudiation of the obligations of marriage. 25. Their Lordships of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Lachman Utamchand Kirpalani versus Meena alias Mota, AIR 1964 SC 40 have held that in its essence desertion means the intentional permanent forsaking and abandonment of one spouse by the other without that other’s consent and without reasonable cause. It is a total repudiation of the obligations of marriage. Their Lordships have further held that the burden of proving desertion - the ‘factum’ as well as the ‘animus deserendi’ is on the petitioner and he or she has to establish beyond reasonable doubt to the satisfaction of the Court, the desertion throughout the entire period of two years before the petition as well as that such desertion was without just cause. Their Lordships have held as under: “The question as to what precisely constitutes "desertion" came up for consideration before this Court in an appeal for Bombay where the Court had to consider the provisions of S. 3(1) of the Bombay Hindu Divorce Act, 1947 whose language is in pari materia with that of S. 10(1) of the Act. In the judgment of this Court in Bipin Chandra v. Prabhavati, 1956 SCR 838 ; ((S) AIR 1957 SC 176 ) there is an elaborate consideration of the several English decisions in which the question of the ingredients of desertion were considered and the following summary of the law in Halsbury's Laws of England (3rd Edn.) Vol. 12 was cited with approval : "In its essence desertion means the intentional permanent forsaking and abandonment of one spouse by the order without that other's consent, and without reasonable cause. It is a total repudiation of the obligations of marriage. In view of the large variety of circumstances and of modes of life involved, the Court has discouraged attempts at defining desertion, there being no general principle applicable to all cases." The position was thus further explained by this Court. "If a spouse abandons the other spouse in a state of temporary passion, for example, anger or disgust, without intending permanently the cease cohabitation, it will not amount to desertion. For the offence of desertion so far as the deserting spouse is concerned, two essential conditions must be there, (1) the factum of separation, and (2) the intention of bring cohabitation permanently to an end (animus deserndi). For the offence of desertion so far as the deserting spouse is concerned, two essential conditions must be there, (1) the factum of separation, and (2) the intention of bring cohabitation permanently to an end (animus deserndi). Similarly two elements are essential so far as the deserted spouse is concerned : (1) the absence of consent, and (2) absence of conduct giving reasonable cause to the spouse leaving the matrimonial home to form the necessary intention aforesaid.. . . . . Desertion is a matter of inference to be drawn from the facts and circumstances of each case. The inference may be drawn from certain facts which may not in another case be capable of leading to the same inference; that is to say, the facts have to be viewed as to the purpose which is revealed by those acts or by conduct and expression of intention, both anterior and subsequent to the actual acts of separation. If, in fact, there has been a separation, the essential question always is whether that act could be attributable to an animus deserendi. The offence of desertion commences when the fact of separation and the animus deserendi co-exist. But it is not necessary that they should commence at the same time. The de facto separation may have commenced without the necessary animus or it may be that the separation and the animus deserendi coincide in point of time." Two more matters which have a bearing on the points in dispute in this appeal might also be mentioned. The first relates to the burden of proof in these cases, and this is a point to which we have already made a passing reference. It is settled Law that the burden of proving desertion - the "factum" as well as the "animus deserendi" -is on the petitioner; and he or she has to establish beyond reasonable doubt, to the satisfaction of the Court, the desertion throughout the entire period of two years before the petition as well as that such desertion was without just cause. In other words, even if the wife, where she is the deserting spouse, does not prove just cause for her living apart, the petitioner-husband has still to satisfy the Court that the desertion was without just cause. In other words, even if the wife, where she is the deserting spouse, does not prove just cause for her living apart, the petitioner-husband has still to satisfy the Court that the desertion was without just cause. As Dunning, L. observed : (Dunn v. Dunn (1948) 2 All ER 822 at p. 823) : "The burden he (Counsel for the husband) said was on her to prove just cause (for living apart). The argument contains a fallacy which has been put forward from time to time in many branches of the law. The fallacy lies in a failure to distinguish between a legal burden of proof laid down by law and a provisional, burden raised by the state of the evidence . . . . . . . . . . . The legal burden throughout this case is on the husband, as petitioner, to prove that this wife deserted him without cause. To discharge that burden, he relies on the fact that he asked her to join him and she refused. That is a fact from which the court may infer that she deserted him without cause, but it is not bound to do so. Once he proves the fact of refusal, she may seek to rebut the inference of desertion by proving that she had just cause for her refusal; and, indeed, it is usually wise for her to do so, but there is no legal burden on her to do so. Even if she does not affirmatively prove just cause, the Court has still, at the end of the case, to ask itself: Is the legal burden discharged? Has the husband proved that she deserted him without cause? Take this case. The wife was very deaf, and for that reason could not explain to the Court her reasons for refusal. The judge thereupon considered reasons for her refusal which appeared from the facts in evidence, though she had not herself stated that they operated on her mind. Counsel for the husband says that the judge ought not to have done that. If there were a legal burden on the wife he would be right, but there was none. The legal burden was on the husband to prove desertion without cause, and the judge was right to ask himself at the end of the case: Has that burden been discharged?" 26. If there were a legal burden on the wife he would be right, but there was none. The legal burden was on the husband to prove desertion without cause, and the judge was right to ask himself at the end of the case: Has that burden been discharged?" 26. Their Lordships of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Smt. Rohini Kumari versus Narendra Singh, AIR 1972 SC 459 have explained the expression ‘desertion’ to mean the desertion of the petitioner by the other party to the marriage without reasonable cause and without the consent or against the wish of such party and includes the willful neglect of the petitioner by the other party to the marriage. “Under Section 10 (1) (a) a decree for judicial separation can be granted on the ground that the other party has deserted the petitioner for a continuous period of not less than two years immediately preceding the presentation of the petition. According to the Explanation the expression "desertion" with its grammatical variation and cognate expression means the desertion of the petitioner by the other party to the marriage without reasonable cause and without the consent or against the wish of such party and includes the willful neglect of the petitioner by the other party to the marriage. The argument raised on behalf of the wife is that the husband had contracted a second marriage on May 17, 1955. The petition for judicial separation was filed on August 8, 1955 under the Act which came into force on May 18, 1955. The burden under the section was on the husband to establish that the wife had deserted him for a continuous period of not less than two years immediately preceding the presentation of the petition. In the presence of the Explanation it could not be said on the date on which the petition was filed that the wife had deserted the husband without reasonable cause because the latter had married Countess Rita and that must be regarded as a reasonable cause for her staying away from him. Our attention has been invited to the statement in Rayden on Divorce, 11th Edn. Our attention has been invited to the statement in Rayden on Divorce, 11th Edn. Page 223 with regard to the elements of desertion According to that statement for the offence of desertion there must be two elements present on the side of the deserting spouse namely, the factum, i.e. physical separation and the animus deserendi i.e. the intention to bring cohabitation permanently to an end. The two elements present on the side of the deserted spouse should be absence of consent and absence of conduct reasonably causing the deserting spouse to form his or her intention to bring cohabitation to an end. The requirement that the deserting spouse must intend to bring cohabitation to an end must be understood to be subject to the qualification that if without just cause or excuse a man persists in doing things which he knows his wife probably will not tolerate and which no ordinary woman would tolerate and then she leaves, he has deserted her whatever his desire or intention may have been. The doctrine of "constructive desertion" is discussed at page 229. It is stated that desertion is not to be tested by merely ascertaining which party left the matrimonial home first. If one spouse is forced by the conduct of the other to leave home, it may be that the spouse responsible for the driving out is guilty of desertion. There is no substantial difference between the case of a man who intends to cease cohabitation and leaves the wife and the case of a man who with the same intention compels his wife by his conduct to leave him.” 27. Their Lordships of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in A. Jayachandra versus Aneel Kaur, AIR 2005 SC 534 have held that expression ‘cruelty’ has been used in relation to human conduct or human behaviour. Their Lordships have held to constitute cruelty, conduct complained of should be grave and weighty for arriving at conclusion that petitioner spouse cannot be reasonably expected to live with other spouse. Their Lordships have further held that evidence showing that respondent wife asked husband to do certain things casting doubt on reputation, character and fidelity of her husband cannot be termed as simple advice but amounts to cruelty. Their Lordships have held as under:- “The expression 'cruelty' has been used in relation to human conduct or human behaviour. Their Lordships have further held that evidence showing that respondent wife asked husband to do certain things casting doubt on reputation, character and fidelity of her husband cannot be termed as simple advice but amounts to cruelty. Their Lordships have held as under:- “The expression 'cruelty' has been used in relation to human conduct or human behaviour. It is the conduct in relation to or in respect of matrimonial duties and obligations. Cruelty is a course or conduct of one, which is adversely affecting the other. The cruelty may be mental or physical, intentional or unintentional. If it is physical, the Court will have no problem in determining it. It is a question of fact and degree. If it is mental, the problem presents difficulties. First, the enquiry must begin as to the nature of cruel treatment, second the impact of such treatment in the mind of the spouse, whether it caused reasonable apprehension that it would be harmful or injurious to live with the other. Ultimately, it is a matter of inference to be drawn by taking into account the nature of the conduct and its effect on the complaining spouse. However, there may be a case where the conduct complained of itself is bad enough and per se unlawful or illegal. Then the impact or injurious effect on the other spouse need not be enquired into or considered. In such cases, the cruelty will be established if the conduct itself is proved or admitted (See Sobh Rani v. Madhukar Reddi, AIR 1988 SC 121 ). To constitute cruelty, the conduct complained of should be "grave and weighty" so as to come to the conclusion that the petitioner spouse cannot be reasonably expected to live with the other spouse. It must be something more serious than "ordinary wear and tear of married life". The conduct, taking into consideration the circumstances and background has to be examined to reach the conclusion whether the conduct complained of amounts to cruelty in the matrimonial law. Conduct has to be considered, as noted above, in the background of several factors such as social status of parties, their education, physical and mental conditions, customs and traditions. It is difficult to lay down a precise definition or to give exhaustive description of the circumstances, which would constitute cruelty. Conduct has to be considered, as noted above, in the background of several factors such as social status of parties, their education, physical and mental conditions, customs and traditions. It is difficult to lay down a precise definition or to give exhaustive description of the circumstances, which would constitute cruelty. It must be of the type as to satisfy the conscience of the Court that the relationship between the parties had deteriorated to such an extent due to the conduct of the other spouse that it would be impossible for them to live together without mental agony, torture or distress, to entitle the complaining spouse to secure divorce. Physical violence is not absolutely essential to constitute cruelty and a consistent course of conduct inflicting immeasurable mental agony and torture may well constitute cruelty within the meaning of Section 10 of the Act. Mental cruelty may consist of verbal abuses and insults by using filthy and abusive language leading to constant disturbance of mental peace of the other party. On reading of judgments of the trial Court and the High Court one thing is clear. While the trial Court analysed the evidence in great detail and found that the accepted stand of the respondent-wife regarding her behaviour and conduct caused mental agony and amounted to mental cruelty, the High Court did not discuss the evidence at all. On the specious ground that witnesses from the hospital were not examined and, therefore, adverse inference was to be drawn. There was not even any discussion as to how the evidence led was insufficient to establish mental cruelty. The High Court's view that if at all it was a fact that respondent was using abusive language and making allegations of adultery with nursing staff, some witnesses from the hospital were necessary to be examined is clearly indefensible. That alone should not have been made the determinative factor to discard evidence on record. On that ground alone the judgment of the High Court is vulnerable. The evidence as led and which is practically undisputed is that the respondent had asked the husband to do certain things which cannot be termed to be a simple advice for proper behaviour. For example in her evidence respondent clearly accepted that she had said five things to be followed by him. Surprisingly, most of them related to ladies working in the hospital. For example in her evidence respondent clearly accepted that she had said five things to be followed by him. Surprisingly, most of them related to ladies working in the hospital. Though respondent tried to show that they were simple and harmless advice, yet on a bare reading thereof it is clear that there were clear manifestations of her suspecting the husband's fidelity, character and reputation. By way of illustration, it may be indicated that the first so called advice was not to ask certain female staff members to come and work on off-duty hours when nobody else was available in the hospital. Second was not to work behind the closed doors with certain members of the staff. Contrary to what she had stated about having full faith in her husband, the so called advices were nothing but casting doubt on the reputation, character and fidelity of her husband. Constant nagging on those aspects, certainly amounted to causing indelible mental agony and amounts to cruelty. The respondent was not an ordinary woman. She was a doctor in the hospital and knew the importance of the nature of duty and the necessity of members of the staff working even during off hours and the working conditions. There was another instance which was specifically dealt with by the trial Court. Same related to the alleged extra marital relationships of the appellant with another married lady who was wife of his friend. Though the respondent tried to explain that she was not responsible for making any such aspersions, the inevitable conclusion is to the contrary. The matter can be looked at from another angle. If acts subsequent to the filing of the divorce petition can be looked into to infer condonation of the aberrations, acts subsequent to the filing of the petition can be taken note of to show a pattern in the behaviour and conduct. In the instant case, after filing of the divorce petition a suit for injunction was filed, and the respondent went to the extent of seeking detention of the respondent. She filed a petition for maintenance which was also dismissed. Several caveat petitions were lodged and as noted above, with wrong address. The respondent in her evidence clearly accepted that she intended to proceed with the execution proceedings, and prayer for arrest till the divorce case was finalized. She filed a petition for maintenance which was also dismissed. Several caveat petitions were lodged and as noted above, with wrong address. The respondent in her evidence clearly accepted that she intended to proceed with the execution proceedings, and prayer for arrest till the divorce case was finalized. When the respondent gives priority to her profession over her husband's freedom it points unerringly at disharmony, diffusion and disintegration of marital unity, from which the Court can deduce about irretrievable breaking of marriage. Several decisions, as noted above, cited by learned counsel for the respondent to contend even if marriage has broken down irretrievably decree of divorce cannot be passed. In all these cases it has been categorically held that in extreme cases the Court can direct dissolution of marriage on the ground that the marriage broken down irretrievably as is clear from paragraph 9 of Shiv Sunder's case (supra). The factual position in each of the other cases is also distinguishable. It was held that long absence of physical company cannot be a ground for divorce if the same was on account of husband's conduct. In Shiv Sunder's case (supra) it was noted that the husband was leading adulterous life and he cannot take advantage of his wife shunning his company. Though the High Court held by the impugned judgment that the said case was similar, it unfortunately failed to notice the relevant factual difference in the two cases. It is true that irretrievable breaking of marriage is not one of the statutory grounds on which Court can direct dissolution of marriage, this Court has with a view to do complete justice and shorten the agony of the parties engaged in long drawn legal battle, directed in those cases dissolution of marriage. But as noted in the said cases themselves those were exceptional cases. In the aforesaid legal and factual background the inevitable conclusion is that the appellant is entitled to a decree of divorce and we direct accordingly.” 28. Their Lordships of Hon’ble Supreme Court in Naveen Kohli vs. Neelu Kohli, (2006) 4 Supreme Court Cases 558 have held that there are various determining factors to determine cruelty. Each case is to be decided on its own merits. The High Court ought to have considered the repercussions, consequences, impact and ramifications of all the criminal and other proceedings initiated by the parties against each other in the proper perspective. Each case is to be decided on its own merits. The High Court ought to have considered the repercussions, consequences, impact and ramifications of all the criminal and other proceedings initiated by the parties against each other in the proper perspective. Their Lordships have held as under:- “80. The High Court ought to have considered the repercussions, consequences, impact and ramifications of all the criminal and other proceedings initiated by the parties against each other in proper perspective. For illustration, the High Court has mentioned that so far as the publication of the news item is concerned, the status of husband in a registered company was only that of an employee and if any news item is published, in such a situation, it could not, by any stretch of imagination be taken to have lowered the prestige of the husband. In the next para 69 of the judgment that in one of the news item what has been indicated was that in the company, Nikhil Rubber (P) Ltd., the appellant was only a Director along with Mrs. Neelu Kohli whom held 94.5% share of Rs.100/- each in the company. The news item further indicated that Naveen Kohli was acting against the spirit of the Article of the Association of Nikhil Rubber (P) Ltd., had caused immense loss of business and goodwill. He has stealthily removed produce of the company, besides diverted orders of foreign buyers to his proprietorship firm M/s Navneet Elastomers. He had opened bank account with forged signatures of Mrs. Neelu Kohli and fabricated resolution of the Board of Directors of the company. Statutory authority-Companies Act had refused to register documents filed by Mr. Naveen Kolhi and had issued show cause notice. All business associates were cautioned to avoid dealing with him alone. Neither the company nor Mrs. Neelu Kohli shall be liable for the acts of Mr. Naveen Kohli. Despite the aforementioned finding that the news item was intended to caution business associates to avoid dealing with the appellant then to come to this finding in the next para that it will by no stretch of imagination result in mental cruelty is wholly untenable. 81. The findings of the High Court that the respondent wife's cautioning the entire world not to deal with the appellant (her husband) would not lead to mental cruelty is also wholly unsustainable. 82. 81. The findings of the High Court that the respondent wife's cautioning the entire world not to deal with the appellant (her husband) would not lead to mental cruelty is also wholly unsustainable. 82. The High Court ought to have examined the facts of the case and its impact. In the instant case, the following cases were filed by the respondent against the appellant. 1. The respondent filed FIR No. 100/96 at Police Station, Kohna under Sections 379/323 IPC 2. The respondent got a case registered under Sections 323/324 registered in the police station Panki, Kanpur City. 3. At the behest of the respondent FIR No.156 of 1996 was also filed in the police station, Panki. 4. The respondent filed FIR under Section 420/468 IPC at the Police Station, Kotwali. 5. The respondent got a case registered under Section under Sections 420/467/468 and 471 IPC. 6. The respondent filed a complaint against the appellant under Sections 498A/323/504/506 IPC at Police Station, Kohna. 7. The respondent had even gone to the extent of opposing the bail application of the appellant in criminal case filed at the police station, Kotwali 8. When police filed final report in two criminal cases at police station, Kotwali and police station, Kohna, the respondent filed protest petition in these cases. 9. The respondent filed complaint no.125 of 1998 in the Women Cell, Delhi in September 1997 against the appellant's lawyer and friend alleging criminal intimidation. 10. The respondent filed a complaint under sections 397/398 before the Company Law Board, New Delhi. 11. The respondent filed a complaint in Case No.1365 0f 1988 against the appellant. 12. Again on 8.7.1999, the respondent filed a complaint in the Parliament Street Police Station, New Delhi and made all efforts to get the appellant arrested. 13. On 31.3.1999, the respondent have sent a notice for breaking the Nucleus of the HUF. 14. The respondent filed a complaint against the appellant under Section 24 of the Hindu Marriage Act. 15. The respondent had withdrawn Rs.9,50,000/- from the bank account of the appellant in a clandestine manner. 16. On 22.1.01 the respondent gave affidavit before the High Court and got non-bailable warrants issued against the appellant. 17. The respondent got an advertisement issued in a national newspaper that the appellant was only her employee. She got another news item issued cautioning the business associates to avoid dealing with the appellant. 16. On 22.1.01 the respondent gave affidavit before the High Court and got non-bailable warrants issued against the appellant. 17. The respondent got an advertisement issued in a national newspaper that the appellant was only her employee. She got another news item issued cautioning the business associates to avoid dealing with the appellant. The findings of the High Court that these proceedings could not be taken to be such which may warrant annulment of marriage is wholly unsustainable. 83. Even at this stage, the respondent does not want divorce by mutual consent. From the analysis and evaluation of the entire evidence, it is clear that the respondent has resolved to live in agony only to make life a miserable hell for the appellant as well. This type of adamant and callous attitude, in the context of the facts of this case, leaves no manner of doubt in our mind that the respondent is bent upon treating the appellant with mental cruelty. It is abundantly clear that the marriage between the parties had broken down irretrievably and there is no chance of their coming together, or living together again.” 29. Their Lordships of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Sujata Udai Patil versus Uday Madhukar Patil, (2006) 13 SCC 272 have held that cruel treatment can be inferred from the entire course of conduct and incidents showing display of temperament, emotion and perversion by one spouse causing hurt and humiliation to the other spouse. Their Lordships have further held that neither actual nor presumed intention to cause hurt to the other spouse is a necessary element in cruelty. Their Lordships have held as under: “The word "cruelty" and the kind or degree of "cruelty" necessary which may amount to a matrimonial offence has not been defined in the Act. What is cruel treatment is to a large extent a question of fact or a mixed question of law and fact and no dogmatic answer can be given to the variety of problems that arise before the court in these kind of cases. The law has no standard by which to measure the nature and degree of cruel treatment that may satisfy the test. It may consist of a display of temperament, emotion or pervasion whereby one gives vent to his or her feelings, without intending to injure the other. The law has no standard by which to measure the nature and degree of cruel treatment that may satisfy the test. It may consist of a display of temperament, emotion or pervasion whereby one gives vent to his or her feelings, without intending to injure the other. It need not consist of direct action against the other but may be misconduct indirectly affecting the other spouse even though it is not aimed at that spouse. It is necessary to weigh all the incidents and quarrels between the parties keeping in view the impact of the personality and conduct of one spouse upon the mind of the other. Cruelty may be inferred from the facts and matrimonial relations of the parties and interaction in their daily life disclosed by the evidence and inference on the said point can only be drawn after all the facts have been taken into consideration. Where there is proof of a deliberate course of conduct on the part of one, intended to hurt and humiliate the other spouse, and such a conduct is persisted, cruelty can easily be inferred. Neither actual nor presumed intention to hurt the other spouse is a necessary element in cruelty.” 30. Their Lordships of Hon’ble Supreme Court in Smt. Mayadevi versus Jagdish Prasad, AIR 2007 SC 1426 have held that the concept of proof beyond reasonable doubt is not applicable to matrimonial disputes while proving cruelty. Their Lordships have held as under: “Learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the foundation of decree for divorce is the alleged conviction for which the appeal is pending and, therefore, the High Court should not have disposed of the matter. In any event, it is submitted that it was the husband and his family members who were torturing her and being threatened by the husband she had not made any grievance with the police. Unfortunately, when she made the allegation, the police did not properly investigate the matter and gave a final report exonerating the husband. Learned counsel for the respondent on the other hand submitted that the instances highlighted by the trial Court and analysed in great detail by the High Court clearly made out a case for dowry and no interference is called for in this appeal. The expression "cruelty" has not been defined in the Act. Cruelty can be physical or mental. Learned counsel for the respondent on the other hand submitted that the instances highlighted by the trial Court and analysed in great detail by the High Court clearly made out a case for dowry and no interference is called for in this appeal. The expression "cruelty" has not been defined in the Act. Cruelty can be physical or mental. Cruelty which is a ground for dissolution of marriage may be defined as wilful and unjustifiable conduct of such character as to cause danger to life, limb or health, bodily or mental, or as to give rise to a reasonable apprehension of such a danger. The question of mental cruelty has to be considered in the light of the norms of marital ties of the particular society to which the parties belong, their social values, status, environment in which they live. Cruelty, as noted above, includes mental cruelty, which falls within the purview of a matrimonial wrong. Cruelty need not be physical. If from the conduct of his spouse same is established and/or an inference can be legitimately drawn that the treatment of the spouse is such that it causes an apprehension in the mind of the other spouse, about his or her mental welfare then this conduct amounts to cruelty. In delicate human relationship like matrimony, one has to see the probabilities of the case. The concept, a proof beyond the shadow of doubt, is to be applied to criminal trials and not to civil matters and certainly not to matters of such delicate personal relationship as those of husband and wife. Therefore, one has to see what are the probabilities in a case and legal cruelty has to be found out, not merely as a matter of fact, but as the effect on the mind of the complainant spouse because of the acts or omissions of the other. Cruelty may be physical or corporeal or may be mental. In physical cruelty, there can be tangible and direct evidence, but in the case of mental cruelty there may not at the same time be direct evidence. In cases where there is no direct evidence, Courts are required to probe into the mental process and mental effect of incidents that are brought out in evidence. It is in this view that one has to consider the evidence in matrimonial disputes.” 31. In cases where there is no direct evidence, Courts are required to probe into the mental process and mental effect of incidents that are brought out in evidence. It is in this view that one has to consider the evidence in matrimonial disputes.” 31. Their Lordships of Hon’ble Supreme Court in Samar Ghosh vs. Jaya Ghosh, (2007) 4 Supreme Court Cases 511 have held that there cannot be any comprehensive definition of “mental cruelty” within which all kinds of cases of mental cruelty can be covered. The prudent and appropriate way to adjudicate the case would be to evaluate it on its peculiar facts and circumstances while taking into consideration the various factors. 32. Their Lordships of Hon’ble Supreme Court in Manisha Tyagi vs. Deepak Kumar (2010) 4 SCC 339 have held that to constitute cruelty it is enough that conduct of one of parties is so abnormal and below accepted norm that other spouse could not be reasonably be expected to put up with it. Their Lordships have held as under:- “26. At this stage we may notice the observations made by this Court in the case of Naveen Kohli vs. Neelu Kohli (2006) 4 SCC 558 . In this case the Court examined the development and evolution of the concept of mental cruelty in matrimonial causes. In paragraph 35 it is observed as follows: "35. The petition for divorce was filed primarily on the ground of cruelty. It may be pertinent to note that, prior to 1976 amendment in the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 cruelly was not a ground for claiming divorce under the Hindu Marriage Act. It was only a ground for claiming judicial separation under Section 10 of the Act. By the 1976 amendment, cruelty was made a ground for divorce and the words which have been omitted from Section 10 are "as to cause a reasonable apprehension in the mind of the petitioner that it will be harmful or injurious for the petitioner to live with the other party". Therefore, it is not necessary for a party claiming divorce to prove that the cruel treatment is of such a nature as to cause an apprehension-reasonable apprehension - that it will be harmful or injurious for him or her to live with the other party." 27. Therefore, it is not necessary for a party claiming divorce to prove that the cruel treatment is of such a nature as to cause an apprehension-reasonable apprehension - that it will be harmful or injurious for him or her to live with the other party." 27. The classic example of the definition of cruelty in the pre-1976 era is given in the well known decision of this Court in the case of N.G. Dastane vs. S. Dastane (1975) 2 SCC 326 , wherein it is observed as follows: "”30........The enquiry has to be whether the conduct charged as cruelty is of such a character as to cause in the mind of the petitioner as reasonable apprehension that it would be harmful or injurious for him to live with the respondent". This is no longer the required standard. Now it would be sufficient to show that the conduct of one of the spouses is so abnormal and below the accepted norm that the other spouse could not reasonably be expected to put up with it. The conduct is no longer required to be so atrociously abominable which would cause a reasonable apprehension that it would be harmful or injurious to continue the cohabitation with the other spouse. Therefore to establish cruelty it is not necessary that physical violence should be used. However continued ill-treatment cessation of marital intercourse, studied neglect, indifference of one spouse to the other may lead to an inference of cruelty. However in this case even with aforesaid standard both the Trial Court and the Appellate Court had accepted that the conduct of the wife did not amount to cruelty of such a nature to enable the husband to obtain a decree of divorce.” 33. Their Lordships of Hon’ble Supreme Court in Ravi Kumar vs. Julmidevi, (2010) 4 SCC 476 have held that cruelty in matrimonial behaviour defies any definition and can be of infinite variety, categories, wherefor can never be closed. Cruelty has to be judged taking into account entire facts and circumstances of case and not by any predetermined rigid formula. Their Lordships have held as under: “19. It may be true that there is no definition of cruelty under the said Act. Cruelty has to be judged taking into account entire facts and circumstances of case and not by any predetermined rigid formula. Their Lordships have held as under: “19. It may be true that there is no definition of cruelty under the said Act. Actually such a definition is not possible, In matrimonial relationship, cruelty would obviously mean absence of mutual respect and understanding between the spouses which embitters the relationship and often leads to various outbursts of behaviour which can be termed as cruelty. Sometime cruelty in a matrimonial relationship may take the form of violence, some time it may take a different form. At times, it may be just an attitude or an approach. Silence in some situations may amount to cruelty. 20. Therefore, cruelty in matrimonial behaviour defies any definition and its category can never be closed. Whether husband is cruel to his wife or the wife is cruel to her husband has to be ascertained and judged by taking into account the entire facts and circumstances of the given case and not by any predetermined rigid formula. Cruelty in matrimonial cases can be of infinite variety -it may be subtle or even brutal and may be by gestures and words. That possibly explains why Lord Denning in Sheldon v. Sheldon [1966 (2) All E.R. 257] held that categories of cruelty in matrimonial cases are never closed. 21. This Court is reminded of what was said by Lord Reid In Gollins v. Gollins [1963 (2) All. E.R. 966] about judging cruelty in matrimonial cases. The pertinent observations are: "In matrimonial cases we are not concerned with the reasonable man, as we are in cases of negligence, We are dealing with this man and this woman and the fewer a priori assumptions we make about them the better. In cruelty cases one can hardly ever start with a presumption that the parties are reasonable people, because it is hard to imagine any cruelty case ever arising if both the spouses think and behave as reasonable people." The aforesaid passage was quoted with approval by this Court in Dastane v. Dastane [ 1975 (2) SCC 326 ]. 22. In cruelty cases one can hardly ever start with a presumption that the parties are reasonable people, because it is hard to imagine any cruelty case ever arising if both the spouses think and behave as reasonable people." The aforesaid passage was quoted with approval by this Court in Dastane v. Dastane [ 1975 (2) SCC 326 ]. 22. About changing perception of cruelty in matrimonial cases, this Court observed in Shobha Rani v. Madhukar Reddi [JT 1987 (4) SC 433 : AIR 1988 SC 121 ] at page 123 of the report: "It will be necessary to bear in mind that there has been a marked change in the life around us. In matrimonial duties and responsibilities in particular, we find a sea change. They are of varying degrees from house to house or person to person. Therefore, when a spouse makes complaint about the treatment of cruelty by the partner in life or relations, the court should not search for standard in life. A set of facts stigmatised as cruelty in one case may not be so in another case. The cruelty alleged may largely depend upon the type of life the parties are accustomed to or their economic and social conditions. It may also depend upon their culture and human values to which they attach importance. We, the judges and lawyers, therefore, should not import our own notions of life. We may not go in parallel with them. There may be a generation gap between us and the parties". 34. Their Lordships of Hon’ble Supreme Court in Gurbux Singh vs. Harminder Kaur, (2010) 14 SCC 301 have held that though a single act of violence which is of grievous and inexcusable nature, married life should be assessed as a whole and a few isolated instances over certain period will not amount to cruelty. Their Lordships have further held that onus to prove that particular conduct or behaviour resulted in cruelty is on the person who claims relief. Their Lordships have held as under:- “14. Cruelty has not been defined under the Act. It is quite possible that a particular conduct may amount to cruelty in one case but the same conduct necessarily may not amount to cruelty due to change of various factors, in different set of circumstances. Their Lordships have held as under:- “14. Cruelty has not been defined under the Act. It is quite possible that a particular conduct may amount to cruelty in one case but the same conduct necessarily may not amount to cruelty due to change of various factors, in different set of circumstances. Therefore, it is essential for the appellant, who claims relief, to prove that a particular/part of conduct or behaviour resulted in cruelty to him. No prior assumptions can be made in such matters. Meaning thereby that it cannot be assumed that a particular conduct will, under all circumstances, amount to cruelty, vis-a-vis the other party. The aggrieved party has to make a specific case that the conduct of which exception is taken amounts to cruelty. 15. It is true that even a single act of violence which is of grievous and inexcusable nature satisfies the test of cruelty. Persistence in inordinate sexual demands or malpractices by either spouse can be cruelty if it injures the other spouse. There is no such complaint by the appellant. In the case on hand, as stated earlier, the appellant has projected few instances in which, according to him, the respondent abused his parents. We have verified all the averments in the petitions, reply statement, written submissions as well as the evidence of both parties. We are satisfied that on the basis of such instances, marriage cannot be dissolved. 16. The married life should be assessed as a whole and a few isolated instances over certain period will not amount to cruelty. The ill-conduct must be precedent for a fairly lengthy period where the relationship has deteriorated to an extent that because of the acts and behaviour of a spouse, one party finds it extremely difficult to live with the other party no longer may amount to mental cruelty. Making certain statements on the spur of the moment and expressing certain displeasure about the behaviour of elders may not be characterized as cruelty. Mere trivial irritations, quarrels, normal wear and tear of married life which happens in day to day life in all families would not be adequate for grant of divorce on the ground of cruelty. Sustained unjustifiable and reprehensible conduct affecting physical and mental health of the other spouse may lead to mental cruelty. Mere trivial irritations, quarrels, normal wear and tear of married life which happens in day to day life in all families would not be adequate for grant of divorce on the ground of cruelty. Sustained unjustifiable and reprehensible conduct affecting physical and mental health of the other spouse may lead to mental cruelty. Both the appellant and respondent being highly qualified persons, the appellant being Principal in ITI College, the respondent working as a Librarian in a Government Institute, an isolated friction on some occasion like festival of Lohri even in the presence of others cannot be a valid ground for dissolving the marriage.” 35. Their Lordships of Hon’ble Supreme Court in Pankaj Mahajan vs. Dimple & Kajal, 2011 (12) SCC 1 have held that repeated threats to commit suicide amounts to cruelty. Their Lordships have further held that onus to prove grounds of divorce was on the husband to prove the grounds put forth by him. Their Lordships have held as under:- “10. Section 13 specifies the grounds on which a decree of divorce may be obtained by either party to the marriage. The onus of proving that the other spouse is incurably of unsound mind or is suffering from mental disorder lies on the party alleging it. It must be proved by cogent and clear evidence. 11. In the case on hand, since the appellant-husband has approached the District Court for a decree of divorce, the onus is on him to prove the grounds put-forth by him. As regards the ground alleged by the appellant-husband for a decree of divorce i.e. the respondent-wife is suffering from unsound mind/mental disorder/schizophrenia, apart from his own evidence as PW-4, various Doctors, who treated her and other witnesses were also examined. From the side of the appellant- husband, Dr. Paramjit Singh (PW-1), Dr. Ravinder Mohan Sharma (PW-2), Dr. Virendra Mohan (PW-3) and Dr. Gurpreet Inder Singh Miglani (PW-7), who had given treatment to the respondent-wife for mental disorder, were examined. 35. It is well settled that giving repeated threats to commit suicide amounts to cruelty. When such a thing is repeated in the form of sign or gesture, no spouse can live peacefully. In the case on hand, the appellant-husband has placed adequate materials to show that the respondent-wife used to give repeated threats to commit suicide and once even tried to commit suicide by jumping from the terrace. When such a thing is repeated in the form of sign or gesture, no spouse can live peacefully. In the case on hand, the appellant-husband has placed adequate materials to show that the respondent-wife used to give repeated threats to commit suicide and once even tried to commit suicide by jumping from the terrace. Cruelty postulates a treatment of a spouse with such cruelty as to create reasonable apprehension in his mind that it would be harmful or injurious for him to live with the other party. The acts of the respondent-wife are of such quality or magnitude and consequence as to cause pain, agony and suffering to the appellant-husband which amounted to cruelty in matrimonial law.” 36 Their Lordships of Hon’ble Supreme Court in Vishwantah Agrawal vs. Sarla Vishwanthan Agarwal, (2012) 7 SCC 288 have explained expression “cruelty” and “mental cruelty” as under:- “22. The expression “cruelty” has an inseparable nexus with human conduct or human behaviour. It is always dependent upon the social strata or the milieu to which the parties belong, their ways of life, relationship, temperaments and emotions that have been conditioned by their social status.” 37 Their Lordships of Hon’ble Supreme Court in K. Srinivas Rao vs. D.A. Deepa (2013) 5 SCC 226 have explained expression “mental cruelty” as under:- “10. Under Section 13(1)(i-a) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, a marriage can be dissolved by a decree of divorce on a petition presented either by the husband or the wife on the ground that the other party has, after solemnization of the marriage, treated the petitioner with cruelty. In a series of judgments this Court has repeatedly stated the meaning and outlined the scope of the term 'cruelty'. Cruelty is evident where one spouse has so treated the other and manifested such feelings towards her or him as to cause in her or his mind reasonable apprehension that it will be harmful or injurious to live with the other spouse. Cruelty may be physical or mental. 16. Thus, to the instances illustrative of mental cruelty noted in Samar Ghosh, we could add a few more. Cruelty may be physical or mental. 16. Thus, to the instances illustrative of mental cruelty noted in Samar Ghosh, we could add a few more. Making unfounded indecent defamatory allegations against the spouse or his or her relatives in the pleadings, filing of complaints or issuing notices or news items which may have adverse impact on the business prospect or the job of the spouse and filing repeated false complaints and cases in the court against the spouse would, in the facts of a case, amount to causing mental cruelty to the other spouse.” 38. The petitioner has not examined his relatives and parents, who according to the petitioner, were not permitted to come to the house of the petitioner at New Shimla by the respondent. Merely, filing of the complaint under Section 498-A would not amount to cruelty. 39. The Division Bench of Andhra Pradesh High Court in Akula Devi vs. Akula Veera Venkata, 2014(1) HLR 308 has held as under:- “16. In the present case, the only oral evidence on behalf of the respondent is his deposition. Howsoever well prepared it may be, it would be of no use to prove the two grounds pleaded by him. He did not even choose to examine his family members to prove the serious allegations made by him. In a way, he confessed in the O.P. itself that he made an attempt to murder his parents and grandmother, when they refused to give the properties. The plea that he did so at the instigation of the appellant, can not at all be accepted. A person with such character and conduct cannot be expected to have any regard for truth. The documentary evidence relied upon by the appellant is nothing but a notice, got issued by him. It is just un-understandable as to how the trial Court felt that the grounds pleaded by the respondent are proved. 17. It is only when the grounds pleaded in the O.P. are proved that the relief can be granted. Nowhere in the order passed by the trial Court, it is held that the grounds are proved, except stating that the filing of a complaint under Section 498-A I.P.C. would amount to mental cruelty. 17. It is only when the grounds pleaded in the O.P. are proved that the relief can be granted. Nowhere in the order passed by the trial Court, it is held that the grounds are proved, except stating that the filing of a complaint under Section 498-A I.P.C. would amount to mental cruelty. The approach of the trial Court can be discerned from the following observations, in para 9 of the judgment: "The conduct of both parties revealed that even though the petitioner is offering to live with the respondent it is not a hearty welcome and the respondent is offering to join the petitioner in half hearted manner and it was not suggested to PW.1 during cross-examination that the respondent intends to join the society of the petitioner, even though an offer was made during chief examination." 18. When the O.P. is filed with a clear prayer for divorce, it is not known as to from where the trial Court gathered the impression that the respondent was offering to live with the appellant. The importance given by the Parliament to the family disputes and making it obligatory on the part of the Courts to ensure that the parties to a marriage are made to live together as far as possible, is evident from the fact that the Family Courts are established throughout. In the instant case also, the predecessor of the Officer, who dealt with the matter, made an attempt to bring about reconciliation. It is only when there is no alternative for the Court, and a case is made out for divorce, that the decree can be passed. However, the basis indicated by the trial Court is evident from the following two sentences. "Continuation of marital relationship between parties would not yield any fruitful result and there is irretrievable break down of marriage between the parties... Thus, I find that there are no grounds to continue the marital relationship between the parties and it is a fit matter to grant divorce by dissolving the marriage between parties." 19. This approach is totally perverse and unwarranted. A Court can never grant divorce, by observing that there are no grounds to continue the marital relationship. In fact, there need not be any grounds to continue marital relationship, and if at all they are required, it is only for dissolving the marriage. This approach is totally perverse and unwarranted. A Court can never grant divorce, by observing that there are no grounds to continue the marital relationship. In fact, there need not be any grounds to continue marital relationship, and if at all they are required, it is only for dissolving the marriage. Further, no one can expect any "fruitful" result from any marriage. The existence or sustenance of relationship itself is the end result. It is not a business enterprise to expect any profit or return. We are of the clear view that the respondent failed to prove the grounds pleaded by him and the order passed by the trial Court is perverse. It is not based on the evidence, and is contrary to settled principles of law. 40. The Division Bench of Andhra Pradesh High Court in Namuduri Srinivasa vs. K. Radha 2014(1) HLR 302 have held that to constitute ground for divorce, need not be the one resulting in bodily injuries to the aggrieved spouse, would be sufficient, if through his or her acts, omissions and gestures one spouse has caused mental agony, anguish and discomfort to the other, to the level of rendering the cohabitation impossible. The Division Bench has held as under:- “12. Cruelty, on the part of one spouse to a marriage, is recognized as a ground for grant of a decree for divorce against the other spouse. The Act does not define as to what constitutes cruelty. In a catena of decisions, the Supreme Court and the High Courts explained the purport of this clause. The gist thereof is that cruelty, to constitute a ground for granting a decree for divorce, need not be the one resulting in bodily injuries to the aggrieved spouse. It would be sufficient, if through his or her acts, omissions and gestures one spouse has caused mental agony, anguish and discomfort to the other, to the level of rendering the cohabitation impossible. However, these aspects need be examined from the point of view of an ordinary prudent person and not according to the whims of one of the parties. Before the trial Court also, various judgments that have bearing upon these aspects have been cited. 23. The facts, which are borne out by record, would demonstrate that the cruelty, if at all, was on the part of the appellant towards the respondent. Before the trial Court also, various judgments that have bearing upon these aspects have been cited. 23. The facts, which are borne out by record, would demonstrate that the cruelty, if at all, was on the part of the appellant towards the respondent. She eagerly and respectably joined his company, but was driven out, on account of the greed and narrow-mindedness of the appellant. The sad part of the matter is that for each of his untenable acts, the appellant has taken shelter under the custom and religion. He did not possess the basic requirements of an ordinary living and he expected them to be fetched by his wife. It would not be difficult to imagine the attitude of such person. One cannot expect the life partner of such person to be satisfied, much less comfortable. There are absolutely no merits in the O.P. filed by the appellant and he miserably failed to prove the acts of cruelty on the part of the respondent. Point No.1 is, accordingly, answered.” 41 Accordingly, in view of the observations and analysis made hereinabove, there is no merit in the appeal and the same is dismissed. Pending application(s), if any, also stands dismissed. No costs.