JUDGMENT S.B. Shukre, J. 1. This appeal is directed against the judgment and decree passed on 10th February, 1995 in Regular Civil Appeal No. 162 of 1992 thereby reversing the judgment and decree of dismissal of Regular Civil Suit No. 75 of 1989 passed on 30th April, 1992 by Civil Judge, Junior Division, Balapur. The respondent Nos. 1 and 2 are the original plaintiffs and the appellants and respondent Nos. 3 to 7 are the original defendants. The respondent No. 3 was the father of original plaintiffs and respondent No. 4 is the mother of the original plaintiffs and they were original defendant Nos. 1 and 2. The suit property involved in this case consists of four lands (for short 'suit-lands') as described in details in plaint paragraph No. 2. According to the respondent Nos. 1 and 2, all the suit lands were sold out to them by respondent No. 3 by registered sale-deed executed on 4-4-1972. They submitted that consideration of Rs.2,000/- was also paid to the respondent No. 3 and soon after registration of the sale-deed, names of both these respondent Nos. 1 and 2 came to be recorded as owners in the revenue record. They submitted that in view of the sale of the suit lands to them by respondent No. 3, they became the absolute owners of the suit lands and respondent Nos. 3 and 4 ceased to have any title or interest in the suit lands. They submitted that the respondent Nos. 3 and 4, after the sale of the suit lands to respondent Nos. 1 and 2, being no longer the owners of the suit lands, had no right to alienate the same to rest of the defendants i.e. appellants and respondent Nos. 4 to 7. They further submitted that if it was held that the respondent Nos. 3 and 4 were competent to make alienations of the suit lands, it be also held that same were without any legal basis, as permission of the District Judge was not obtained for making the alienations of the suit-lands, these respondents being minors at relevant time, having interest since birth in the ancestral properties, that the suit lands were. They also submitted that the alienations of suit-lands were without legal necessity and were not made for any benefit to the estate. Therefore, the respondent Nos. They also submitted that the alienations of suit-lands were without legal necessity and were not made for any benefit to the estate. Therefore, the respondent Nos. 1 and 2 filed a suit for a declaration that the alienations made by the respondent Nos. 3 and 4 were not binding upon them and for setting aside the alienations and for recovery of possession of the suit lands. 2. The respondent Nos. 3-Bhimrao, filed his consent written statement, vide Exhibit-18, and admitted the entire claim of the respondent Nos. 1 and 2. The respondent No. 4-Krushnabai also filed her separate written statement at Exhibit-20 admitting the entire claim of the respondent Nos. 1 and 2. The appellants (original defendant Nos. 3, 5, 7 and 8) and respondent No. 5-Sheshrao (Original defendant No. 4) filed their joint written statement, vide Exhibit-17 resisting the suit. Their main contention was that the sale-deed between the respondent No. 3 on the one hand and respondent Nos. 1 and 2 on the other was a nominal one and even after execution of the sale-deed, respondent No. 3 continued to remain in possession of the suit lands. They submitted that the said sale-deed was not a genuine and valid document and they denied that the respondent Nos. 1 and 2 became the owners of the suit lands by virtue of the said sale-deed. They submitted that there was in existence legal necessity to be met by respondent Nos. 3 and 4 and, therefore, they sold out the suit lands to remaining defendants i.e. appellants and respondent No. 7 and that they were the bona fide purchasers for valuable consideration. They submitted that the permission of the District Judge was also not necessary for alienations of the suit-lands to appellants. They submitted that the respondent No. 7 (original defendant No. 9) purchased one of the suit lands bearing Survey No. 108/2 after obtaining necessary permission from the District Judge, Akola in M.J.C. No. 34 of 1977 and the permission was also sought by the respondent No. 5 for sale of the said suit-land to respondent No. 7. They submitted that the respondent No. 5-Sheshrao, was wrongly added as a party defendant. Thus, they prayed for dismissal of the suit with costs. 3. They submitted that the respondent No. 5-Sheshrao, was wrongly added as a party defendant. Thus, they prayed for dismissal of the suit with costs. 3. The respondent No. 6 (original defendant No. 6) filed his written statement, vide Exhibit-19, submitting that he had no knowledge about any transaction of sale between the respondent Nos. 1 and 2 on the one hand and respondent No. 3 on the other. He submitted that he purchased one acre of land out of field Survey No. 105/2 for a valuable consideration of Rs.1,500/- on 1-8-1985 and it was sold out to him by respondent No. 3 for benefit to the estate and for also meeting legal necessity. He submitted that he had no knowledge as to whether or not any permission was obtained from the District Judge for sale of shares of minors in the property. He denied that the sale-deed dated 1-8-1985 executed in his favour was void ab initio. He submitted that so far as sale transaction with him was concerned, same being entered for meeting legal necessity and for earning benefit to the estate, was valid. But, he submitted that he could not say the same thing about the alienations made by the respondent No. 3 of the other suit-lands in favour of remaining defendants (appellants and respondent No. 7). He submitted that the respondent No. 3 being addicted to drinking and other vices, all other alienations, barring the alienation in his own favour, might be for satisfaction of the lust and desire of respondent No. 3. Without prejudice to all these contentions, he further submitted that if the Court found that the respondent No. 3 did not have any right to sell the property, the amount of consideration of Rs.1,500/- be refunded to him. 4. The respondent No. 7 (original defendant No. 9) did not file his written statement and the suit proceeded against him without his written statement. 5. This appeal has been admitted by this Court on 3rd April, 1995, on two substantial questions of law. The substantial questions of law that arise for my consideration are: 1. Whether the Appellate Court was justified in holding that appellants were not bona fide purchasers for valuable consideration? 2. Whether the Appellate Court was justified in reversing the finding recorded by trial Court on issue No. 1? 6. I have heard Mr. The substantial questions of law that arise for my consideration are: 1. Whether the Appellate Court was justified in holding that appellants were not bona fide purchasers for valuable consideration? 2. Whether the Appellate Court was justified in reversing the finding recorded by trial Court on issue No. 1? 6. I have heard Mr. S.N. Dhanagare, learned counsel for the appellants and Mr. L.A. Mohta, learned counsel for the respondent No. 1 and legal representatives of Respondent No. 2, (2-A) to (2-C) and Ku. U.R. Tanna, learned counsel for the legal representatives of Respondent No. 3, (3-A) and (3-C). None appeared for remaining respondents though duly served. 7. With the assistance of Mr. S.N. Dhanagare, Mr. L.A. Mohta and Ku. U.R. Tanna, I have carefully gone through the paper book of the appeal and also the record of the trial Court. 8. Learned counsel for the appellants has submitted that the first Appellate Court has, without considering the evidence and without taking into account the findings of facts recorded by the trial Court which were based upon the proper appreciation of evidence available on record, has reversed the findings of the trial Court and partly decreed the suit for possession of the suit lands except the land bearing Survey No. 108/2. He has invited my attention to evidence on record to point out some of the established material facts which together go to show that sale-deed dated 4-4-1972 (Exhibit-44) was nominal and appellants were bona fide purchasers for value. These are: (i) at the time of execution of Exhibit-44 sale-deed, the respondent Nos. 1 and 2 were minors and did not do anything to earn, (ii) there is no pleading and no evidence adduced by the respondent Nos. 1 and 2 showing as to how the consideration of Rs.2,000/- for purchasing the suit lands, vide Exhibit-44, was paid and who had arranged for the consideration, (iii) the possession of the suit lands was not with the respondent Nos. 1 and 2 and that mutation entry in the revenue record showing the respondent Nos. 1 and 2 as owners (vide Exhibit-45) was cancelled by another mutation entry (vide Exhibit-77) because as per the revenue record, the respondent Nos. 1 and 2 and that mutation entry in the revenue record showing the respondent Nos. 1 and 2 as owners (vide Exhibit-45) was cancelled by another mutation entry (vide Exhibit-77) because as per the revenue record, the respondent Nos. 1 and 2 were not in possession of the suit lands and that the respondent No. 3 was shown to be in possession of the suit lands, (iv) the possession of the suit lands after alienations made to the appellants and other respondents was also passed over by respondent No. 3 to these parties, and (v) evidence of parties clearly showed that there was some dispute going on in respect of a ceiling land between Datta Sansthan and respondent No. 3 and that the respondent No. 3 had obtained loan of Rs.9,000/- on the suit lands, pointing out the fact that the sale-deed (vide Exhibit-44) was only nominal and was neither intended to be acted upon nor was actually acted upon by the parties thereto. He thus submits that the findings recorded by the trial Court on the basis of such evidence that the sale transaction of dated 4-4-1972 (Exhibit-44) was not genuine and was only a nominal transaction and on the other hand the alienations of the suit lands made by the respondent No. 3 in favour of appellants and remaining respondents were for bona fide reasons and for valuable considerations, could not have been disturbed by the first Appellate Court. 9. Mr. Mohta, learned counsel for the respondent Nos. 1 and 2, on the other hand submits that the transaction dated 4-4-1972 evidenced by a registered document of sale-deed was genuine and had been acted upon by the parties, as seen from the evidence adduced by both sides. He submits that the consideration of the sale-deed as well as mutation entry (vide Exhibit-45) have been admitted by the appellants and the remaining respondents and, therefore, even though the respondent Nos. 3 and 4, the parents of the respondent Nos. 1 and 2 did not enter the witness box, it did not have any adverse impact on the case of the respondent Nos. 1 and 2. 3 and 4, the parents of the respondent Nos. 1 and 2 did not enter the witness box, it did not have any adverse impact on the case of the respondent Nos. 1 and 2. He further submits that the sale-deed (vide Exhibit-44), being a registered instrument, was a public document and in view of the provision of section 3 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 all the subsequent purchasers of the suit lands were presumed have notice of the same and, therefore, would not be permitted to say that they being the bona fide purchasers for value and having no notice of the earlier transaction, were entitled to protect their possession of the suit lands. He further submits that except for one of the suit lands bearing Survey No. 108/2, the evidence on record has shown that no permission has been granted by the District Judge for making of alienations of the suit lands even though same was necessary, the suit lands being ancestral property and at the time of those alienations, the respondent Nos. 1 and 2 being minor coparceners had right and interest in the same. On these grounds, he has urged that the appeal is liable to be dismissed with costs. 10. Ku. U.R. Tanna, learned counsel has adopted the arguments so canvassed on behalf of the respondent Nos. 1 and 2. 11. On going through the impugned judgment and decree as well as evidence available on record, I find that there is great substance in the argument so canvassed before me on behalf of appellants and no merit in the argument canvassed on behalf of respondent Nos. 1, 2 and respondent Nos. 3(A) and 3(B). 12. The trial Court upon an in-depth consideration of the evidence adduced by the rival parties recorded findings that the sale deed dated 4-4-1972 (Exhibit-44) was nominally executed by respondent No. 3 in favour of respondent Nos. 1 and 2 and that the respondent Nos. 3 and 4 had joined hands with respondent Nos. 1 and 2 in bringing the suit against the appellants and remaining respondents. Upon such consideration of evidence, the learned Judge of the trial Court also found that the alienations of the suit lands made by the respondent Nos. 3 and 4 in favour of appellants and respondent Nos. 6 and 7 were for legal necessity and, therefore, these parties were bona fide purchasers. Upon such consideration of evidence, the learned Judge of the trial Court also found that the alienations of the suit lands made by the respondent Nos. 3 and 4 in favour of appellants and respondent Nos. 6 and 7 were for legal necessity and, therefore, these parties were bona fide purchasers. Accordingly, the trial Court dismissed the suit. 13. If we go through the evidence brought on record by the rival parties, it could be seen that the findings so recorded by the trial Court are completely based upon the evidence available on record and represent a view that can be logically taken from such evidence. 14. It is an admitted fact that the suit lands have been purchased by sons (respondent Nos. 1 and 2) from father (respondent No. 3) at a time, when both sons were minors and were not earning anything. The suit lands together measured about 14 acres and the consideration paid for acquiring of such a large chunk of land has been stated to be of Rs.2,000/-. Of course, inadequacy of consideration is not a valid ground for setting aside the sale transaction, but it does raise a suspicion that something is amiss in the transaction. Then, the sons being minors at the time of purchase of the suit lands, some evidence explaining as to how the consideration was paid and what was the source of consideration should have been tendered. There is neither any pleading made nor evidence adduced in this regard by the respondent Nos. 1 and 2 and, therefore, a further doubt is created about the genuineness of the transaction. There have been several other factors brought on record through the evidence of witnesses of the appellants and respondent Nos. 5 to 7, casting doubt about genuineness of the said sale-deed and these factors have been cumulatively considered by the trial Court as proving the fact that the sale-deed (Exhibit-44) was only a nominal one and was not a genuine document. These factors as seen from the evidence of DW 1-Bhaskar-, DW 2-Rukhminibai, DW 3-Jairam, DW 4-Sadanand are as follows: i) The evidence shows that at the relevant time i.e. on 4-4-1972, there was some dispute going on between respondent No. 3 and Datta Sansthan in respect of one ceiling land and respondent No. 3 had some interest in this land. These factors as seen from the evidence of DW 1-Bhaskar-, DW 2-Rukhminibai, DW 3-Jairam, DW 4-Sadanand are as follows: i) The evidence shows that at the relevant time i.e. on 4-4-1972, there was some dispute going on between respondent No. 3 and Datta Sansthan in respect of one ceiling land and respondent No. 3 had some interest in this land. The evidence further indicates that to avoid further complications, respondent No. 3 sold out the suit lands to his sons on 4-4-1972 nominally. ii) There has been no challenge to the evidence of DW 1-Bhaskar-, DW 2-Rukhminibai, DW 3-Jairam and DW 4-Sadanand on the point of dispute going on between the respondent No. 3 and Datta Sansthan in respect of ceiling land and execution of nominal sale-deed by respondent No. 3 in favour of respondent Nos. 1 and 2. iii) The respondent Nos. 1 and 2 did not lead any evidence as to how did they generate funds for paying the consideration of the sale-deed (Exhibit-44), when at the relevant time they were minors. iv) The respondent No. 3 obtained loan of Rs.9,000/- from the land mortgaged with Bank by showing himself to be the owner of the suit lands and on 15-4-1974, the Bank had also issued notices for the auction purchase of field Survey Nos. 150/2, 105/1, 145/2 and 108/2 situated at village Bharatpur, which were shown to be in the name of respondent No. 3. These facts proved through the evidence of DW 6-Ajabrao, the employee of land mortgage Bank, have not been challenged by respondent Nos. 1 and 2. v) Though Exhibit-45 is a mutation entry in the revenue record, showing names of respondent No. 1 and 2 as owners of the suit lands, there is a subsequent mutation entry at Exhibit-77 which effectively cancels the mutation entry, vide Exhibit-45. The subsequent mutation entry at Exhibit-77 discloses that the names of respondent Nos. 1 and 2 have been removed from the revenue record on the ground that the respondent No. 3 is in possession of the suit lands and it is specifically mentioned therein that he is owner of the suit lands. The subsequent mutation entry at Exhibit-77 discloses that the names of respondent Nos. 1 and 2 have been removed from the revenue record on the ground that the respondent No. 3 is in possession of the suit lands and it is specifically mentioned therein that he is owner of the suit lands. vi) The sale-deed dated 4-4-1972 was never acted upon by the parties as subsequently by mutation entry vide Exhibit-77, respondent No. 3 has been shown in the revenue record to be the owner of the suit lands and loan was obtained by respondent No. 3 from the land mortgage Bank on 15-4-1974 over the suit lands, by showing himself to be the owner thereof. vii) If respondent No. 3 had really intended to transfer ownership of the suit lands to his sons, there would not have been a subsequent mutation entry (Exhibit-77) showing him to be in possession of the suit lands and respondent No. 3 would not have obtained any loan on the suit lands on 15-4-1974. viii) At the time of execution of the sale-deeds of the suit lands in favour of other defendants, (appellants and respondent Nos. 6 and 7) the respondent No. 3 delivered possession of the respective suit lands to these parties, which is a very strong circumstance indicating that the suit lands were in possession of the respondent No. 3 at the time of alienations made by him to the said parties and that he handed over actual possession of the respective suit lands to them on the basis of those sale-deeds. 15. Above stated factors emerge from the evidence of above referred witnesses of other defendants i.e. appellants and respondent Nos. 5 to 7 and since there is neither any challenge to the said evidence nor any doubtful circumstance having appeared in the cross-examination of these witnesses taken by the learned counsel for the respondent Nos. 1 and 2, it has to be said that this evidence strongly probabilises the case of other defendants i.e. the appellants and respondent Nos. 5 to 7 and completely weakens the case of the respondent Nos. 1 to 4. Therefore, the conclusions drawn by the trial Court that the sale-deed dated 4-4-1972 was a nominal document not representing any genuine transaction of sale between the respondent No. 3 on the one hand and respondent Nos. 1 and 2 on the other and that respondent Nos. 1 to 4. Therefore, the conclusions drawn by the trial Court that the sale-deed dated 4-4-1972 was a nominal document not representing any genuine transaction of sale between the respondent No. 3 on the one hand and respondent Nos. 1 and 2 on the other and that respondent Nos. 3 and 4 joined hands with respondent Nos. 1 and 2 in bringing a false and frivolous suit against the appellants and remaining respondents cannot be said to be not based upon the evidence available on record or the result of non-consideration of material evidence or based upon some extraneous material. The conclusions so drawn can also not to be founded on such a view as can never be possibly taken by application of process of reasoning and logic in the sense it is understood by a man of prudence. 16. It seems, however, the learned District Judge turned oblivious of the great deal of evidence glaringly showing the factors going in favour of case of other defendants (appellants and respondent Nos. 5 to 7) and against the case of the respondent Nos. 1 and 2. The learned District Judge, while reversing the aforestated findings of facts recorded by the trial Court gave only three reasons namely: i) the appellants and respondent Nos. 5 to 7 were not parties to the sale-deed and had no concern with the family affairs of respondent Nos. 1 and 2 on the one hand and respondent Nos. 3 and 4 on the other, ii) the appellants and other respondents had admitted in their plaint that the consideration of Rs. 2,000/- was paid to the respondent No. 3 and so it did not lie in the mouths of the appellants and remaining respondents that the sale-deed at Exhibit-44 was a nominal document, and iii) said sale-deed was also acted upon and the names of both respondent Nos. 1 and 2 were mutated in the record of rights. These reasons in fact showed only the half truth. The appellants and other respondents never disputed execution of the sale-deed for a consideration of Rs.2,000/-. What did they dispute was the intention to transfer the ownership by submitting that the ownership was never conveyed to respondent Nos. 1 and 2, the sale-deed being nominally executed. These reasons in fact showed only the half truth. The appellants and other respondents never disputed execution of the sale-deed for a consideration of Rs.2,000/-. What did they dispute was the intention to transfer the ownership by submitting that the ownership was never conveyed to respondent Nos. 1 and 2, the sale-deed being nominally executed. The appellants and the other respondents had also brought on record subsequent mutation entry (vide Exhibit-77) cancelling the effect of the previous mutation entry (vide Exhibit-45). These pleadings and said evidence together with remaining evidence discussed earlier were not even cursorily gone through by the learned District Judge and the result is there for us to see, completely erroneous and perverse findings based upon non-consideration of the material evidence available on record. 17. Having regard to the nature of evidence available on record and which has been discussed at length in earlier paragraphs, I am of the view that there is absolutely no scope for reversing the findings recorded by the trial Court as regards the effect of sale-deed dated 4-4-1972 (vide Exhibit-44). Accordingly, I hold that sale-deed dated 4-4-1972 (vide Exhibit-44) being nominally executed by the respondent No. 3 in favour of respondent Nos. 1 and 2 does not represent any genuine conveyance and, therefore, respondent Nos. 1 and 2 cannot be said to have become the absolute owners of the suit lands. Consequently, I further hold that the respondent Nos. 3 and 4 did have right, title and interest in the suit lands at the time when alienations of the suit lands through various sale-deeds were made to appellants and other respondents. The question No. 2 is, therefore, answered as in the negative. 18. The finding of the trial Court that the appellants and other respondents were bona fide purchasers for valuable consideration has been reversed by the learned District Judge. For such reversal, the learned District Judge has assigned the reason of absence of any evidence on record to show that the appellants and other respondents had made reasonable inquiry about the marketability of the title of respondent No. 3 in respect of suit lands before purchasing them. In paragraph 13, learned District Judge states that DW 1-Bhaskar did not utter a single word in this respect nor did DW 2-Rukhminibai say anything about it. In paragraph 13, learned District Judge states that DW 1-Bhaskar did not utter a single word in this respect nor did DW 2-Rukhminibai say anything about it. He also states that DW 4-Sadanand maintained silence in this regard and only DW 3-Jairam deposed that before purchasing the suit lands, he had made reasonable inquiry in that respect. This evidence, in the opinion of learned District Judge, indicated that the appellants and remaining other respondents were not bona fide purchasers for value without notice of rights of respondent Nos. 1 and 2. 19. With due respect to the learned District Judge, I must say that the learned District Judge has either misread the evidence or missed some vital portions thereof. Barring DW 2-Rukhminibai, the evidence of all other witnesses, namely, DW 1-Bhaskar, DW 3-Jairam and DW 4-Sadanand clearly discloses that these witnesses had made due inquiry in this respect. If DW 2-Rukhminibai had not made any inquiry, it cannot be seen as a lapse affecting the genuineness of the alienations of all the suit lands as after all, there was a suit commonly brought against these parties in respect of alienations of the suit lands made at different points of time and the defence as well as evidence of these parties were commonly presented. In such a case, therefore, the evidence of all witnesses is required to be read together and when we do so by and large we find that purchasers had made inquiries. That apart, the admission given by DW 2-Rukhminibai that she did not make any inquiry as regards ownership of the suit lands at the time of its purchase has to be understood as having been given in the natural course of conduct not adversely affecting her case in any manner. Admittedly, all the transactions and affairs of her family were being looked after by her husband Sakharam Sirsat and unless and until such admission came from the mouth of Sakharam Sirsat, not much significance can be given to the said admission of Rukhminibai. Significantly no suggestion has been made to Rukminibai in her cross-examination by respondent Nos. 1 and 2 that her husband did not make any inquiry in this respect. Significantly no suggestion has been made to Rukminibai in her cross-examination by respondent Nos. 1 and 2 that her husband did not make any inquiry in this respect. The question of putting the appellants and remaining respondents on a notice by virtue of section 3 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 would also not arise in this case as the sale-deed (Exhibit-44) itself has been held to be a nominal document not genuinely made. Then, it is nobody's case that the alienations of the suit lands through various sale-deeds to appellants and other respondents were without any consideration. Therefore, I find that the learned Judge of the trial Court has rightly held that the alienations of the suit lands to appellants and respondent Nos. 6 and 7 were valid and these parties were bona fide purchasers for valuable consideration. The question No. 1 is, therefore, answered as in the negative. 20. Before parting with the judgment, I think it necessary to place on record what are seen to be the established obligations of the first Appellate Court while deciding the first appeal. If the first Appellate Court agrees with the view of the trial Court, there is no need for it to restate the effect of the evidence or reiterate the reasons given by the trial Court and an expression of general agreement with reasons given by the Court should suffice the purpose as held in the case of Girijanandini Devi and others vs. Bijendra Narain Choudhary, reported in AIR 1967 SC 1124 . However, when the findings of facts recorded by the trial Court are to be reversed by the first Appellate Court, the first Appellate Court must come into close quarters with the reasoning assigned by the trial Court and then assigning its own reasons, it may record different findings of fact. It must be remembered that first appeal is a valuable right of the parties and unless restricted by law, the whole case in the appeal is open for rehearing on questions of facts as well as questions of law. The judgment of the first Appellate Court must, therefore, reflect its application of mind to the evidence available on record and must show the reasons for recording the findings which should be recorded on all the issues involved in the appeal and on which adjudication is sought by the parties. The judgment of the first Appellate Court must, therefore, reflect its application of mind to the evidence available on record and must show the reasons for recording the findings which should be recorded on all the issues involved in the appeal and on which adjudication is sought by the parties. A useful reference may be made to the law laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court in this regard, in the case of Santosh Hazari vs. Purushottam Tiwari (Dead) by LRs., reported in 2001(2) Mh.L.J. (S.C.) 786 : AIR 2001 SC 965 . These are the duties of the Appellate Court which must be discharged by it while deciding first appeal. 21. In the result, the appeal deserves to be allowed with costs. 22. The appeal is allowed with costs. 23. Regular Civil Suit No. 75 of 1989 stands dismissed. The decree be drawn up accordingly. Appeal allowed.