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2014 DIGILAW 510 (GAU)

Hage Tera v. Hage Appo and Anr.

2014-05-09

B.K.SHARMA, M.R.PATHAK

body2014
B.K. Sharma,J.:- 1. The appeal and the revision petition by and between the same parties have been heard analogously and are being disposed of by this common judgment and order. 2. Briefly stated the facts involved in both the proceedings are as follows : RFA No.02(AP)/2011: 3. This appeal is directed against the judgment and order dated 22.6.2011 passed by the learned District and Sessions Judge, West Sessions Division, Yupia in Title Suit No. 45/2011(UPA) by which the suit filed by the respondent herein has been decreed in his favour. 4. The respondents herein as the plaintiff filed the Title Suit for declaration with the following prayers : "(i) Declaration that the plaintiff is a partner of M/s. Laali Gyachi Gas Services at Ziro entitled to accounts and all rights and benefits of the firm. (ii) Dissolution of the partnership firm M/s. Laali Gyachi Gas Services, Ziro. (iii) Accounts of the partnership firm M/s. Laali Gyachi Gas Services, Ziro till date of dissolution. (iv) Recovery of the share of profit and all properties, assets, rights and benefits of the partnership firm M/s. Laali Gyachi Gas Services, Ziro as occurred till date of dissolution. (v) Appointment of receiver for running the business of the firm M / s. Laali Gyachi Gas Services, Ziro till disposal of the suit. (vi) Preliminary decree for realization of Rs. 70 lakh final decree accordingly as found entitled in due course in favour of the plaintiff. (vii) Preliminary decree for Rs. 1,25,000 per month with effect from the date of filing of the suit (24.3.1995) till realization of the entire amounts found due to the plaintiff by the defendant No.1 as future profit since filing of the suit. (viii) Decree for interest @ 5% per month on Rs. 70,00,000 with effect from the date of filing of the suit (24.3.95) as well as future interest on the future profit with 60% share of the monthly profit on Rs. 1,25,000.00 with effect from the date of accrual of the profit (future profit). (ix) Pass final decree on due course. (x) Full costs of the suit and any other relief or reliefs to which the plaintiff is found entitled under the law, equity and good conscience." 5. 1,25,000.00 with effect from the date of accrual of the profit (future profit). (ix) Pass final decree on due course. (x) Full costs of the suit and any other relief or reliefs to which the plaintiff is found entitled under the law, equity and good conscience." 5. In the suit it was the case of the respondent-plaintiff that as per the decision arrived at by and between the parties, i.e., the plaintiff and the defendant (appellant herein), they entered into an agreement on 12.4.1990 and executed a deed of agreement in presence of five witnesses and authenticated by Magistrate, Ziro, with the seal of the court. The agreement is quoted below : "AGREEMENT License No. CC(LPG)S-56/MTAN Dated 20.3.1990 Between 1. Shri Hage Tara 2. Shri hage Appo (First Party) (Second Party) In connection with management of Laali Gyanchi Gas Service, Hapoli (Ziro). We the first party and second party have agreed for joint management of the above gas service in following terms and conditions : 1. Whereas the first party got a licence of LPG distributorship from the IOC authorities for opening a outlet for public ale at Hapoli (Ziro). The second party has invested the initial expenditure at the tune of which may be worked out later. 2. The expenditure might have incurred by both party till the date of commission (10th April, 1998) will be showed at the ration of 50:50. 3. Since the god own has been constructed on the plot at land owned by the second party, rents will be charged at the rate which might be prevailing in that locality after five years. The land where the godown is constructed will never be claimed by the first party whatsoever. 4. The first party will act as manager and will be sole responsible for smooth management of the gas service for the next five years to start with. He will be paid total emolument of Rs. 1,600 per month. He will not engage himself in any other personal business during the above period. 5. The first party and the 2nd party will share the profit at 40% and 60%, respectively. 6. The balance amount of bank loan if any shall be utilized for improvement and development of the gas service only. If necessary they may open a joint account in the bank as may be convenient to them. 5. The first party and the 2nd party will share the profit at 40% and 60%, respectively. 6. The balance amount of bank loan if any shall be utilized for improvement and development of the gas service only. If necessary they may open a joint account in the bank as may be convenient to them. Sd/- Sd/- Shri Hage Tara Shri Hage Appo (First Party) (Secnd Party) Witnesses 1. Shri Hage Ajo 2. Hage Hanya Sd/- Sd/- 3. Hage Taki 4. Shri Hage Tatun Sd/- Sd/- 5. Shri Hage Tado 6. Shri hage Batt Sd/- Sd/- Judicial Magistrate First Class, Ziro." 6. As enumerated in the said agreement, the parties thereto entered into a partnership towards running the LPG distributorship with their respective share as indicated therein. Pursuant to the said agreement, the affairs of the distributorship were being run as per the said terms and conditions. However, at a later point of time and to be precise in the 1st week of April, 1991, trouble started between the parties when the accounts of the business of the partnership could not be finalized due to alleged unfair and non-cooperative attitude of the defendant. When the defendant ignored his responsibility, efforts were made to settle the matter amicably but eventually when nothing followed except enmity by and between the parties, the respondent-plaintiff served a notice dated 24.3.1994 upon the defendant-appellant demanding his part of the performance in respect of the partnership business. However, in response to the notice when the defendant denied his responsibility, the respondent-plaintiff instituted the suit with the aforesaid prayers. In between, there was occasion for instituting a criminal case by the plaintiff-respondent being Complaint Case No. 01/1994 under section 406/408/409 of the IPC, which eventually culminated to Criminal Revision Petition No. 560/1994 preferred by the defendant. 7. On receipt of the notice, the defendant-appellant filed the written statement with the general statement regarding the affairs of the partnership business. As regards the different paragraphs in the plaint, the stand of the defendant-appellant in the written statement was as follows : "14. That the defendant No.1 categorically denies the correctness of the statements made in the plaint more particularly in paragraphs 4,5,6,7,8,9, 10,11,13,14,15,16,17,18,19,20,21,22,23,24,25,26,27,28,29,30,31,32,33, 34,35,36,37,38,39,40 and 41 of the plaint and the plaintiff is put to strictest proof thereof." 8. As regards the different paragraphs in the plaint, the stand of the defendant-appellant in the written statement was as follows : "14. That the defendant No.1 categorically denies the correctness of the statements made in the plaint more particularly in paragraphs 4,5,6,7,8,9, 10,11,13,14,15,16,17,18,19,20,21,22,23,24,25,26,27,28,29,30,31,32,33, 34,35,36,37,38,39,40 and 41 of the plaint and the plaintiff is put to strictest proof thereof." 8. From the above, what is seen is that even in the aforesaid vague and indefinite response to various paragraphs in the plaint, there was no reference to paragraph 12 of the plaint in which the plaintiff-respondent specifically referred to the aforementioned agreement dated 12.4.1990 and the terms and conditions thereof. 9. In the written statement, while dealing with the pleas in the plaint enumerated in various paragraphs in the above quoted paragraph 14, the defendant-appellant also took the general pleas that the partnership agreement was not maintainable as per the provisions of the Indian Partnership Act, 1932. It was also stated in the written statement that the suit was filed by the respondent-plaintiff with mala fide intention to achieve collateral gain. What is significant to note is that in the said general statement made in the written statement, there was no plea taken that the agreement was signed by the defendant-appellant under compulsion. Be it stated here that the written statement was filed on 13.4.1995. 10. After 12 years of filing the aforesaid written statement, the defendant in his evidence on affidavit filed as DW-1 took the plea that he had signed the agreement dated 12.4.1990 under duress and pressure from the plaintiff-respondent and other elderly persons in the family. 11. The learned trial court on the basis of the pleadings of the parties framed the following issues : "(i) Whether the suit of the plaintiff is maintainable in proper form? (ii) Whether the suit of plaintiff is bad Non-joinder or mis-joinder of parties? (iii) Whether the suit is barred by the provisions of Limitation Act and by section 69 of Indian Partnership Act? (iv) Whether there is/was a partnership within the defendant No. 1 and the plaintiff in respect of the management of M/s. Laali Gycohi Gas Service, Hapoli, A.P.? (v) What is the quantum of amount of money is spent by plaintiff or the capital investment for obtaining the licence providing land, construction godown, providing a truck for carrying Gas Cylinders, etc.? (iv) Whether there is/was a partnership within the defendant No. 1 and the plaintiff in respect of the management of M/s. Laali Gycohi Gas Service, Hapoli, A.P.? (v) What is the quantum of amount of money is spent by plaintiff or the capital investment for obtaining the licence providing land, construction godown, providing a truck for carrying Gas Cylinders, etc.? (vi) Whether the plaintiff has right to claim for dissolution of partnership and for account of the firm M/s. Laali Gyochi Gas Service ? (vii) Whether there was accounts and sharing of profit of LPG business at the ration of 60% to plaintiff and 40% to defendant No.1, for the period 10.4.1990 to 10.5.1990 and whether the plaintiff is entitled for profit M/s. Laali Gyochi Gas Service, Hapoli, at the said ration from 11.5.1990 till dissolution of the partnership between plaintiff and defendant No. 1? (viii) To what relief the plaintiff/defendant is entitled?" 12. During trial both the parties examined witnesses and also exhibited several documents. While the plaintiff-respondent examined himself along with four other witnesses, the defendant-appellant also examined himself along with four other witnesses. 13. The agreement in question was exhibited as Ext.1 and the signatures therein of the parties including the witnesses thereto were also exhibited and marked. The other documents exhibited pertain to accounts of the partnership business signed by the parties i.e. the plaintiff and the defendant. Exhibiting the said documents, it was the plea of the plaintiff-respondent that the agreement was acted upon and thus the defendant-appellant could not have resiled back from the terms and conditions of the agreement so as to deny the existence of the partnership business. 14. The learned trial court on the basis of the evidence on record having decreed the suit in favour of the plaintiff- respondent, the defendant has filed the instant appeal challenging the said judgment and decree on the grounds enumerated in the appeal. CRP No. 16(AP)/2012 15. 14. The learned trial court on the basis of the evidence on record having decreed the suit in favour of the plaintiff- respondent, the defendant has filed the instant appeal challenging the said judgment and decree on the grounds enumerated in the appeal. CRP No. 16(AP)/2012 15. This Civil Revision Petition filed by the appellant in RFA No.02(AP)/ 2011 is against the order dated 15.9.2011 passed by the learned District and Sessions Judge, West Sessions Division, Yupia in Execution Petition No. 12/2011 (UPA), by which the petitioner is held to be liable for payment of monthly rent in respect of the godown of the LPG distributorship in question for the period from 12.11.2008 to 22.6.2011 as per the judgment and decree dated 17.12.2003 passed in Money Suit No. 3/1995 upheld by this court in appeal vide judgment and order dated 19.8.2005 in RFA No. 01(AP)/2005. It will be pertinent to mention here that the defendant-petitioner being aggrieved by the said appellate judgment dated 19.8.2005 had preferred an SLP before the Apex Court which was registered and numbered as SLP(Civil) No. (S) 23205-23206 and the same was also dismissed. Thus, the judgment and decree passed by the learned Trial Court in Money Suit No. 3/2005 has attained its finality. However, the appellant is aggrieved by the order dated 15.9.2011 passed by the Executing Court referred to above. 16. This proceeding has arisen out of an independent suit being Money Suit No. 3/2005 by and between the same parties to the above appeal and pertaining to the same agreement dated 12.4.1990 questioned in the above appeal and in reference to clause III of the said agreement when a dispute arose regarding payment of rent in respect of the land belonging to him on which the petitioner had constructed the LPG Cylinder Storage Godown for running the business under the name and style Laali Gyochi Gas Service. The suit filed by the respondent was decreed on contest with the following order : "The plaintiff succeeds in his claim from the defendant. The plaintiff is entitled to a monthly rent of Rs. 6,000 w.e.f. 12.4.1995 for the land at Laru where the gas godown is situated along with simple interest @ 14% p.a. for the arrears of rent till 11.12.2003 from the defendant. The rent and interest from 12.4.1995 to 11.12.2003 cumulates to Rs. 9,60,000 approx. The defendant is to pay Rs. The plaintiff is entitled to a monthly rent of Rs. 6,000 w.e.f. 12.4.1995 for the land at Laru where the gas godown is situated along with simple interest @ 14% p.a. for the arrears of rent till 11.12.2003 from the defendant. The rent and interest from 12.4.1995 to 11.12.2003 cumulates to Rs. 9,60,000 approx. The defendant is to pay Rs. 9,60,000 to the plaintiff within one month from today and beyond that date with interest @ 12% p.a. The plaintiff is also to pay an amount of Rs. 6,000 p.m. by the 31st (or last day) of every month as rent of the land w.e.f. 30th January, 2004 for the rent beginning 11.12.2003." 17. Against the said judgment and decree, the present petitioner who was the defendant in the suit preferred an appeal before this court which was registered and numbered as RFA No. 01(AP)/2005. The appeal having been dismissed vide judgment dated 19.8.2005, the defendant-petitioner had gone to the Supreme Court by filing the aforementioned SLP, which was also dismissed on 17.4.2007. 18. The executing court by its order dated 15.9.2011 passed in EP No. 12/2011(UPA) having held that the judgment debtor, i.e., the petitioner herein is liable to pay the monthly rent w.e.f. 12.11.2008 to 22.6.2011 as per the judgment and decree dated 17.12.2003, affirmed by his court, the defendant judgment debtor as the petitioner has filed the Civil Revision Petition. 19. In the execution proceeding the dependant-petitioner filed objection stating inter alia that he having shifted the godown from the premises of the plaintiff - decree holder during the period from 29.12.2008 to 31.12.2008, he is not liable to pay any rent from 1.1.2009. On the other hand, it was the plea of the decree holder-respondent that the alleged unilateral shifting of the godown without any intimation to him was inconsequential and pursuant to the judgment and decree referred to above and affirmed by this court vide judgment and order dated 19.8.2005 in RFA No. 01(AP)/2005, he is entitled to get rent for the remaining period. 20. 20. According to the decree holder-respondent, in view of pendency of the above appeal, i.e., RFA No.02(AP)/2011 with stay order operating therein, the decree for dissolution of the partnership could not be executed and consequently the terms and conditions of the partnership agreement being prevalent, the judgment debtor-petitioner is liable to pay rent in respect of the godown constructed over his land for use of the LPG Distributorship till such time the decree passed in Title Suit No. 45/2011 under challenge in RFA No. 02(AP)/2011 is finally decided. 21. We have heard Mr. D. Mazumdar, learned counsel for the appellant/ petitioner in the appeal and the Civil Revision Petition. We have also heard Mr. T. Pertin, learned counsel representing the plaintiff-respondent. Referring to the pleadings and the evidence, both oral and documentary, they submitted in favour and against the impugned judgment and order. Mr. Mazumdar, learned counsel for the appellant/petitioner placing reliance on the decision of the Apex Court reported in Helper Girdharbhai v. Saiyed Mohmad Mirasaheb Kadri and Others, (1987) 3 SCC 538 and also the provisions of section 6 of the Partnership Act, 1932, submitted that even if the purported partnership agreement is taken on its face value but in absence of anything to show that the ingredients of partnership are traceable in the said agreement, the plaintiff- respondent cannot harp upon the same so as to file the suit with the aforementioned prayers. 22. Countering the above argument, Mr. T. Pertin, learned counsel representing the plaintiff-respondent submitted that the defendant- appellant having voluntarily entered into the partnership agreement and also having admitted the same in the written statement, cannot take the plea of non-enforceability of the agreement. Referring to the evidence on record and also placing reliance on the judgment referred to by Mr. Mazumdar, learned counsel for the appellant, he submitted that the appeal is misconceived and devoid of any merit. According to him, the same very agreement having been gone into by this court in the aforesaid appellate judgment dated 19.8.2005 in RFANo. 1(A)/2005 and affirmed by the Apex Court, it is not now open for the appellant to question the validity of the said agreement. He has also placed reliance on the judgment of the Apex Court reported in Alka Gupta v. Narender Kumar-Gupta, (2010) 10 SCC141. 23. He has also placed reliance on the judgment of the Apex Court reported in Alka Gupta v. Narender Kumar-Gupta, (2010) 10 SCC141. 23. As regards the Civil Revision Petition challenging the order of the executing court referred to above, while Mr. D. Mazumdar, learned counsel for the appellant/petitioner submitted that as soon as the godown was vacated by the end of December 2008, the plaintiff-respondent cannot claim further rent even for the period when the godown was not under his occupation. On this, Mr. T. Pertin, learned counsel for the decree holder-respondent submitted that the judgment debtor, the petitioner having defied the terms and conditions of the agreement, the respondent-decree holder had to file the aforementioned Money Suit. On the other hand, the decree passed in his favour in the other suit, i.e., Title Suit No. 45/2011 (UFA) having been stayed by this I court in the above appeal, till finalization of the matter with the execution of the decree, the respondent is entitled to get rent irrespective of alleged l unilateral vacation of the godown situated on the land of the plaintiff-decree holder. 24. We have given our anxious consideration to the submissions made j by the learned counsel for the parties and have also considered the entire materials on record. Our findings and conclusions in both the I proceedings, i.e., RFA No. 2(AP)/2011 and CRP No.16(AP)/2012 are as follows. RFANo.2(AP)/2011 25. As to what are the pleadings in the plaint and the written statement and the issues framed by the learned trial court has been noted above. In the written statement filed by the defendant- appellant, it was never his plea that the agreement in question was because of any pressure mounted on him by the plaintiff-respondent or his family members. There was not even a whisper in that direction in the written statement filed on 13.4.1995. It was long 12 years thereafter when the appellant filed the evidence on affidavit as DW-1 on 12.4.2007, he took the vague and indefinite plea that he did not have any intention or desire of constituting a partnership firm by virtue of the agreement and that the said agreement was under duress and pressure from the plaintiff-respondent and other elderly persons in the family. Such plea was contrary to the stand in the written statement referred to above. Such plea was contrary to the stand in the written statement referred to above. It will be pertinent to mention here that the defendant -appellant had also filed an additional written statement on 31.10.2006 with the following statements : (i) That the defendant constructed the godown for storage of LPG Cylinders at Laru. Although the land belonging to plaintiff, the defendant took loan from SBI, Ziro for construction of godown and constructed the godown thereon, (ii) That then plaintiff did not take any interest in the management of the alleged partnership business nor did he make any financial contribution for the said business. 26. From the above, what is seen is that even in the said additional written statement it was not the plea of the defendant-appellant that the partnership agreement was not acceptable and/or that the same was a product of any compulsion. With the aforesaid statement in the additional written statement, rather the defendant-appellant agreed that there was an agreement by and between the parties and that the plaintiff-respondent did not take interest in the partnership business. 27. As noted above, in the Money Suit being MS No.3/2005 also the agreement in question was referred to. In the appellate judgment dated 19.8.2005 also and affirmed by the Apex Court, the agreement was referred to. It is in reference to the said agreement, the suit was decreed in favour of the plaintiff- respondent. In the said suit also, there was no whisper on the part of the appellant that the agreement was not acceptable. If the same is acceptable in respect of the rent clause, same is also acceptable in respect of other clauses. 28. It was in reference to the aforesaid agreement and the related documents showing the fact of acting on the said agreement by the parties and thereby settling the accounts of the partnership business, and in reference to the other evidence on record, the learned trial court has decreed the suit in favour of the plaintiff-respondent with the following direction while answering the issue No. 8. "ISSUE NO. 8: To what relief the plaintiff/defendant is entitled? I have heard both the learned counsels of the parties also perused the documents available in the record. "ISSUE NO. 8: To what relief the plaintiff/defendant is entitled? I have heard both the learned counsels of the parties also perused the documents available in the record. After considering all facts of the case and the provisions of law involved therein and with the reasons discussed hereinabove, this court is of the view that the plaintiff had succeeded in proving his case. Therefore, it is hereby order that the plaintiff Shri Hage Appo is a partner in the business of M/s. Laali Gyochi Gas Services, Hapoli, along with Shri Hage Tara. It is also order that business partnership between Shri Hage Appo and Shri Hage Tara of Ziro in the business of M/s. Laali Gyochi Gas Services, Hapoli, is stands dissolved from today. However, the defendant No.1 Shri Hage Tara, who is licence holder and duly appointed authorized dealer of defendant No. 2 (corporation) is allowed to continue the business of M/s. Laali Gyochi Gas Services, Hapoli at his own cost and risk from today. Further, it is order that the plaintiff Hage Appo shall be entitled for auditing of account of the of M/s. Laali Gyochi Gas Services, Hapoli, of period between dated 11.5.1990 to till today and he shall be entitled I to his share of 60% of the profits of the business of M/s. Laali Gyochi Gas Services, Hapoli, from 11.5.1990 to till today. It is further provided that aforesaid judgment and order shall be subject to the following two conditions. (i) In view of the admitted fact that the defendant No. 1 Shri Hage Tara is the license and duly appointed authorized dealer of LPG distributor of Hapoli. Therefore, it is made clear that his business of M/ s. Laali Gyochi Gas Services, Hapoli, shall not be disturbed, for the convenient of the public as he is the sole LPG distributor of that area. (ii) as the partnership between the plaintiff and defendant No.1 in the business of M/s. Laali Gyochi Gas Services, Hapoli, is an unregistered firm. Therefore, parties are directed to appoint a competent person or persons having good knowledge of account matters, preferably Chartered Accountant on their own cost of audit the account of the firm." 29. Sections 4 and 6 of the Indian Partnership Act, 1932 provide the definition of partnership and mode of determining existence of partnership respectively. Therefore, parties are directed to appoint a competent person or persons having good knowledge of account matters, preferably Chartered Accountant on their own cost of audit the account of the firm." 29. Sections 4 and 6 of the Indian Partnership Act, 1932 provide the definition of partnership and mode of determining existence of partnership respectively. Partnership is the relation between persons who have agreed to share the profits of a business carried on by all or any of them acting for all. The persons who have entered into partnership with one another are called individually "partners" in determining whether a group of persons is or is not a firm or whether a person is or is not a partner in a firm, regards shall be had to the real relation between the parties, as shown by all relevant facts taken together. 30. Learned counsel for the appellant referring to the explanation 1 and 2 to section 6, submitted that mere sharing of proceedings or of gross returns arising from the distributorship did not make the plaintiff-respondent a partner to the distributorship. Explanation 1 and 2 under clause 6 will have to be understood in the context of section 4 of the Act. As to whether the plaintiff-respondent was a partner to the partnership business with the defendant-appellant or not, will have to be considered in reference to the terms and conditions of the agreement in question. As per the said agreement, the partnership business was to be managed in a particular manner with the share of profits as indicated therein. A right to participation in profits is a strong test of partnership. The plea that the relation of partnership did not exist will have to be considered on the basis of the whole contract and the circumstances followed there from. 31. As noted above, not only the partnership agreement was executed by and between the parties but on the basis of the terms and conditions thereof, they also settled the accounts of the partnership business with their clear signatures in the documents pertaining to such accounts exhibited before the trial court. 31. As noted above, not only the partnership agreement was executed by and between the parties but on the basis of the terms and conditions thereof, they also settled the accounts of the partnership business with their clear signatures in the documents pertaining to such accounts exhibited before the trial court. Irrespective of the plea of having no relationship of partners between the plaintiff and the defendant flowing from the partnership agreement, when the same was acted upon by the parties with their eyes wide open, it cannot be said that the partnership agreement was not as per the provisions of the partnership Act. This issue can be tested in the light of the decision of the Apex Court in Kale and Others v. Deputy Director of Consolidation and Others, (1976) 3 SCC 119 in which the Apex Court dealing with an un-registered family settlement deed, held that irrespective of non-registration, the same was acceptable, inasmuch as, the parties thereto had acted upon the said family arrangement. Applying the test of estoppel, it was held, thus : "26. It was then contended by the respondents that the family arrangement was not bona fide for two reasons: "(1) that it sought to give property to Appellant 1 Kale who was not a legal heir to the estate of Lachman. because in view of U.P. Land Reforms (Amendment) Act 20 of 1954 Mst. Ram Pyari even after being married could retain the property, and so long as she was there the appellant had no right; and (2) that the family arrangement was brought about by fraud or undue influence." 29. Coming to the second plank of attack against the family settlement that it was brought about by duress or undue influence or fraud, there is not an iota of evidence or a whisper of an allegation by respondents 4 and 5 either in the revenue courts or in the High Court. Even before respondent 1, where respondents 4 and 5 were the petitioners they never questioned the compromise on the ground that it was fraudulent on a point of fact. It is well settled that allegations of fraud or undue influence must first clearly be pleaded and then proved by clear and cogent evidence. There was neither pleading nor proof of this fact by respondents 4 and 5. It is well settled that allegations of fraud or undue influence must first clearly be pleaded and then proved by clear and cogent evidence. There was neither pleading nor proof of this fact by respondents 4 and 5. Moreover, it may be mentioned that even in their objections before the Assistant Commissioner for setting aside the previous mutation made in favour of the appellant-Kale the only ground taken by respondents 4 and 5 was that the order was passed without their knowledge. Lastly the petition filed before the Assistant Commissioner for mutatins the lands in pursuance of the compromise was signed by both the parties who were major and who knew the consequences thereof. In these circumstances, therefore, the argument of the learned counsel for the respondents that the compromise was fraudulent appears to be a pure afterthought and is not at all justified by any evidence. This contention must therefore be overruled. 33. Finally the respondents never took any objection before any of the courts that no family arrangement had as a matter of fact taken place between the parties. The only objection centred round the admissibility of the document said to have embodied the terms of the compromise. This contention, therefore, cannot be accepted. 34. It was then submitted that even the appellant had given a go-bye to the compromise and seems to have forgotten all about it. This is also factually incorrect. As indicated earlier right from the court of the Consolidation Officer up to the High Court the appellant has always been relying mainly on the compromise entered into between the parties. 41. To the same effect is the decision of this court in Krishna Beharilal case, where the doctrine of estoppel was discussed, and while referring to the previous cases of this court, it was observed as follows : "In Dhiyan Singh case this court ruled that even if an award made is invalid, the persons who were parties to that award are estopped from challenging the validity of the award or from going behind the award in a subsequent litigation. In T. V.R. Subbu Chetty's Family Charities v. M. Gaghava Mudaliar. In T. V.R. Subbu Chetty's Family Charities v. M. Gaghava Mudaliar. this court ruled that if a person having full knowledge of his rights as a possible reversioner enters into a transaction which settles his claim as well as the claim of the opponent at the relevant time, he cannot be permitted to go back on that arrangement when reversion actually opens. At the time of the compromise Lakshmichand and Ganeshilal were the nearest presumptive reversioners. They must be deemed to have known their rights under law. Under the compromise they purported to give a portion of the suit properties absolutely to Pattobai, evidently in consideration of her giving up her claim in respect of the other properties. They cannot be now permitted to resile from the compromise and claim a right inconsistent with the one embodied in the compromise." 42. Finally in a recent decision of this court in S. Shanmugam Pillai case after an exhaustive consideration of the authorities on the subject it was observed as follows: "Equitable principles such as estoppel, election, family settlement, etc., are not mere technical rules of evidence. They have an important purpose to serve in the administration of justice. The ultimate aim of the law is to secure justice. In the recent times in order to render justice between the parties, courts have been liberally relying on those principles. We would hesitate to narrow down their scope. *** *** *** As observed by this court in T. V.R. Subbu Chetty's Family Charities case, that if a person having full knowledge of his right as a possible reversioner enters into a transaction which settles his claim as well as the claim of the opponents at the relevant time, he cannot be permitted to go back on that agreement when reversion actually falls open." In these circumstances there can be no doubt that even if the family settlement was not registered it would operate as a complete estoppel against respondents 4 and 5. Respondent 1 as also the High Court, therefore, committed substantial error of law in not giving effect to the doctrine of estoppel as spelt out by this court in so many cases. Respondent 1 as also the High Court, therefore, committed substantial error of law in not giving effect to the doctrine of estoppel as spelt out by this court in so many cases. The learned counsel for the respondents placed reliance upon a number of authorities in Rachbha v. Aft Mendha; Chief Controlling Revenue Authority v. Smt. Satyawati Sood and some other authorities, which, in our opinion have no bearing on the issues to be decided in this case and it is therefore not necessary for us to refer to the same." 32. Although it was argued that the learned trial court did not deal with the issue relating to existence of otherwise of the partnership business but the same is belied by issue No. 4 which is "whether there is/was a partnership with the defendant No. 1 and the plaintiff in respect of the management of M/s. Laali Gyochi Gas Service, Hapoli, A.P.?" While answering the said issue, the learned trial court has referred to the agreement in question and has also dealt with the subsequent plea of the defendant-appellant that he had put his signature therein because of pressure, and held in reference to the evidence of two attesting witnesses of the agreement that it is unbelievable that the defendant-appellant would have put his signature under such pressure. It is more so, when the appellant never called in question the said agreement dated 12.4.1990. 33. The learned trial court while determining the issue whether the said agreement is valid or not, has rightly held that the same was a valid agreement, more particularly, when the same was acted upon by the parties. Referring to the provisions of section 4 of the Indian Partnership Act, 1932, the learned trial court has rightly held that all the ingredients towards consideration of a partnership are present in the agreement. As noted by the learned trial court, Clause-V of the agreement clearly indicates that the profit of the business shall be shared by the parties in the manner indicated therein. 34. In the deposition of PWs, the agreement in question was referred to and in the cross-examination nothing could be brought out about invalidity of the agreement. The defendant-appellant in his cross-examination admitted the signature in the agreement and also in the other related documents pertaining to the agreement of the partnership business. Admitting the documents marked as Ext. 34. In the deposition of PWs, the agreement in question was referred to and in the cross-examination nothing could be brought out about invalidity of the agreement. The defendant-appellant in his cross-examination admitted the signature in the agreement and also in the other related documents pertaining to the agreement of the partnership business. Admitting the documents marked as Ext. 11 pertaining to the accounts of the partnership business, the defendant-appellant also admitted his signature therein. As regards the other documents pertaining to the account of the partnership business the same were also admitted by the defendant-appellant. Referring to Ext. 11 he admitted that the same shows the partnership business and the ratio of share of net profit. 35. The DWs also did not questioned the validity of the agreement, rather one of the DWs, namely, Hage Tado in his cross-examination while admitting the agreement stated that the same was under avoidable compelling situation. The learned trial court has meticulously gone through the evidence, both oral and documentary, and arrived at a particular finding recorded in the impugned judgment and order. As has been held by the Apex Court in Santosh Hazari v. Purshottam Tiwari, (2001) 3 SCC 179 , while writing a judgment of reversal the appellate court must remain conscious that the findings of fact based on conflicting evidence arrived at by the trial court must weigh with the appellate court, more so when the findings are based on oral evidence recorded by the same Presiding Judge who authors the judgment. 36. Upon a detailed discussion of the evidence on record and also the provisions of the aforesaid Act, the learned trial court has come to the conclusion that the agreement in question was a valid agreement and the same having been acted upon, the defendant-appellant cannot resile back from the said position so as to question the very validity of the partnership agreement and that too at a belated stage and with the aforesaid pleas in the written statement in which there was no dealing with the specific pleas in various paragraphs of the plaint, more particularly paragraph 12. 37. In the decision in Helper Girdharbhai (supra) to which the learned counsel for the parties have referred to, the Apex Court in the facts involved in the said case was concerned with the provisions of section 4 of the Partnership Act, 1932. 37. In the decision in Helper Girdharbhai (supra) to which the learned counsel for the parties have referred to, the Apex Court in the facts involved in the said case was concerned with the provisions of section 4 of the Partnership Act, 1932. In paragraph 8 of the judgment, the Apex Court dealt with the ingredients towards constitution of a partnership. This aspect of the matter has already been dealt with above. It has been held that all the ingredients required for constitution of a partnership are available in the agreement in question. 38. The learned counsel for the respondent has placed reliance on the decision in Alka Gupta (supra) so as to contend that as per section 11 of the CPC (Explanation 4), the plea of the defendant-appellant regarding non-maintainability of the partnership agreement is barred by res judicata. This judgment has been referred to so as to contend that the same very agreement having been gone into in Money Suit No. 3/2005 affirmed by this Court in RFA No.01(AP)/2005 and in absence of any plea raised in the said proceeding about the maintainability of the partnership agreement, such a plea cannot be raised by the defendant-appellant in the subsequent suit, i.e., suit being Title Suit No. 45/2011. This aspect of the matter need not detain us in view of our findings in this appeal. 39. Above being the position, we are of the considered opinion that the appeal is devoid of any merit and accordingly the same is liable to be dismissed, which we accordingly do. 40. The appeal is dismissed. The Registry shall send back the case records to the learned trial court along the copy of this judgment and order after observing necessary formalities. Civil Revision Petition No. 16(AP)/2012 41. As to what was the decree in Money Suit No. 3/1995, has been quoted above. When the judgment and decree was carried on appeal, the same was affirmed vide dated 19.8.2005 in RFA No. 1(AP)/2005 which was further affirmed by the Apex Court vide order dated 17.4.2007. The Executing Court by its impugned order dated 15.9.2011 has ordered for payment of monthly rent w.e.f. 12.11.2008 to 22.6.2011 in terms of the said decree. Annexure-E to the petition is the order dated 5.12.2008 by which the Executing Court called for a feasibility report from the jurisdictional Magistrate so as to be submitted on or before 29.12.2008. The Executing Court by its impugned order dated 15.9.2011 has ordered for payment of monthly rent w.e.f. 12.11.2008 to 22.6.2011 in terms of the said decree. Annexure-E to the petition is the order dated 5.12.2008 by which the Executing Court called for a feasibility report from the jurisdictional Magistrate so as to be submitted on or before 29.12.2008. The interim order operating in the proceeding requiring to maintain status quo was continued. In the mean time the petitioner by his Annexure F letter dated 19.11.2011 intimated the respondent about the shifting of the LPG godown to another place. In the letter, the fact of depositing the decreetal amount of Rs. 1,64,300 as per the impugned order with the court was also intimated. According to the said letter, such deposit is in full and final payment of the monthly rent. As regards the storage godown, the petitioner offered the sum of Rs. 10,000 for purchasing the storage shed. In the letter it was also contended that the storage shed as under use of the respondent as a store house of fire woods and other produce from the adjoining bamboo grove. 42. The decreetal amount pertaining the period from 12.11.2008 to 22.6.2011 has already been deposited by the judgment debtor. As per the impugned order, during the said period the godown was not shifted to Solang as was contended by the judgment debtor and the possession of the land was also not handed over and as such there was an order from the Executing Court to maintain status quo in respect of shifting of the godown from the land. 43. The learned Executing Court dealing with the plea of the judgment debtor-petitioner that the godown was shifted in the year 2008 under compelling circumstances with due intimation to the decree holder-respondent has also referred to the communications made between the petitioner and the licencing authority; judgment debtor and the Commissioner and also the particular verification report dated 29.12.2008 and other related documents. In consideration of all the related materials, the learned Executing Court found the same to be of the period before shifting of the godown to the new site. In consideration of all the related materials, the learned Executing Court found the same to be of the period before shifting of the godown to the new site. In absence of any document to show that the godown was shifted in 2008, the learned Court below referring to the particular judicial order dated 14.12.2007 passed by the deputy Commissioner, Ziro (the then District Judge), on the basis of the application filed by the decree holder under order 39, rules 1 and 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 found that the said order was valid till 22.6.2011 on which date the suit was disposed of. It is in such circumstances the Executing Court was of the opinion that the decree-holder was entitled to monthly rent for the said period as well w.e.f. 12.11.2008 to 22.6.2011 in terms of the decree passed in the suit and affirmed by this court in RFA No.1(AP)/2005. 44. Above being all relatable to factual aspect of the matter and more particularly when the judgment debtor-petitioner has also deposited the decreetal amount, we are of the considered opinion that no interference is called for in respect of the order of the Executing Court. However, the plea of the respondent that he is not entitled to rent for the subsequent period till disposal of the appeal proceeding and execution of the decree, stands rejected. 45. The Civil Revision Petition is answered in the above manner and stands disposed of, leaving the parties tor bear their own costs.