Oral Judgment: 1. Heard learned Counsel Shri Rajnish Vyas for the petitioner and the learned Additional Public Prosecutor Shri P.V. Bhoyar for the respondents. 2. Rule. Rule made returnable forthwith by consent of the learned Counsel appearing for the parties. 3. This petition challenges the order passed by the Commissioner of Police in exercise of his power as District Magistrate under Section 18 of the Immoral Traffic (Prevention) Act, 1956 (in short “the Act”). The petitioner Smt. Sharada Premlal Chhadi, aged about 65 years, was occupier of House No.6, City Survey No.175/528, Nagpur and she was allegedly running brothel in the said premises. The District Magistrate i.e. respondent No.2 after giving notice to the petitioner, had passed an order on 26-9-2012 directing sealing of the said premises and further directed that the premises shall not be let out for a period of three years. The said order was challenged before this Court by the petitioner in Criminal Application (APL) No.619 of 2012. This Court while disposing of the said application, set aside the order and directed that respondent No.2 should pass necessary orders only after giving personal hearing to the petitioner. 4. Accordingly, respondent No.2 had issued notices to the petitioner for appearance in person. The petitioner had appeared in person and after hearing the petitioner, similar order was passed by the successor in office of the Commissioner of Police. 5. Learned Counsel Shri Rajnish Vyas appearing on behalf of the petitioner has submitted that respondent No.2 had no authority to pass order under Section 18 of the Act as it empowers the District Magistrate only and not the Additional District Magistrate. My attention was invited to the impugned order in which the Commissioner of Police has stated 'in exercise of his power as Executive Magistrate and Additional District Magistrate'. In this regard, it may be noted here that admittedly the Commissioner of Police of Nagpur has been conferred with powers of District Magistrate for the purposes of Section 18 of the Act. Therefore, if there is some typographical mistake in the order, it cannot be said that the order is vitiated. 6. Learned Counsel Shri Rajnish Vyas has further submitted that despite the order of this Court, the petitioner was not given sufficient opportunity of being heard. She was not allowed to place her case before respondent No.2. Therefore, if there is some typographical mistake in the order, it cannot be said that the order is vitiated. 6. Learned Counsel Shri Rajnish Vyas has further submitted that despite the order of this Court, the petitioner was not given sufficient opportunity of being heard. She was not allowed to place her case before respondent No.2. It was pointed out that the petitioner had submitted an application for engaging a Lawyer and Vakalatnama of a Lawyer had also been placed before respondent No.2. Learned Counsel Shri Rajnish Vyas has further submitted that the petitioner has specifically stated in her petition that she was asked only one question by respondent No.2 and she was allowed to go out of chamber of respondent No.2. It is submitted by Shri Rajnish Vyas that action of respondent No.2 obviously was malicious and he was not honest to his duty as a public servant. It is submitted in the affidavit filed by respondent No.1 that the petitioner was granted opportunity on 12-9-2013 and 20-9-2013. The petitioner does not deny of having received the notices for her appearance on 12-9-2013 and 20-9-2013. Learned Counsel Shri Rajnish Vyas has submitted that the petitioner is an illiterate lady and therefore, she was unable to address respondent No.2. In the circumstances, it was necessary for respondent No.2 to allow her to engage a Lawyer. 7. After hearing both the sides, I have come to the conclusion that the proceedings under Section 18 of the Act are miscellaneous proceedings and are required to be disposed of in summary manner. The subjective satisfaction of the District Magistrate plays a vital role in decision taken under Section 18 of the Act. No doubt only subjective satisfaction will not be sufficient to deprive a person of his property. The District Magistrate is under obligation to take into consideration all the facts before him and give finding that the provisions of the Act have been violated and that the attachment of the premises is necessary. At the same time, it needs to be stated here that the District Magistrate is not under obligation to give an elaborate hearing to the occupier of the premises. At the same time, it needs to be stated here that the District Magistrate is not under obligation to give an elaborate hearing to the occupier of the premises. The requirement of Section 18 of the Act are as under:- (1) A Magistrate shall have an information from the police or otherwise, that any house, room, place or any portion thereof within a distance of two hundred meters of any public place referred to in sub-section (1) of section 7, is being run or used as a brothel by any person, or is being used by prostitutes for carrying on their trade. (2) On having received such information, the District Magistrate is under obligation to issue notice to the owner, lessor or landlord of such house, room, place or portion or the agent of the owner, lessor or landlord or on the tenant, lessee, occupier of, or any other person in charge of such house, room, place, or portion. (3) A show cause shall call upon the person mentioned in para (2) above, as to why the premises shall not be attached for improper user thereof. (4) The District Magistrate is required to give hearing to the person to whom a notice has been issued. 8. If the District Magistrate is satisfied that house, room, place or portion thereof was being used as brothel or for carrying on prostitution, he may direct eviction of the occupier within seven days of passing of the order. He may also direct that such premises shall not be let out during the period of one year without prior approval of the District Magistrate. In case child or minor has been found in such house, room, place or portion during a search under Section 15, the District Magistrate may direct that the premises shall not be let out for a period of three years without prior approval of the Magistrate. 9. As such it is abundantly clear from the provisions of Section 18(1) of the Act that the proceedings under Section 18 (1) are summary in nature and the District Magistrate not necessarily depends on the police report. He may take action on the basis of receipt of information from some other source also. As such in a case where the information is received from a source other than police, the Police Commissioner may not have panchanama and other documents before him. He may take action on the basis of receipt of information from some other source also. As such in a case where the information is received from a source other than police, the Police Commissioner may not have panchanama and other documents before him. It, therefore, indicates that subjective satisfaction of the Police Commissioner/District Magistrate is integral part of the proceedings under Section 18 of the Act. 10. As such I have come to the conclusion that a reasonable opportunity was given to the petitioner by respondent No.2. Issuance of notices for appearance of petitioner on two occasions i.e. 12-9-2013 and 20-9-2013 by itself are indicative of the fact that respondent No.2 was anxious to follow the order passed by this Court. If the petitioner adopted dubious method of delaying the proceedings, respondent No.2 cannot be responsible for the same. 11. Learned Counsel Shri Rajnish Vyas has further submitted that the respondents have not produced the notification issued under Section 7 of the Act to establish that the place attached by respondent No.2 was within 200 meters of a public place notified under Section 7 of the Act. Section 7 of the Act runs as under:- “7. Prostitution in or in the vicinity of public places – (1) Any (person), who carries on prostitution and the person with whom such prostitution is carried on, in any premises,- (a) which are within the area or areas, notified under sub-section (3), or (b) which are within a distance of two hundred meters of any place of public religious worship, educational institution, hostel, hospital, nursing home or such other public place of any kind as may be notified in this behalf by the Commissioner of Police or Magistrate in the manner prescribed, shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to three months. (1-A) Where an offence committed under sub-section (1) is in respect of a child or minor, the person committing the offence shall be punishable with imprisonment of either description for a term which shall not be less than seven years but which may be for life or for a term which may extend to ten years and shall also be liable to fine: Provided that the Court may, for adequate and special reasons to be mentioned in the judgment, impose a sentence of imprisonment for a term of less than seven years. (2) ------- (3) The State Government may, having regard to the kinds of persons frequenting any area or areas in the State, the nature and the density of population therein and other relevant considerations, by notification in the Official Gazette, direct that prostitution shall not be carried on in such area or areas as may be specified in the notification. (4) ----- (5) ------” Reading of sub-sections (1) and (3) of Section 7 of the Act makes it absolutely clear that the area within a distance of 200 meters of any public religious worship, educational institution, hostel, hospital, nursing home is not required to be specifically notified. The Government has authority to notify any other area within which the prostitution is prohibited. This notification of Government specifying the area is in addition to the areas already stated in Section (7) (1)(b) of the Act. In the present case, there was a Balaji temple at a distance of 90 meters from the premises of the petitioner, there was Sudarshan Higher Primary School at a distance of 70 meters and Kamleshababa Dargah at a distance of 45 meters. As such the premises of the petitioner allegedly used for running brothel was within 200 meters of the places mentioned in Section 7(1)(b) of the Act. Therefore, the separate notification was not necessary. As such the argument of learned Counsel Shri Vyas that it was necessary to issue notification under Section 7(1)(a) of the Act is devoid of any merit inasmuch as the premises in question were already within the distance of two hundred meters from educational institution and the places of public religious worship. 12. Learned Counsel Shri Rajnish Vyas has also brought to my notice that the proviso to sub-section (1) of Section 18 of the Act empowers the Magistrate to pass orders directing that the premises shall not be leased out or otherwise given possession of by the person concerned within one year or within three years, as the case may be. The limitation of one year is applicable in normal cases of prostitution and limitation of three years is applicable where the child or minor are found in the premises. In the present case, minor girls were found in the premises, therefore, the limitation of three years was applicable. The limitation of one year is applicable in normal cases of prostitution and limitation of three years is applicable where the child or minor are found in the premises. In the present case, minor girls were found in the premises, therefore, the limitation of three years was applicable. The District Magistrate/respondent No.2 was empowered to issue directions that such premises shall not be let out or given possession thereof without his permission for a period of three years. Learned Counsel Shri Rajnish Vyas has brought to my notice that the District Magistrate has arbitrarily passed the order that the premises in question shall not be let out for a period of three years. He has not even placed a rider on the order that the premises could be leased out with prior permission of the District Magistrate. In this regard, it is sufficient to mention here that if there is a statutory provision which entitles the petitioner to move the District Magistrate for letting of the premises, nothing prevents the petitioner from moving the District Magistrate/respondent No.2 for a necessary relief. I do not think that non placing of rider in the impugned order vitiates the order any manner. If the statutory provision is available for necessary relief, same can be availed at any time. The applicant is always at liberty to move the District Magistrate for grant of approval to let out the premises. 13. Learned Counsel Shri Rajnish Vyas has submitted that the petitioner was not the sole owner of the premises and therefore, respondent No.2 was under obligation to issue notices to other owners also. It is submitted that this fact was brought to the notice of respondent No.2 and despite having knowledge of the fact that there were other owners of the premises, respondent No.2 had maliciously avoided to serve them notices and has passed the order hastily without applying his mind. It was brought to my notice that the other owners had also filed objections during the course of hearing before the District Magistrate. In this regard, what is pertinent to note is that the District Magistrate, in exercise of his powers under Section 18(1) of the Act, was not under obligation to issue notices to all the owners of property. What he was under obligation was to issue notice to the owner, lessor, landlord or agent of owner, lessor or landlord. In this regard, what is pertinent to note is that the District Magistrate, in exercise of his powers under Section 18(1) of the Act, was not under obligation to issue notices to all the owners of property. What he was under obligation was to issue notice to the owner, lessor, landlord or agent of owner, lessor or landlord. If the petitioner was working on behalf of other owners who are not residents of Nagpur, she can be treated as agent of the other owners and in my opinion, the order impugned is not vitiated in any manner only because the notices were not issued to the co-owners of the property. 14. For all these reasons, I do not find any substance in the petition. The petition stands dismissed. Rule stands discharged. 15. Learned Counsel Shri Rajnish Vyas prays for four weeks time and submits that ad interim order granted may be allowed to be continued for a further period of four weeks. After having come to the conclusion that the petitioner does not have merits in her case at all, I do not find substance in the prayer. The prayer stands rejected.