1. This civil second appeal by the defendants is directed against judgment and decree dated 31.12.2012 of learned Additional District Judge, Udhampur passed in a Civil 1st Appeal. Learned Additional District Judge, while dismissing defendants' appeal, has upheld the judgment and decree passed by learned Sub Judge (C.J.M.) Udhampur in a suit for ejectment in favour of the plaintiffs (herein respondents) as against defendants (herein appellants and two others). 2. Heard. I have pursued the record. 3. Fact which are necessary for disposal of this appeal are these: 3.1. Plaintiffs' suit before the learned Sub Judge, Udhampur pertained to a piece of land (herein after to be referred as suit land) measuring 90 feet x 110 feet, underneath a cinema hall, namely, City Light and shops, situate at ward No. 3 (old), Udhampur. The suit land seems to have been taken on rent by predecessor-in-interest of the defendants, late Shri Sant Ram, in the year 2008 Bk, who constructed the cinema hall, and the shops to be used for running the cinema hall on the said land. After the death of late Shri Sant Ram, the original defendants, Shakti Parkash, Hirdhey Parkash and Santosh Rani executed a fresh lease deed (rent note) dated 15.07.1981 in respect of the suit land in favour of its owner, Shri Dina Nath, predecessor-in-interest of the plaintiffs. By virtue of the said lease deed, a fresh lease for a period of 15 years, commencing 1st August, 1981 and ending 31.07.1996, was thus created and the defendants inter alia agreed to vacate and deliver back the vacant possession of the suit land after removing the building structure and fixtures etc. from there after the end of the lease period. 3.2. As the defendants did not hand over the possession of the suit land to the plaintiffs after the end of the tenancy period at the mid night on 31.07.1996, Plaintiffs filed the suit for ejectment against them on 29.10.1996. They sought a decree for ejectment of the defendants from the suit land on the ground that the tenancy determined by efflux of time at the mid night on 31.07.1996 but the defendants did not hand over possession back to the plaintiffs and were continuing in possession as tenants at sufferance. They sought a decree for ejectment of the defendants from the suit land on the ground that the tenancy determined by efflux of time at the mid night on 31.07.1996 but the defendants did not hand over possession back to the plaintiffs and were continuing in possession as tenants at sufferance. They also alleged that defendants have violated the rent deed by renting out the shops existing on the suit land to M/S Kailoo Agency on monthly rental of 3,000/ rupees though the rent deed mandated use of the land and construction thereon only for the purpose of running the cinema hall. Plaintiffs also contended that suit land was reasonably and bona fide required by them as they wanted to construct shopping-cum-hotel complex in the said land and for that propose construction plan has been submitted by them to Town Area Committee, Udhampur. Plaintiffs also contended that the defendants were not entitled to protection under the J&K Houses and Shops Rent Control Act (for short, the Act) as their annual income was more than 60,000/ rupees and the tenancy was covered under Section 1(3)(iii) of the Act [Refer JK Laws 2nd Ed. 2013 Vol. 16 P-549] 3.3. Defendant Nos. 1 & 2, Shakti Parkash and Hirdhey Parkash, in their written statement before the trial Court pleaded that they ceased to be the partners in the City Light cinema due to dissolution of the partnership and therefore, had no right or interest in the tenancy. 3.4. Defendant No. 3, Santosh Rani, predecessor-in-interest of herein appellants, in her written statement, while admitting the tenancy and retirement of defendants 1 & 2 from cinema business, denied the violation of the lease deed as well as the personal necessity of the plaintiffs. She also pleaded that her net annual income was less than 60,000/ rupees and therefore, protection under the Act was applicable to the tenancy. While not denying the term of tenancy from 1.8.1981 to 31.7.1996, defendant No. 3 denied that she continues in possession of the suit land as tenant at sufferance and pleaded that she is in possession as tenant holing over. She, therefore, sought dismissal of plaintiffs' suit. 3.5. Learned trial court on the basis of pleadings of the parties framed following seven issues in the suit: 1. Whether annual net income of defendant at the relevant period was more than Rs. She, therefore, sought dismissal of plaintiffs' suit. 3.5. Learned trial court on the basis of pleadings of the parties framed following seven issues in the suit: 1. Whether annual net income of defendant at the relevant period was more than Rs. 60,000/- and therefore the provisions of J&K Houses & Shops Rent Control Act are not applicable to the present suit? ..OPP 2. In case the provisions of Houses and Shops Rent Control Act are held to be applicable to the present suit, whether the plaintiffs reasonably and bonafidely require the suit land for construction purposes?...OPP 3. In case issue No.-2 is proved in affirmative whether the proposed construction shall be in the interest of public benefit? ....OPP 4. Whether as per the terms of the lease deed it was mandatory for the defendant to use the demised land and the building and shops built thereon only for the purpose of running the cinema? ...OPP 5. In case issue no. 4 is proved in affirmative, whether the defendants have in violation of the mandatory terms of aforesaid lease deed rented out a shop to M/S Kailoo Agencies on a monthly rent of Rs. 3000/, if proved so, what is its effect on the suit? .OPP 6. Whether the defendant Nos. 1 & 2 have relinquished and ceased to be the partners of city light cinema business and also the tenancy rights of the suit land vide registered dissolution deed dated 13th July 1984 and thereafter only the defendant No. 3 has been continuing as the sole tenant to the knowledge and with the implied consent of the plaintiffs by accepting rent from her, if proved so what is its effect?. ..OPD 7. Whether the tenancy of the defendant No. 3 despite the expiry of contractual period still continues as tenant holding over which has not been legally determined, if proved so, what is its effect? OPD 8. Relief? 3.6. Plaintiffs', besides plaintiff No. 1, produced eight witnesses and defendant No. 3, besides her attorney holder son, Bharat Kumar Gupta, produced three witnesses. Defendant Nos. 1 and 2 were set ex parte. 3.7 Learned trial Court after evaluating the evidence decided all the issues framed in the case. OPD 8. Relief? 3.6. Plaintiffs', besides plaintiff No. 1, produced eight witnesses and defendant No. 3, besides her attorney holder son, Bharat Kumar Gupta, produced three witnesses. Defendant Nos. 1 and 2 were set ex parte. 3.7 Learned trial Court after evaluating the evidence decided all the issues framed in the case. Learned Court as regards issue No. 1, took the view that tenancy commenced from 1.8.1981 and expired on 31.7.1996 and the suit was filed in October, 1996 so relevant period for the purpose of determining annual income of the defendants was the period of twelve months from 1.8.1995 to 31.7.1996. After appraisal of the evidence learned Court found that total annual income from the cinema for the relevant period of 12 months was 5,28,185/ rupees, the income from the shop, which was rented out by the defendants, was 25,200/ rupees and the total income, thus, was 5,53, 385 rupees. From the evidence available on record learned Court calculated total expenses for running the cinema for that period as 1,68,000/ rupees and therefore, arrived at a conclusion that "plaintiffs have proved that the income of the defendants from City Light cinema is much more than 60,000/ rupees per annum as such provisions of J&K Houses and Shops Rent Control Act are not applicable." Learned trial Court, therefore, decided issue No. 1 in favour of the plaintiffs as against the defendants. In evaluating the evidence on issue no. 1, learned trial court did not rely upon the income tax returns produced by the defendant no. 3.In that learned trial Court referred to the income tax returns for the successive years immediately prior thereto in which net income was shown more than 60,000/ and relied upon a judgment of this court in Banarsi Dass v. Jagdish Raj Kolhi, AIR 1960 J&K 5 : JKJ Soft JKJ/10355, in which it has been held that provisions of Income Tax Act cannot be imported for construing a totally different Act like House and Shop Rent Control Act. 3.8 Learned trial Court, in spite of holding that the Act was not applicable in the case and therefore, observing that issue Nos. 2 & 3 were not required to be decided, after a brief discussion of the evidence, decided these two issues too in favour of the plaintiffs. Taking up issue Nos. 3.8 Learned trial Court, in spite of holding that the Act was not applicable in the case and therefore, observing that issue Nos. 2 & 3 were not required to be decided, after a brief discussion of the evidence, decided these two issues too in favour of the plaintiffs. Taking up issue Nos. 4 & 5 together, learned trial Court after appraisal of the evidence held that defendants had violated the terms and conditions of the lease deed and decided these two issues in favour of the plaintiffs too. 3.9 Learned trial Court did not agree with the plea of the defendants that defendant Nos. 1 & 2 had retired and ceased to be the partners in City Light cinema business and only defendant No. 3 had been continuing as sole tenant of the suit land and therefore, decided issue no. 6 against the defendants. 3.10 As regards issue No. 7, learned trial Court on the basis of the pleadings of the parties and referring to sections 111 and 106 of the Transfer of the Property Act, 1977 [Refer JK Laws 2nd Ed. 2013 Vol. 32 P-21] held that "the defendants are not holding the suit premises as a tenants holding over but only as tenants at sufferance and no notice is required for termination of their tenancy" and therefore, decided the issue in favour of the plaintiffs as against the defendants. 3.11 Learned trial Court, thus, allowed the suit by passing a decree in favour of the plaintiffs as against the defendants directing them to hand over the possession of the suit land to the plaintiffs after removing the building and other fixtures attached thereto. Learned Court, however, attached a rider to execution of the decree directing that the decree shall be executable only after the plans for construction of the proposed shopping complex/building are sanctioned by the Competent Authority. 3.12 Feeling aggrieved by the decree and judgment of the learned trial Court, defendants (legal representative sof original defendant No. 3) assailed the same in Civil Ist Appeal No. 09 before learned Additional District Judge, Udhampur. 4. I may briefly refer to the grounds on which the judgment and decree were challenged in the Ist appeal. 3.12 Feeling aggrieved by the decree and judgment of the learned trial Court, defendants (legal representative sof original defendant No. 3) assailed the same in Civil Ist Appeal No. 09 before learned Additional District Judge, Udhampur. 4. I may briefly refer to the grounds on which the judgment and decree were challenged in the Ist appeal. Defendants (appellants) questioned the finding of the learned trial Court in issue No. 1 contending that material on record clearly shows that annual income of the defendants during the relevant time was less than 60,000/rupees. They contended that learned trial Court acted on surmises and conjectures and unreasonably rejected the income tax assessment record of the defendants. Appellants also questioned the view taken by the learned trial Court that decisions in issue Nos. 2 & 3 was not required and also the decision of the Court in these issues contending that the same was arrived at ignoring all material facts from which inference of bona fide and reasonable need of plaintiffs could have been drawn. In this regard, appellants also pointed out that the impugned judgment sans reference to defendants' preferential right to the construction to be raised on the suit land, if a decree for ejectment on that ground were to be passed. Defendants also questioned finding as regards sub-letting of a shop on the ground that the same was not proved and there was no forfeiture clause. It is important, however, to underline that the defendants in the Ist. appeal did not raise any specific objections to the finding of the learned trial Court in issue Nos. 6 & 7 and, to say in particular, against the finding that they/their predecessor-in-interest, Santosh Rani, were/was continuing in possession of the suit land as tenant at sufferance. 5. Learned 1st. appellate Court dismissed the appeal. However, in accepting cross objections of the plaintiffs, learned Court removed the rider on execution of the decree imposed by the learned trial Court. 6. Learned 1st. appellate Court after evaluating the evidence on the trial Court file agreed with the finding recorded by the learned trial Court in issue No. 1. In appreciating the evidence leaned Ist appellate Court took note of the failure on the part of the defendants to have pleaded in the written statement or to have produced evidence to prove the expenditure involved in running the cinema hall. In appreciating the evidence leaned Ist appellate Court took note of the failure on the part of the defendants to have pleaded in the written statement or to have produced evidence to prove the expenditure involved in running the cinema hall. Learned Court also, while relying upon Banarsi Dass's case (supra), recorded its own reasons for not relying upon the income tax returns for the years 1995-96 and 1996-97. 7. Learned 1st. appellate Court held as correct the finding recorded by the learned trial Court in issue Nos. 2 & 3 also emphasizing that the findings on these two issues are subject to negative finding on issue no. 1. As regards issues 4 & 5, the learned 1st. appellate Court rejected contention of the defendants that there was no forfeiture clause in the rent deed pointing out that it was expressly provided therein that defendants will use the premises only for running cinema and not to sub-let any part or portion of it. Contextually, learned 1st. appellate Court on perusal of learned trial Court record held that cogent and sufficient evidence has been led by the plaintiffs to prove that a shop in the cinema premises has been sub-let by the defendants to Kailoo agencies run by Hemant Kumar. 8. Learned 1st. appellate Court also rejected the argument of the defendants'/appellants' counsel that the defendants/appellants continued in possession of the suit land as tenants holding over and it was obligatory upon the plaintiffs to determine the tenancy by serving notice upon defendants, which was not done. In that learned Court, while referring to sections 111 and 116 of the Transfer of Property Act, held that lease between the parties determined by efflux of time in terms of section 111. In this context, learned 1st. appellate Court also observed that there was no evidence to show that the plaintiffs or their representatives had accepted the rent from the defendants or otherwise assented to their continuing in possession of the suit premises after end of the lease period and that on the other hand plaintiffs had expressed their intention to evict the defendants by filing the suit for ejectment. Learned Court, therefore, held that it was not a case of tenant holding over. In the end, learned 1st. Learned Court, therefore, held that it was not a case of tenant holding over. In the end, learned 1st. appellate Court pointed out that though there was express condition in the lease deed that lessee shall not sub-let the leased premises but there is no such condition that on breach thereof the lessor may re-enter so the lease had determined only by the efflux of time and not by breach of condition in the lease deed. 9. It goes without saying that after passing of the amendment Act No. XI of 1983, (1976 amendment in Central Code) second appeal under section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure [Refer JK'S Code of Civil Procedure Commentary P-174] (for short the Code) to the High Court lies only on the basis of a substantial question of law'. Satisfaction about existence of a `substantial question of law' is a prerequisite for admitting a second appeal to hearing. To fulfill this condition, sub section (3) of section 100 casts obligation on the appellant to state precisely in the memorandum of appeal the substantial question or questions of law involved in the appeal and sub sections (4 ) & (5) cast obligation on the High Court to formulate those questions and hear the parties on those questions only. A second appeal cannot be admitted to hearing unless the court is satisfied about involvement of `substantial question of law'. Sub section (5) further gives a right to respondents to argue that the case does not involve such questions. 10. `What is substantial question of law involved in a case?' was the question posed by a three-judge bench of the Supreme Court in Santosh Hazari v. Purshottam Tiwari, AIR 2001 SC 965 . Their Lordships in para 14 of the reporting have observed: "14. A point of law which admits of no two opinions may be a proposition of law but cannot be a substantial question of law. To be `substantial' a question of law must be debatable, not previously settled by law of the land or a binding precedent, and must have a material bearing on the decision of the case, if answered either way, in so far as the rights of the parties before it are concerned. To be `substantial' a question of law must be debatable, not previously settled by law of the land or a binding precedent, and must have a material bearing on the decision of the case, if answered either way, in so far as the rights of the parties before it are concerned. To be a question of law `involving in the case' there must be first a foundation for it laid in the pleadings and the question should emerge from the sustainable findings of fact arrived at by Court of facts and it must be necessary to decide that question of law for a just and proper decision of the case. An entirely new point raised for the first time before the High Court is not a question involved in the case unless it goes to the root of the matter. It will, therefore, depend on the facts and circumstance of each case whether a question of law is a substantial one and involved in the case, or not; the paramount overall consideration being the need for striking a judicious balance between the indispensable obligation to do justice at all stages and impelling necessity of avoiding prolongation in the life of any lis." 11. Earlier in para 12 of the reporting, Their Lordships have observed that the "phrase `substantial question of law' as occurring in amended Section 100 is not defined in the Code. The word substantial, as qualifying `question of law' means of having substance, essential, real, of sound worth, important or considerable. It is to be understood as something in contradiction with-technical, of no substance or consequent, or academic merely. However it is clear that the Legislature has chosen not to qualify the scope of `substantial question of law' by suffixing the words `of general importance' as has been done in many other provisions such as Section 109 of the Code [Refer JK'S Code of Civil Procedure Commentary P-210] Article 133 (1)(a) of the Constitution". [Refer JK'S Constitution Of India P-66] 12. In this appeal, appellants have proposed as many as twelve questions as `substantial questions of law'. I have read and analyzed all of them. [Refer JK'S Constitution Of India P-66] 12. In this appeal, appellants have proposed as many as twelve questions as `substantial questions of law'. I have read and analyzed all of them. Six of these questions express and revolve around the dissatisfaction of the plaintiffs/appellants with the affirmative finding of the 1stappellant Court/courts below in issue No. 1, dealing with the income of the defendants, holding that the annual income of defendants from City Light cinema at the relevant time was more than 60,000/ rupees and thereby provisions of the Act were not applicable to the suit. In the other six questions, appellants have questioned the manner of writing the judgment by the appellate Court. 13. Emphasis in the arguments advanced by Mr. A.V. Gupta, learned Sr. Advocate, appearing on behalf of appellants (defendants), was on the contention that evidence has not been properly appreciated by the learned courts below. Mr. Gupta mainly assailed the manner of appreciation of the evidence adopted by the learned 1st. appellate Court, making a point in his submissions that by application of the `doctrine of merger' judgment of trial Court has merged into the judgment of 1st appellate Court. Mr. Gupta would say that learned trial Court as well as the Ist appellate Court have committed error by making the purchase of the entertainment tickets as the basis of arriving at the gross income from the cinema business and not taking into account the income tax returns covering the relevant period. Mr. Gupta submitted further that the lower courts committed further error by assuming the net income without taking into consideration the entire expenditure involved in running the cinema hall. Mr. Gupta would say further that learned 1st.appellate Court was wrong in taking the view that expenditure should have been proved by the defendants. In support of his arguments, Mr. Gupta relied upon a Division Bench decision of this Court in Mohd Ashraf Ahanger v. Ghulam Mohd Shah and ors., AIR 1982 J&K 11 : JKJ Soft JKJ/22633 where their Lordships have held that exemption contained in sub section 3 of section 1 of the Act has to be pleaded and proved by the plaintiff, who wants to exclude the application of special provisions of the Act in a case. It is held by their Lordships that it is the landlord and not the tenant, who would be benefited on the proof of the exemption. It is held by their Lordships that it is the landlord and not the tenant, who would be benefited on the proof of the exemption. Mr. Gupta, thus, concluded his arguments in this regard saying that wrong appreciation of evidence and coming to a conclusion that income of the defendant was more than 60,000/ rupees without taking into consideration the expenditure, amounts to a `substantial question of law' as laid down by the Supreme Court in Santosh Hazari (supra) so appeal deserves admission for hearing. 14. Mr. D.C. Raina, learned Sr. Advocate, appearing on behalf of respondent No. 1, on the other hand argued that concurrent finding of facts cannot be assailed in second appeal as appellants' dissatisfaction with concurrent finding cannot be taken as substantial question of law. Mr. Raina among others, relied upon Gurdev Kaur v. Kaki, (2007) 1 SCC 546 and Vishwanath Agarwal v. Sarla Vishwanath Agarwal (2012) 7 SCC 288 . Mr. Raina also supported learned 1st Appellate Court's finding pointing out the defendants' failure to prove expenditure involved in running the cinema Hall and in this behalf relied upon a three Judge-Bench decision of the Supreme Court in Gopal Krishnaji Ketkar v. Mohamed Haji Latif and ors. AIR 1968 SC 1413 . 15. By now it is settled as a principle of law that a challenge to a concurrent finding of fact, recorded by the trial Court and 1st. appellate Court generally does not raise a `substantial question of law' calling for hearing of the matter in second appeal under Section 100 of the Code.It may be useful to refer to some judgments of the Supreme Court to trace the emergence of this principle: 16. In a three-Judge Bench decision in Bholaram v. Ameer Chand, (1981) 2 SCC 414 , their Lordships of the Supreme Court, have observed that the High Court seems to have justified its interference in second appeal mainly on the ground that the judgments of the courts below were perverse and were given in utter disregard of the important material on the record particularly misconstruction of the rent note. Even if we accept the main reason given by the High Court the utmost that could be said was that the findings of fact by the courts below were wrong or grossly inexcusable but that by itself would not entitle the High Court to interfere in the absence of a clear error of law. 17. In Parsini (dead) through LRs v. Atma Ram and ors, AIR 1996 SC 1558 , the Supreme Court held that findings of the fact by the trial Court and appellate Court cannot be interfered and reversed with in second appeal. In Ms. Labanya Neogi (through LRs) v. W. B. Engineering Co., AIR 1999 SC 3331 , Supreme Court has held that findings recorded after considering the entire evidence on record or the questions of fact cannot be interfered in the second appeal. 18. In Thiagarajan v. Sri Venugopala swamy B. Koil (2004) 5 SCC 762 , the Supreme Court has held that it is the obligation of the courts of law to further the clear intendment of the legislature and not frustrate it by excluding the same. This court in catena of decisions held that where findings of fact by the lower appellate court are based on evidence, the High Court in second appeal cannot substitute its own findings on re-appreciation of evidence merely on the grounds that another view was possible. 19. In Gurdev Kour (supra), the Supreme Court seems to have expressed anxiety over the scope and object of section 100 of the Code not being properly appreciated and applied in a large number of the cases. On the outset their Lordships in para 4 of the reporting observed: "4. Despite declaration of law in numerous judgments, it is evident that the scope and ambit of section 100 CPC has not been properly appreciated and applied in a large number of cases. We are, once again making a serious endeavor to discern legislative intention, ambit and scope of interference under Section 100 CPC. We plan to carry out this exercise by critically examining important judgments decided before and after 1976 amendment in Section 100 CPC. This effort is made with the hope that in future the High Courts would decide according to the scope of Section 100 CPC and this Court may not be compelled to interfere with the judgments delivered under Section 100 CPC." 20. This effort is made with the hope that in future the High Courts would decide according to the scope of Section 100 CPC and this Court may not be compelled to interfere with the judgments delivered under Section 100 CPC." 20. Their Lordships in para 71 of the reporting of Gurdev Kour have observed: "71. The fact that, in a series of cases, this Court was compelled to interfere was because the true legislative intendment and scope of section 100 CPC have neither been appreciated nor applied. A class of judges while administering law honestly believe that, if they are satisfied that in any second appeal brought before them evidence has been grossly misappreciated either by the lower appellate court or by both the courts below, it is their duty to interfere, because they seem to feel that a decree following upon a gross misappreciation of evidence involves injustice and it is the duty of the High Court to redress such injustice. We would like to reiterate that the justice has to be administered in accordance with law." 21. Recently in Vishwanath Agarwal (supra) Supreme Court has referred to some earlier judgments of the Courts to clarify the scope of interfering with in the Second Appeal with the findings/ concurrent findings of the facts and in this record it is useful to refer paras 35, 36 & 37 of the reporting: "35. It is worth nothing that this Court in Kulwant Kaur v. Gurdial Singh Mann (2001) 4 SCC 262 , has held that while it is true that in a second appeal, a finding of fact, even if erroneous, will generally not be disturbed but where it is found that the findings stand vitiated on wrong test and on the basis of assumptions and conjectures and resultantly there is an element of perversity involved therein, the High Court will be within its jurisdiction to deal with the issue. An issue pertaining to perversity comes within the ambit of substantial question of law. Similar view has been stated in Govindaraju v. Mariamman (2005) 2 SCC 500 . 36. An issue pertaining to perversity comes within the ambit of substantial question of law. Similar view has been stated in Govindaraju v. Mariamman (2005) 2 SCC 500 . 36. In Major Singh v. Rattan Singh ( AIR 1997 SC 1906 ), it has been observed that when the courts below had rejected and disbelieved the evidence on unacceptable grounds, it is the duty of the High Court to consider whether the reasons given by the courts below are sustainable in law while hearing an appeal under Section 100 of the Code or Civil Procedure. 37. In Vidhyadhar v. Manikrao, (1999) 3 SCC 573 , it has been ruled that the High Court in a second appeal should not disturb the concurrent findings of fact unless it is shown that the findings recorded by the courts below are perverse being based on no evidence or that on the evidence on record no reasonable person could have come to that conclusion. We may note here that solely because another view is possible on the basis of the evidence, the High Court would not be entitled to exercise the jurisdiction under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure. This view of ours has been fortified by the decision of this Court in Abdul Raheem v. Karnataka Electricity Board. ( AIR 2008 SC 956 )." 22. The legal position emerging from the principles laid down by the Supreme Court is clear too. High Court in exercise of appellate jurisdiction in second appeal under Section 100 of the Code should not normally entertain appellant's challenge to and disturb the findings on the questions of fact recorded by the 1st. Appellate Court, much less, the concurrent findings of the trial court and the 1st appellate Court because challenge and questions so raised cannot be taken as `substantial question of law'. Nevertheless, such a challenge will be covered within the ambit of `substantial question of law' if the findings recorded by the Appellate Court or the concurrent findings recorded by the lower courts suffer from legal defects, like having been recorded; without any evidence, on the basis of irrelevant or inadmissible evidence or by misreading or ignoring some relevant or important evidence. However, findings arrived at by the 1st.Appellate Court cannot be reevaluated only for the reason that a view other than that taken by the 1st.Appellate Court may be possible. 23. However, findings arrived at by the 1st.Appellate Court cannot be reevaluated only for the reason that a view other than that taken by the 1st.Appellate Court may be possible. 23. On perusal and scrutiny of the judgments of the 1st. appellate Court and the trial Court and the evidence recorded by the trial Court, I, however, am not persuaded to accept the contention urged on behalf of the appellants that appreciation of the evidence and the concurrent findings recorded by the two courts suffer from a defect as much as to raise a `substantial question of law'. 24. The focus of contention sought to be projected on behalf of the defendants/appellants is that the net income of the appellants has been arrived at ignoring the expenditure involved in running the cinema hall. It is urged in this behalf that even the onus of proving the expenditure was on the respondents (plaintiffs). Contention, however, is not acceptable. In this behalf it, however, may be stated that there cannot be any disagreement with the proposition that plaintiff has to plead and prove that his case falls under the exception provided under section 1(3) of the Act and the Act does not apply. It indisputably was for the plaintiffs to prove that the annual income of the original defendants (say defendant No. 3) for the relevant period, that is, from 1.08.1955 to 31.07.1996, was more than 60,000/ rupees to make out that the provisions of the Act were not applicable to the tenancy in question, in terms of Section 1 (3) (iii), which reads: 1. (1)................... (2)................... (3) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (2), nothing in this Act shall apply to- (i) .......................... (ii) .......................... (iii) any tenancy in respect of any house or shop where the income of the tenant, whether accruing within or outside the State, exceeds rupees 60,000/ per annum; 25. Plaintiffs in para 5 of the plaint have clearly pleaded that the annual income of the defendants was more than 60,000/ rupees so the Act was not applicable. In reply, defendant No. 3 pleaded in her written statement that the net income from City Light cinema, which was the only source of income to her, was much less than 60,000/ rupees. In reply, defendant No. 3 pleaded in her written statement that the net income from City Light cinema, which was the only source of income to her, was much less than 60,000/ rupees. Learned trial Court, having regard to the meaning of the word `income' occurring in Section 1(3) (iii) of the Act as laid down by this Court in Banarsi Dass (Supra), on evaluation of the evidence led by the parties found that the total annual income from the cinema hall was 5,28,185/ rupees and adding to it 25,200/ rupees as rental income from rented out shop, took the total annual income of defendants as 5,53,385/ rupees. Learned trial Court did not rely upon the income tax returns produced by defendant No. 3 for the year 1995-96 in which net income was shown as Rs. 57,751/ and for the year 1996-97 in which net income was shown as Rs. 41,657/.In that learned trial Court referred to income tax return for successive years immediately prior thereto in which net income was shown more than Rs. 60,000/. In not taking into consideration the income tax returns for calculating the income of the defendants for the relevant period, learned trial Court relied upon Banarsi Das (supra) in which this Court has held that word `income' cannot be construed as meaning nothing more and nothing less than the amount in respect of which income tax is assessed under the provisions of the Income tax Act. This court has however, held in that case that "there appears to be no justification to import the provisions of Income Tax Act for construing the provisions of a totally different Act such as the Houses and Shops Rent Control Act. The provisions of Income tax Act are intended exclusively for the purpose of assessing and collecting income tax. It has adopted its own standards and principles for the purpose of arriving at the amount on which the tax should be assessed. That Act does not and cannot be understood as laying down general principle for computing the income of person for other purpose or with reference to other enactments. It has adopted its own standards and principles for the purpose of arriving at the amount on which the tax should be assessed. That Act does not and cannot be understood as laying down general principle for computing the income of person for other purpose or with reference to other enactments. It is also well to remember that Section 1(3) (iii) of the Houses and Shops Rent Control Act applies not only to persons who are liable to pay income tax but also to others who are not liable to pay income tax but who nevertheless receive considerably agriculture income." 26. Learned trial Court, having regard to the detail of employees engaged in the cinema hall and their wages as per the evidence given by the attorney holder son of the original defendant no. 3, herein appellant no. 1, calculated total expenditure in running the cinema hall as 1, 68,000/ rupees and while deducting further 2387/ rupees as show tax paid during the relevant period took the net annual income for the relevant period as 3, 61,498/ rupees. 27. Learned 1st appellate Court again evaluated the evidence and arrived at the conclusion that the total income of the defendants for the relevant period of 12 months was 5, 53, 385/ rupees. Learned trial Court too did not take into consideration the income tax returns relying upon the law laid down by this Court in Banarsi Dass (supra). 28. The concurrent finding recorded by the two courts as regards the total income of the defendants for the relevant period does not suffer from any defect, much less a defect making out a `substantial question of law', calling for interference in second appeal. 29. Correct it is that the 1st.appellate Court did not go into the question relating to expenditure part and it is in this context that it has been urged on behalf of the appellants that by the application of the `doctrine of merger' only judgment of the 1st appellate Court should be taken into consideration and the same calls for intervention in 2nd appeal as question of expenditure has not been considered by the learned 1st. Appellate Court. Point, however, is not sustainable and much less gives rise to `substantial question of law. Appellate Court. Point, however, is not sustainable and much less gives rise to `substantial question of law. It may be stated in this context that in Santosh Hazari (supra) Supreme Court has laid down that the `substantial question of law' raised in 2nd appeal must have its foundation in the pleadings and should emerge through evidence brought on record. Original defendant No. 3 in her written statement before the trial Court did not make any mention of the expenditure incurred in running the cinema hall. She could have, but did not disclose the total income, the expenditure or the net income from the cinema hall. She did not lead any evidence to prove the expenditure in running the cinema hall. Best evidence in this regard could have been led by the defendants and it was for her/them to prove that the expenditure was more than what the trial Court has taken as. That aspect of the matter, therefore, could have been decided only on the basis of evidence available on the record and the learned trial court accordingly calculated the same as 1,68,000/ rupees. Finding of the trial Court in this regard neither was challenged in the 1stappeal nor has been challenged in this appeal. The finding to that extent, therefore, neither was required to be gone into by learned 1st appellate Court nor would emerge as question of law much less a `substantial question of law' for determination in the 2nd appeal and for that the application of the `doctrine of merger' does not arise for consideration. 30. For aforementioned, in my considered view no `substantial question of law' for reconsidering the concurrent finding recorded by the Courts below in issue no. 1 is made out. As the Act did not apply to the tenancy in question because of affirmative decision in issue no. 1 and as there is no challenge to the finding on the question of law that tenancy had terminated due to efflux of time prior to the filing of suit nor the said finding suffers from any defect, the other questions raised by the appellants and challenge to findings in other issues need not be gone into. 31. For all that said and discussed above, I would precisely hold that `no substantial question of law' is involved in this 2nd appeal and the same does not merit admission to hearing. 32. 31. For all that said and discussed above, I would precisely hold that `no substantial question of law' is involved in this 2nd appeal and the same does not merit admission to hearing. 32. In result, the appeal is dismissed. 33. Record of the Courts below be remitted back.