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2014 DIGILAW 5 (GAU)

RIAJUL HAQUE v. STATE OF ASSAM

2014-01-02

A.K.GOSWAMI, A.M.SAPRE

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JUDGMENT (A.M.Sapre, CJ) Heard Mr. R. Islam, learned counsel for the appellants and Mr. BJ Talukdar, learned Government Advocate, Assam. This is an intra-court appeal filed by the writ petitioners of WP(C) No.5550/2012 under Rule 2(3) of Chapter V-A of the Gauhati High Court Rules against the order dated 18.9.2013 passed by the Single Judge in abovementioned writ petition. By impugned order, the Single Judge dismissed the writ petition filed by the appellants and declined to grant them the relief claimed therein. So the question, which arises for consideration in this appeal, is whether learned Single Judge was justified in dismissing the appellants’ writ petition? Facts of the case lie in a narrow compass. They, however, need mention in brief infra. The appellants had filed the writ petition challenging the very appointment process of grade IV employees in Assam Secretariat, in which, they too had participated, as candidates along with several others, but to their misfortune were not selected. The challenge to the advertisement was essentially on the ground that advertisement for filling the post in question was issued under the signature of an authority “A“ whereas the appointing authority for the post in question was “B“ and hence it should have been issued under the signature of appointing authority “B”. In other words, the contention was that the authority which issued the advertisement was superior to the appointing authority and hence the very advertisement becomes bad for want of authority and in consequence, all the appointments made pursuant to such invalid advertisement were also rendered bad and hence liable to be quashed. The other ground of challenge was on malafides. Both the grounds of challenge were repelled by the writ court resulting in dismissal of the writ petition and in consequence, upholding of the advertisement so also the appointments made pursuant thereto giving rise to filing of this appeal by the unsuccessful writ petitioners. Having heard the learned counsel for the appellants and upon perusal of the record of the case, we are inclined to dismiss the appeal as, in our opinion, the reasoning and the conclusion arrived at by the writ court for dismissal of the writ petition is just and proper, calling no interference. Having heard the learned counsel for the appellants and upon perusal of the record of the case, we are inclined to dismiss the appeal as, in our opinion, the reasoning and the conclusion arrived at by the writ court for dismissal of the writ petition is just and proper, calling no interference. In our considered view, In the first place, once the appellants submitted to the selection process and participated in it pursuant to the impugned advertisement, then, in such circumstances, they had no right to challenge the advertisement by finding fault therein. In fact, they were precluded from challenging the advertisement much less on the grounds taken in the writ petition and here also. Apart from this infirmity, the grounds of challenge are also without any legal foundation because whether the advertisement was issued under the signatures of “A” or “B” authority was of no significance. One cannot possibly dispute that advertisement in question was issued for and on behalf of the State and the authority who signed the advertisement namely “A” was very much in the employment of the State and secondly, the State never disputed his authority in signing the advertisement on behalf of the State. In our view, it was not necessary for the appointing authority of Grade IV employees to have signed the advertisement in question and any authority other than the appointing authority was competent to sign on behalf of State. In our considered opinion, there lies a distinction between the issuance of advertisement and issuance of appointment letter. Both cannot be placed at one platform for determination of the rights of the potential candidates at least on the issue of authority in signing these two documents. If in the case of former, it need not be signed by the appointing authority of a post for which the advertisement was issued, whereas, in a later case, it is required to be signed by the appointing authority as provided in the Rules. The case in hand falls in the former category and hence the challenge made herein on this issue must fail. So far as the other ground of challenge is concerned, the same need not detain us any more for the simple reason because it is clear to us that it was raised only for the sake of raising without any factual basis. The plea of malafides is always based on facts. So far as the other ground of challenge is concerned, the same need not detain us any more for the simple reason because it is clear to us that it was raised only for the sake of raising without any factual basis. The plea of malafides is always based on facts. It has to be therefore precise and it must be supported with factual data. The person concern against whom it is raised must be made party and that too in their personal capacity in the writ petition. Nothing was done in this case and hence their plea was rightly rejected by the writ court. We concur with the same and accordingly uphold its rejection. The appellants were not able to either plead or prove which of their rights were violated and in what way. If they appeared and were not selected, they have to find fault in their merits rather than in the process of selection. In the light of foregoing discussion, the appeal is found to be totally devoid of any merit. It thus fails and is accordingly dismissed in limini. No cost.