JUDGMENT D.H.WAGHELA, CJ (ORAL) : 1. The appellants, original petitioners, have sought to challenge the order dated 21.11.2013 of learned Single Judge of this court, whereby the challenge to acquisition of their lands was spurned and the petitions were dismissed. 2. The relevant facts in brief are that, the appellants claimed to be in possession of several parcels of land of Kolipura Village, Doddaballapura Taluk, Bangalore Rural District, which lands were stated to be virtually adjacent to a lake cum reservoir. The respondent, Karnataka Industrial Area Development Board (‘KIADB’ for short), issued notification dated 21.5.2007 for acquisition of some parts of the lands of the appellants for the proposed “Apparel Park”. The appellants submitted their objections and ultimately, notification dated 27.4.2010 was issued under the provisions of Section 28(4) of the Karnataka Industrial Areas Development Act, 1966 (‘KIAD Act’ for short) in respect of five parcels of land, totally admeasuring19 acres 16 guntas. 3. After considering the contentions of the appellants, mainly based on judgment of the Apex Court in Karnataka Industrial Areas Development Board Vs. C.Kenchappa ( AIR 2006 SC 2038 ), it was held in the impugned order that mere declaration of an industrial area by the State, by itself, will not take away the requirement of obtaining change of land use, which is contemplated under other statutes and, therefore, the declaration of an industrial area is always subject to the statutory authorities under other legislation permitting the establishment of industry in a particular area. 4. Learned counsel for the appellants vehemently argued and reiterated that, in view of the observations made by the Apex Court in C.Kenchappa,(supra), KIADB was required to take into consideration the environmental impact of declaring certain area as an industrial area under the provisions of Section 3 of the KIAD Act. On that basis, it was further argued that, in the facts of the present case, even as the other objections of the appellants were supposed to have been considered, the KIADB appears to have ignored the aforesaid observations, which were binding. He emphasized the relevant observations made by the Apex Court in paragraph 97 of C.Kenchappaas under: “97. The importance and awareness of environment and ecology is becoming so vital and important that we, in our judgment, want the appellant to insist on the conditions emanating from the principle of ‘Sustainable Development’. He emphasized the relevant observations made by the Apex Court in paragraph 97 of C.Kenchappaas under: “97. The importance and awareness of environment and ecology is becoming so vital and important that we, in our judgment, want the appellant to insist on the conditions emanating from the principle of ‘Sustainable Development’. (1) We direct that, in future, before acquisition of lands for development, the consequence and adverse impact of development on environment must be properly comprehended and the lands be acquired for development that they do not gravely impair the ecology and environment. (2) We also direct the appellant to incorporate the condition of allotment to obtain clearance from the Karnataka State Pollution Control Board before the land is allotted for development. The said directory condition of allotment of lands be converted into a mandatory condition for all the projects to be sanctioned in future.” 5. Since the argument of the appellants is based on the provisions of Section 3 of the KIAD Act and the provisions of Section 4 are also relevant, the text of those provisions may be quoted hereunder: “3. Declaration of industrial areas. (1) The State Government may, by notification, declare any area in the State to be an industrial area for the purposes of this Act. (2) Every such notification shall define the limits of the area to which it relates. 4. Alteration of industrial area. The State Government may at any time, by notification, exclude from any industrial area, any area, or include therein any additional area, as may be specified in such notification.” Admittedly, the provisions for acquisition of lands are separate and distinctly enacted in Section 28 of the KIAD Act. Therefore, the process and consideration for declaring any area in the State to be industrial area for the purpose of the Act are distinct and the process precedes the acquisition of land. Between the operation of both the provisions of Section 3 and Section 28, there are provisions of Section 4, which permit exclusion of any area or inclusion of any additional area in the industrial area declared under Section 3. 6. The provisions of Section 1(3) are also relevant for the purpose insofar as Section 28 falling under Chapter VII could come into force in an area only from such date that the State Government may, from time to time, by notification, specify. 6. The provisions of Section 1(3) are also relevant for the purpose insofar as Section 28 falling under Chapter VII could come into force in an area only from such date that the State Government may, from time to time, by notification, specify. It is clear from a bare reading of the observations of the Apex Court that they are made in the context of acquisition of land and not in the context of declaration of any area as an industrial area. The observations which may be relevant for the purpose of the present case may be the observations made in paragraph 97(2) of the aforesaid judgment. Therefore, it would be fallacious and incorrect to apply the observations made in respect of the acquisition of land to the process of declaration of an area as an industrial area. In the particular facts of the present case, as recorded in the impugned order, on a close consideration of the pros and cons, the KIADB had willfully deleted substantial portions of the lands of the petitioners, adjoining the village limits and the lake area which, according to the appellants, was a perennial source of water to the lands. Thus, the contention of the appellants in respect of source of livelihood had been favourably addressed in deleting substantial portions of the lands before acquisition of lands was initiated. 7. In the above facts and for the reasons discussed hereinabove, there is no substance in the argument that the KIADB was required to take environmental clearance even before declaring the area as an industrial area. 8. There being no other point for consideration, the appeals are summarily dismissed, along with the application made therein.