Basavaraj Basavanneppa Pattan v. Govt. of Karnataka, Rep By Deputy Commissioner
2014-04-29
A.V.CHANDRASHEKARA
body2014
DigiLaw.ai
Judgment :- 1. Parties in all these appeals are identical and common questions of law and facts are involved in all these cases. Apart from this, the original suits bearing no. 133/95, 134/95, 135/95, 18/96, 19/96 and 20/96 which are the basis for all these second appeals have been disposed of by recording common evidence and through a common judgment. Hence all these appeals are taken up together for disposal. 2. Sri Basavaraj Basavanneppa Pattan is the appellant in all these cases. Appellant was the plaintiff in the suits mentioned above. The above suits came to be dismissed after contest vide common judgment dated 20.07.2001. Against the said common judgment and decree, regular appeals in R.A. Nos. 23/2001 to 28/2001 were preferred u/S 96 of CPC before the Court of Civil Judge (Sr. Dn.), Saundatti, sitting at Ramdurg respectively. All these appeals have been dismissed after contest. Hence the present appeals have been filed u/S 100 of CPC in R.S.A. Nos.533/2004 to 538/2004. Appellant in the present cases is the plaintiff in the said suits and respondents are the defendants in the said suits. Plaintiff is stated to be in lawful possession and enjoyment of the land in sy. No. 37 and 38 of K. Junipeth village, Ramdurg Taluka, Belgaum District. Originally these two lands belonged to defendant no. 3-Veeranagouda, the genetic father of the plaintiff. Plaintiff Basavaraj was given in adoption to one lady by name Parawwa by third defendant-Veeranagouda on 29.05.1967. These two schedule properties were sold by third defendant Veeranagouda in favour of Smt. Parawwa, the adoptive mother of Basavaraj through a registered sale deed dated 01.06.1977 for a total consideration of Rs.27,500/- and on the basis of the same her name was incorporated as khatadar by the revenue authorities in M.E. No. 387. The said Paravva was the mother-in-law of the third defendant. 3. Defendant no.3-Veeranagouda was working in Ramdurg Urban Co-operative Bank as an employee. On conducting audit of the account of the Society, it was found out that defendant no.3 had misused the funds of the said Society and therefore steps were taken to recover the misappropriated amount from the defendant no.3. Accordingly, cases were filed by the Administrator of the Society before the Assistant Registrar of Co-Operative Societies as per the provisions of Karnataka Co-Operative Societies Act, 1959 and as many as six awards were passed against the defendant no.3.
Accordingly, cases were filed by the Administrator of the Society before the Assistant Registrar of Co-Operative Societies as per the provisions of Karnataka Co-Operative Societies Act, 1959 and as many as six awards were passed against the defendant no.3. The details of the awards and the connected suits, appeals and regular second appeals are mentioned below: SI. No. RSA No. R.A.No. O.S. No. Awards Nos. & dates 1. 533/2004 23/2001 133/1995 ABN-608/1/78 07.07.1979 2. 534/2004 24/2001 134/1995 ABN-608/2/78 21.03.1979 3. 535/2004 25/2001 135/1995 ABN-427/12/1977 14.11.1977 4. 536/2004 26/2001 18/1996 ABN-105/7/1980 20.03.1980 5. 537/2004 27/2001 19/1996 ABN-105/12/80 29.05.1980 6. 538/2004 28/2001 20/1996 ABN-105/13/1980 29.05.1980 In order to recover the amount due from defendant no.3, suit schedule properties were sought to be auctioned by the defendant nos.1 and 2. Prior to the proposed auction the properties were got attached as per the provisions of Karnataka Co-Operative Societies Act. As the properties were sought to be sold for recovering the arrears of the amount due from the third defendant by issuing public notice, Smt. Parawwa who had purchased these two lands from defendant no.3 instituted a suit for permanent injunction in O.S. No. 80/1987 before the Court of the then Munsiff at Ramdurg and interim injunction was granted. On 26.01.1988 Parawwa breathed her last. Since the suit bearing No. 80/1987 was not prosecuted, it was dismissed for default on 21.03.1990. On 12.12.1995 and 13.01.1996 three separate notices for recovery of the amounts due from the first defendant were issued and property was attached. Hence six separate suits bearing O.S. NO.133/95, 134/95, 135/95, 18/96, 19/96 AND 20/96 were instituted by Basavaraj Pattan, the plaintiff, before the Court of Munsiff at Ramdurg. Case of the plaintiff Basavaraj, as projected in the trial Court is that, he is in lawful possession and enjoyment of the suit schedule properties and that the schedule properties had been sold by the defendant no.3 to his adoptive mother-Parawwa on 01.06 1997 and thus she had become the owner of the schedule properties having purchased the same for a total consideration of Rs.27,500/-. The said Parawwa was stated to be in lawful possession of the schedule properties till her death, more particularly being the khatadar and owner. Since the plaintiff is the only legal heir of Parawwa, he has succeeded to her estate and has been in possession of the schedule properties from 26.01.1987, the date on which she died.
The said Parawwa was stated to be in lawful possession of the schedule properties till her death, more particularly being the khatadar and owner. Since the plaintiff is the only legal heir of Parawwa, he has succeeded to her estate and has been in possession of the schedule properties from 26.01.1987, the date on which she died. According to the plaintiff, he was shocked to note that the defendant no.2, the Assistant Registrar of Co-operative Societies, had issued notice to defendant no 3 that he would sell the suit lands in case if he failed to pay the amount mentioned in the notice on or before the date mentioned in the notice. The dates and number of the notices issued to the third defendant are mentioned in the suits. According to the plaintiff, the said notice is illegal and invalid and the same has been issued without taking any care. It is the case of the plaintiff that the scheduled land can neither be attached nor sold as he is the absolute owner in possession of the properties and that the sale deed has come into existence even prior to the passing of the awards by the Assistant Registrar of Co-Operative Societies. The cause of action for the suit is stated to have arisen when the notice was issued to defendant no.3 and when the same came to his knowledge The prayer sought for in all the suits are as follows: To declare that the suit lands are not liable for attachment and sale or for sale in the proceedings for recovery of amount as per the award passed by the Arbitrator and for consequential perpetual injunction to be issued against defendant no.2 either from attaching the properties or from selling the suit lands by himself or through his subordinates for recovery of the amount due from defendant nos.1 and 2 to defendant no. 3 The said suits came to be contested by defendant nos.1 and 2 denying all the material averments. According to the defendants, suit is stated to be collusive in nature and that the alienation so made by defendant no.3 in favour of deceased Parawwa through a registered Sale Deed is a fraudulent one more particularly to avoid defendant nos.1 and 2 from recovering the amount from the third defendant. Suit is scaled to be not maintainable more particularly when earlier suit bearing no.
Suit is scaled to be not maintainable more particularly when earlier suit bearing no. 80/1987 was dismissed for default. The suit is stated to be barred by principles of resjudicata and barred by the provisions of Order 2 Rule 2 of CPC. Suit is stated to be not maintainable for not issuing notice as per Sec. 125 of the Karnataka Co-Operative Societies Act and that the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to challenge the award passed under the provisions of Karnataka Co-Operative Societies Act, 1959. The alleged cause of action is stated to be imaginary. It is further averred that present suits have been filed in order to restrain the defendant nos.1 and 2 from recovering the misappropriated amount from defendant no 3 who is stated to be in possession of the schedule property. The principles of estoppel are applicable to the present suits in view of O.S. No. 80/1987, is the averment. Suits are stated to be barred by time. It is further averred that deceased Parawwa was none other than the mother in law of the third defendant and therefore the suit bearing O.S. No. 80/1987 and the present suits are collusive in nature and the suits are not maintainable in view of the provisions of Sec. 32 and 33 of the Karnataka Co-Operative Societies Act, 1959. According to the defendants, Civil Courts have no jurisdiction to question the averments as per Sec. 101(2) of the Karnataka Co-Operative Societies Act. The suits are also stated to be baired by the provisions of Sec. 118(3). 4. On the basis of the above pleadings the following issues came to be framed by the trail Court. Issue No.1 in O.S. Nos. 133/95. 134/95, 135/95, 18/96, 19/96 and 20/96 1. Whether the plaintiff proves that he is the owner of the suit properties? Issue No. 2 in O.S. Nos. 133/95, 134/95, 135/95, 18/96, 19/96 and 20/96 2. Whether the plaintiff proves that he is in possession and enjoyment of the suit lands? Issue No.3 in O.S. No. 133/95, 134/95, 135/95, 18/96, 19/96 and 20/96 3. Whether the plaintiff further proves that he is the adopted son of one late Smt. Pareivwa W/o Basavaneppa Pattan? Issue No.4 in O.S.Nos. 133/95, 134/95, 135/95, 18/96 and 20/96 4. Whether the plaintiff further proves that defendant No.3 sold the suit properties to one Smt.Parewwa W/o Basavanneppa Pattan under a registered sale deed on 1.6.1977?
Whether the plaintiff further proves that he is the adopted son of one late Smt. Pareivwa W/o Basavaneppa Pattan? Issue No.4 in O.S.Nos. 133/95, 134/95, 135/95, 18/96 and 20/96 4. Whether the plaintiff further proves that defendant No.3 sold the suit properties to one Smt.Parewwa W/o Basavanneppa Pattan under a registered sale deed on 1.6.1977? Issue No.5 in O.S.Nos.133/95, 134/95, 135/95, 18/96 and 20/96 5. Whether the defendants prove that the said sale deed dated 1-6-1977 between defendant No.3 and Smt.Parewwa W/o Basavanneppa Pattan is illegal and void ? Issue No.6 in O.S.Nos.133/95, 134/95, 135/95, 18/96 and 20/96 6. Whether the plaintiff further proves that entry in record of rights of suit lands per diary No.265 is illegal, unenforceable and not binding on plaintiff? Issue No.7 in O.S.Nos. 133/95, 134/95, 135/95, 18/96 and 20/96 7. Whether the suit is maintainable? Issue No.8 in O.S.Nos. 133/95, 134/95, 135/95, 18/96 and 20/96 8. Whether this Court has got jurisdiction to try the suit? Issue No.9 in O.S.Nos.133/95, 134/95, 135/95, 18/96 and 20/96 9. Whether this Court has got pecuniary jurisdiction to try the suit? Issue No. 10 in O.S.Nos. 133/95, 134/95, 135/95,_l_8/_96 and 20/96 10. Whether plaintiff proves alleged cause of action? Issue No. 11 in O.S.Nos. 133/95, 134/95, 135/95, 18/95 and 20/96 11. Whether the suit is barred, by Limitation? Issue No. 12 in O.S.Nos 133/95. 134/95, 135/95, 18/96 and 20/96 12. Whether the suit is barred by principle of estoppel? Issue No. 13 in O.S.Nos. 133/95, 134/95, 135/95, 18/96 and 20/96 13. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for declaratory relief? Issue No. 14 in O.S.Nos. 133/95, 134/95, 135/95, 18/96 and 20/96 14. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for relief of permanent injunction as sought for? Issue No. 15 in O.S.Nos. 133/95, 134/95, 135/95, 18/96 and 20/96 15. To what reliefs plaintiff is entitled for? Issue No. 16 in O.S.Nos. 133/95, 134/95, 135/95, 18/96 and 20/96 16. What order or decree? 5. Plaintiff Basavaraj is examined as P.W.I and Shivaputrappa, Assistant Registrar of Co-operative Societies is examined as D.W.I. 28 exhibits have been got marked on behalf of the plaintiff and five exhibits have been got marked on behalf of defendant nos.1 and 2. Third defendant has not chosen to file any written statement.
What order or decree? 5. Plaintiff Basavaraj is examined as P.W.I and Shivaputrappa, Assistant Registrar of Co-operative Societies is examined as D.W.I. 28 exhibits have been got marked on behalf of the plaintiff and five exhibits have been got marked on behalf of defendant nos.1 and 2. Third defendant has not chosen to file any written statement. Ultimately, the learned Judge of the trial Court has answered issues so framed in these suits as follows as found in page nos.30 and 31 of the judgment of the trial Court. Issue No. 1 in O.S.Nos. 133/95,134/35, 135/95, 18/96, 19/96 & 20/96 - In affirmative Issue No.2 in O.S.Nos. 133/95, 134/95, 135/95, 18/96, 19/96 & 20/96 - In affirmative Issue No.3 in O.S.Nos. 133/95, 134/95, 135/95, 18/96, 19/96 & 20/96 - In affirmative Issue No.4 in O.S.Nos. 133/95, 134/95, 135/95, 18/96, 19/96 & 20/96 - In affirmative Issue No.5 in O.S.Nos.133/95, 134/95, 135/95, 18/96, 19/96 & 20/96 – In negative Issue No.6 in O.S.Nos.133/95, 134/95, 135/95, 18/96, 19/96 & 20/96 - - In affirmative Issue No.7 in O.S.Nos.133/95, 134/95, 135/95, 18/96, 19/96 & 20/96 – In negative Issue No.8 in O.S.Nos.133/95, 134/95, 135/95, 18/96, 19/96 & 20/96 – In negative Issue No.9 in O.S.Nos.133/95, 134/95, 135/95, 18/96, 19/96 & 20/96 - – In Affirmative Issue No. 10 in O.S.Nos.133/95, .134/95, 135/95, 18/96, 19/96 & 20/96 - – In negative Issue No. 11 in O.S.Nos.133/95, 134/95, 135/95, 18/96, 19/96 & 20/96 – In Affirmative Issue No. 12 in O.S.Nos.133/95, 134/95, 135/95, 18/96, 19/96 & 20/96 - In Affirmative Issue No. 13 in O.S.Nos.133/95, 134/95, 135/95, 18/96, 19/96 & 20./96 – In negative Issue No. 14 in O.S.Nos.133/95, 134/95, 135/95, 18/96, 19/96 & 20/96 – In negative Issue No. 15 in O.S.Nos.133/95, 134/95, 135/95, 18/96, 19/96 & 20/96 – In negative Issue No. 16 in O.S.Nos.133/95, 134/95, 135/95, i8/96, 19/96 & 20/96 - As per final order 6. Against the said common judgment and decree passed in all these suits by clubbing the same, separate appeals came to be filed u/S 96 of CPC before the Civil Judge (Sr. Dn.), Saundatti sitting at Ramdurg in R.A. Nos.23/2001 to 28/2001 arising out of O.S. Nos. 133/95, 134/95, 135/95, 18/96, 19/96 and 20/96 respectively. Several grounds had been urged in the appeals.
Dn.), Saundatti sitting at Ramdurg in R.A. Nos.23/2001 to 28/2001 arising out of O.S. Nos. 133/95, 134/95, 135/95, 18/96, 19/96 and 20/96 respectively. Several grounds had been urged in the appeals. After hearing the arguments and perusing the records, the learned Judge of the first appellate Court has dismissed all these appeals by a common judgment by formulating the following five points for consideration as found in page nos.l2 and 13 of the impugned common judgment. 1) Whether the appellant has made out reasonable grounds to produce additional evidence u/O 41 Rule 27(1) (b) of CPC, in the matter? 2) Whether judgment and decree under appeal are contrary to law and evidence on record? 3) Whether there are any grounds for this Court to interfere in the. judgment and decree under appeal? 4) Whether the plaintiff was entitled for the relief of declaration as sought for? 5) What decree or order? All the first four points have been answered in the negative and ultimately appeals have been dismissed. 7. All these appeals have been admitted to consider the following common substantial questions of law framed on 17.06.2004 by my learned predecessor. 1) Whether the Courts below are justified in dismissing the suit on the ground of Limitation as prescribed under Article 58 of the Limitation Act, 1963 when as per the pleadings of the plaintiff, the cause of action has arisen for the plaintiff in the year 1995?
1) Whether the Courts below are justified in dismissing the suit on the ground of Limitation as prescribed under Article 58 of the Limitation Act, 1963 when as per the pleadings of the plaintiff, the cause of action has arisen for the plaintiff in the year 1995? 2) Whether the Courts below are right in holding that the cause of action arose for the plaintiff's adopted mother in the year 1987 on the basis of the attachment notice issued in respect of the suit schedule property and the said attachment order continued in law up to the period of year 1995 and therefore the right to sue for the plaintiff's accrued in the year 1987 and as such the suits are barred by limitation and whether these findings and reasons are in conformity with the law laid down in the decisions of the Supreme Court reported in AIR 1961 SC 808 and AIR 1960 SC 350 and AIR 1930 PRIVY COUNCIL 270, wherein it has been succinctly held as to when the invasion of the right of sue accrues and whether mere attachment order would amount to an overt act for repudiating the plaintiff's title upon the suit property which would make him incumbent to bring the declaratory suit as explained in the plaint as cause of action?" 8. Learned counsel for the appellant has submitted his argument at length. Learned Government Advocate appearing for respondent nos.1 and 2, i.e., the Deputy Commissioner, Belgaum and the Assistant Registrar of Co-Operative Societies, Bailhongal, Disi. Belgaum, has argued at length supporting the judgment of the trial Court as well as the first appellate Court Learned counsel for the 9th respondent-Liquidator has also submitted his arguments. Since the Society in question has been superceded and Liquidator is appointed, respondent no.9 represents the Society. 9. The two substantial questions of law framed by my learned predecessor are interlinked in the sense they overlap. They are interlinked in the sense that question of limitation and cause of action are dealt with in both these substantial questions of law. The aspect of limitation will have to be reckoned from the date of cause of action and in this sense they are interlinked. 10. The plaintiff has been held to be the owner in possession of both the suit schedule properties.
The aspect of limitation will have to be reckoned from the date of cause of action and in this sense they are interlinked. 10. The plaintiff has been held to be the owner in possession of both the suit schedule properties. Sale deeds executed by defendant no.3 in favour of Parawwa is held to be valid and plaintiff is held to be the adopted son of Parawwa. Mutatifon Entry made regarding attachment before judgment is held to be not binding on the plaintiff. Admittedly the suit properties were not attached before they were sold by defendant no.3 in favour of his mother in law Parawwa. Suits have been dismissed mainly on the ground of maintainability and there being no cause of action. Suits came to be dismissed on the ground of applicability of principles of estoppel. The finding of the trial Court insofar as it relates to maintainability of the suit as per Sec. 125 of the Karnataka Co-Op. Societies Act is not upheld by the appellate Court on the ground that plaintiff is not a member of the Society and therefore he is not required to issue any notice prior to the filing of the suits. Therefore, the first appellate Court has reversed the finding on issue nos.7 and 8. 11. The appeals filed u/S 96 of CPC have been dismissed on the ground that plaintiff has no cause of action in the light of his adoptive mother having instituted a similar suit, though for permanent injunction, in O.S. No. 80/1987 before the same Court and that both of them had the knowledge of the attachment. 12. Learned counsel for the appellant has submitted his arguments at length. It is argued that the cause of action for filing a civil suit arises when there is real threat or infringement of right and limitation starts from that day. He has relied upon a decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court reported in AIR 1960 SC 335 (Smt. Rukma Bai Vs. Lai Laxminarayan & Others). It is a decision rendered by a Bench consisting of three Hon'ble Judges of the Apex Court.
He has relied upon a decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court reported in AIR 1960 SC 335 (Smt. Rukma Bai Vs. Lai Laxminarayan & Others). It is a decision rendered by a Bench consisting of three Hon'ble Judges of the Apex Court. Discussing the provisions of Article 120 of title Repealed Limitation Act of 1908, it is held that there can be no right to sue until there is an accrual of the right asserted in the suit and its infringement or at least a clear and unequivocal threat to infringe that right by the defendant against whom the suit is instituted. The decision of a Bench consisting of five Hon'ble Judges of the Privy Council reported in AIR 1930 PC 270 (Master Bolo vs. M.T. Koklan), has been referred to by the Apex Court in Rukma Bai's case mentioned above and followed. In the said decision, the Hon'ble Privy Council has held that there can be no right to sue until there is an accrual of the right asserted in the suit and its infringement or at least a clear and unequivocal threat to infringe that right by the defendant against whom the suit is instituted. 13. Learned Government Advocate representing the respondent nos.1 and 2 has relied upon a decision of the Apex Court reported in (2011) 9 SCC 126 Khatri Hotels Private limited and Another Vs. Union of India and Another. Learned counsel for the respondent no.9 has also relied upon the said decision to contend that Article 58 of the Limitation Act of 1963 is a substantial departure from Article 120 of the Repealed Limitation Act of 1908 and therefore the said decision rendered in Rukma Bai's case by the Apex Court is not applicable to the facts of the case. 14. Before discussing about the applicability or otherwise of the decisions relied upon by the parties to the facts of the case, it is relevant to look into some facts of the case. The fact that defendant no.3 was the absolute owner in possession of the schedule properties is not in dispute. The fact that plaintiff was given in adoption by the third defendant to Smt. Parawwa on 29.05.1967 is also not in dispute. The adoption of plaintiff by Smt. Parawwa is evidenced through a registered adoption deed and the original adoption deed is marked as Ex.P.4.
The fact that plaintiff was given in adoption by the third defendant to Smt. Parawwa on 29.05.1967 is also not in dispute. The adoption of plaintiff by Smt. Parawwa is evidenced through a registered adoption deed and the original adoption deed is marked as Ex.P.4. Sec. 16 of Hindu Adoption & Maintenance Act enables the Court to draw a presumption regarding the due adoption and burden is always upon the person who disputes the genuineness or authenticity or validity of such adoption. Anyhow the trial Court has held that plaintiff is the adoptive son and that has been affirmed by the first appellate Court. Name of Parawwa came to be incorporated as Khatadar of the schedule properties on the basis of a sale deed executed by defendant no.3 on 01.06.1977, i.e., almost ten years after Parawwa adopted the plaintiff. She had become the owner of the schedule property and was also in possession of the same. Consequent upon her death, plaintiff succeeded to the property and is in possession of the same as the owner and the trial Court as well as the first appellate Court have upheld the assertion of the plaintiff in regard to the plaintiffs ownership and possession. 15. The fact that third defendant was working as an employee in Urban Co-Operative Bank, Ramdurg and cases had been instituted against him before the Assistant Registrar of Co-Operative Societies for passing an award in regard to the amount misappropriated by him, is not in dispute. Six awards came to be passed against the third defendant for recovery of the amount allegedly misappropriated by him and they were sought to be recovered by attaching the suit schedule property on the ground that third defendant was in lawful possession and enjoyment of the schedule property. Therefore, Parawwa, being the owner in possession of the schedule property chose to file a suit in O.S. No. 80/1987 before the then Court of Munsiff at Ramdurg by presenting a suit on 03.09.1987. The certified copy of the plaint filed by Parawwa along with her adopted son Basavaraj in O.S. No. 80/1987 is marked as Ex.D.2. The said suit was filed against the Assistant Registrar of Co-Operative Societies, Bailhongal, Recovery Officer and Sale Officer and they were defendant nos.1 to 3.
The certified copy of the plaint filed by Parawwa along with her adopted son Basavaraj in O.S. No. 80/1987 is marked as Ex.D.2. The said suit was filed against the Assistant Registrar of Co-Operative Societies, Bailhongal, Recovery Officer and Sale Officer and they were defendant nos.1 to 3. The public notice got issued by defendant nos.1 to 3 therein for holding public auction of the said lands on 07.09.1987 at Ramdurg was attacked as illegal. The cause of action for filing the suit in O.S. No. 80/1987 from the date on which public notice was issued intending to sell the suit lands in public auction. Paragraph no.3 and 4 of the plaint filed in O.S No. 80/1987 as found in Ex.D.2 are reproduced below: "3) The defendants, without lawful authority have now illegally issued public notice, mentioning therein that they are going to hold public auction for sale of both suit lands on 7.9.1987 at 2 p.m. at Ramdurg. The defendants have no right what so-ever to sell the suit lands by public auction, and thereby cause irreparable loss and hardship to the plaintiffs. Their action is not only illegal and high handed but also highly injurious to the right, title and interest of plaintiffs in suit lands. Hence, plaintiffs are constrained to file this suit for obtaining permanent injunction against defendants restraining them from doing any act or acts interfering with plaintiff's right, title and interest in the suit lands. 4) The cause of action for this suit arose when the defendants have issued public notice to sell the suit lands by holding public auction on 07.09.1987 or there about." 16. Copy of the written statement filed by defendant nos.1 to 3 in O.S. No. 80/1987 is marked as Ex.D.3. The contents of the written statement filed by defendant nos.1 to 3 in O.S. No. 80/1987 as found in Ex.D.3 are identical to the averments found in the written statements filed by defendant nos.1 and 2 in the above six suits which are the basis for these six regular second appeals. 17. Ex.D.4 is the application filed vide I.A. No. 1 in O.S. No. 80/97 by this plaintiff as plaintiff no.2 under Order 39 Rule 1 and 2 of CPC.
17. Ex.D.4 is the application filed vide I.A. No. 1 in O.S. No. 80/97 by this plaintiff as plaintiff no.2 under Order 39 Rule 1 and 2 of CPC. In the affidavit accompanying the I.A. No. 1 as found in Ex.D.4, this plaintiff has sworn to that Parawwa is- his adoptive mother and he is well acquainted with the facts of the case and is also competent to swear on his behalf as also on behalf of his adoptive mother-plaintiff no.1, more particularly as she was too old and not in a position to do normal things. 18. Ex.D.5 is the order passed on I.A.No. 1 in O.S. No. 80/1987 dismissing the LA. No. 1 filed under Order 39 Rule 1 and 2. Exparte injunction granted earlier was vacated with immediate effect from 01.09.1989, the date on which I.A. No. 1 was dismissed by the learned Munsiff. It is to be seen that plaintiff Basavaraj has not made any reference about the earlier suit filed in O.S. No. 80/1987 by himself and his adoptive mother in the plaint filed in all these six suits. According to him, the cause of action arose on 12.12.1995 insofar as. O.S. No. 133/1995, i.e., the date on which the public sale notice was issued. Similarly, a reference is made in the other suits about the notices issued in the year 1995 and 1996. On a plain reading of the plaints filed in all these six suits, it appears as though he did not have any knowledge about the attachment of the properties in question and the proposed public auction to be held in the year 1987. Having very much participated in the earlier suit in O.S. No. 80/1987 along with his mother and having sworn to an affidavit about the actual cause of action arise for filing O.S. No. 80/1987, plaintiff cannot turn around and say that cause of action for all these six suits arose only in the year 1995 and 1996 when three separate public notices were issued on 12.12.1995 and 13.01.1996 respectively. 19. The Hon'ble Apex Court has extensively dealt with Article 58 and 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 in the case of Khatri Hotels Private Limited and Another Vs. Union of India reported in 2011 (9) S.C.C. 126 .
19. The Hon'ble Apex Court has extensively dealt with Article 58 and 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 in the case of Khatri Hotels Private Limited and Another Vs. Union of India reported in 2011 (9) S.C.C. 126 . Decisions of the Hon'ble Apex Court rendered in Rukma Bai's case ( AIR 1960 SC 335 ) and AIR 1930 SC 270-Bolo Vs. Koklan have been referred to and discussed in Khatri Hotel's case. In paragraph no. 25 at page no. 138 of the decision rendered in Khatri Hotel's case, Article 58 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act, 1963 has been referred to and in paragraph no. 26 Article 120 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act, 1908 has also been referred to. 20. The distinction between these two Articles has been succinctly explained in paragraph no. 30 at page no. 139 of the decision in Khatri Hotel's case. Para no. 30 is reproduced below: "30. While enacting Article 58 of the 1963 Act, the legislature has designedly made a departure from the language of Article 120 of the 1908 Act. The word "first" has been used between the words "sue" and "accrued". This would mean that if a suit is based on multiple' causes of action, the period of limitation will begin to run from the date when the right to sue first accrues. To put it differently, successive violation of the right will not give rise to fresh cause and the suit will be liable to be dismissed if it is beyond the period of limitation counted from the day when the right to sue first accrued." 21. In the present cases there is overwhelming evidence placed on record by defendant nos.1 and 2 to establish that this plaintiff had clear knowledge of the public notices issued by defendant nos.1 and 2 for auctioning schedule properties based on an earlier attachment, in the year 1987. Plaintiff has not whispered anything about the earlier suit filed by him and his adoptive mother in O.S. No. 80/1987 in which the cause of action for this suit had really arisen. Though the said suit in O.S. No 80/1987 was for the main relief of permanent injunction, all the ingredients found in these six suits are found in the plaint filed in the said suit O.S. No. 80/1987. 22.
Though the said suit in O.S. No 80/1987 was for the main relief of permanent injunction, all the ingredients found in these six suits are found in the plaint filed in the said suit O.S. No. 80/1987. 22. Plaintiff cannot contend that O.S. No. 80/1987 was only a suit for permanent injunction and therefore any number of injunction suits could be filed on the basis of recurring cause of action. Subsequent issuance of notices to defendant no.3 for bringing the properties for sale on prior attachment cannot be the first cause of action for filing these suits. Cause of action to challenge the awards passed against defendant no.3 had already arisen in 1987 itself. Limitation Act only bars the remedy and does not extinguish remedy. Limitation Act is an act of repose and finality. The right to sue had already accrued when the defendants nos.1 and 2 had attached these suit properties and brought them for sale by issuing pubic auction notice in the year 1987 itself. Just because O.S. No. 80/1987 was dismissed for default, it does not give rise to further cause of action to this plaintiff to file separate suits in the garb of seeking comprehensive relief of declaration. Even otherwise, the relief of declaration sought for in these suits is to the effect that the suit lands are not liable for attachment and for sale in order to recover the amount due under the six awards. Instead of perusing the said suits after the death of his adoptive mother-Parawwa, plaintiff allowed the suit to be dismissed for non-prosecution. Having questioned the very authority of defendant nos.1 and 2 by filing a suit along with his mother in 1987, it cannot be said that the cause of action for these six suits arose only in 1995 and 1996. 23. The decision of the Hon'ble three judges of the Supreme Court in Rukma Bai's case, is distinguishable in the light of separate wordings found in Article 58 of Limitation Act, 1963 and the clear distinction made by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in paragraph no.30 of Khatri Hotel's case. 24. Even as per the facts found in Katti Hotel's case suit for declaration and permanent injunction in respect of immovable property was filed stating that cause of action arose in the year 2000.
24. Even as per the facts found in Katti Hotel's case suit for declaration and permanent injunction in respect of immovable property was filed stating that cause of action arose in the year 2000. Suit had been filed against Delhi Development Authority from interfering with the possession of the suit land held by the plaintiffs. In the written statement filed in 1990, the defendants therein had already taken up a specific plea that suit land belonged to Gaon Sabha. In view of Notification issued u/S 507 of the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act, the land had automatically vested in Central Government and the Central Government had transferred the entire land including the suit land to Delhi Development Authority more particularly as per Notification issued in 1974 u/S 22(1) of D.D.A. Act. On analyzing the facts of the case, the Hon'ble Apex Court has held in Katri Hotel's case that Notification u/S 501 Delhi Municipal Corporation Act and Notification u/S 22(1) of B.D A. Act was the basis for cause of action. It is further held that at least on receipt of written statement filed by Delhi Development Authority in 1990 the cause of action had arisen and therefore three years had to be reckoned from December 1990. Hence it is specifically held that suit filed in the year 2000 was barred by time. 25. In the present cases also the defendants have taken up a specific stand that suit was not maintainable and that defendants were entitled to recover the amount by bringing the suit schedule properties for sale in the public auction. Having filed a suit, plaintiff allowed in to be dismissed for default. Nothing is whispered about the earlier suit in the plaints filed before the trial Court. Subsequent issuance of notices by defendant nos.1 and 2 for bringing the properties for sale is only a repetition of what was done earlier based on attachment of these properties done way back in 1987. Inspite of holding that plaintiff is the absolute owner in possession of the suit properties, the defendants can still support the impugned judgments under Order 41 Rule 33 of CPC. 26. In this view of the matter, the Courts below are justified in dismissing the suits on the ground of Limitation as per Article 58 of the Limitation Act, 1963.
Inspite of holding that plaintiff is the absolute owner in possession of the suit properties, the defendants can still support the impugned judgments under Order 41 Rule 33 of CPC. 26. In this view of the matter, the Courts below are justified in dismissing the suits on the ground of Limitation as per Article 58 of the Limitation Act, 1963. The cause of action as averred in the six plaints filed by the plaintiff in 1995 and 1996 cannot be considered as cause of action for these suits since the cause of action had arisen in 1986 and 1987 when suit properties had been attached and notices had been issued to defendant no.3, proposing to hold public auction. Therefore, the said attachment continued in law for all practical purposes up to the period of 1995 and therefore right to sue for the plaintiff had first accrued in 1987. The invasion of the right of the plaintiff started in the year 1987 itself when attachment was done by defendant nos.1 and 2 and their recovery Officers and Sale Officers attempted to bring the suit properties for public auction. Hence, it cannot be held that the right of the plaintiff to file suit arose for the first time in 1995. On the other hand, right of the plaintiff had been invaded way back in 1987 itself by attaching the properties and issuing separate notices. Intelligent drafting of plaint cannot get over the cause of action which had arisen way back in 1987. Hence the substantial questions of law nos.1 and 2 are answered in the affirmative. 27. Point No. 3: No good grounds are made out to interfere with the well considered findings in regard to limitation and cause of action as given the trial Court and affirmed by the first appellate Court u/S 96 of CPC. Accordingly the appeals are liable to be dismissed. ORDER Appeals filed u/S 100 of CPC are dismissed with costs. Consequently, common judgment of the trial Court and the first appellate Court are upheld.