Judgment N. Kumar, J. 1. This is the plaintiffs appeal against dismissal of her suit for partition and separate possession of her share in the suit properties. 2. For the sake of convenience, parties would be referred to as they are referred in the original suit. 3. The suit is filed for partition of vacant sites, house properties (except 7(f) of item No. 1 of the suit schedule) and agricultural lands (Item No. 2 of suit schedule) standing in the name of one Bachappa and the lands in respect of which the grand sons of said Bachappa through his eldest son Late B. Kalappa entered into a joint development agreement with the 13th defendant (Item No. 3 of the Suit schedule). 4. The plaintiff is the youngest daughter of one Bachappa. The said Bachappa had three wives. Through the 1st wife Bayamma, he had a son by name B. Kalappa and a daughter by name Akkayyamma, the 1st defendant in the suit. After the 1st wife's demise, he married Muniyamma and begot the 10th defendant B. Narayanappa. After the death of the 2nd wife, Bachappa married another lady also by name Muniyamma; 18th defendant Munirajamma, 19th defendant Byamma and the plaintiff Nanjamma were born through the third wife. D1(a) to D1(i) are the LRs of deceased 1st defendant Akkayyamma. The 2nd defendant is the wife, defendants 3 to 9 are the sons and 29th defendant is the daughter of late B. Kalappa. D10(a) to D10(g) are the LRs of deceased 10th defendant B. Narayanappa, who died during the pendency of the appeal. Defendants 13 to 26, 28 are the subsequent purchasers of some of the suit schedule properties. 27th defendant is the Agricultural Produce Market Committee for whose benefit some items of the suit schedule properties were acquired. 5. The case of the plaintiff is that she and the defendants are Hindus governed by Mitakshara School of law. The suit schedule properties were acquired by her father Bachappa out of his own funds. After Bachappa died intestate on 07.03.1972 she is in joint possession of the suit schedule properties along with defendants 1 to 12. However B. Kalappa and B. Narayanappa clandestinely got the katha of some of the properties changed either to their individual names or joint names. She came to know the same only on 27.6.2001 on verification of the Record of Rights. However B. Kalappa and B. Narayanappa clandestinely got the katha of some of the properties changed either to their individual names or joint names. She came to know the same only on 27.6.2001 on verification of the Record of Rights. That apart B. Kalappa along with his son the 6th defendant Gopalakrishna and also on behalf of his other minor children illegally entered into an agreement with the 13th defendant to develop 05 acre 23 1/2 gunta of land as described in Item No. 3 of the suit schedule for consideration, claiming to be the absolute owner thereof and the 13th defendant has started putting up a complex in the said land. The defendants are trying to alienate several other immovable properties acquired by Late Bachappa without heeding to her demand for partition and separate possession. 6. After service of summons, the defendants have entered appearance. Defendants 2, 3, 4, 6 and 8; defendants 16 to 25 have filed common written statement. Defendants 10, 13, 26, 27 and 28 have filed separate written statements. D12(a) to D12(c) have filed common written statement consenting for decreeing the suit of the plaintiff. 7. The defendants 2, 3, 4, 6 and 8 in their common written statement admit the relationship as set out in the plaint but contend that the suit properties are not Bachappa's self-acquired properties and that his two sons B. Kalappa and B. Narayanappa have not clandestinely got the khata changed in their names after Bachappa's death as alleged. It is the specific case of these defendants that the property bearing Sy. No. 18/2, 18/3 and 18/4 was jointly purchased by B. Kalappa and B. Narayanappa under two separate sale deeds 17.06.1970 and 18.03.1971 and these are their self-acquired properties. B. Kalappa was allotted item No. 3 of the suit schedule at a partition that took place on 19.8.1973 between him and Narayanappa. Except these three properties other properties described in the suit schedule were acquired by joint exertion, labour and joint family funds by the members of the joint family Nanjundappa, Bachappa, Kalappa and Narayanappa in the name of Bachappa as he was the Karta. The Plaintiffs marriage took place about 30 years ago, when Bachappa was alive and she is not a member of the joint family. In fact the marriage of all the daughters was performed by Bachappa befitting the status of the family. The Plaintiffs marriage took place about 30 years ago, when Bachappa was alive and she is not a member of the joint family. In fact the marriage of all the daughters was performed by Bachappa befitting the status of the family. After the birth of the grandsons of Bachappa, the properties described in para 7 of the plaint acquired the character of ancestral properties in their hands and therefore the plaintiff has no right to seek partitions. All the joint family members shown in the genealogical tree are not made parties to the suit and therefore the suit is not maintainable. 8. Bachappa died on 07.03.1972. Thereafter B. Kalappa and B. Narayanappa partitioned their self-acquired as well as the joint family properties in 1973 and since then they have been enjoying their respective share absolutely and independently. Thus the joint family was disrupted in the year 1973 itself. The plaintiff was aware of the same. Since the plaintiff and her sisters have not chosen to question the partition between B. Kalappa and B. Narayanappa all these years and voluntarily abandoning the right in favour of B. Kalappa and B. Narayanappa are estopped from seeking partition. After the death of Bachappa on 7.03.1972, the plaintiff and the defendants 1, 10 to 12 executed a registered GPA in favour of B. Kalappa on 12.7.1972 authorizing him to do all such acts including the power to alienate any property of Bachappa and obtain the benefit irrespective of their right in the joint family property. In addition, the plaintiff and her other sisters also relinquished their right in the joint family properties by receiving 10 gunta of land in S. No. 85/2. This relinquishment was in full and final settlement of the plaintiffs claims. They had even obtained RTC in their names in respect of these lands; endorsement dated 04.03.99 is executed by them. On the same day B. Kalappa also executed a release deed on 04.03.1999 releasing his right over 10 gunta each in S. No. 85/3 given to his sisters. The plaintiff and her sister consented for his release. After settling the plaintiff and her sisters' claim, B. Kalappa's family members are left with only 1 acre 5 gunta in the said survey number. The plaintiff has no locus standi to institute the suit. The plaintiff and her sister consented for his release. After settling the plaintiff and her sisters' claim, B. Kalappa's family members are left with only 1 acre 5 gunta in the said survey number. The plaintiff has no locus standi to institute the suit. Karta of a Hindu family has absolute right to enter into agreements of sale for the benefit of Joint Hindu Family and legal necessity. Even if it is assumed that the plaintiff is entitled for partition, she will be entitled to a fractional share and not 1/9th share as claimed. The plaintiff has not properly valued the suit and she is guilty of misconduct, negligence, latches and acquiescence and therefore, not entitled to any relief. 9. 10th Defendant in addition to the above defence set by defendants 2, 3, 4, 6 and 8 also contends that Bachappa had gifted property bearing Khaneshmari No. 57 and 58 situated at Hebbal, Bangalore North Taluk, consisting of 4 items of property to the plaintiff and the same is fetching huge rent of Rs. 12,000/- to Rs. 15,000/- per month. Bachappa had also gifted 2 acres of land each to the plaintiff and the 1st defendant Akkayamma in Sy. No. 4 of Jakkur Plantation, Yelahanka Hobli, Bangalore North Taluk and another 34 guntas jointly in favour of the sons of Akkayamma and Munirajamma in Sy. No. 2/4 of Guddadahalli, Kasaba Hobli, Bangalore North Taluk. The 10th defendant B. Narayanappa and his elder brother B. Kalappa further gifted 10 guntas of land in Sy. No. 85/3 in favour of their sisters i.e., plaintiff, Akkayamma, Munirajamma and Byamma; they received the same in full and final settlement of their claims in joint family properties of late Bachappa and got their names mutated in the mutation register and RTC records. A deed of endorsement dated 4.3.1999 evidencing the same was also executed. Sy. Nos. 5/1, 5/2A, 6/1, 6/2 of Byatarayanapura that stood in names of Kalappa and Narayanappa was acquired by the Agricultural Produce Market Committee, Byatarayanapura for forming APMC Yard and these lands in the possession of the Government. Similarly, Sy. No. 40, 40/1, 41/3B, 42/2A, 50/2, 50/4, 50/5 and 52/3 are also acquired in 1984 by the Government of Karnataka and handed over to RMS House Building Co-operative Society. After paying betterment charges in respect of Gramathana in Sy. Nos. Similarly, Sy. No. 40, 40/1, 41/3B, 42/2A, 50/2, 50/4, 50/5 and 52/3 are also acquired in 1984 by the Government of Karnataka and handed over to RMS House Building Co-operative Society. After paying betterment charges in respect of Gramathana in Sy. Nos. 105/1, 105/2 and 105/3 to the CMC of Byataryanapura, they formed a private layout and sold all the residential sites as early as in the year 1993-94. Sy. No. 18/1, 18/2, 18/3, 18/4, 18/5, 18/6, 18/7, 18/8 and 18/9 measuring in all 2 acres 17 gunta, Sy. No. 85/1 measuring 1 acre 5 gunta and 31 gunta in Sy. No. 85/2 was converted for non-agricultural purposes in the year 1994 itself. The plaintiff, therefore, is not entitled to any share much less 1/9th share as claimed. 10. 13th Defendant contends that after entering into transactions with B. Kalappa and children in respect of item No. 3 of the suit schedule, he got prepared the plan, obtained license and got the plan sanctioned for constructing multi storied apartments. He was to bear the entire construction cost. As per the understanding between him and the 6th defendant, he would retain 75% of the land and constructed area and the 6th defendants would be entitled for 25%. The 6th defendant in all received from him Rs. 20 Lakhs as advance, which is inclusive of both refundable and nonrefundable deposits, pursuant to memorandum of understanding. The 6th and 3rd defendants have earmarked the areas falling to their respective shares in the proposed building as per the sharing agreement dated 15.01.2001. Thus he has invested money to the extent of Rs. 4,58,76,000/- for development of item No. 3 of the suit schedule as evidenced by certificate issued by his chartered accountants M/s. H. Srinivasan & Co. He requires another 15 crores for completing the project and he has raised loans on higher rate of interest. Now after 29 years, if the plaintiff wants a share in all the properties including the one being developed by him, it is nothing but abuse of process of law. All that the plaintiff is entitled to is 1/9th share and the same could be adjusted in the properties retained by defendants 1 to 12 or in the 25% share of 6th defendant. Being a bona fide purchaser, his interest to the extent of 75% should not be distributed. 11. All that the plaintiff is entitled to is 1/9th share and the same could be adjusted in the properties retained by defendants 1 to 12 or in the 25% share of 6th defendant. Being a bona fide purchaser, his interest to the extent of 75% should not be distributed. 11. Defendants 16 to 25 contend that the land in Sy. No. 40/1, 42/2 were converted for residential purposes in the year 1991 itself and therefore the property as described at Sl. No. 26-28 of item No. 2 of the suit schedule does not exist. These lands were the subject matter of proceedings before Special Deputy Commissioner for Urban Land Ceiling. After the said proceedings were dropped, B. Kalappa, who became Karta of the joint family after death of Bachappa, entered into agreement with defendants 16 to 23 for formation of residential layouts. B. Kalappa also put up temporary asbestos sheet constructions in the said layout besides executing power of attorney on 30.08.91. The said Power of Attorney Holder also sold the property to defendants 16 to 25 on 06.04.1992; and they have constructed residential apartments in the said property. The plaintiff tried to obstruct this construction work and at that time, they filed O.S. 17071/2006 in the City Civil Court, obtained interim order and the same was confirmed. The plaintiff and her son filed MFA 1765/07 against the same before the High Court, but no stay of order was granted. 12. 26th Defendant contends in his written statement that the land in Sy. No. 25 to an extent of 2.25 acres that belonged to B. Kalappa and B. Narayanappa was notified for acquisition by the Government in the year 1980 for the benefit of RMS Telephone Employees Co-operative society. They also executed power of attorney in favour of Dayananda Pai and Satish Pai in respect of 2.21 acres of land in Sy. No. 25 and an agreement of sale in favour of Mohan Pai on 05.10.1988. After transferring the possession they also executed two registered sale deeds in favour of 26th defendant on 17.03.1995 and 22.06.1995. Dayananda Pai has constructed a house in various survey numbers of Byatarayanapura including Sy. No. 25. 13. 27th Defendant has stated in his written statement about acquisition of land in Sy. After transferring the possession they also executed two registered sale deeds in favour of 26th defendant on 17.03.1995 and 22.06.1995. Dayananda Pai has constructed a house in various survey numbers of Byatarayanapura including Sy. No. 25. 13. 27th Defendant has stated in his written statement about acquisition of land in Sy. No. 5/2B, 104/5B and other survey numbers of Byatarayanapura and subsequent acquisition of a portion of the land in S. No. 5/2B and 104/5B by National Highways Authority. 14. 28th defendant specifically contended that the suit is time barred. 15. Based on the above pleadings the Trial Court framed the following issues: "1. Whether the plaintiff proves that the suit schedule properties are the self acquired properties of late Bachappa and that she has a share in the said properties? 2. Whether the defendants prove that the properties as described in the plaint schedule are the joint family properties as pleaded? 3. Whether the plaintiff proves that she is entitled to share in all the suit properties? 4. Whether the defendants 2, 4, 6 and 8 prove that the plaintiff and her other sisters have relinquished and gave up their rights in respect of joint family properties of late Bachappa as contended in para 17 of their written statement? 5. Whether the defendants 2, 4, 6 and 8 prove the execution of General Power of Attorney on 12.7.1972 referred to in para 16 of their written statement? 6. Whether the plaintiff proves that she is in joint possession of the suit properties, if not what is the effect? 7. Whether court fee paid is proper and sufficient? 8. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for share in all the suit properties? 9. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for the relief of perpetual injunction prayed? 10. To what other relief?" 16. The plaintiff has examined herself as P.W. 1 and got marked Ex. P1 to Ex. P104. 17. On behalf of the defendants, Muralikrishna the representative of the 13th defendant M/s. Prospero Reality Limited is examined as D.W. 1; 28th defendant is examined as D.W. 2; D10(f) is examined as D.W. 3. On behalf of 27th defendant, an official by name B. Vedamurthy is examined as D.W. 4. 6th defendant has examined himself as D.W. 5. On behalf of defendants 15 to 16, one Satish Pai is examined as D.W. 6. On behalf of 27th defendant, an official by name B. Vedamurthy is examined as D.W. 4. 6th defendant has examined himself as D.W. 5. On behalf of defendants 15 to 16, one Satish Pai is examined as D.W. 6. Two witnesses by name K.V. Jayaram and Lakshmipathaiah are examined as D.W. 7 and D.W. 8. In all 144 documents are produced for the defendants and marked as Ex. D1 to D144. 18. The Trial Court on appreciation of the oral and documentary evidence on record held that the suit properties, except Sl. Nos. 5 to 7, 12 to 16 and 21 to 24 of item No. 2 of plaint schedule, are the self-acquired properties of Bachappa: The said Bachappa, B. Kalappa and B. Narayanappa had 1/3rd share each in the property at Sl. No. 41 of item No. 2 which are granted lands and therefore the plaintiff is entitled to a share in Bachappa's 1/3rd share therein. The alienations made by Kalappa are not binding on the plaintiff as the same was not made on the basis of her power of attorney. The plaintiff was ousted from the suit schedule properties by her brothers and their sons in the year 1973 itself when there was a partition between Kalappa and Narayanappa and that it was within the plaintiff's knowledge. Since the plaintiff was not found to be in possession of the suit properties, while declining to grant the relief of Permanent Injunction, the Trial Court directed the plaintiff to file fresh valuation slip under Section 35(1) of the Karnataka Court-Fees and Suits Valuation Act and to pay deficit court fee. The trial court dismissed the suit as time barred holding that the plaintiff had not brought the suit within the time prescribed under Article 110 of the Limitation Act even though no specific issue was framed in that behalf. 19. Aggrieved by the said judgment and decree of the Trial Court the plaintiff has filed this appeal. 20. The learned counsel for the plaintiff Sri Madhusudan Rao assailing the impugned judgment and decree contended that the finding of the Trial Court that the plaintiff has been ousted from the suit schedule property long before institution of the suit and therefore her claim is time barred is contrary to the pleadings and the evidence on record. The property belonged to Bachappa. The property belonged to Bachappa. On his death, the properties devolved on his sons and daughters who became co-owners. It is settled law that the possession of one co-owner is possession of all the co-owners. One co-owner may be living away from the properties or may not be in possession of the properties; and one co-owner may be in exclusive possession. This kind of possession does not make any difference because, in law a person who is living away is deemed to be in joint possession with the other co-owners. The plea of adverse possession between the co-owners can succeed only when there is a positive act of ouster pleaded and proved by the defendants. In this case, there is no whisper about the ouster of the plaintiff or adverse possession. On the contrary, what the defendants claim is that the plaintiff and her sisters relinquished their right in the property under a release deed. Once the relinquishment is held to be not proved, in the absence of plea of adverse possession or ouster, the plaintiff being the co-owner is deemed to be in joint possession of the suit schedule properties. Therefore, the Court below committed a serious error in recording a finding that the plaintiff is ousted from the suit schedule properties. He further contended that the plaintiff is not only entitled to a share in the properties standing in the name of Bachappa, but also those purchased by Bachappa in the name of Kalappa and Narayanappa; the recitals in the sale-deeds make this position very clear. The finding recorded by the Trial Court that the properties standing in the name of Kalappa and Narayanappa are their self-acquired property is illegal and contrary to the legal evidence on record and therefore requires to be set-aside. The purchasers of a portion of the suit schedule property were not made parties initially because the plaintiff was not a party to the said alienation. But they were subsequently impleaded having regard to the fact that these purchasers are in possession of the properties purchased by them and any declaration made in that behalf would affect their interest. Further the alienations made by these persons during the pendency of the proceedings would be hit by doctrine of lis pendens. Such being the case, finding of the Trial Court that the suit is bad for non-joinder of necessary parties is without any substance. Further the alienations made by these persons during the pendency of the proceedings would be hit by doctrine of lis pendens. Such being the case, finding of the Trial Court that the suit is bad for non-joinder of necessary parties is without any substance. Lastly it was contended that because of the finding of ouster, the trial Court has found that the plaintiff is not in possession and therefore directed the plaintiff to value the suit under Section 35(1) of the Karnataka Court Fees and Suits Valuation Act. If the case of plaintiff that she is in joint possession is accepted then the suit is properly valued under section 35(2) of the Karnataka Court Fees and Suits Valuation Act. Therefore it was urged that the finding of the Trial Court in this regard requires to be set-aside and suit be decreed by setting aside the impugned judgment and decree. 21. Per contra the learned Senior Counsel Sri. Anant Mandgi appearing for the defendants 2, 4, 6, 8 and 29 submitted that the plaintiff has admitted in unequivocal terms that Kalappa and his children and Narayanappa and his children are in exclusive possession and enjoyment of the property from the day they effected a partition in the year 1973; they prevented the plaintiff from entering the property and got the mutation entries in their names. Besides this, they, exercising the rights of absolute ownership, have alienated the property and the alienees have put up construction in the property. Therefore, even in the absence of a plea, the Court has to appreciate the case of parties in its entirety and if that is done, the finding of ouster recorded by the Trial Court is strictly in accordance with law and it does not call for interference. He also argued that the subsequent purchasers have not been made parties and therefore, the suit is bad for non-joinder of necessary parties; crores of rupees have been spent for putting up construction and the plaintiff did not move her little finger for 29 long years. In fact the evidence on record shows that Bachappa gave several properties under unregistered gift-deeds to the daughters in addition to jewellery and silverware given at the time of marriage and also subsequently from time to time. In fact the evidence on record shows that Bachappa gave several properties under unregistered gift-deeds to the daughters in addition to jewellery and silverware given at the time of marriage and also subsequently from time to time. In fact Kalappa and Narayanappa also gave 10 guntas of land to each of their sisters which clearly shows that whatever the plaintiff and her sisters were entitled to had been given to them and therefore they had relinquished their rights. The suit is clearly an afterthought. It lacks bona fides and therefore no interference is called for in the matter. 22. Sri. Padmanabha Mahale, learned Senior counsel appearing for defendants 10(a) to 10(g) contended that the properties bearing Sy. Nos. 5/1, 5/2A, 6/1, 6/2, 40, 40/1, 41/3B, 42/2A, 50/2, 50/4, 50/5 and 52/3 are all acquired by the Government of Karnataka for Agricultural Produce Marketing Committee as well as for RMS House Building Co-operative Society and the said lands are not available for partition. The plaintiff has suppressed this fact. Bachappa during his lifetime had given Khaneshmari Nos. 57 and 58 situated at Hebbal, Bangalore North Taluk and Sy. No. 4 of Jakkur Plantation measuring 34 guntas in favour of the plaintiff and another daughter Akkayamma. Thus, whatever the plaintiff was entitled to have been given to her and the present suit filed for partition is clearly barred by limitation. He also submitted that the plaintiff has no right in the various sub numbers of Sy. No. 18 being the self-acquired properties of Kalappa and Narayanappa. Considering all these aspects the Trial Court rightly dismissed the suit and the same does not call for interference. 23. Sri. D.L.N. Rao, learned Senior counsel appearing for the defendant No. 13, submitted that the sale deed in respect of Sy. Nos. 18/1, 18/2, 18/3, 18/4 and 18/5 of item No. 3, is in the name of Kalappa. The said property did not belong to Bachappa and therefore the plaintiff has no right in this property. Insofar as Sy. No. 117/3 is concerned, the total extent of land regranted is 3 acres 2 gunta out of which, only 1 acre 23 1/2 gunta is given to the 13th defendant for joint development; and the remaining extent continues to be with Kalappa and Narayanappa. In respect of Sy. No. 118/1 regranted land, only an extent of 24 gunta is the subject matter of joint development. In respect of Sy. No. 118/1 regranted land, only an extent of 24 gunta is the subject matter of joint development. The trial Court has held that even in these lands the plaintiff is entitled to 1/18th share in the share of her father late Bachappa. Pursuant to the joint development agreement, 13th defendant invested crores of rupees, constructed multi-storied complex, flats and even sold the same by entering into agreements. The 13th defendant is entitled to 75% of the constructed area whereas the remaining 25% belongs to Kalappa. Even if the court were to hold that the plaintiff is entitled to a share in the said property, it has to be worked out in 25% of the constructed area allotted to the share of Kalappa. 24. Sri. Vishwanath appearing for defendants 15 to 26 submitted that they are the bona fide purchasers and the properties purchased by them stood in the name of Kalappa as per the revenue entries. They have been in possession of the properties as absolute owners on buying the same by paying valuable consideration. They have obtained sanctioned plan, license and are putting up huge construction. When there was interference from the plaintiffs side, they were constrained to file a suit for permanent injunction and obtained an ad-interim injunction; the plaintiffs prayer for vacating the said order was rejected. The plaintiffs appeal against said order was also rejected. It was however, made clear that any construction made in the said property shall be subject to the result of this appeal. Under these circumstances, even if it is held that the plaintiff is entitled to a share, the share which would be allotted to the sons may be allotted to her so that the constructions are not affected in any way. 25. In the light of these rival contentions of the parties, the points that arise for our consideration in this appeal are: "1) Whether the plaintiff is entitled to a share in all the suit schedule properties? If no, in which of the properties is she entitled to a share? 2) Whether the plaintiff is entitled to a share in the property standing in the name of Kalappa or Narayanappa? 3) Whether the Court below is justified in holding that the plaintiff has been ousted from the suit properties only on the basis of evidence without there being any plea or issue in that behalf? 2) Whether the plaintiff is entitled to a share in the property standing in the name of Kalappa or Narayanappa? 3) Whether the Court below is justified in holding that the plaintiff has been ousted from the suit properties only on the basis of evidence without there being any plea or issue in that behalf? 4) Whether the finding of the Court that the suit ought to have been valued under Section 35(1) of the Karnataka Court-Fees and Suits Valuation Act 1958 is sustainable? (5) What order? POINT Nos. 1 AND 2: 26. In the light of the pleadings and the evidence on record, what needs to be considered at the outset is "Whether the suit schedule properties are the self-acquisitions of Bachappa and therefore devolved on his death upon the legal heirs as per Section 8 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 or if it is a co-parcenary property or a joint family property which devolved on his legal heirs as per section 6 of the Hindu Succession Act prior to the amendment?" 27. The plaintiffs specific case is that the suit properties belonged to Bachappa. But, D.W. -3 B.N. Byregowda S/o. Late Narayanappa in his examination-in-chief has categorically stated that the plaintiff has not produced any documents to show that she along with L.Rs of deceased Kalappa and deceased Narayanappa i.e. the 10th defendant constituted joint family and that the suit schedule properties are the joint family properties. By this the defendants have not only given a go bye to the specific stand taken in the written statement that the properties standing in the name of Bachappa are joint family, coparcenary properties but also expect the plaintiff to prove the same. 28. The evidence on record shows that Bachappa did not inherit any property from his father or ancestors. In other words, there was no co-parcenary property nor joint family property and Bachappa acquired properties out of his own earnings. The defendants have not produced evidence to show that Bachappa inherited any property. Nor is there any material to show that the joint family acquired any property in the name of any of the members of the family. He was also cultivating land in Sy. No. 117/3 and 118/1 situated at Amruthahalli village, Yelahanka Hobli, as a tenant. The defendants have not produced evidence to show that Bachappa inherited any property. Nor is there any material to show that the joint family acquired any property in the name of any of the members of the family. He was also cultivating land in Sy. No. 117/3 and 118/1 situated at Amruthahalli village, Yelahanka Hobli, as a tenant. The properties acquired by Bachappa are set out in the plaint schedule as item 1 except 7(f); agricultural properties owned by Bachappa are described in item No. 2 and only some of them stand in his name. Sy. Nos. 117/3 and 118/1 were lands granted to Bachappa and his two sons and therefore they have 1/3rd share each in these two properties. Thus, the defendants have miserably failed to prove that the suit properties standing in the name of Bachappa are the joint family properties or co-parcenary properties. Consequently, the plaintiffs case that the properties belonged to her father and on his death, all the children are entitled to equal share therein stands proved. This is precisely the conclusion arrived at by the Trial Court and the said finding does not call for interference. 29. The plaintiff claims that Bachappa purchased Sy. Nos. 18/2, 18/3 and 18/4 out of his income and that she has an equal right over the same. The burden of proving the same is squarely on the plaintiff. In the first place, there is no plea in the plaint that the sale consideration mentioned in Ex. P56 and Ex. P57 was paid by Bachappa and also that no evidence was adduced to show that the consideration flowed from Bachappa for purchase of the properties in the name of Kalappa and Narayanappa. Moreover, it is not a case where the plaintiff is claiming her share in these properties on the ground that it is a joint family property. 30. On the other hand P.W. 1's evidence during cross examination clearly shows that her brother Kalappa was carrying on transport business. He was also the Chairman of the Village Panchayat for about 40 years and Member of the Taluk Board for a term. Ex. P56 and Ex. P57 dated 17.6.70 and 18.3.71 respectively speak to the effect that Kalappa and Narayanappa purchased land bearing Sy. Nos. 18/2, 18/3 and 18/4 in their joint names during Bachappa's lifetime. He was also the Chairman of the Village Panchayat for about 40 years and Member of the Taluk Board for a term. Ex. P56 and Ex. P57 dated 17.6.70 and 18.3.71 respectively speak to the effect that Kalappa and Narayanappa purchased land bearing Sy. Nos. 18/2, 18/3 and 18/4 in their joint names during Bachappa's lifetime. Kalappa was aged about 50 years and Narayanappa was aged about 35 years at that time. Thus the properties which are not standing in the name of Bachappa cannot be the subject matter of partition at the instance of the plaintiff. No relief by way of declaration is sought with regard to Bachappa's title even though the said properties stand in the name of his sons. In the absence of requisite plea and necessary evidence on record, the Trial Court was justified in holding that the properties acquired in the name of Kalappa and Narayanappa are their self-acquisitions. Consequently the finding that the plaintiff is not entitled for any share in item No. 2, property at Sl. No. 5 bearing Sy. No. 6/1 measuring 34 gunta, Sl. No. 6 bearing Sy. No. 6/2 measuring 1 acre 2 gunta, Sl. No. 7 bearing Sy. No. 8/2B measuring 35 gunta, Sl. No. 12 bearing Sy. No. 18/1 measuring 1 acre, Sl. No. 13 bearing Sy. No. 18/2 measuring 35 gunta, Sl. No. 14 bearing Sy. No. 18/3 measuring 28 gunta, Sl. No. 15 bearing Sy. No. 18/4 measuring 1 acre 4 gunta, Sl. No. 16 bearing Sy. No. 18/5 measuring 20 gunta and Sl. No. 21 bearing Sy. No. 19/1 measuring 22 gunta, Sl. No. 22 bearing Sy. No. 19/4 measuring 26 gunta, Sl. No. 23 bearing Sy. No. 19/5 measuring 17 gunta and Sl. No. 24 bearing Sy. No. 19/6 measuring 19 gunta standing in the name of Kalappa and Narayanappa, also does not call for interference. 31. Land bearing Sy. No. 117/3 measuring 3 acres 2 gunta and Sy. No. 118/1 measuring 24 guntas situated at Amruthalli village, Yelahanka Hobli, Bangalore North Taluk are Inam lands. Bachappa and his sons were cultivating the said lands as tenants. After the abolition of Inams, Bachappa filed an application for its regrant. Kalappa who gave evidence in that matter as per Ex. D38 has categorically admitted that he and his father were cultivating the said lands. Bachappa and his sons were cultivating the said lands as tenants. After the abolition of Inams, Bachappa filed an application for its regrant. Kalappa who gave evidence in that matter as per Ex. D38 has categorically admitted that he and his father were cultivating the said lands. Therefore, the lands were regranted in the name of Bachappa in 1960 as per Ex. P59. Thus Bachappa and his two sons were having equal share in the Inam lands re-granted by the Special Deputy Commissioner. Therefore, the Trial Court has held that Bachappa and his two sons are entitled to 1/3rd share each in the re-granted land. In the 1/3rd share which is to be allotted to Bachappa notionally, the plaintiff and defendants 1 to 12 are entitled to equal share i.e., the plaintiff would be entitled to 1/18th share in the lands regranted under Ex. P59. 32. The learned counsel for the plaintiff submitted that in the very re-grant order, two other survey numbers have been granted and therefore share may be declared in the said property also. Admittedly none of the parties to the suit attempted to include those properties. A decree for partition cannot be passed in respect of a property which is not the subject matter of the suit. No doubt there is an order of regrant in Bachappa's name but absolutely there is no material on record to show where these properties exist or who is in possession thereof. Therefore, it is open to the plaintiff to file a fresh suit for partition and separate possession in respect of the said property and no decree can be passed in this suit. 33. It was contended on behalf of the defendants that they got the lands converted for non-agricultural purposes by paying necessary conversion charges and there are layout in some of these lands. As such the description given in the suit schedule is incorrect. Though in the plaint the property is described as an agricultural land, if an order of conversion had been passed for nonagricultural purposes and if lay outs are in existence that would not take away the plaintiffs right to claim a share in the property of her father. Therefore, the finding of the Trial Court that the plaintiff is entitled to 1/6th share in the properties which belonged to her father cannot be found fault with. Therefore, the finding of the Trial Court that the plaintiff is entitled to 1/6th share in the properties which belonged to her father cannot be found fault with. Similarly, the finding of the Trial Court in respect of the granted lands, the plaintiff is entitled to 1/18th share also cannot be found fault with. Similarly the finding of the Trial Court that the plaintiff is not entitled to any share in the properties purchased in the name of Kalappa and Narayanappa under two different sale deeds cannot be found fault with and therefore, we affirm the said findings recorded by the Trial Court. POINT No. 3 34. After recording findings as above, the plaintiff has been denied a share on the ground that she has been ousted from the properties and the suit for partition is time barred placing reliance on Article 110 of the Limitation Act. Limitation Act, 1963 prescribes no time limit for filing a suit for partition by a co-sharer or co-owner. However, under Article110, 12 years is the period prescribed for filing a suit by person who is excluded from a joint family property to enforce a right to a share and the starting point for limitation is when the exclusion becomes known to the plaintiff. 35. Article 110 of the Limitation Act is extracted here below for easy reference: 110. By a person excluded from a joint family property to enforce a right to share therein Twelve years When the exclusion be comes know to the plaintiff 36. The object underlying this Article is presumably to afford protection to a member of a Joint Family against prejudicial action by the other members of the family behind his back with respect to his interest in the family property at a time when he is employed elsewhere, away from his native place. Members of a joint family often leave their houses for long periods of time to seek employment in some distant place and their relatives may take steps to exclude them from their family property without their knowledge. It is therefore considered right to allow them to bring a suit under such circumstances to enforce their right within 12 years from the time when they first know come to of their exclusion. It is therefore considered right to allow them to bring a suit under such circumstances to enforce their right within 12 years from the time when they first know come to of their exclusion. Therefore, limitation is provided by this Article for a suit by a person excluded from his joint family property whether movable or immovable to enforce a right to a share therein. 37. The word used is joint family property' in Article 110 and the word 'Hindu' is conspicuously missing. A joint and undivided family is the normal condition of a Hindu society but it is not a juristic person, as such it cannot hold any property independent of the members. The presumption in respect of a joint Hindu Family is that it is joint unless the contrary is proved. By virtue of the same, the initial burden is on the person who claims disruption of the joint status. 38. Article 110 requires for its application (1) the existence of a joint family (2) joint family property (3) the person excluded being one of the members of the joint family (4) the exclusion of such member from a joint family property. Thus, this Article presupposes the existence of a joint family and can be invoked only when the suit is brought to enforce the right to a share therein by a person excluded from such property. Under this Article unless a member of the joint family has been excluded from the joint family property to his own knowledge mere lapse of time will not deprive of him of his rights in the joint family property as possession of the member of the joint family is deemed in law to be possession on behalf of all members even though the other members may take no part in the management or enjoyment of the property. 39. Joint family property ceases to be so if there is partition. A member of a joint Hindu Family has no definite share in the joint family property, but he has an undivided interest in the property. According to law, partition consists in defining the shares of the members of the joint family. A separation is effected by a clear and unequivocal intimation on the part of one member of the joint Hindu Family to his co-sharers of his desire to severe himself from the family. According to law, partition consists in defining the shares of the members of the joint family. A separation is effected by a clear and unequivocal intimation on the part of one member of the joint Hindu Family to his co-sharers of his desire to severe himself from the family. There should be an intimation, indication or representation of such intention and that the manifestation or declaration of intention should be to the knowledge of the person affected because a mere un-communicated declaration amounts to no more than merely harbouring an intention to separate. Severance results from the date of declaration. 40. An intention to exclude is an essential element of the definition of exclusion in this Article. The Courts must be satisfied that there was an intention on the part of those in control and possession of the joint family property to exclude the plaintiff from his or from his share of a joint family property when he should choose his rights. The word 'Exclusion' is not defined under the Limitation Act. It is obvious that the question whether a person has been excluded from joint family property must depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case. The exclusion contemplated by Article 110 is conscious and deliberate act amounting to denial of the right of a particular member concerned to have any benefits from the common property and there must be awareness or acknowledgement of the right and the claimant must be kept out of it. 41. The onus under this Article is on the defendants to prove the exclusion on which they rely and also that the plaintiff knew of the same more than 12 years before suit. Once a party establishes his claim to his share in the joint family property, the onus is on the opposite party to establish exclusion to the knowledge of the members of the joint family for over 12 years. 42. The learned counsel for the plaintiff submitted that the plaintiff is a co-sharer. It is settled law that the possession of one co-sharer is the possession of all co-sharers. In the written statement none of the defendants pleaded ouster nor have they pleaded acquisition of title by adverse possession. 42. The learned counsel for the plaintiff submitted that the plaintiff is a co-sharer. It is settled law that the possession of one co-sharer is the possession of all co-sharers. In the written statement none of the defendants pleaded ouster nor have they pleaded acquisition of title by adverse possession. The specific defence put forth by the defendants was that the plaintiff and the other sisters relinquished their interest in the properties, their father also has given sufficient property to them by way of gift and at the time of partition in 1973 brothers also gave 10 guntas of land and therefore, their case was, plaintiff has no right to maintain the suit. Therefore, the Trial Court did not frame any issue with regard to ouster. 43. Following judgments are relied upon in support of the plaintiffs case: 44. In P. Lakshmi Reddy v. L. Lakshmi Reddy reported in, AIR 1957 S.C. page 314 it is held as under: "It is well settled that in order to establish adverse possession of one-co-heir as against another it is not enough to show that one out of them is in sole possession and enjoyment of the profits, of the properties. Ouster of the non-possessing co-heir by the co-heir in possession who claims his possession to be adverse, should be made out. The possession of one co-heir is considered, in law, as possession of all the coheirs. When one co-heir is found to be in possession of the properties it is presumed to be on the basis of joint title. The co-heir in possession cannot render his possession adverse to the other co-heir, not in possession, merely by any secret hostile animus of his own part in derogation of the other co-heir title. It is a settled rule of law that as between co-heirs there must be evidence of open assertion of hostile title, coupled with exclusive possession and enjoyment by one of them to the knowledge of the other so as to constitute ouster. This does not necessarily mean that there must be an express demand by one and denial by the other. There are cases which have held that adverse possession and ouster can be inferred when one co-heir takes and maintains notorious exclusive possession in assertion of hostile title and continues in such possession for a very considerable time and excluded heir takes no steps to vindicate his title. There are cases which have held that adverse possession and ouster can be inferred when one co-heir takes and maintains notorious exclusive possession in assertion of hostile title and continues in such possession for a very considerable time and excluded heir takes no steps to vindicate his title. It is well settled that the burden of making out ouster is on the person claiming to displace the lawful title of a co-heir by his adverse possession." 45. The Apex Court in Bharat Singh and others v. Mst. Bhagirathi reported in, AIR 1966 S.C. page 405 at para 7 has held as under: "There is a strong presumption in favour of Hindu brothers constituting a joint family. It is for the person alleging severance of the joint family to prove it. The mere fact that after the death of the father mutation entry was made in favour of three brothers and indicated the share of each to be one-third, by itself could be no evidence of the severance of the joint family which, after the death of the father consisted of the three brothers who were minors. Mutation entry in favour of the widow of one of the three brother on his death might have been made without the knowledge of the other two brothers w.p. were minors at the time. Their minority will also explain the absence of objection to the mutation being made in her favour." 46. In Shambu Prasad Singh v. Most. Phool Kumari and others reported in, AIR 1971 S.C. page 1337 it is held at para 17 as under: "On the question of adverse possession by a co-sharer, the law is fairly well settled. Adverse possession has to have the characteristics of adequacy, continuity and exclusiveness. The onus to establish these characteristics is on the adverse possessor. As between co-sharers, the possession of one co-sharer is in law the possession of all co-sharers. Therefore, to constitute adverse possession, ouster of the non-possessing co-sharer has to be made out. As between them, therefore, there must be evidence of open assertion of a hostile title coupled with exclusive possession and enjoyment by one of them to the knowledge of the other." 47. In Karbalai Begum v. Mohd. Sayeed and another reported in, AIR 1981 S.C. page 77 at para. As between them, therefore, there must be evidence of open assertion of a hostile title coupled with exclusive possession and enjoyment by one of them to the knowledge of the other." 47. In Karbalai Begum v. Mohd. Sayeed and another reported in, AIR 1981 S.C. page 77 at para. 7 following proposition is laid down: "It is well settled that mere non-participation in the rent and profits of the land of a co-sharer does not amount to an ouster so as to give title by adverse possession to the other co-sharer in possession. Indeed even if this fact is admitted, then the legal position would be that the co-sharers in possession would become constructive trustees on behalf of the co-sharer who is not in possession and the right of such co-sharer would be deemed to be protected by the trustees. The possession of the defendants, apart from being in the nature of constructive trustees, would be in law the possession of the plaintiff." 48. In Darshan Singh and others v. Gujjar Singh (dead) by LRs. and others reported in, (2002)2 SCC page 62 at para 9 it is held as under: "In our view, the correct legal position is that possession of a property belonging to several co-sharers by one co-sharer shall be deemed that he possesses the property on behalf of the other co-sharers unless there has been a clear ouster by denying the title of other co-sharers and mutation in the revenue records in the name of one co-sharer would not amount to ouster unless there is a clear declaration that title of the other co-sharers was denied." 49. The Apex Court in Binapani Paul v. Pratima Ghosh and others reported in, (2007) 6 S.C.C page 100 at para. 39 has held as under: "Interestingly, Amal pleaded ouster. If ouster is to be pleaded, the title has to be acknowledged. Once such a plea is taken, irrespective of the fact that as to whether any other plea is raised or not, conduct of the parties would be material. If, therefore, plea of ouster is not established, a fortiori the title of other co-sharers must be held to have been accepted." 50. In T. Anjanappa v. Somalingappa reported in, 2006(7) SCC page. 570 at para. 12 it is held as under: "12. If, therefore, plea of ouster is not established, a fortiori the title of other co-sharers must be held to have been accepted." 50. In T. Anjanappa v. Somalingappa reported in, 2006(7) SCC page. 570 at para. 12 it is held as under: "12. The concept of adverse possession contemplates a hostile possession i.e., a possession which is expressly or impliedly in denial of the title of the true owner. Possession to be adverse must be possession by a person who does not acknowledge the other's rights but denies them. The principle of law is firmly established that a person who bases his title on adverse possession must show by clear and unequivocal evidence that his possession was hostile to the real owner and amounted to denial of his title to the property claimed. For deciding whether the alleged acts of a person constituted adverse possession, the animus of the person doing those acts is the most crucial factor. Adverse possession is commenced in wrong and is aimed against right. A person is said to hold the property adversely to the real owner when that person in denial of the owner's right excluded him from the enjoyment of his property." 51. The Apex Court in Jai Singh and others v. Gurmej Singh reported in, 2009 AIR SCW page 3652 after referring to several earlier judgments, has laid down the following principles at para. 7 which reads as under: "The principles relating to the inter se rights and liabilities of co-sharers are as follows: 1. A co-owner has an interest in the whole property and also in every parcel of it. 2. Possession of joint property by one co-owner is in the eye of law, possession of all even if all but one are actually out of possession. 3. A mere occupation of a larger portion or even of an entire joint property does not necessarily amount to ouster as the possession of one is deemed to be on behalf of all. 4. The above rule admits of an exception when there is ouster of a co-owner by another. But in order to negative the presumption of joint possession on behalf of all, on the ground of ouster, the possession of a co-owner must not only be exclusive but also hostile to the knowledge of the other as, when a co-owner openly asserts his own title and denies, that of the other. But in order to negative the presumption of joint possession on behalf of all, on the ground of ouster, the possession of a co-owner must not only be exclusive but also hostile to the knowledge of the other as, when a co-owner openly asserts his own title and denies, that of the other. 5. Passage of time does not extinguish the right of the co-owner who has been out of possession of the joint property except in the event of ouster or abandonment. 6. Every co-owner has a right to use the joint property in a husband like manner not inconsistent with similar rights of other co-owners. 7. Where a co-owner is in possession of separate parcels under an arrangement consented by the other co-owners, it is not open to anybody to disturb the arrangement without the consent of others expect by filing a suit for partition." OUSTER 52. Per contra, it was contended by the defendants that the plaintiff was not in possession of the suit properties since the time of her marriage in 1958 till filing the suit. Relying upon the admission of P.W. 1 during cross examination about execution of GPA in favour of Kalappa and Narayanappa, Mutation of revenue records in Kalappa's name after Bachappa's death, they contend that she was not in possession of land bearing Sy. No. 25 etc., at any time. According to the defendants the right to sue for partition, if any, accrued in favour of the plaintiff on the death of Bachappa in 1972. But the plaintiff did not even move her little finger to enforce the said right. Nor did she enter upon the property or object for being kept away from the property. Thus, this exclusion of the plaintiff from the suit schedule property for a period of more than 12 years is clearly established and therefore, the finding of the Trial Court that the plaintiff has been ousted from the suit schedule property and the suit is not maintainable was justified. 53. In support of the above contention the defendants relied upon the following judgments: 54. In para 28 of the judgment in Vidya Devi @ Vidya Vati (Dead) by L.Rs. v. Prem Prakash and Others reported in, (1995)4 SCC 496 the minority view is expressed in the following words: "28. 'Ouster' does not mean actual driving out of the co-sharer from the property. In para 28 of the judgment in Vidya Devi @ Vidya Vati (Dead) by L.Rs. v. Prem Prakash and Others reported in, (1995)4 SCC 496 the minority view is expressed in the following words: "28. 'Ouster' does not mean actual driving out of the co-sharer from the property. It will, however, not be complete unless it is coupled with all other ingredients required to constitute adverse possession. Broadly speaking, three elements are necessary for establishing the plea of ouster in the case of co-owner. They are (i) declaration of hostile animus, (ii) long and uninterrupted possession of the person pleading ouster, and (iii) exercise of right of exclusive ownership openly and to the knowledge of other co-owner. Thus, a co-owner, can under law, claim title by adverse possession against another co-owner who can, of course, file appropriate suit including suit for joint possession within time prescribed by law." The majority view as expressed in Para 16 of the said judgment reads as under: "16. When we now consider the plea of acquisition of title by adverse possession to the holding of co-bhumidhars raised by defendant-1 (respondent-1 herein), a co-bhumidhar in a suit for partition of that holding by another co-bhumidhar, it becomes wholly and clearly untenable because of the entries in Columns 4 and 5 relating to suit for partition of co-bhumidhar in respect of his holding envisaged at Sl. No. 11 to Schedule-1 fixing no period of limitation for such suit against other co-bhumidhar/s. Thus, when no period of limitation is fixed for filing a suit for partition by co- bhumidhar against his other co-bhumidhars in respect of a joint holding, the question of the other co-bhumidhar acquiring his title to such holding by adverse possession for over 12 years can never arise. If that be so, such plea of perfection of title by adverse possession of a holding by co-bhumidhar against his other co-bhumidhar as defence in the latter's suit for partition can be of no legal consequence. If that be so, such plea of perfection of title by adverse possession of a holding by co-bhumidhar against his other co-bhumidhar as defence in the latter's suit for partition can be of no legal consequence. In the said view of the matter, we agree with the learned single Judge of the High Court who held that the explanation to sub-section (1) of section 186 of the DL Act came in the way of defendant-1 (respondent-1 herein) in raising the issue of his title to the holding said to have been acquired by adverse possession and getting it referred by the Revenue Court to Civil Court for decision and disagree with the Division Bench of the High Court which has held that section 67(d) of the DL Act which provides for extinction of bhumidhar's interest in a holding enabled defendant-1 (respondent-1 herein) to take the plea of title by adverse possession in respect of the holding in a suit for partition of such holding filed by a co-bhumidhar". 55. The defendants have produced Ex. D6 and Ex. D6(a), the General Power of Attorney dated 12.07.1972 executed by Sri. Narayanappa, the plaintiff Nanjamma and her sisters in favour of Kalappa authorizing him to sell, exchange, surrender, lease, mortgage, pledge or dispose of the properties of late Sri. Bachappa and to execute, enforce any powers of sale, release, any mortgage or charge or otherwise to realize or to obtain the benefit in respect of the estate of late Sri. Bachappa. These persons agreed to ratify and confirm whatsoever their attorney shall do or purport to do by such deed. Though the power of attorney was executed by Narayanappa, Plaintiff Nanjamma and her sisters in favour of Kalappa, he dealt with the property as if he is the absolute owner thereof and not as the Power of attorney holder so as to bind his sisters' interest. 56. Ex. D7 is an unregistered relinquishment deed dated 04.03.1999 executed by Kalappa where under he gave 1 acre of land to his three sisters, but the plaintiff is not a party thereto. However it can be safely inferred from this document that the relationship between Kalappa and his sisters was cordial. He wanted to give one acre to three sisters as Arishina Kumkuma as promised to his parents at the time of partition. Since Ex. However it can be safely inferred from this document that the relationship between Kalappa and his sisters was cordial. He wanted to give one acre to three sisters as Arishina Kumkuma as promised to his parents at the time of partition. Since Ex. D7 is not a registered document, no relinquishment took place under the said document and therefore whatever rights the plaintiff and her sisters had in the property continued. The trial Court after considering all these aspects has recorded a finding that Kalappa did not enter into joint agreement to alienate the property as the power of attorney holder of his sisters and therefore the alienation does not bind the plaintiff. 57. Then, reliance was placed on the judgment of the Apex Court in Des Raj and Ors. v. Bhagat Ram (dead) by L.RS. AND ORS. reported in, (2007) 9 SCC 641 wherein at Paragraph 10 it was held as under: "10. We have noticed hereinbefore the factual aspects of the matter which are neither denied nor disputed. Admittedly, the plaintiff respondent had remained in possession for a long time i.e. since 1953. It may be true that in his plaint, the plaintiff did not specifically plead ouster but muffusil pleadings, as is well known, must be construed liberally. Pleadings must be construed as a whole." 58. This Court had an occasion to consider the law on adverse possession in the case of Janatha Dal Party v. The Indian National Congress, New Delhi and Others reported in, 2014 (1) KCCR 95 . It was held as under:-- "The plea of adverse possession raises a mixed question of law and fact. Where a person wants to base his title on it, he should specifically set up the plea. Unless the plea is raised, it cannot be entertained. A plea must be raised and it must be shown when possession became adverse, so that the starting point of limitation against the party affected can be found. The prayer clause is not a substitute for a plea. A person acquires title by way of adverse possession when he is in continuous, uninterrupted, hostile possession over a period of 12 years. In order to calculate 12 years period there should be a starting point. The date of commencement of adverse possession is very crucial for calculating the period of 12 years. A person acquires title by way of adverse possession when he is in continuous, uninterrupted, hostile possession over a period of 12 years. In order to calculate 12 years period there should be a starting point. The date of commencement of adverse possession is very crucial for calculating the period of 12 years. Therefore, the law mandates that the person who seeks a declaration that he has perfected his title by way of adverse possession should specifically plead the date from which his possession becomes adverse to that of the opposite party against whom the said plea is set up. It is from that date if the party proves continuous, uninterrupted possession for a period of 12 years, then the right of the opposite party to the property stands extinguished and the party who has set up the plea would acquire title by way of adverse possession. Therefore, in the absence of crucial pleadings, which constitute adverse possession, the party cannot claim that he has perfected their title by adverse possession. In a proper case, the Court may have to construe the entire pleadings so as to come to a conclusion as to whether the proper plea of adverse possession has been raised in the pleadings or not which can also be gathered from the cumulative effect of the averments made therein. Therefore, a person who claims adverse possession should show: (a) on what date he came into possession, (b) what was the nature of his possession, (c) whether the factum of possession was known to the other party, (d) how long his possession has continued, and (e) his possession was open, continuous and undisturbed. A person pleading adverse possession has no equities in his favour. Because, adverse possession is commenced in wrong and is aimed against right. Since he is trying to defeat the rights of the true owner, it is for him to clearly plead and establish all facts necessary to establish his adverse possession. Once a suit for recovery of possession is instituted against a defendant in adverse possession his adverse possession does not continue thereafter. In other words, the running of time for acquiring title by adverse possession gets arrested." 59. The Apex Court in the case of Jai Singh & Others. Once a suit for recovery of possession is instituted against a defendant in adverse possession his adverse possession does not continue thereafter. In other words, the running of time for acquiring title by adverse possession gets arrested." 59. The Apex Court in the case of Jai Singh & Others. v. Gurmej Singh reported in, 2009 AIR SCW 3652 has held that, a co-owner has an interest in the whole property and also in every parcel of it. Possession of joint property by one co-owner is in the eye of law, possession of all even if all but one are actually out of possession. A mere occupation of a larger portion or even of an entire joint property does not necessarily amount to ouster as the possession of one is deemed to be on behalf of all. 60. It is well settled that in order to establish adverse possession of one-co-heir as against another it is not enough to show that one out of them is in sole possession and enjoyment of the profits, of the properties. Ouster of the non-possessing co-heir by the co-heir in possession who claims his possession to be adverse, should be made out. The possession of one co-heir is considered, in law, as possession of all the co-heirs. When one co-heir is found to be in possession of the properties it is presumed to be on the basis of joint title. The co-heir in possession cannot render his possession adverse to the other co-heir not in possession, merely by any secret hostile animus of his own part in derogation of the other co-heir title. It is a settled rule of law that as between co-heirs there must be evidence of open assertion of hostile title, coupled with exclusive possession and enjoyment by one of them to the knowledge of the other so as to constitute ouster. 61. If ouster is to be pleaded, the title has to be acknowledged. Once such a plea is taken, irrespective of the fact that as to whether any other plea is raised or not, conduct of the parties would be material. If, therefore, plea of ouster is not established, a fortiori the title of other co-sharers must be held to have been accepted. 'Ouster' does not mean actual driving out of the co-sharer from the property. If, therefore, plea of ouster is not established, a fortiori the title of other co-sharers must be held to have been accepted. 'Ouster' does not mean actual driving out of the co-sharer from the property. It will, however, not be complete unless it is coupled with all other ingredients required to constitute adverse possession. It is well settled that mere non-participation in the rent and profits of the land of a co-sharer does not amount to an ouster so as to give title by adverse possession to the other co-sharer in possession. 62. The co-sharer in possession would become constructive trustees on behalf of the co-sharer who is not in possession and the right of such co-sharer would be deemed to be protected by the trustees. A mere occupation of a larger portion or even of an entire joint property does not necessarily amount to ouster as the possession of one is deemed to be on behalf of all. Mutation in the revenue records in the name of one co-sharer would not amount to ouster unless there is a clear declaration that title of the other co-sharers was denied. 63. Passage of time does not extinguish the right of the co-owner who has been out of possession of the joint family property. It is only when he is ousted from the joint family property and after such ouster, he is out of possession of the property for a period of more than 12 years and in the meanwhile, the person who ousted, asserts his title, continues in possession for the statutory period openly, then person out of possession loses his right to have possession. When possession of one co-owner in the eye of law is the possession of all the co-owners, till the partition is effected, by metes and bounds, anybody can claim exclusive title of the property because each co-owner has the interest in every parcel of the property. 64. Merely because one co-owner is in exclusive possession of the properties and other co-owners are residing separately it cannot be said that the co-owners who are not in possession are ousted from the property. In the absence of ouster, hostile title, mere exclusive possession would not constitute either adverse possession or ouster. 64. Merely because one co-owner is in exclusive possession of the properties and other co-owners are residing separately it cannot be said that the co-owners who are not in possession are ousted from the property. In the absence of ouster, hostile title, mere exclusive possession would not constitute either adverse possession or ouster. Even in case of alienation, though the alienee is put in exclusive possession of portion of the property, as the property is not divided by metes and bounds, he cannot claim exclusive title in the property for the co-owner who is not a party to the alienation is deemed to be in possession of the property. 65. In the instant case, though the plaintiffs marriage took place in 1958, the right to seek partition accrued in her favour only on the death of her father Bachappa in 1972. Since the time of marriage, the plaintiff was living with her husband and therefore, no portion of her father's property was in the physical possession of the plaintiff. It is only on the date of death of Bachappa all the legal heirs of Bachappa became co-owners; possession of one co-owner is the possession of all the co-owners. Ex. D6, the registered power of attorney is not cancelled till today. But Kalappa as observed earlier did not choose to act as the power of attorney holder of the executants of Ex. D6. Nor did Kalappa execute joint development agreement or sale deed for and on behalf of the plaintiff. Ex. D7 speaks about the cordial relationship that existed between the sons and daughters of Bachappa. Therefore it can be concluded that the hostile animus to exclude the plaintiff from the suit properties was lacking. 66. There was a partition between Kalappa and Narayanappa pursuant to which the properties were mutated, taxes were paid. These entries were not challenged by the plaintiff and her sisters. It is settled law that a mutation entry or katha change does not extinguish the title of the owner of the property. It may be beneficial to refer to Ex. D6 here as the plaintiff, her sisters had authorized Kalappa to do all acts on their behalf in respect of the properties. Under these circumstances mere change in the RTC entries or changing the khata or payment of tax by the defendants will not amount to asserting hostile title. 67. It may be beneficial to refer to Ex. D6 here as the plaintiff, her sisters had authorized Kalappa to do all acts on their behalf in respect of the properties. Under these circumstances mere change in the RTC entries or changing the khata or payment of tax by the defendants will not amount to asserting hostile title. 67. It is settled principle of law that moffusil pleadings must be liberally construed and pleadings must be construed as a whole. In the instant case absolutely there is no plea of adverse possession or ouster in the written statements. No doubt applications are filed for conversion of the land for non-agricultural purposes, lay-outs have been formed and approval has been obtained for the same. Even these acts cannot constitute a hostile act or assertion of a hostile title against the co-owners. At best it may amount to development of the properties by those in charge of the same and managing their properties. 68. Therefore from the tenor of whatever is put forth as defence, ouster or adverse possession cannot be inferred by any stretch of imagination. The Trial Court is fully justified in not framing any issue regarding ouster. In fact the parties have also not adduced any evidence on ouster. By picking up some admission from the evidence of P.W. 1 with regard to possession an attempt is made to make out a case of ouster. Unfortunately, the Trial Court has accepted the same that too in the absence of specific plea regarding ouster and without there being any issue or evidence thereon. The learned trial Judge has failed to keep in mind the settled legal position and is carried away by the so called admissions, recorded a finding that the plaintiff is ousted and the suit is barred by limitation. The said finding being contrary to the statutory provisions, settled law and the legal evidence on record, cannot be sustained and therefore liable to be set-aside. Accordingly, it is set aside. POINT No. 4 69. The Trial Court has recorded a categorical finding that the plaintiff was not in possession of any of the properties as on the date of suit. Kalappa had executed a joint development agreement and has put defendants 13 to 28 in possession of various properties. Accordingly, it is set aside. POINT No. 4 69. The Trial Court has recorded a categorical finding that the plaintiff was not in possession of any of the properties as on the date of suit. Kalappa had executed a joint development agreement and has put defendants 13 to 28 in possession of various properties. Thereafter the purchasers have got the lands converted, formed lay-outs, constructed multi storied shopping complexes after obtaining sanctioned plan and sold the same. As on the date of suit, neither the plaintiff nor her brother Kalappa was in possession of the property and therefore the suit ought to have been valued under Section 35(1) of the Karnataka Court Fees and Suits Valuation Act and not under Section 35(2). It also directed the plaintiff to value the suit under Section 35(1) and pay deficit court fee. 70. Section 35 of the Karnataka Court Fees and Suits Valuation Act, 1958 deals with partition suits. It reads as under: "35. Partition suits. (1) In a suit for partition and separate possession of a share of joint family property or of property owned, jointly or in common, by a plaintiff whose title to such property is denied, or who has been excluded from possession of such property, fee shall be computed on the market value of the plaintiffs share. (2) In a suit for partition and separate possession of joint family property or property owned, jointly or in common, by a plaintiff who is in joint possession of such property, fee shall be paid at the following rates:-- Rupees fifteen if the value of plaintiff's share is Rs. 3,000 or less; Rupees thirty if the value is above Rs. 3,000 but not more than Rs. 5,000. Rupees one hundred if the value is above Rs. 5,000 but below Rs. 10,000 and Rs. 200/- if the value is Rs. 10,000 and above. 3,000 or less; Rupees thirty if the value is above Rs. 3,000 but not more than Rs. 5,000. Rupees one hundred if the value is above Rs. 5,000 but below Rs. 10,000 and Rs. 200/- if the value is Rs. 10,000 and above. (3) Where, in a suit falling under sub-section (1) or sub-section (2), a defendant claims partition and separate possession of his share of the property, fee shall be payable on his written statement computed on half the market value of his share or at half the rates specified in sub-section (2), according as such defendant has been excluded from possession or is in pint possession.(4) Where, in a suit falling under subsection (1) or sub-section (2), the plaintiff or the defendant seeks cancellation of decree or other document of the nature specified in Section 38separate fee shall be payable on the relief of cancellation in the manner specified in that section." 71. The Apex Court in the case of Neelavathi v. Natarajan reported in AIR 1980 SC 691 has held as under:-- "126. Court fee is payable under S 37(1), T.N. Act, if the plaintiff is 'excluded' possession of the joint property. The general principle of law is that in the case of co-owners, possession of one is possession of all unless ouster or exclusion is proved. To continue to be in joint possession in law it is not necessary that the plaintiff should be in actual possession of the whole or part of the property. Equally it is not necessary that he should be getting a share or some income from the property. So long as his right to a share and the nature of the property is not disputed, the law presumes that he is in joint possession. To apply S 37(1) there should be a clear and specific averment in the plaint that Plaintiff has been excluded from joint possession. An averment that remain in joint possession would not amount to exclusion from possession." 72. To apply S 37(1) there should be a clear and specific averment in the plaint that Plaintiff has been excluded from joint possession. An averment that remain in joint possession would not amount to exclusion from possession." 72. The Apex Court interpreting Section 37(1) of the Tamil Nadu Court Fees and Suits Valuation Act, which is similar to the provisions of Section 35(1) of the Karnataka Court Fees & Suit Valuation Act in the case of Jagannath Amin v. Seetharama (dead) by LRs and Others reported in, (2007) 1 SCC 694 has held as under: "It will be seen that the Court fee is payable under Section 37(1) if the plaintiff is 'excluded' from possession of the property. The plaintiffs who are sisters of the defendants, claimed to the members of the joint family and prayed for partition alleging that they are in joint possession. Under the proviso to Section 6 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, the plaintiffs being the daughters of the male Hindu who died after the commencement of the Act, having at the time of the death an interest in the Mitakshara Co-parcenary property, acquired an interest by devolution under the Act. It is not in dispute that the plaintiffs are entitled to a share the property to which the plaintiffs are entitled is undivided joint family property' though not in a strict sense of the term. The general principle of the law is that in the case of co-owners, the possession of one is in law possession of all, unless ouster or exclusion is proved. To continue to be in joint possession in law, it is not necessary that the plaintiff should be in actual possession of the whole or part of the property. Equally, it is not necessary that he should be getting a share or some income from the property. So long as his right to a share and the nature of the property as joint is not disputed the law presumes that he is in joint possession unless he is excluded from such possession. Equally, it is not necessary that he should be getting a share or some income from the property. So long as his right to a share and the nature of the property as joint is not disputed the law presumes that he is in joint possession unless he is excluded from such possession. Before the plaintiffs could be called upon to pay Court fee under Section 37(1) of the Act on the ground that they had been excluded from possession, it is necessary that on a reading of the plaint, there should be a clear and specific averment in the plaint that they had been 'excluded' from joint possession to which they are entitled in law. The averments in the plaint that the plaintiff could not remain in joint possession as they were not given any income from the joint family property would not amount to their exclusion from possession. We are unable to read into the plaint a clear and specific admission that the plaintiffs had been excluded from possession. 73. The Division Bench of this Court in the case of B.S. Malleshappa v. Koratagigere B. Shivalingappa and others reported in, AIR 2001 Kar. Page 384 after referring to the various judgment of the Apex Court held as under: "11: We may now conveniently summarize the principles relating to Court -fee in regard to suits for partitions and appeals therefrom: i) Payment of Court-fee will depend on plaint averment alone. Neither the averments in the written statement, nor the evidence nor the final decision have a bearing on the decision relating to Court-fee. ii) The scope of investigation under Section 11 is confined practically to determine two points: (i) under valuation of the subject matter of the suit and (ii) category; under which the suit falls, for the purpose of Court-fee. Once the category of suit is determined with reference to plaint averments, the Court cannot subsequently change the category on the basis of the averments in the written statement or on the basis of evidence and arguments. In short, if the suit is found to fall under S.35(2) of the Act on the plaint averments, the Court has no power to convert the suit as one falling under S.35(1) of the Act, at any point of time, much less while rendering judgment. The only exception is when the plaint is amended. In short, if the suit is found to fall under S.35(2) of the Act on the plaint averments, the Court has no power to convert the suit as one falling under S.35(1) of the Act, at any point of time, much less while rendering judgment. The only exception is when the plaint is amended. iii) The plaintiff in a suit being dominus litis has the choice of filing a suit of a particular nature or seek a particular relief. Neither the defendant nor the Court can alter the suit as one for a different relief or as a suit falling in a different category and require the plaintiff to pay Court-fee on such altered category of suit. iv) If the plaintiff claims that he is in joint possession of a property and seeks partition and separate possession, he categorizes the suit under Section35(2) of the Act. He is therefore, liable to pay Court-fee only under Section 35(2). If on evidence, it is found that he was not in joint possession, the consequence is that the relief may be refused in regard to such property or the suit may be dismissed. But the question of Court treating the suit as one falling under Section 35(1) of the Act and directing the plaintiff to pay the Court-fee under Section 35(1) of the Act does not arise. Even after written statement and evidence (which may demonstrate absence of possession or joint possession) if the plaintiff chooses not to amend the plaint to bring the suit under Section 35(1) and pay Court-fee applicable thereto, he takes the chance of suit getting dismissed or relief being denied. vi) On appreciation of evidence, if the Court disbelieves the claim of plaintiff regarding joint possession, it can only hold that the case does not fall under Section 35(2) and, therefore, plaintiff is not entitled to relief. It cannot, in the judgment, hold that the case of plaintiff should be categorised under Section 35(1) nor direct the plaintiff to pay Court-fee on market value under Section 35(1) of the Act. vii) The Court-fee payable on an appeal is the same as the Court-fee payable on the suit. Therefore, even if the trial Court holds that plaintiff was not in joint possession or that plaintiff had been excluded from possession, there will be no change in the Court-fee payable in an appeal by the plaintiff against such decision. vii) The Court-fee payable on an appeal is the same as the Court-fee payable on the suit. Therefore, even if the trial Court holds that plaintiff was not in joint possession or that plaintiff had been excluded from possession, there will be no change in the Court-fee payable in an appeal by the plaintiff against such decision. The Court-fee on the appeal will still be the same as the Court-fee paid on the plaint in the Court of first instance. 74. Recently, this Court in the case of Sampangi Gowda & Others v. Muddanna & Another, RFA No. 872/2013 dated 04.04.2014, has held as under:-- "11. Therefore, the general principle of law is that in the case of co-owners, possession of one is possession of all unless ouster or exclusion is proved. To continue to be in joint possession in law it is not necessary that the plaintiff should be in actual possession of the whole or part of the property. Equally it is not necessary that he should be getting a share or some income from the property. So long as his right to a share and the nature of the property is not disputed, the law presumes that he is in joint possession. 12. Therefore, what the Court has to look into is the averment in the plaint. If in the plaint it is averred that the plaintiffs and defendants are in joint possession, notwithstanding the fact that they are living separately, even at two different places, in law it makes no difference. In the eye of law, in the case of co-parcenary, joint family or co-ownership, possession of one co-parcener or member of the joint family or co-owner is possession of all. Then the case would fall under Section 35(2) of the Act. To take the case out of Section 35(2) there should be a clear and specific averment in the plaint that the plaintiff has been excluded from joint possession. In fact, in the case of co-parcenary or joint family property, the averment should be that the plaintiff has been ousted from possession. If there is a clear and specific averment in the plaint that they have been excluded form joint possession to which they are entitled to in law, then the case would fall under Section 35(1) of the Act. If there is a clear and specific averment in the plaint that they have been excluded form joint possession to which they are entitled to in law, then the case would fall under Section 35(1) of the Act. In a suit for partition, if the Court after trial records a finding that the plaintiff is not in possession and the plaintiff challenges the said finding, the correctness of the said finding has to be gone into by the Appellate Court. Therefore, as the finding has not attained finality, the question of the appellants paying Court fee on the basis of the said finding would not arise. Therefore, the High Court office cannot insist on payment of Court Fee on the basis of the findings recorded by the trial Court on the issue regarding possession". 75. Therefore what follows is, in order to determine whether the Court Fee paid is proper on the plaint, what the Court should look to is the averments in the plaint and not the written statement or the evidence. Mere averment in the plaint that the plaintiffs and defendants are in joint possession is sufficient, notwithstanding the fact they are living separately, even at two different places, because in law it makes no difference. 76. In the case of a property belonging to coparcenary, joint family or co-ownership, possession of one co-parcener or a member of the joint family or a co-owner is the possession of all. To hold that the plaintiff is in joint possession on the date of the suit, it is not necessary that the plaintiff should be in actual physical possession of the whole or part of the property which is the subject matter of the suit. Even the plaintiff need not be getting a share in the income from the property. So long as the plaintiff has a right to a share, the law presumes that he is in joint possession. 77. Therefore, even if the evidence adduced by the parties discloses that the plaintiff is not in physical possession of the property or any portion thereof it is of no consequence. Thus a mere averment in the plaint that the plaintiff is in joint possession with the defendant in the schedule property is sufficient to bring the valuation of the suit within the ambit of section 35(2) of the Karnataka Court Fees and Suits Valuation Act, 1958. 78. Thus a mere averment in the plaint that the plaintiff is in joint possession with the defendant in the schedule property is sufficient to bring the valuation of the suit within the ambit of section 35(2) of the Karnataka Court Fees and Suits Valuation Act, 1958. 78. In para 6 of the plaint, the plaintiff has categorically stated that she is in joint possession of the suit schedule property. The defendants on the other hand claim to be in exclusive possession. After the death of Bachappa, the plaintiff became the co-owner. The possession of one co-owner is the possession of all the co-owners. Therefore, the valuation of the suit under Section 35(2) of the Karnataka Court Fees and Suits Valuation Act, 1958 is proper. The Trial Court was not justified in directing the plaintiff to value the same under Section 35(1) of the Karnataka Court Fees and Suits Valuation Act, 1958. 79. In view of our findings that in the absence of any plea regarding ouster or adverse possession, the plaintiff continues to be in joint possession of the property as on the date of the suit. Even though the plaintiff is not in physical possession, in law, she is deemed to be in joint possession. Therefore, she cannot be denied share. In that view of the matter, the plaintiff is entitled to partition and separate possession of her legitimate share in the suit properties i.e., the properties belonging to Bachappa only. 80. The alienees contend that they are bona fide purchasers for valuable consideration. On the date they entered into agreement of purchase and joint development agreement, the property stood in the name of Kalappa and he was paying tax. Kalappa was in physical possession of the property and obtained conversion orders. He had contested the matter before the ULC and order was passed in his favour holding that he did not possess excess of land. After inspecting these documents, they entered into agreements. Thereafter, openly, they formed lay out, laid foundation and put up multistoried complex and also alienated the plots in favour of the 3rd parties. The purchasers are not made parties to the suit. Even if the plaintiff succeeds, her share is only 1/6th in Bachappa's properties and 1/8th in the granted land. After inspecting these documents, they entered into agreements. Thereafter, openly, they formed lay out, laid foundation and put up multistoried complex and also alienated the plots in favour of the 3rd parties. The purchasers are not made parties to the suit. Even if the plaintiff succeeds, her share is only 1/6th in Bachappa's properties and 1/8th in the granted land. As such she can be allotted a share in the properties that are still in the possession of Kalappa's children and Narayanappa's children, so that the 3rd party interest is not affected. 81. In the light of these submissions it is pertinent to mention that in this proceeding the Court is called upon to decide as to what is the share of each co-sharer in this proceeding. In so far as alienations made prior to the filing of the suit is concerned, the alienees are made parties. While deciding the share to which each co-sharer is entitled the question of considering the rights and interests of the alienee does not arise. That is not the scope of a preliminary decree. This has to be gone into at the stage of final decree proceedings. Therefore, we are not expressing any opinion on these points urged by the purchasers of the properties and make it clear that they are to be gone into only in the final decree proceedings. 82. It is submitted that the defendant Nos. 16 to 25 had filed O.S. No. 17071/2006 for permanent injunction against the plaintiff restraining her from interfering with their peaceful possession and enjoyment of the property and also development of the property. Ad-interim order of injunction was granted. The plaintiff entered appearance and sought for vacating the interim order. After contest, the application for vacating was dismissed and ex parte ad-interim order was confirmed. Aggrieved by that, plaintiff had preferred MFA No. 1765/2007 before this Court and the same came to be dismissed with an observation that any construction that may be put up in the suit schedule property shall be subject to the decision in the suit and also in the partition suit filed by the appellant. Therefore, all the constructions which are made subsequent to the filing of the said suit and also this suit shall be subject to the decision in this suit as well as in the injunction suit. 83. Therefore, all the constructions which are made subsequent to the filing of the said suit and also this suit shall be subject to the decision in this suit as well as in the injunction suit. 83. In the result we pass the following; ORDER i) The appeal is partly allowed. ii) The plaintiff is entitled to 1/6th share in the following properties:-- (a) Property No. 20/3, measuring 31 ft x 36 ft, Property No. 73/90 (2/90) measuring 17 ft x 32 ft, Property No. 58/72 (2/72) measuring 17 ft x 32 ft, Property No. 164/193 (6/93) measuring 53 ft x 53 ft and Sy. No. 250/290 measuring 130 ft x 112 ft, all situated at Byatarayanapura Village, Yelahanka Hobli, Bangalore North Taluk, in item No. 1 of the suit schedule. (b) Sy. No. 1/9 measuring 2 guntas, Sy. No. 5/1 measuring 2 acres 13 guntas, Sy. No. 5/2A measuring 2 acres 5 guntas, Sy. No. 5/2A measuring 20 guntas, Sy. No. 17/1 measuring 5 guntas, Sy. No. 17/2 measuring 3 guntas, Sy. No. 17/3 measuring 3 guntas, Sy. No. 25 measuring 2 acres 21 guntas, Sy. No. 40/1 measuring 2 acres 28 guntas, Sy. No. 42/2A measuring 12 guntas, Sy. No. 50/2 measuring 14 guntas, Sy. No. 50/4 measuring 1 acre 25 guntas, Sy. No. 50/5 measuring 21 guntas, Sy. No. 52/3 measuring 1 acre 11 guntas, Sy. No. 85/1 measuring 1 acre 5 guntas, Sy. No. 85/2 measuring 31 guntas, Sy. No. 85/3 measuring 2 acres 5 guntas, Sy. No. 94/5 measuring 1 acre 23 guntas, Sy. No. 104/5B measuring 4 3/4 guntas, Sy. No. 105/1 measuring 24 guntas, Sy. No. 105/2 measuring 27 guntas and Sy. No. 105/3 measuring 1 acre 6 guntas, all situated at Byatarayanapura village, Yelahanka Hobli, Bangalore North Taluk, in item No. 2 of the suit schedule, iii) The plaintiff is entitled to 1/18th share in the following properties:-- (a) Sy. No. 117/3 measuring 3 acres 2 guntas and (b) Sy. No. 118/1 measuring 24 guntas both situated at Amruthalli Village, Yelahanka Hobli, Bangalore North Taluk. iv) The plaintiffs suit is dismissed in respect of the following properties:-- (a) bearing, Sy. No. 6/1 measuring 34 guntas, Sy. No. 6/2 measuring 1 acre 2 guntas, Sy. No. 8/2B measuring 35 guntas, Sy. No. 8/2C measuring 35 guntas, Sy. No. 18/1 measuring 6 guntas, Sy. No. 18/2 measuring 9 guntas, Sy. iv) The plaintiffs suit is dismissed in respect of the following properties:-- (a) bearing, Sy. No. 6/1 measuring 34 guntas, Sy. No. 6/2 measuring 1 acre 2 guntas, Sy. No. 8/2B measuring 35 guntas, Sy. No. 8/2C measuring 35 guntas, Sy. No. 18/1 measuring 6 guntas, Sy. No. 18/2 measuring 9 guntas, Sy. No. 18/3 measuring 8 guntas, Sy. No. 18/4 measuring 5 guntas, Sy. No. 18/5 measuring 3 guntas, Sy. No. 18/6 measuring 6 guntas, Sy. No. 18/7 measuring 2 guntas, Sy. No. 18/8 measuring 1 gunta, Sy. No. 18/9 measuring 2 guntas, Sy. No. 19/1 measuring 22 guntas, Sy. No. 19/4 measuring 26 guntas, Sy. No. 19/5 measuring 17 guntas, Sy. No. 19/6 measuring 19 guntas, in item No. 2 of the suit schedule. (b) Sy. No. 18/1 measuring 34 guntas, Sy. No. 18/2 measuring 26 guntas, Sy. No. 18/3 measuring 20 guntas, Sy. No. 18/4 measuring 39 guntas, Sy. No. 18/5 measuring 17 guntas of Byatarayanapura Village, Yelahanka Hobli, Bangalore North Taluk, in item No. 3 of the suit schedule. (iv) No costs. Appeal Partly Allowed.