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2014 DIGILAW 509 (ALL)

Ram Kumar Yadav and others v. State of U. P. and another

2014-02-13

KARUNA NAND BAJPAYEE

body2014
Karuna Nand Bajpayee,J. This revision has been filed with the prayer to quash the order dated 10.10.2013 passed by the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Jhansi in Case No.168 of 2010 (Chatur Singh Vs. Ram Kumar and others) u/s 323/379/504/506 I.P.C., Police Station-Nawabad, District-Jhansi pending in the Court of Chief Judicial Magistrate, Jhansi whereby the discharge application moved by the accused-revisionists has been rejected by the trial court. 2. Learned counsel for the revisionists has filed the supplementary affidavit, which is taken on record. 3. Heard Shri Lal Chandra Mishra, learned counsel for the revisionists as well as learned A.G.A. on behalf of the State. Perused the record including the impugned order. 4. The submission of the counsel is that one of the accused was not present on the place of occurrence and the material indicating his alibi was produced by the accused before the trial court but the same has not been duly considered. It has been submitted that in order to create pressure to enter into a compromise with relation to a litigation which was already pending in between the parties, the present prosecution has been brought against the accused which is entirely false and frivolous. 5. Learned A.G.A. has also made his brief submissions and the hub of his argument is that if witnesses other than the first informant turn hostile or do not support the first informant but the first informant himself gives a statement against the accused launching allegations which make out the offence and his statement is also duly corroborated by the First Information Report lodged by him, then even this much of the material, if accepted and acted upon by the Court, would be sufficient to convict the accused. Obviously enough this much of material in the case diary would also be sufficient to frame the charge. It has also been submitted on behalf of the State that the defence documents submitted by the accused and the defence plea of alibi raised by him cannot form the basis to decide whether the charge should be framed or not nor the defence material produced by the accused at the stage of framing of the charge can form any legitimate basis to discharge the accused. 6. It appears from the record that there is allegation against the accused-revisionists for having criminally assaulted the first informant of the case. 6. It appears from the record that there is allegation against the accused-revisionists for having criminally assaulted the first informant of the case. There is also the allegation of taking away Rs.300/- which had dropped down during the period of assault done on the first informant. There is also allegation of threats being given by the accused. The discharge application was moved primarily on the ground of false implication due to previous enmity and the plea of alibi was also raised regarding one of the accused. 7. Before proceeding to adjudge the validity of the impugned order it may be useful to cast a fleeting glance to some of the representative cases decided by the Hon'ble Supreme Court which have expatiated the legal approach to be adopted at the time of framing of the charge. It shall be advantageous to refer to the observations made by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of State of Bihar vs. Ramesh Singh 1977 (4) SCC 39 which are as follows :- “4. Under S. 226 of the Code while opening the case for the prosecution the prosecutor has got to describe the charge against the accused and State by what evidence he proposes to prove the guilt of the accused. Thereafter, comes at the initial stage, the duty of the Court to consider the record of the case and the documents submitted therewith and to hear the submissions of the accused and the prosecution in that behalf. The Judge has to pass thereafter an order either u/s. 227 or u/s. 228 of the Code. If "the Judge considers that there is not sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused, he shall discharge the accused and record his reasons for so doing", so enjoined by s. 227. If, on the other hand, "the Judge is of opinion that there is ground for presuming that the accused has committed an offence which ...................................... (b) in exclusively triable by the court, he shall frame in writing a charge against the accused," as provided in S. 228. Reading the two provisions together in juxtaposition, as they have got to be, it would be clear that at the beginning and the initial stage of the trial the truth, veracity and effect of the evidence which the prosecutor proposes to adduce are not to be meticulously judged. Reading the two provisions together in juxtaposition, as they have got to be, it would be clear that at the beginning and the initial stage of the trial the truth, veracity and effect of the evidence which the prosecutor proposes to adduce are not to be meticulously judged. Nor is any weight to be attached to the probable defence of the accused. It is not obligatory for the Judge at that stage of the trial to consider in any detail and weigh in a sensitive balance whether the facts, if proved, would be incompatible with the innocence of the accused or not. The standard of test and judgment which is to be finally applied before recording a finding regarding the guilt or otherwise of the accused is not exactly to be applied at this stage of deciding the matter under s. 227 and 228 of the Code. At that stage the court is not to see whether there is sufficient ground for conviction of the accused or whether the trial is sure to end in his conviction. Strong suspicion against the accused, if the matter remains in the region of suspicion, cannot take the place of proof of his guilt at the conclusion of the trial. But at the initial stage if there is a strong suspicion which leads the court to think that there is ground for presuming that the accused has committed an offence then it is not open to the court to say that there is no sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. The presumption of the guilt of the accused which is to be drawn at the initial stage is not in the sense of the law governing the trial of criminal cases in France where the accused is presumed to be guilty unless the contrary is proved. But it is only for the purpose of deciding prima facie whether the court should proceed with the trial or not. If the evidence which the Prosecutor proposes to adduce to prove the guilt of the accused even if fully accepted before it is challenged in cross-examination or rebutted by the defence, if any, cannot show that the accused committed the offence, there will be no sufficient ground for proceeding with the trial. An exhaustive list of the circumstances to indicate as to what will lead to one conclusion or the other is neither possible nor advisable. An exhaustive list of the circumstances to indicate as to what will lead to one conclusion or the other is neither possible nor advisable. We may just illustrate the difference of the law by one more example. If the scales of pan as to the guilt or innocence of the accused are something like even at the conclusion of the trial, then, on the theory of benefit of doubt the case is to end in his acquittal. But if, on the other hand, it is so at the initial stage of making an order under S. 227 or S. 228, then in such a situation ordinarily and generally the order which will have to be made will be one under S. 228 and not under S. 227. 8. Aforesaid case was again referred to in another Apex Court's decision Superintendent and Remembrancer of Legal Affairs, West Bengal Versus Anil Kumar Bhunja AIR 1980 (SC) 52 and the Apex Court proceeded to observe as follows: “18. It may be remembered that the case was at the stage of framing charges; the prosecution evidence had not yet commenced. The Magistrate had, therefore, to consider the above question on a general consideration of the materials placed before him by the investigating police officer. At this stage, as was pointed out by this Court in State of Bihar v. Ramesh Singh, AIR 1977 SC 2018 , the truth, veracity and effect of the evidence which the prosecutor proposes to adduce are not to be meticulously judged. The standard of test, proof and judgment which is to be applied finally before finding the accused guilty or otherwise, is not exactly to be applied at the stage of Section 227 or 228 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. At this stage, even a very strong suspicion founded upon materials before the Magistrate, which leads him to form a presumptive opinion as to the existence of the factual ingredients constituting the offence alleged; may justify the framing of charge against the accused in respect of the commission of that offence. 9. In yet another case of Palwinder Singh Vs. Balvinder Singh AIR 2009 SC 887 the Apex Court had the occasion to reflect upon the scope of adjudication and its ambit at the time of framing of the charge and also about the scope to consider the material produced by the accused at that stage. 9. In yet another case of Palwinder Singh Vs. Balvinder Singh AIR 2009 SC 887 the Apex Court had the occasion to reflect upon the scope of adjudication and its ambit at the time of framing of the charge and also about the scope to consider the material produced by the accused at that stage. Following extract may be profitably quoted to clarify the situation : “12. Having heard learned counsel for the parties, we are of the opinion that the High Court committed a serious error in passing the impugned judgment insofar as it entered into the realm of appreciation of evidence at the stage of the framing of the charges itself. The jurisdiction of the learned Sessions Judge while exercising power under Section 227 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is limited. Charges can be framed also on the basis of strong suspicion. Marshalling and appreciation of evidence is not in the domain of the Court at that point of time. This aspect of the matter has been considered by this Court in state of Orissa v. Debendra Nath Padhi, (2005) 1 SCC 568 wherein it was held as under : "23. As a result of the aforesaid discussion, in our view, clearly the law is that at the time of framing charge or taking cognizance the accused has no right to produce any material. Satish Mehra's Case holding that the trial Court has powers to consider even materials which the accused may produce at the stage of Section 227 of the Code has not been correctly decided." The following observations made by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Sanghi Brothers (Indore) Pvt. Ltd. v. Sanjay Choudhary AIR 2009 SC 9 also reiterated the same position of law :- “10. After analyzing the terminology used in the three pairs of sections it was held that despite the differences there is no scope for doubt that at the stage at which the Court is required to consider the question of framing of charge, the test of a prima facie case to be applied. 11. The present case is not one where the High Court ought to have interfered with the order of framing the charge. 11. The present case is not one where the High Court ought to have interfered with the order of framing the charge. As rightly submitted by learned counsel for the appellant, even if there is a strong suspicion about the commission of offence and the involvement of the accused, it is sufficient for the Court to frame a charge. At that stage, there is no necessity of formulating the opinion about the prospect of conviction. That being so, the impugned order of the High Court cannot be sustained and is set aside. The appeal is allowed. “ 11. Learned Chief Judicial Magistrate has discussed all the pleas raised on behalf of the accused-revisionists and analyzed the entire factual scenario with sound reasonings. He has also discussed the relevant law on the point of framing of charge and its legal requirements. It has been rightly held by the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate that it is not necessary at the stage of framing of charge to go into the last details of the case and enter into a roving inquiry about all the pros and cons of the case and evaluate the evidence as if the Court was sitting to deliver final judgment on the point of guilt or innocence of the accused. It has been rightly observed by the lower court that even a grave suspicion may be, in a given case, sufficient to frame the charge. The considerations at the stage of summoning the accused to face trial, the considerations to decide whether the charge ought to be framed or not and the considerations about the sufficiency of material in order to record the conviction are all essentially different from each other. The Court has to be satisfied only on the prima facie basis, and if, the material available makes out the alleged offences when taken on their face value, the charges ought to be framed. The ultimate credibility of evidence and its reliability is not to be gone into at the stage of framing of the charge. It has also been taken note of by the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate that the first informant has in his statement given to the Investigating Officer, supported the contents of First Information Report. The ultimate credibility of evidence and its reliability is not to be gone into at the stage of framing of the charge. It has also been taken note of by the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate that the first informant has in his statement given to the Investigating Officer, supported the contents of First Information Report. All the aforesaid factual aspects and the aspects relating to law, have been duly considered by the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate and he has rightly concluded that there is sufficient prima facie material to frame the charge. Because of the same reason the application seeking discharge has been rejected. 12. The counsel for the revisionists has not been able to show any convincing reason on the basis of which the impugned order may be faulted with or which may reflect any illegality, impropriety or error in the same. 13. No interference by this Court is therefore called forth. 14. The revision being sans merit stands dismissed. _____________