Judgment Ashim Kumar Banerjee, J. Backdrop The Port Blair Municipal Council would permit various advertising agencies to set up hoardings within the Municipal limits of Port Blair upon payment of fees. Such licence was given periodically with option for renewal. The dispute arose when the authority attempted to enhance the renewal fee that became the subject matter in various writ proceedings. This appeal would relate to one of the writ petitioners namely M/s. G.V.R. Advertising Marketing who was initially a party to the writ petition being W.P. No. 699 of 2012 along with others wherein the petitioners questioned the increase in annual rent of hoardings and banners imposed by the Municipal Council as well as the amendment of advertisement Bye laws of 2009 through the amended Bye-laws of 2012. The learned Single Judge dismissed the writ petition being W.P. No.699 of 2012. The petitioners therein along with the present appellant filed an appeal. The Division Bench affirmed the decision of the learned Single Judge by judgment and order dated June 07, 2013. The writ petitioners in W.P. No. 699 of 2012 did not question the judgment and order of the Division Bench before the Apex Court and thus the said decision attained finality. The present appellant along with two other similarly circumstanced advertisers filed a second writ petition being W.P. No.13673(W) of 2013 asking for the identical relief. Perusal of the writ petition would depict, the writ petitioners mentioned about the earlier writ proceedings however, deliberately suppressed the subsequent order of the Division Bench. The writ petitioners in WP No.13673(W) of 2013 contended that they did not raise the legal issues in the earlier writ proceeding. Paragraph 17 being relevant herein is quoted below:- “17. That writ petitioners along with other challenged the impugned Notification dated 29.6.2012 in writ proceeding Vide W.P. No.699 of 2012 which was dismissed by an order dated 12.12.2012. In the said writ petition the writ petitioners did not raise the legal issues as regard non-fulfillment of the requirement of the clause 204 Andaman and Nicobar Islands (municipal) Regulation – 1994 by the respondent authorities in promulgating the impugned Bye-law and as such those legal issues have raised in the present writ petition for the first time.” Judgment and order impugned There were altogether three writ petitioners. Out of three the first and third writ petitioners including the present appellant were parties to the earlier writ petition being W.P. No.699 of 2012 and the subsequent appeal referred to above. It is more surprising, although in the subsequent writ petition they would claim they did not raise the legal issue in the earlier proceeding, they sought to amend their Memorandum of Appeal that the Division Bench specifically rejected. The learned Single Judge dismissed the writ petition mainly on the ground of suppression. His Lordship also dealt with the legal issue that we would be discussing little later. The relevant paragraphs on suppression being Paragraphs 13 and 19 are quoted below:- “13. Mr. Arul Prasanth and Mrs. Anjili Nag, learned advocates representing the Council raised preliminary objection to the maintainability of W.P. No. 13673 (W) of 2013 and W.P. No. 332 of 2013. According to them, the three petitioners in W.P. No. 13673 (W) of 2013 and the first and third petitioners in W.P. No. 332 of 2013 had earlier jointly presented a writ petition, being W.P. No. 699 of 2012, questioning the increase in annual rent of hoardings and banners imposed by the Council as well as the amendment of the Advertisement Bye-laws of 2009 by the Amendment Bye-laws of 2012. The said writ petition was considered by a learned Judge on 12th December, 2012 and upon contested hearing, His Lordship was pleased to hold that the increase in licence fees had been brought about lawfully and that the Court would not review the decision taken by the Council in respect of fiscal matters regarding garnering of funds and expenditure, which are exclusively within its domain. The order dated 12th December, 2012 had been carried in appeal and the Hon’ble Division Bench by its order dated 7th June, 2013 accepted the reasons for dismissal of the writ petition and, consequently, dismissed the appeal. The order of the Hon’ble Division Bench dated 7th June 2013 was not questioned before the Hon’ble Supreme Court and thus attained finality. According to Mr. Prasanth and Mrs. Nag, the said two writ petitions are hit by res judicata and/or analogous principles. 19. In W.P. No. 13673 (W) of 2013, the three petitioners have pleaded that they are not guilty of suppression of material facts. According to Mr. Prasanth and Mrs. Nag, the said two writ petitions are hit by res judicata and/or analogous principles. 19. In W.P. No. 13673 (W) of 2013, the three petitioners have pleaded that they are not guilty of suppression of material facts. There is, however, no disclosure therein of presentation of W.P. No. 699 of 2012 by them together with 5 (five) other petitioners and its dismissal by the order dated 12th December, 2012. Similar is the case in W.P. No. 332 of 2013. The first and third petitioners therein have not disclosed dismissal of W.P. No. 699 of 2012 by the order dated 12th December, 2012. There is also no disclosure of the order of the Hon’ble Division Bench passed on 7th June, 2013. The said petitioners having unsuccessfully approached this Court earlier, W.P. No. 13673 (W) of 2013 and W.P. No. 332 of 2013 (at the instance of the first and third petitioners) are liable to be dismissed not only on the ground of constructive res judicata, but also on the ground of suppression of material facts. The submission of Mr. Jayapal that the provisions of the Code do not apply to writ proceedings in view of the explanation appended to Section 141 thereof and hence the principles of res judicata cannot be invoked, has been advanced to be rejected. In a catena of decisions, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has ruled that the principles flowing from the Code could be applied to writ proceedings, as far as practicable. Reference in this connection may be made to the decision reported in (2011) 3 SCC 408 : M. Nagabhushana vs. State of Karanataka, wherein it was ruled that principles of constructive res judicata are applicable to writ proceedings. That apart, Rule 53 of the writ rules framed by this Court provides that the provisions of the Code in regard to suits shall be followed, as far as it can be made applicable in all proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.” The legal issue that the second writ petition would seek to raise was, as to whether the authority was entitled to enhance the fees through amendment of Bye-laws without adhering to the requirement of Rule204 that would oblige the Municipal Council to place the proposed amendment before both Houses of Parliament. Regulation 204 being relevant herein is quoted below:- “204. Regulation 204 being relevant herein is quoted below:- “204. Every rule and every bye-law made under this Regulation shall be laid as soon as may be after is made before each House of Parliament. While it is in session or a total period of thirty days which may be comprised in one session or in two or more successive sessions and if before the expiry of the session immediately following the session or the successive sessions as aforesaid both Houses agree for making any modification in the rule or bye-law or both houses agree that the rule or bye-law should not be made, the rule or bye-law shall thereafter have effect only in modified from or be of no effect as the case may be, so however that any such modification or annfulment shall be without prejudice to the validity of anything previously done under that rule or bye-law.” It is true that the amendment was not placed before the Parliament contemporaneously. Mrs. Nag, learned advocate appearing for the Municipal Council, would contend, it was placed subsequently and duly approved by the Parliament. The learned Single Judge held, mere non-approval by the Parliament was not fatal. His Lordship relied on the Apex Court decision in the case of Jan Mohammed Noor Mohammed Bagban vs. State of Gujarat and another reported in All India Reporter 1966 Supreme Court 385 and K.T. Plantation (P) Ltd. vs. State of Karnataka reported in 2011 Volume 9 Supreme Court Cases 1. His Lordship imposed a cost of Rs.10,000/- against each of the writ petitioners. Being aggrieved, one of the five writ petitioners involved therein, preferred the instant appeal that we heard on the abovementioned date. Contentions Mr. Jayapal, learned advocate appearing for the appellant would contend, the learned Judge misconstrued the provision interpreting the amount as “fees” instead of “tax” as provided in the relevant Regulation. In case of “tax” the authority was not entitled to impose the same without having the approval of the legislature. He would distinguish the case relied upon by His Lordship by contending, those may not be applicable in case of “tax”. Par contra, Mrs. Nag, learned advocate appearing for the Municipal Council would contend, the Apex Court decision would be squarely applicable and the learned Judge rightly held that mere non-approval by the Parliament would not vitiate the process of enhancement. Par contra, Mrs. Nag, learned advocate appearing for the Municipal Council would contend, the Apex Court decision would be squarely applicable and the learned Judge rightly held that mere non-approval by the Parliament would not vitiate the process of enhancement. Cases cited at the Bar 2001 Volume 6 Supreme Court Cases 307 (Union of India Vs. National Hydroelectric Power Corpn. Ltd and Others) Mr. Jayapal cited this decision to support his contention on Regulation 204. The Apex Court observed, there should be a positive act of approval by Parliament to the issuance of the notification before it can be held that Schedule 1 has been amended. Merely laying the notification before each House of Parliament is not sufficient compliance within the provisions of Section 16(2). Such decision was rendered in respect of appropriate provision under the Water (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Cess Act, 1977 that would empower the authority to impose cess on the use of water by an industry resulting in pollution. 2003 Volume 4 Supreme Court Cases 239 (High Court of Judicature for Rajasthan Vs. P.P. Singh and another) This decision would suggest, if the provision was subject to permission the action does not become effective unless permission is granted. 2011 Volume 3 Supreme Court Cases 408 (M. Nagabhushana vs. State of Karnataka and others) The learned Judge relied on this decision to support his decision on the issue of res judicata. The Apex Court in Paragraph 17 held, while applying the principle of res judicata the court should not be hampered by any technical rules of interpretation. Mr. Jayapal contended, the Code of Civil Procedure would have no application in case of writ proceeding. The learned Judge rejected such contention relying on the decision referred to supra. 2011 Volume 9 Supreme Court Cases 1 [K.T. Plantation Private Limited and another Vs. State of Karnataka] The learned Judge relied upon this decision to support his view on interpretation of Regulation 204. The decision in the case of Jan Mohammad Noor Mohammad Bagban Vs. The State of Gujarat (supra) was cited to support the contention that in absence of approval of the Parliament the amendment was invalid. Learned Judge distinguished the said decision by observing, the ratio decided therein would suggest, failure to lay before the Parliament would not be fatal. The decision in the case of Jan Mohammad Noor Mohammad Bagban Vs. The State of Gujarat (supra) was cited to support the contention that in absence of approval of the Parliament the amendment was invalid. Learned Judge distinguished the said decision by observing, the ratio decided therein would suggest, failure to lay before the Parliament would not be fatal. The decision in the case of Atlas Cycle Industries Ltd. (supra) would suggest the procedure and purpose of laying a legislation before the Parliament. Paragraph 32 of the said decision being relevant herein is quoted below:- 32. From the foregoing discussion, it inevitably follows that the Legislature never intended that non-compliance with the requirement of laying as envisaged by sub-section (6) of Section 3 of the Act should render the order void. Consequently non-laying of the aforesaid notification fixing the maximum selling prices of various categories of iron and steel including the commodity in question before both Houses of Parliament cannot result in nullification of the notification. Accordingly, we answer the aforesaid question in the negative. In view of this answer, it is not necessary to deal with the other contention raised by the respondent to the effect that the aforesaid notification being of a subsidiary character. It was not necessary to lay it before both Houses of Parliament to make it valid.” Mr. Jayapal, learned advocate, relied on the decision in the case of General Officer, Commanding-in-Chief (supra) for the proposition, any rule or regulation framed under a statute cannot override the principal statute. Our view We have considered the contentions raised at the Bar. The learned Judge dismissed the writ petitions on the ground of suppression of fact. Hence, the second issue on merit need not be gone into. Yet, His Lordship dealt with the issue. We would also view this problem from a different angle. Apart from question of suppression, the principle of res-judicata and/or constructive resjudicata would also come into play. The appellant sought to raise this issue before the Division Bench through amendment. The Division Bench rejected such contention. Having not challenged such order the appellant was perhaps not competent to raise the identical issue. Apart from question of suppression, the principle of res-judicata and/or constructive resjudicata would also come into play. The appellant sought to raise this issue before the Division Bench through amendment. The Division Bench rejected such contention. Having not challenged such order the appellant was perhaps not competent to raise the identical issue. The learned Judge took note of the observation of the Division Bench to the effect, amendment could not be permitted to be introduced at the appellate stage by amending the writ petition and the proposed amendment involved mixed question of law and facts and as such could not be allowed. However, by subsequent order the Division Bench recalled its earlier order and permitted such issue to be considered at the time of hearing of the appeal. Subsequently at the time of hearing of the appeal the Division Bench observed, it is not purely a point of law but it is a mixed question of fact and law and since the appellant/the writ petitioner has not pointed out such legal grounds earlier, it will not be proper for the Court to permit the appellant/writ petitioner to take such alleged legal grounds at the appellate stage. The Division Bench dismissed the appeal having found it meritless. The appellant accepted the said order. In our view, it would foreclose their right to raise the issue again in a subsequent proceeding. The learned Judge perhaps went into the other question on merit in view of involvement of other writ petitioners including some of them who were not parties to the earlier proceeding. Before us, the sole appellant was a party to the earlier proceeding. He was guilty of suppression of facts as discussed hereinbefore. His writ petition was barred by the principle of res-judicata. Learned Single Judge rightly rejected his writ petition that would deserve no interference. The learned Judge however directed the Administration to lay the amendment before the Parliament at the earliest. On merit also the learned Judge took note of the fact that the Council considered the objection raised by the advertisers. There was subsequent reduction of fee that was published in “The Daily Telegrams”. This would justify the bonafide approach of the Council. Learned Judge imposed the cost of Rs.10,000/- on the present appellant. Mr. Jayapal prayed for making it easy. Considering the facts and circumstances, we do not feel it inclined. There was subsequent reduction of fee that was published in “The Daily Telegrams”. This would justify the bonafide approach of the Council. Learned Judge imposed the cost of Rs.10,000/- on the present appellant. Mr. Jayapal prayed for making it easy. Considering the facts and circumstances, we do not feel it inclined. The appeal fails and is hereby dismissed. There would be no order as to costs.