Judgment : Per Rajiv Sharma, Judge: A complaint was filed by Onkar Singh, Junior Assistant, Forest Working Division, Hamirpur, against the petitioner alleging therein that an amount of Rs.1000/- was paid to him on account of T.A. advance, but the figure was changed to Rs.4000/- by the petitioner by tampering in the voucher. The matter was looked into by the Divisional Manager, Forest Working Division, Hamirpur. He sent the report to the Director (North), i.e. respondent No.2 on 13.12.1999. According to his comments, the amount was sanctioned on the voucher because Onkar Singh had neither submitted the advance sanctioned application nor any sanctioned bill against the amount, which was taken by him. The Director (North) sent a communication to the Divisional Manager, Forest Working Division, Hamirpur on 16.2.2000 to settle the matter. The matter was settled between Onkar Singh and the petitioner on 9.3.2000 as is evident from Annexure P-7. The Divisional Manager informed the Director (North) on 28.3.2000 that the matter stood settled. Though the matter stood settled, it appears that another complaint was filed by Onkar Singh. 2. The Director (North) again forwarded the matter to the Divisional Manager, Forest Working Division, Hamirpur on 14.9.2004. He informed the Director (North) on 2.11.2004 that there was no substance in the complaint filed by Onkar Singh. The Divisional Manager, Forest Working Division, Hamirpur, informed the Director (North) on 16.12.2004 that all the points raised by Onkar Singh in his complaint were replied in proper order and nothing was concealed. The matter was also settled by the then Divisional Managers, namely, S.K. Sharma, HPFS, H.S. Kanwar HPFS and M.P. Vashisth, HPFS. However, The Director (North) decided to issue charge-sheet against the petitioner. The Divisional Manager, Forest Working Division, Hamirpur informed the Director (North) on 24.11.2010 that the matter already stood settled and the petitioner was not at fault. However, despite this communication, the disciplinary authority, Director (North) issued memorandum to the petitioner under Rule 14 of the Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeals) Rules, 1965, reiterating earlier charges against the petitioner on the basis of complaint filed by Onkar Singh, vide Annexure P-1 dated 27.11.2010. The petitioner filed a detailed reply to the same on 9.12.2010. He stated that the matter already stood settled and the charge sheet could not be issued to him after a period of twelve years. The petitioner filed a detailed reply to the same on 9.12.2010. He stated that the matter already stood settled and the charge sheet could not be issued to him after a period of twelve years. The Director (North) instead of dropping the charges appointed Inquiry Officer vide letter dated 14.3.2011. 3. Mrs. Ranjana Parmar, learned Advocate, has vehemently argued that the matter has already been settled by three Divisional Managers, namely, S.K. Sharma, HPFS, H.S. Kanwar HPFS and M.P. Vashisth, HPFS. She then contended that the charge-sheet could not be issued to the petitioner after a lapse of twelve years. 4. Mr. Rajender Singh Thakur, learned Advocate, has supported the issuance of charge-sheet. 5. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and have also gone through the record carefully. 6. What emerges from the facts, enumerated hereinabove, is that a complaint was filed by Onkar Singh against the petitioner with regard to certain T.A. advances made in the year 1998. The Divisional Manager on 13.12.1999 explained the correct position to the Director (North). However, despite that the Divisional Manager was asked to settle the matter by Director (North) on 16.2.2000. The matter was settled between the petitioner and Onkar Singh. Onkar Singh agreed to pay Rs.2500/- and the petitioner agreed to pay Rs.1500/-vide settlement arrived at on 9.3.2000. The settlement was brought to the notice of the Director (North) on 28.3.2000. 7. The matter instead of being given quietus by the Department was again revived by the Director (North) on the basis of the complaint filed by Onkar Singh on the same facts. The Divisional Manager informed the Director (North) that all the points raised by Onkar Singh were gone into and there was no substance in the same. The Divisional Manager also brought to the notice of the Director (North) that the issuance of charge sheet was not required at this stage. In his communication, he also cited judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 8. The Court is of the considered view that since the matter has already been settled, charge-sheet, dated 27.11.2010 Annexure P-1 was not required to be issued to the petitioner. The incident pertains to the year 1998 and the charge-sheet has been issued to the petitioner on 27.11.2010, that too after a period of about twelve years. 8. The Court is of the considered view that since the matter has already been settled, charge-sheet, dated 27.11.2010 Annexure P-1 was not required to be issued to the petitioner. The incident pertains to the year 1998 and the charge-sheet has been issued to the petitioner on 27.11.2010, that too after a period of about twelve years. The Director (North) has not taken into consideration the earlier communication entered into between the office of the Divisional Manager and the Director (north). Three Divisional Managers had already looked into the matter at different times and had specifically stated that no illegality or irregularity was committed by the petitioner. Rather, it has come in the report that it was Onkar Singh, who should have returned an amount of Rs.4000/- to the Department. It is not proper for the disciplinary authority to reopen the matter after a period of twelve years. It has become stale. The settled matter should not be unsettled. The disciplinary authority is required to take into consideration the reply filed to the charges and all the points/grounds taken in the reply are required to be discussed at length before the decision is taken by the disciplinary authority to appoint an Inquiry Officer. 9. Their Lordships of Hon’ble Supreme Court in State of Madhya Pradesh versus Bani Singh and Another, 1990 (Supp) SCC 738 have held as under: “4. The appeal against the order dt. 16-12-1987 has been filed on the ground that the Tribunal should not have quashed the proceedings merely on the ground of delay and laches and should have allowed the enquiry to go on to decide the matter on merits. We are unable to agree with this contention of the learned Counsel. The irregularities which were the subject-matter of the enquiry is said to have taken place between the years 1975-1977. It is not the case of the department that they were not aware of the said irregularities, if any, and came to know it only in 1987. According to them even in April, 1977 there was doubt about the involvement of the officer in the said irregularities and the investigations were going on since then. If that is so, it is unreasonable to think that they would have taken more than 12 years to initiate the disciplinary proceedings as stated by the Tribunal. According to them even in April, 1977 there was doubt about the involvement of the officer in the said irregularities and the investigations were going on since then. If that is so, it is unreasonable to think that they would have taken more than 12 years to initiate the disciplinary proceedings as stated by the Tribunal. There is no satisfactory explanation for the inordinate delay in issuing the charge memo and we are also of the view that it will be unfair to permit the departmental enquiry to be proceeded with at this stage. In any case there are no grounds to interfere with the Tribunal's orders and accordingly we dismiss this appeal.” 10. Their Lordships of Hon’ble Supreme Court in State of A.P. versus N. Radhakishan, (1998) 4 SCC 154 have held that in considering whether delay has vitiated the disciplinary proceedings, the court has to consider the nature of charge, its complexity and on what account the delay has occurred. If the delay is unexplained, prejudice to the delinquent employee is writ large on the fact of it. Their Lordships of Hon’ble Supreme Court have held as under:- “19. It is not possible to lay down any pre-determined principles applicable to all cases and in all situations where there is delay in concluding the disciplinary proceedings. Whether on that ground the disciplinary proceedings are to be terminated each case has to be examined on the facts and circumstances in that case. The essence of the matter is that the Court has to take into consideration all relevant factors and to balance and weigh them to determine if it is in the interest of clean and honest administration that the disciplinary proceedings should be allowed to terminate after delay particularly when delay is abnormal and there is no explanation for the delay. The delinquent employee has a right that disciplinary proceedings against him are concluded expeditiously and he is not made to undergo mental agony and also monetary loss when these are unnecessarily prolonged without any fault on his part in delaying the proceedings. In considering whether delay has vitiated the disciplinary proceedings the Court has to consider the nature of charge, its complexity and on what account the delay has occurred. If the delay is unexplained prejudice to the delinquent employee is writ large on the face of it. In considering whether delay has vitiated the disciplinary proceedings the Court has to consider the nature of charge, its complexity and on what account the delay has occurred. If the delay is unexplained prejudice to the delinquent employee is writ large on the face of it. It could also be seen as to how much disciplinary authority is serious in pursuing the charges against its employee. It is the basic principle of administrative justice that an officer entrusted with a particular job has to perform his duties honestly, efficiently and in accordance with the rules. If he deviates from this path he is to suffer a penalty prescribed. Normally, disciplinary proceedings should be allowed to take its course as per relevant rules but then delay defeats justice. Delay causes prejudice to the charged officer unless it can be shown that he is to blame for the delay or when there is proper explanation for the delay in conducting the disciplinary proceedings. Ultimately, the Court is to balance these two diverse considerations.” 11. Similarly, their Lordships of Hon’ble Supreme Court in P.V. Mahadevan versus MD, T.N. Housing Board, (2005) 6 SCC 636 have not allowed the respondent to proceed further with the departmental proceedings since there was inordinate delay of 10 years in initiating departmental enquiry against the appellant and no convincing explanation was given by the employer. Their Lordships of Hon’ble Supreme Court have held as under:- “Our attention was also drawn to the counter affidavit filed by the respondent Board in this appeal. Though some explanation was given, the explanation offered is not at all convincing. It is stated in the counter affidavit for the first time that the irregularity during the year 1990, for which disciplinary action had been initiated against the appellant in the year 2000, came to light in the audit report for the second half of 1994-95. Sections 118 and 119 of the Tamil Nadu State Housing Board Act, 1961 (Tamil Nadu Act 17 of 1961) read thus: "118. At the end of every year, the Board shall submit to the Government an abstract of the accounts of its receipts and expenditure for such year. 119. Sections 118 and 119 of the Tamil Nadu State Housing Board Act, 1961 (Tamil Nadu Act 17 of 1961) read thus: "118. At the end of every year, the Board shall submit to the Government an abstract of the accounts of its receipts and expenditure for such year. 119. The accounts of the Board shall be examined and audited once in every year by such auditor as the Government may appoint in this behalf." Section 118 specifically provides for submission of the abstracts of the accounts at the end of every year and Section 119 relates to annual audit of accounts. These two statutory provisions have not been complied with at all. In the instant case the transaction took place in the year 1990. The expenditure ought to have been considered in the accounts of the succeeding year. In the instant case the audit report was ultimately released in 1994-95. The explanation offered for the delay in finalising the audit account cannot stand scrutiny in view of the above two provisions of the Tamil Nadu Act 17 of 1961, It is now stated that the appellant has retired from service. There is also no acceptable explanation on the side of the respondent explaining the inordinate delay in initiating departmental disciplinary proceedings. Mr. R. Venkataramani, learned Senior Counsel is appearing for the respondent. His submission that the period from the date of commission of the irregularities by the appellant to the date on which it came to the knowledge of the Housing Board cannot be reckoned for the purpose of ascertaining whether there was any delay on the part of the Board in initiating disciplinary proceedings against the appellant has no merit and force. The stand now taken by the respondent in this Court in the counter-affidavit is not convincing and is only an afterthought to give some explanation for the delay. Under the circumstances, we are of the opinion that allowing the respondent to proceed further with the departmental proceedings at this distance of time will be very prejudicial to the appellant. Keeping a higher government official under charges of corruption and disputed integrity would cause unbearable mental agony and distress to the officer concerned. Under the circumstances, we are of the opinion that allowing the respondent to proceed further with the departmental proceedings at this distance of time will be very prejudicial to the appellant. Keeping a higher government official under charges of corruption and disputed integrity would cause unbearable mental agony and distress to the officer concerned. The protracted disciplinary enquiry against a government employee should, therefore, be avoided not only in the interests of the government employee but in public interest and also in the interests of inspiring confidence in the minds of the government employees. At this stage, it is necessary to draw the curtain and to put an end to the enquiry. The appellant had already suffered enough and more on account of the disciplinary proceedings. As a matter of fact, the mental agony and sufferings of the appellant due to the protracted disciplinary proceedings would be much more than the punishment. For the mistakes committed by the department in the procedure for initiating the disciplinary proceedings, the appellant should not be made to suffer.” 12. Their Lordships of Hon’ble Supreme Court in M.V. Bijlani versus Union of India and Others, (2006) 5 SCC 88 have held that initiation of disciplinary proceedings after 6 years and continuance thereof for a period of 7 years prejudiced the delinquent officer. Their Lordships of Hon’ble Supreme Court have held as under:- “16. So far as the second charge is concerned, it has not been shown as to what were the duties of the Appellant in terms of the prescribed rules or otherwise. Furthermore, it has not been shown either by the disciplinary authority or the Appellate Authority as to how and in what manner the maintenance of ACE-8 Register by way of sheets which were found attached to the estimate file were not appropriate so as to arrive at the culpability or otherwise of the Appellant. The appellate authority in its order stated that the Appellant was not required to prepare the ACE-8 Register twice. The Appellant might have prepared another set of register presumably keeping in view the fact that he was asked to account for the same on the basis of the materials placed on records. The appellate authority in its order stated that the Appellant was not required to prepare the ACE-8 Register twice. The Appellant might have prepared another set of register presumably keeping in view the fact that he was asked to account for the same on the basis of the materials placed on records. The Tribunal as also the High Court failed to take into consideration that the disciplinary proceedings were initiated after six years and it continued for a period of seven years and, thus, initiation of the disciplinary proceedings as also continuance thereof after such a long time evidently prejudiced to the delinquent officer.” 13. In Secretary, Forest Department and Others versus Abdur Rasul Chowdhury, (2009) 7 SCC 305 , their Lordships of Hon’ble Supreme Court have held that delay is not always fatal to the inquiry and it depends on the facts and circumstances of each case and unexplained protected delay may be one of the circumstance in not permitting the employer to continue with the enquiry proceedings. Their Lordships of Hon’ble Supreme Court have held as under:- “16. The next issue is with regard to delay in concluding disciplinary proceedings. In our view the delay in concluding the domestic enquiry proceedings is not fatal to the proceedings. It depends on the facts and circumstances of each case. The unexplained protracted delay on the part of the employer may be one of the circumstances in not permitting the employer to continue with the disciplinary enquiry proceedings. At the same time, if the delay is explained satisfactorily then the proceedings should be permitted to continue.” 14. It is settled law by now that ordinarily no writ lies against a charge-sheet or show-cause notice. Their Lordships of Hon’ble Supreme Court in Union of India and Another versus Kunisetty Satyanarayana, (2006) 12 SCC, 28 have held that writ jurisdiction is discretionary jurisdiction and such discretion should not ordinarily be exercised by quashing a show-cause notice or charge-sheet. Albeit, in some very rare and exceptional cases the High Court can quash a charge-sheet or show-cause notice if it is found to be wholly without jurisdiction or for some other reason if it is wholly illegal. Their Lordships of Hon’ble Supreme Court have held as under: “13. Albeit, in some very rare and exceptional cases the High Court can quash a charge-sheet or show-cause notice if it is found to be wholly without jurisdiction or for some other reason if it is wholly illegal. Their Lordships of Hon’ble Supreme Court have held as under: “13. It is well settled by a series of decisions of this Court that ordinarily no writ lies against a charge sheet or show-cause notice vide Executive Engineer, Bihar State Housing Board vs. Ramdesh Kumar Singh, Special Director vs. Mohd. Ghulam Ghouse, Ulagappa vs. Divisional Commissioner, Mysore, State of U.P. vs. Brahm Datt Sharma etc. 15. Writ jurisdiction is discretionary jurisdiction and hence such discretion under Article 226 should not ordinarily be exercised by quashing a show-cause notice or charge sheet. 16. No doubt, in some very rare and exceptional cases the High Court can quash a charge-sheet or show-cause notice if it is found to be wholly without jurisdiction or for some other reason if it is wholly illegal. However, ordinarily the High Court should not interfere in such a matter.” 15. Accordingly, in view of the observations and analysis made hereinabove, the writ petition is allowed and charge-sheet dated 27.11.2010 Annexure P-1 and order dated 14.3.2011 Annexure P-3 are quashed and set aside. Pending application(s), if any, also stands disposed of.