JUDGMENT Mr. Jaswant Singh, J.:- Petitioner (tenant) is in revision under Section 15(5) of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) against the findings returned by the Authorities below, whereby her eviction has been ordered under Section 13-A of the Act by the learned Rent Controller, Chandigarh vide order dated 14.09.2012 and the findings thereof have been affirmed by the learned Appellate Authority, Chandigarh vide its judgment dated 21.08.2013. 2. The respondent(landlord) had sought eviction of the tenant from the demised premises on the ground that Dr. Ramesh Kumar Jindal became the owner of the property vide transfer deed executed by his wife on 4.3.2009. It was averred that since he is working as a Medical Officer with the Chandigarh Administration in Government Office, Sector 8, Chandigarh on deputation from Punjab Government and is going to retire on 31.08.2009, therefore, he requires the premises for his own use and occupation after retirement. Thus petition was preferred under Section 13 A of the Act. 3. Upon notice, petitioner(tenant) denied the necessity as well as the fact that the petition was maintainable under Section 13 A of the Act. It was stated that transfer deed is sham and only a device to get the property vacated from the petitioner herein. 4. From the pleadings of the parties issues were framed. Both sides lead their evidence in support of their respective claims and after appreciating their evidence learned Rent Controller allowed the petition and the findings thereof were affirmed by the learned Appellate Authority. Hence the present revision petition. 5. I have heard learned Counsel for the petitioner(tenant) and have also gone through the case file carefully with his able assistance. 6. Learned Counsel for the petitioner(tenant) has argued that although the respondent(landlord) has concededly become an owner of the demised house on 4.3.2009(as elaborated in para 2 of the grounds of revision) and filed the eviction petition under Section 13-A in April 2009, in view of his impending retirement on 31.08.2009, his eviction petition under section 13-A would not be maintainable since he has not initially let out the premises. It is further argued that under Section 13-A, the eviction application can be instituted by the specified landlord within one year or after one year.
It is further argued that under Section 13-A, the eviction application can be instituted by the specified landlord within one year or after one year. Therefore, the implicit intention of the legislature is that the specified landlord should be an owner at least for a year before filing his eviction petition. It is further argued that in the facts of this case, the transfer by the wife on 4.3.2009 having purchased the demised premises on 1.10.2008, is mala fide and the court is required to keep this aspect in view while deciding the claim of the eviction petition. In support he cites Devi Dass Vs. Mohan Lal 1982(2) RCR (Rent) 246. It is further argued that the landlord has sufficient accommodation on the first and second floor of the demised premises and therefore it cannot be accepted that there is no suitable accommodation. 7. After hearing learned Counsel for the petitioner(tenant) and having gone through the case file carefully with his able assistance, this Court is of the considered view that the present revision petition is devoid of any merit and the same deserves to be dismissed. 8. Before adverting to the facts of the present case it would be apposite to reproduce the definition of landlord as given in the Act:- “2(c) “landlord” means any person for the time being entitled to receive rent in respect of any building or rented land whether on his own account or on behalf or for the benefit, of any other person, and includes a tenant who sublets any building or rented land in the manner hereinafter authorised, and, every person from time to time deriving title under a landlord” “2(hh) “specific landlord” means a person who is entitled to received rent in respect of a building on his own account and who is holding or has held an appointment in a public service or post in connection with the affairs of the Union of India or of a State”. (emphasis supplied) 9. As is evident from the conjoint reading of definition given under Section 2(c) & 2(hh) of the Act, there is no absolute requirement of law that a person has to let out a property or receive rent in order to file the eviction application under Section 13 or Section 13-A of the Act.
(emphasis supplied) 9. As is evident from the conjoint reading of definition given under Section 2(c) & 2(hh) of the Act, there is no absolute requirement of law that a person has to let out a property or receive rent in order to file the eviction application under Section 13 or Section 13-A of the Act. Since as per the definition any person, who derives a title under a landlord is permitted to be the landlord and any person who is entitled to receive rent on his own account i.e. he is owner of the demised premises, comes under the definition of specified landlord subject to fulfilling the other ingredients laid down under Section 13-A of the Act. Therefore, the first argument raised by the learned Counsel for the petitioner(tenant) that the eviction petition itself is not maintainable since the premises was not initially let out by the respondent(landlord) is misconceived. The person who has once bought the property or is the legal owner of the property, then he is the natural landlord and for all intents and purposes can get the property vacated on any of the grounds that accrue in his favour under the Act. This proposition is no longer res integra as in 2003 (1) RCR (Rent) 698 Deepak Suri Vs. Commodore K.S. Sandhu & [2011(2) Law Herald (P&H) 1874] : 2011(2) CCC 295 Chander Bhushan Anand Vs. Devender Kumar Singla two different coordinate Benches of this Court have already held that there is no legal impediment for a person filling an eviction application under Section 13-A of the Act that he should have necessarily let out the premises upon which he is claiming himself to be a landlord. 10. The second argument that has been raised by the learned Counsel for the petitioner is also devoid of merit. Had the intention of the legislature been that the landlord filing an petition under Section 13 A of the Act was to be a owner for atleast a year, then the same would have been specifically mentioned in the Act itself, as it has been mentioned for NRI(landlord) under Section 13 B. Since there are no such words used by the legislature under Section 13-A of the Act, the Court cannot take upon itself the work of legislature and traverse beyond its own scope of judicial review and add words which the legislature never intended to.
Not only this, in Deepak Suri’s case (supra), this Court has already held that the contention of a camouflage by the landlord in order to file a petition under Section 13-A is not tenable because such kind of objections would only led to chaos and confusion. 11. As far as the third argument raised by the learned Counsel for the petitioner is concerned, this Court is of the opinion that there is no dispute regarding the proposition of law laid down by Hon’ble Supreme Court in Devi Dass’s case (supra). However, much water has flown through since the passing of the said judgment and courts are required to interpret the law as per the changed scenario. In the present case, the tenant has not disputed the validity or otherwise of the sale deed executed in favour of Sushma Jindal wife of respondent(landlord) by its previous owners i.e. Vijay Jindal etc on 1.10.2008. The transfer deed dated 4.3.2009 executed between the present respondent(landlord) and his wife Sushma Jindal has been challenged to be a mala fide document but as is evident, the said document is registered and valid rights have been transferred as permitted under law. Thus, challenge to the same in rent proceedings on mere assertions is also without any merit. An internal arrangement between husband and wife cannot be looked into by the court while exercising its jurisdiction under the Rent Act. 12. Finally, the argument that the first and second floor of demised premises are vacant and therefore sufficient for the respondent (landlord) is concerned, this Court has held time and again in numerous judgments that tenant is no one to dictate terms to the landlord and the landlord is best judge of his own requirement. If after retirement the landlord wants to live comfortably in a good house of his own on the ground floor, then a tenant cannot curtail his necessity by taking the plea that he can live in alternative accommodation which is on some other floor. 13. In view of the above discussion, finding no merit in the present revision, the same is hereby dismissed.