JUDGMENT The present Civil Miscellaneous Appeal is preferred by the Andhra Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation, represented by the Depot Manager, Siricilla Depot, Karimnagar Region (for brevity ‘the Corporation’), assailing the order dated 23.08.2002 in W.C.Case No.64 of 2000 passed by the Commissioner for Workmen’s Compensation and Assistant Commissioner of Labour, Karimnagar (for brevity ‘the Commissioner’). The facts in brief are that the legal representatives, i.e., the wife and the two minor children of the deceased employee, filed an application before the learned Commissioner for Workmen’s Compensation in W.C.Case No.64 of 2000 invoking Section 22 of the Workmen’s Compensation Act (for brevity ‘the Act’), seeking compensation on account of the death of the deceased employee, in course of his employment in the Corporation. The deceased employee, viz., Mr. R.Narsayya, with employment code No.319618, being the driver in the Corporation, on 24.09.1998 was allotted the bus to be plied between Siricilla and Illanthakunta. Having finished the first two trips, while he was on the third trip from Siricilla to Illanthakunta at about 11-00 p.m., suddenly he drove the bus to the margin of the road and vomited profusely complaining of severe chest pain. Alarmed at the situation, the conductor stopped a private jeep coming from the opposite direction and took the driver to the nearest doctor in Siricilla by 12-30 p.m. The doctor, however, declared the driver brought dead. On examination of the deceased, the doctor certified that he had died of acute cardiac failure. Soon thereafter, the 1st respondent, i.e., wife of the deceased, got the news and rushed to the clinic, from where both the conductor and the wife of the deceased took the deceased-workman to the Government hospital, where too, doctors declared that the workman had been brought dead and advised them to take the body away. The conductor immediately informed the Depot Manager and other staff, who later visited the hospital. Though the Depot Manager was said to have been requested to have a postmortem conducted, the request was refused and the dead body was asked to be taken home.As a matter of further development, despite the representation of the workers’ union and also written representation dated 15.11.1999 submitted by the wife of the deceased to extend the benefits to the bereaved family, the Management has insisted on production of a medical certificate, which, in fact, was submitted on 05.06.2000. Despite the compliance with the requirement, the dependents of the deceased have not been extended any benefits by the Corporation. Under those circumstances, the wife and the minor children of the deceased have invoked the provisions of the Workmen’s Compensation Act, 1953. During the course of trial, it has come on record that the deceased was 36 years old by the date of his death; he was being paid monthly wages @ Rs.3,382-66 ps. Based on the age and the earning of the deceased, the applicants have claimed an amount of Rs.1,94,640/- towards compensation along with interest and penalty from the Corporation.The Corporation has filed its counter and admitted that the deceased was in the service of the Corporation and was on duty on the fateful day. The Corporation, however, contested the claim by stating that the deceased had a natural death and acute cardiac arrest could not be attributed to any of the duties discharged by the deceased, who was a driver, plying the allotted bus on a fixed route, as he had all along been doing earlier.On the part of the applicants/respondents, the wife of the deceased, i.e., 1st respondent, got herself examined as P.W.1, apart from examining the conductor of the bus on the fateful day as P.W.2 and another driver, the fellow worker of the deceased as P.W.3. The applicants have marked Exs.A.1 to A.7, Exs.A.1 and A.2 being the death certificates issued by the doctor at Siricilla and the Government Hospital. On the part of the Corporation, its Assistant Traffic Manager, Hyderabad, was examined as R.W.1 and Ex.R.1, which is a copy of statistical return, was marked. On appreciation of the oral and documentary evidence, the learned Commissioner has held that the death due to sudden cardiac arrest could be attributed to the stress and strain the deceased had undergone while he had been on duty. The rest of the issues having not been disputed by the Corporation, the Tribunal held that the claimants were entitled to the compensation of Rs.1,94,640/- along with other statutory permissible benefits. The learned Standing Counsel for the appellant-Corporation has strenuously contended that the duties discharged by the deceased workman were not of the character to cause any cardiac disorders. She has also submitted that the deceased workman on the fateful day was on duty in a familiar route. The learned Standing Counsel for the appellant-Corporation has strenuously contended that the duties discharged by the deceased workman were not of the character to cause any cardiac disorders. She has also submitted that the deceased workman on the fateful day was on duty in a familiar route. The learned Standing Counsel has further contended that, though the respondent dependants have not established by means of cogent evidence that the deceased workman had suffered cardiac arrest owing to the stress while he on duty, the Tribunal has decided the issue on mere conjectures. Per contra, the learned counsel for the respondents has submitted that the Tribunal has taken into account all aspects before awarding compensation. He has contended that the deceased workman was quite young and never had any medical history of heart ailment. Countering the allegation that the respondent-dependants could not discharge the initial burden that the workman had died to the causes that arose during the course of his discharging the duties, the learned counsel has contended that the respondents cannot be compelled to prove the negative. He has, in the end, submitted that the award of the Tribunal does not call for any interference. Heard the respective learned counsel for the appellant-Corporation and the respondents-applicants, apart from perusing the entire record placed before this Court. The wife of the deceased, being not an eyewitness to the incident, not much reliance could be placed on her deposition as P.W.1. Curiously, the Corporation has failed to elicit any information from P.W.1 whether the deceased-workman had any previous history of heart ailment or any other related disease. P.W.2, being the conductor of the bus, which was being plied by the deceased-driver, his evidence assums importance. He has deposed that while the deceased-workman was navigating the bus between Siricilla and Illanthakunta, suddenly he steered the vehicle to the margin of the road, omited profously and collapsed saying that he had severe chest pain. Though without wasting further time, he rushed the driver to the nearest clinic, the doctor declared him to have been brought dead. He has deposed that while the deceased-workman was navigating the bus between Siricilla and Illanthakunta, suddenly he steered the vehicle to the margin of the road, omited profously and collapsed saying that he had severe chest pain. Though without wasting further time, he rushed the driver to the nearest clinic, the doctor declared him to have been brought dead. Subsequently, when the deceased was taken to the Government Hospital, Siricilla, the Government doctors too have pronounced the same.What assumes importance is that it is the specific assertion of P.W.2 that he suggested to the Depot Manager to have a postmortem examination, when the said Depot Manager visited the hospital on receiving information passed on by P.W.2 himself. This assertion on the part of P.W.2 was not contradicted by the Corporation. It is prosaic to state that usually cardiac arrest would have certain medical history and proving the condition of the patient by subjecting the deceased to the post-mortem would have thrown ample light on the course and history of the ailment of the deceased. Though the Corporation has contended that the workman has died a natural death and that the cardiac arrest could not be attributed to any factors during the course of discharging the duties, it has nevertheless squandered an opportunity to subject the deceased to medical examination, which could have ascertained the cause of death. As such, owing to the inactivity or refusal of the Corporation to take recourse to a legally acceptable course to determine the cause of death, the dependents of the deceased could not be made to suffer. The other witness examined by the claimants is another colleague of the deceased-workman. Though he was not an eyewitness to the incident of sudden collapse and death of the deceased-workman, he is one of the persons who rushed to the hospital at the earliest point of time and witnessed the subsequent developments. He would also attest to the incident that despite the request made, the Corporation was not willing to have the postmortem conducted. When it comes to the basic cause that is said to have triggered heart attack, as was canvassed by the respondent-dependants, the road through which the bus was navigated by the deceased is said to have been full of pot holes. When it comes to the basic cause that is said to have triggered heart attack, as was canvassed by the respondent-dependants, the road through which the bus was navigated by the deceased is said to have been full of pot holes. It was further assured that the steering was very rigid and that in the late hours of night the deceased-driver had subjected himself to extreme exertion and stress while driving the bus. Given his young age, as the deceased was admittedly only 30 years old by the time of his death, it was, averred the respondents, highly improbable that the deceased-workman would have had any previous history of heart ailment or any other congenital disorder resulting in a sudden cardiac arrest. On the part of the Corporation, the Assistant Traffic Manager, Hyderabad, was examined as R.W.1. Apart from asserting the fact that the bus in question did not suffer from any mechanical defect, the said witness could not throw much light on other issues. It goes without saying that R.W.1, not being an eyewitness, not even being the immediate superior officer dealing with the deceased-workman, could not be attributed with any personal knowledge of the condition of the deceased while he was on duty.If we examine the statutory scheme in this regard, theentitlement to the claim of compensation is dependent on fulfillment of the stipulations contained in Section 3(1) of the Act, which is to the effect that if personal injury is caused to an employee by accident arising out of and in the course of his employment, his employer shall be liable to pay compensation in accordance with the provisions of the Act. There are decisions of the English Court as early as of the year 1903 onwards stating that unlooked-for mishap or an untoward event which is not expected or designed should be construed as falling within the definition of an "accident". In the event of such "untoward" "unexpected" event resulting in a personal injury caused to the workman in the course of his employment in connection with the trade and business of his employer, the same would be governed, in the Indian Contract, by the provisions of Section 3 of the Workmen's Compensation Act. Such a legal principle sufficient antiquity got the seal of approval of the Supreme Court. For this purpose we can refer to the celebrated decision in Mackinnon Mackenzie and Co. Such a legal principle sufficient antiquity got the seal of approval of the Supreme Court. For this purpose we can refer to the celebrated decision in Mackinnon Mackenzie and Co. Pvt. Ltd. v. Ritta Farnandes (1969 ACJ 419 (SC). After referring to the decision of House of Lords in Clover Clayton & Co. v. Hughes (1910 A.C. 242), the Supreme Court quoted with approval the relevant passage in the decision of House of Lords in paragraph 4, which reads as under: “4. Even if a workman dies from a pre-existing disease, if the disease is aggravated or accelerated under the circumstances which can be said to be accidental, his death results from injury by accident. This was clearly laid down by the House of Lords in Clover Clayton & Co. v. Hughes where the deceased, whilst tightening a nut with a spanner, fell back on his hand and died. A post mortem examination showed that there was a large aneurism of the aorta, and that death was caused by a rupture of the aorta. The aneurism was in such an advanced condition that it might have burst while the man was asleep, and very slight exertion or strain would have been sufficient to bring about a rupture. The County Court Judge found that the death was caused by a strain arising out of the ordinary work of the deceased operating upon a condition of body which was such as to render the strain fatal, and held upon the authorities that this was an accident within the meaning of the Act. His decision was upheld both by the Court of Appeal and the House of Lords: No doubt the ordinary accident," said Lord Loreburn, L.C. "is associated with something external: the bursting of a boiler or an explosion in a mine, for example. But it may be merely from the man's own miscalculation, such as tripping and falling. Or it may be due both to internal and external conditions, as if a seaman were to faint in the rigging and tumble into the sea. I think it may also be something going wrong within the human frame itself, such as straining of muscle or the breaking of a blood vessel. If that occurred when he was lifting a weight, it would properly be described as an accident. I think it may also be something going wrong within the human frame itself, such as straining of muscle or the breaking of a blood vessel. If that occurred when he was lifting a weight, it would properly be described as an accident. So, I think, rupturing an aneurism when tightening a nut with a spanner may be regarded as an accident.” With regard to Lord Macnanghten's definition of an accident being "an unlooked for mishap or untoward event which is not expected or designed" it was said that an event was unexpected if it was not expected by the man who suffered it, even though everyman of commonsense who knew the circumstances would think it certain to happen.(vide ParamPal Singh v. National Insurance Company (2013) 3 SCC 409 ). In the same ParamPal Singh (3 supra), an exhaustive judgement that has surveyed the entire case law obtaining on the issue, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has quoted with approval the observations of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Sundarbaiv. Ordnance Factory (1976 Lab IC 1163 (MP), thus: “10. On a review of the authorities, the principles insofar as relevant for our purposes may be stated as follows: (A) ‘Accident’ means an untoward mishap which is not expected or designed by the workman. ‘Injury’ means physiological injury. (B) ‘Accident’ and ‘injury’ are distinct in cases where accident is an event happening externally to a man; e.g. when a workman falls from a ladder and suffers injury. But accident may be an event happening internally to a man and in such cases ‘accident’ and ‘injury’ coincide. Such cases are illustrated by bursting of an aneurism, failure of heart and the like while the workman is doing his normal work. (C) Physiological injury suffered by a workman due mainly to the progress of a disease unconnected with employment, may amount to an injury arising out of and in the course of employment if the work which the workman was doing at the time of the occurrence of the injury contributed to its occurrence. (D) The connection between the injury and employment may be furnished by ordinary strain of ordinary work if the strain did in fact contribute to or accelerate or hasten the injury. (D) The connection between the injury and employment may be furnished by ordinary strain of ordinary work if the strain did in fact contribute to or accelerate or hasten the injury. (E) The burden to prove the connection of employment with the injury is on the applicant, but he is entitled to succeed if on a balance of probabilities a reasonable man might hold that the more probable conclusion is that there was a connection.” The factors required to be established to prove that an accident has taken place are: 1. Stress and strain arising during the course of employment; 2. Nature of employment; and 3. Injury aggravated due to stress and strain. (vide ShakuntalaChandrakant Shreshti (2007) 11 SCC 668 ). The principles to attract Section 3 of the Workmen's Compensation Act, as identified by the Supreme Court in MalikarjunaG. Hiremath v. Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd., (2009) 13 SCC 405 ) are: “(1) There must be a causal connection between the injury and the accident and the accident and the work done in the course of employment. (2) The onus is upon the applicant to show that it was the work and the resulting strain which contributed to or aggravated the injury. (3) If the evidence brought on record establishes a greater probability which satisfies a reasonable man that the work contributed to the causing of the personal injury, it would be enough for the workman to succeed, but the same would depend upon the facts of each case.” In Mackinnon Mackenzie and Co. (P) Ltd. v. Ibrahim Mohd (1969) 2 SCC 607 ), the Supreme Court, placing reliance on Lancashire and Yorkshire Railway Co. v. Highley (1917) AC 352), has further elaborated on the issue in the following manner: “5.To come within the Act the injury by accident must arise both out of and in the course of employment. (P) Ltd. v. Ibrahim Mohd (1969) 2 SCC 607 ), the Supreme Court, placing reliance on Lancashire and Yorkshire Railway Co. v. Highley (1917) AC 352), has further elaborated on the issue in the following manner: “5.To come within the Act the injury by accident must arise both out of and in the course of employment. The words “in the course of the employment” mean “in the course of the work which the workman is employed to do and which is incidental to it.” The words “arising out of employment” are understood to mean that “during the course of the employment, injury has resulted from some risk incidental to the duties of the service, which, unless engaged in the duty owing to the master, it is reasonable to believe the workman would not otherwise have suffered.” In other words there must be a causal relationship between the accident and the employment. The expression “arising out of employment” is again not confined to the mere nature of the employment. The expression applies to employment as such — to its nature, its conditions, its obligations and its incidents. If by reason of any of those factors the workman is brought within the zone of special danger the injury would be one which arises ‘out of employment’. To put it differently if the accident had occurred on account of a risk which is an incident of the employment, the claim for compensation must succeed, unless of course the workman has exposed himself to an added peril by his own imprudent act...” In ESI Corporation v Francis De Costa (1996) 6 SCC 1 ), the Supreme Court has quoted with approval the decision of Lord Wright in Dover Navigation Co. Ltd. v. Isabella Craig (1939) 4 All ER 558 (HL) wherein it was held: “Nothing could be simpler than the words ‘arising out of and in the course of the employment’. It is clear that there are two conditions to be fulfilled. What arises ‘in the course’ of the employment is to be distinguished from what arises ‘out of the employment’. The former words relate to time conditioned by reference to the man's service, the latter to causality. It is clear that there are two conditions to be fulfilled. What arises ‘in the course’ of the employment is to be distinguished from what arises ‘out of the employment’. The former words relate to time conditioned by reference to the man's service, the latter to causality. Not every accident which occurs to a man during the time when he is on his employment—that is, directly or indirectly engaged on what he is employed to do—gives a claim to compensation, unless it also arises out of the employment. Hence the section imports a distinction which it does not define. The language is simple and unqualified.” Only because a person dies of heart attack, the same does not give rise to automatic presumption that the same was by way of accident. A person may be suffering from a heart disease although he may not be aware of the same. Medical opinion will be of relevance providing guidance to court in that behalf. Circumstances must exist to establish that death caused by reason of failure of heart was because of stress and strain of work. Stress and strain resulting in a sudden heart failure in a case of the present nature would not be presumed. No legal fiction therefor can be raised. As a person suffering from a heart disease may not be aware thereof, medical opinion therefore would be of relevance. Each case, therefore, has to be considered on its own fact and no hard-and-fast rule can be laid down therefor. (vide ShakuntalaChandrakant Shreshti v. Prabhakar Maruti Garvali (2007) 11 SCC 668 ). In the instant case, the Corporation has let go of a vital opportunity to subject the deceased to post-mortem to ascertain the actual cause of death or, as it was believed to be due to heart attack, the nature of the said decease. Eventually, in ParamPal Singh (3 supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court, after applying the various principles laid down in the above decisions to the facts of the case, has concluded that there was causal connection to the death of the deceased with that of his employment as a truck driver. We cannot, observed their Lordships, lose sight of the fact that a 45 years old driver meets with his unexpected death, may be due to heart failure while driving the vehicle from Delhi to a distant place called Nimiaghat near Jharkhand, which is about 1152 kms. We cannot, observed their Lordships, lose sight of the fact that a 45 years old driver meets with his unexpected death, may be due to heart failure while driving the vehicle from Delhi to a distant place called Nimiaghat near Jharkhand, which is about 1152 kms. away from Delhi, would have definitely undergone grave strain and stress due to such long distance driving. The deceased being a professional heavy vehicle driver when undertakes the job of such driving as his regular avocation, it can be safely held that such constant driving of heavy vehicle, being dependant solely upon his physical and mental resources & endurance, there was every reason to assume that the vocation of driving was materially a contributory factor if not the sole cause, that accelerated his unexpected death to occur which in all fairness should be held to be an untoward mishap in his life span. Such an 'untoward mishap' can therefore be reasonably described as an 'accident' as having been caused solely attributable to the nature of employment indulged in with his employer which was in the course of such employer's trade or business. Incidentally in the present case too, the facts are substantially similar, thus calling for the application of the ratio laid down by their Lordships in ParamPal Singh (3 supra). On a close observation of the facts and circumstances of the case, it is very evident that in the present instance, the learned Tribunal has taken into account all aspects of the case and has come to a just and proper conclusion that the work man died of accident arising out of and in the course of his employment,and accordingly ordered compensation. It is too well settled to be restated that unless there is error apparent on the face of the record or the findings suffer from the vice of perversity or that the Tribunal has committed any jurisdictional error, this Court is loathe to interfere with, especially, findings of fact as have been arrived at by the Tribunal. It is trite to observe that just because this Court can as well come to a different conclusion on the same set of fact is no ground to interfere with the findings of a jurisdictional forum. For the foregoing reasons, this Court does not find any merit in the writ petition, and accordingly dismisses it as devoid of any merit. It is trite to observe that just because this Court can as well come to a different conclusion on the same set of fact is no ground to interfere with the findings of a jurisdictional forum. For the foregoing reasons, this Court does not find any merit in the writ petition, and accordingly dismisses it as devoid of any merit. No order as to costs.