JUDGMENT : Tashi Rabstan, J.:- 1. This Letters Patent Appeal is directed against the judgment and order dated 09.11.2001 passed by the learned Single Judge in OWP No. 562/2001, whereby the learned Single Judge has dismissed the writ petition filed by the appellants herein. The facts, as claimed by the appellants-writ petitioners, are that their forefathers along with other proprietors had a big chunk of shamlat deh land situated in Village Rehambal, Tehsil Udhampur. After the demise of their forefathers, the appellants herein have stepped into their shoes and inherited all the rights and interest in the aforesaid property owned and possessed by their forefathers along with other proprietors of the village. Further it has been stated that respondent No. 3 behind their back attested Mutation No. 446 on 09.10.2009 BK, i.e., 1952 AD declaring the Shamlat deh land as Maqbooja kachcharai. It has also been stated that no notice of mutation was ever served upon them of other land owners. An appeal came to be filed before the Deputy Commissioner (Collector), Udhampur with respect to the land comprising Khasra Nos. 1165 and 116. The Deputy Commissioner while setting deh land cannot be entered as kahcharai as the same was the proprietary land of village community. On coming to know about attestation Mutation No. 446 dated 09.10.2009 BK by the Tehsildar Udhampur with respect to the land comprising of Kharsra Nos. 238, 1256, 356, 276, 359, 382, 366 and 383 as maqbooza kahcharai, the appellants herein also filed a revision petition before the Settlement Commissioner, Jammu, respondent No. 2 herein. Respondent No. 2 herein after going thorough the record dismissed the revision petition vide order dated 10.04.2001. Appellants assailed the said order before the learned Writ Court filing OWP No. 562/2001. The learned Singal Judge vide Judgment and order dated 09.11.2001, impugned herein, dismissed the writ petition. Hence the appellants have filed the present appeal. 2. Heard learned counsel appearing for the parties and perused the writ records. 3. Mr. Wazir, learned senior counsel argued that without issuing any notice the mutation-in-question was passed behind the back of forefathers of appellants. He further argued that the Settlement Commissioner dismissed the revision petition merely on the ground of limitation, therefore, the order of respondent No. 2 on the face of it is illegal and against the provisions of law. 3. Mr. Wazir, learned senior counsel argued that without issuing any notice the mutation-in-question was passed behind the back of forefathers of appellants. He further argued that the Settlement Commissioner dismissed the revision petition merely on the ground of limitation, therefore, the order of respondent No. 2 on the face of it is illegal and against the provisions of law. He also argued that the learned Singal Judge too erred in dismissing the writ petition only on the ground of limitation, although there is no limitation period prescribed under any provision of Land Revenue Act for filling the revision petition. His further argument was that neither the revisional cour nor the learned Single Judge appreciated Section 15 of the Land Revenue Act, wherein no limitation period has been prescribed for filing the revision petition. In support of his arguments, he relied upon a judgment of Division Bench of this Court delivered in a case, titled as, Jan Mohammad v. Revenue Minister, 1975 KLJ 11 : JKJ Soft JKJ/11045, wherein it has been held that "no period of limitation was prescribed for filing a revision before the Financial Commissioner and the provisions of Limitation Act were not attracted ...." 4. Mr. Wazir has also relied upon a case, titled as, Akhtara v. State of J&K, 2009 (1) JKJ 79 [HC], wherein the learned Single Judge has observed that for filing revision petition no period of limitation is prescribed in the Limitation Act. 5. Mr. Siddiqui, learned AAG, argued that the appellants herein have suddenly awaken to stake their claim in the disputed land by filing revision petition against the mutation-in-question after more than four decades without sufficiently explaining the delay. The revisional court as well as learned Writ Court has rightly rejected the claim of appellants on the ground of limitation. He further argued that even on merits the appellants have no case because the land in dispute was never partitioned and the same being shamlet deh land has been reserved for Kahcharai and jointly owned by the village community. 6. The view of learned Single Judge is discernable from the following portion of the judgments, which reads as: "After having heard learned counsel for the parties, I am of the opinion that with a view to enforce some rights under Article 226, it has to be established that some rights still exist and can be enforced. 6. The view of learned Single Judge is discernable from the following portion of the judgments, which reads as: "After having heard learned counsel for the parties, I am of the opinion that with a view to enforce some rights under Article 226, it has to be established that some rights still exist and can be enforced. It has again to be demonstrated that such enforcement is being sought within a reasonable time. The argument put across by the counsel for the petitioners that as no time limit is fixed in the Land Revenue Act, therefore, the petitions preferred by the petitioners before any Authority at any time could be accepted, is an argument which cannot be accepted. Whatever time period is prescribed under the Law of Limitation can always be taken as a reasonable guide in such matters. If the petitioners had gone to a civil court for filing a suit for declaration, that suit would merit dismissal on the plea of limitation. This view of mine would get support from the view expressed by the Supreme Court in the case of State of Madhya Pradesh and another v. Bhailal Bhai and others, AIR 1964 SC 1006 . The above is one aspect of the matter. The other aspect of the matter is that the land in question stands acquired and the same is in possession of Union of India through Indian Army. The compensation for this has been paid to the State. These events took place long ago, therefore, there is no subsisting right which can be enforced through the medium of this petition. Thus, looking from any point of view, there is no merit in this writ petition, which shall stand dismissed." 7. Hon'ble Supreme Court in various judgments has held that the maximum period for filing of writ petition cannot be more than the period for filing a civil suit. A Seven Judges Bench of the Apex Court in case, S.S. Rathore v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 1989 (4) SCC 582 , has clarified the position of law that filing of representations are not to be taken into consideration in the matter of reckoning the period of limitation, as the same has no roots in statutory provision and therefore would not extend the period of limitation. These observations have also been noticed by the Apex Court in case, State of Punjab v. Gurdev Singh, 1991 (4) SCC 1 , paragraphs 7 & 8 whereof is reproduced hereunder: "13. The Allahabad High Court in Jagdish Prasad Mathur and Ors. v. United Provinces Government has taken the view that a suit for declaration by a dismissed employee on the ground that his dismissal is void, is governed by Article 120 of the Limitation Act. A similar view has been taken by Oudh Chief Court in Abdul Vakil v. Secretary of State. That in our opinion is the correct view to be taken. A suit for declaration that an order of dismissal or termination from service passed against the plaintiff is wrongful, illegal or ultra vires is governed by Article 113 of the Limitation Act. The decision to the contrary taken by the Punjab & Haryana High Court in these and other cases (State of Punjab v. Ajit Singh and State of Punjab v. Ram Singh) is not correct and stands overruled." 8. The Apex Court in Leelawanti v. State of Haryana, 2012 (1) SCC 66 , while appreciating the judgment delivered by Five Judges Constitutional Bench in the High Court of Madhya Pradesh in case, titled as, State of M.P. v. Bhailal Bhai, has observed as follows:. "9. The High Court negatived the appellants' plea that in view of Standing Order 28, the respondents were obliged to return the acquired land by observing that the object of utilizing the acquired land cannot remain static for all times and the same can be used for other purposes. The High Court also observed that once the acquired land vested in the State Government, the same cannot be returned to the owners after a gap of 30 years." "13 We have considered the respective submissions and examined the records. In our view, the High Court did not commit any error by not entertaining the appellants challenge to the acquisition of land because they did not offer any explanation for the long time gap of more than three decades between the issue of notifications under Sections 4 and 6 i.e. 1976 and filing of the writ petition i.e. 2007." 9. The aforesaid authorities of Hon'ble Supreme Court have binding effect under Article 141 of the Constitution of India as it is the law declared by the Supreme Court. The aforesaid authorities of Hon'ble Supreme Court have binding effect under Article 141 of the Constitution of India as it is the law declared by the Supreme Court. Therefore, the judgment delivered by a Division Bench of this Court in Jan Mohammad (supra), on which reliance has been placed by Mr. Wazir, learned senior counsel, is held to be per-incuriam and cannot have the binding force. We are, therefore, of the view that the learned Single Judge has rightly disabled the appellants from making any such claim after a period of more than 42 years. The Supreme Court of India in the case of S.S. Rathore (supra) has categorically held that in the suit for declaration the period of limitation would be three years as laid down under Article 58 of the Limitation Act, 1963. 10. Applying broader parameters laid down by the Apex Court, referred to hereinabove, to the facts of present appeal, we do not find a case of interference with the judgment passed by the learned Writ Court. Consequently, the appeal is dismissed along with connected CMA(s), if any.