Judgment : 1. The dispute in all these petitions pertains to the retrenchment of 30 employees working in the Maharashtra State Handlooms Corporation on account of they being rendered surplus in the establishment. Separate complaints were filed by all these employees under Section 28 read with Item I of Schedule IV of the Maharashtra Recognition of Trade Unions & Prevention of Unfair Labour Practices Act, 1971, which were allowed by the Labour Court, Nagpur, by its separate judgments and orders, granting a declaration that the termination of all these complainants amounts to such unfair labour practice and the direction was given to reinstate all the complainants in employment with continuity in service and full back wages. 2. In the separate revisions preferred by the Corporation under Section 44 of the MRTU & PULP Act, the Industrial Court has set aside the order of reinstatement with continuity in service and full back wages and instead, the Corporation is directed to pay to every complainant, an amount of compensation equivalent to three times of retrenchment compensation payable under Section 25F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 within a period of three months; failing which it was ordered that the amount shall carry interest at the rate of 6% per annum. 3. The employees have filed separate Writ Petitions Nos.299 of 2012, 903 of 2005, 2985 of 2002, 3118 of 2004, 3119 of 2004, 3120 of 2004, 3502 of 2001, 3531 of 2004, 3592 of 2004, 5902 of 2002 and 5954 of 2004, challenging the decision of the Industrial Court setting aside the order of reinstatement with continuity in service and full back wages; whereas, the Corporation has preferred Writ Petitions Nos.67 of 2006, 1023 of 2002, 1024 of 2002, 1025 of 2002, 1026 of 2002, 1027 of 2002, 1028 of 2002, 1029 of 2002, 1031 of 2002, 1032 of 2002, 1033 of 2002, 1102 of 2002, 1103 of 2002, 1104 of 2002, 3554 of 2002, 3555 of 2002, 4184 of 2002, 4204 of 2002, 4241 of 2002, 4451 of 2002, 4470 of 2002, 4471 of 2002, and 5561 of 2004, challenging even the payment of retrenchment compensation as per the order modified by the Industrial Court. All these petitions are clubbed together and heard. 4. This Court tried to explore the possibility of settlement between the parties and hence the matter was adjourned from time to time for that purpose. All these petitions are clubbed together and heard. 4. This Court tried to explore the possibility of settlement between the parties and hence the matter was adjourned from time to time for that purpose. Even after hearing all the petitions, a chance was given to the parties to explore the possibility of settlement. On 15.1.2014, a pursis was filed by the employees giving the proposal as under: “That, the employees before the Hon'ble High Court of Judicature at Bombay, Bench at Nagpur submit that : 1. That, the above matters pertain to retrenchment of workers and whose retrenchment has been held to be illegal by the learned Labour/Industrial Court, Nagpur. That, during the pendency of the Writ Petitions, to maintain cordial relations and industrial peace, the workmen had held a meeting and have decided to give a proposal of settlement to the management Handloom Corporation, which is as under : a) That the workmen are ready and willing to accept Rs.1 lakh with 9% interest from the date of notice of retrenchment till actual payment is made as compensation instead of back-wages. b) The workmen be notionally reinstated with continuity and all other consequential benefits such as Provident Fund, Gratuity, except back-wages. c) That, the provident fund and gratuity should be paid separately to each employee from the date of their respective entry (initial appointment) in service till their superannuation. 2. In view of the above and if the management is ready and willing to accept the above terms and conditions, the matter can be amicably settled in between the parties by the consent of the Hon'ble Court. Hence this pursis.” Though the learned counsel appearing for the Corporation made a statement, after taking instructions, that the Corporation is prepared to implement the decision given by the Industrial Court in all these matters, sought time to take instructions on the aforesaid offer given by the complainants. This Court, therefore, passed an order on 15.1.2014 as under : “The Counsels appearing for the workmen have filed a pursis giving proposal for amicable settlement. Such proposals are pending with the Corporation since long. The learned Counsel Mrs. Bharti Dangre, the learned Counsel appearing for the Corporation, seeks time upto Monday to make statement about acceptance of the proposal. If no positive statement comes from the Corporation, then the Court will proceed to decide the matters on merits. S.O. to 21.1.2014. Such proposals are pending with the Corporation since long. The learned Counsel Mrs. Bharti Dangre, the learned Counsel appearing for the Corporation, seeks time upto Monday to make statement about acceptance of the proposal. If no positive statement comes from the Corporation, then the Court will proceed to decide the matters on merits. S.O. to 21.1.2014. Steno copy of this order be supplied to the learned Counsel for the parties to act upon.” 5. In response to the aforesaid order, the Corporation-employer has filed an affidavit dated 20.1.2014, stating in paras 2 and 3 as under : “The Corporation-employer is prepared to pay compensation of Rs.1 lakh to each of the complainants without any interest.” 6. The factual position emerging from the pleadings and the findings recorded by the courts below is as under : The employer-Maharashtra State Handlooms Ltd. is a Government Company registered under the provisions of the Companies Act, 1956. It was established for the overall upliftment of weavers in the State of Maharashtra in the year 1970. The Corporation had to purchase yarn from the market and give it to the weavers for preparing the cloths by looms located in their houses. The weavers were paid wages on the piecerate basis for preparing handloom cloths and the same are sold by the Corporation through its own outlets in the market. The Corporation claimed to have 21 units, like dye house, production centres, common weaving sheds, design units, sale depots, etc. The Head Office of the Corporation is located at Umrer Road, Nagpur, which is registered under the Factories Act, 1948. The Corporation had the strength of more than 600 employees working all over the State of Maharashtra. 7. When the demand for handloom cloth started reducing and the cost of production went on increasing, the Corporation started facing financial predicament. The Corporation, therefore, asked M/s. Kirloskar Consultants sometime in the month of March 1990 to identify the employees who can be rendered surplus as a step to check the unnecessary financial expenditure. The said Consultants submitted its report and recommended the retrenchment of 131 employees, including 67 Junior Clerks. In the meetings of the Board of Directors of the Corporation held on 20.6.1990 and 15.9.1990, the said report was accepted and it was decided to retrench all such 131 employees. The said Consultants submitted its report and recommended the retrenchment of 131 employees, including 67 Junior Clerks. In the meetings of the Board of Directors of the Corporation held on 20.6.1990 and 15.9.1990, the said report was accepted and it was decided to retrench all such 131 employees. It is now claimed that the number of employees working in the Corporation has been drastically reduced and presently only 41 employees are working with the Corporation. The Corporation is running in losses to the tune of Rs.106 crores and it has closed all its dye houses and the employees working therein have opted for voluntary retirement as per the scheme announced on 31.10.2007. 8. The complainants are 30 employees amongst those 131 employees, who were retrenched on 25.6.1991 on the basis of the report of M/s. Kirloskar Consultants being rendered surplus on the establishment. The complainants were all permanent in the employment of the Corporation and they have worked on different posts of Shop Assistants, Clerks Drivers and Labours in different Departments for the period ranging from 8 to 14 years at different places. The salary/wages drawn by them were different. Some of them were drawing Rs.874.00, 606.00, 658.50, 1,616.20, 1,710.20, 1,080.00, 1,185.00, 1,961.00, 1,894.00, and Rs.2,097.00 per month. All the complainants are the “workmen”, as defined under Section 2(s) of the Industrial Disputes Act, who had filed separate Complaints (ULP) Nos.707 and 708 of 1990; 993 to 1001 of 1990; 109, 115, 128, 131, 132, 135, 140, 339 and 398 of 1991; 591 of 1991; and 817 and 826 of 1991 before the Labour Court, Nagpur, in which the decisions impugned in these petitions have been rendered on 14.8.1996, 9/10.7.1998, 23.3.1999, 25.10.1999, 15.12.2000 and 31.7.2007. 9. In all these complaints, the Labour Court had recorded a categorical finding that the complainants belong to nontechnical cadre and they have been rendered surplus on the establishment of the Corporation. Their retrenchment is by following the procedure prescribed under Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act. The reliance is also placed upon the seniority-list dated 26.6.1990 at Exhibit 52 to hold that the complainants were the junior-most employees retrenched from service. Their retrenchment is by following the procedure prescribed under Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act. The reliance is also placed upon the seniority-list dated 26.6.1990 at Exhibit 52 to hold that the complainants were the junior-most employees retrenched from service. The Labour Court has rejected the contention raised by the Corporation that the Departments of the Corporation in which the complainants working were not the “industrial establishments”, as defined under Section 25-L of the Industrial Disputes Act and there was no functional integrality of such Departments with the dye house, which is registered as a factory under the Factories Act. The Labour Court has held that all the Departments were owned, controlled and supervised by the Corporation and the services of the complainants were transferable to the dye house, which was a “factory”, as defined in clause (m) of Section 2 of the Factories Act, and consisted of the posts of Junior Clerks on the establishment. It has been held that the entire establishment of the Corporation consisting of all Departments and total 600 employees constituted an “industrial establishment”, as defined under Section 25-L of the Industrial Disputes Act. The reliance is placed upon the oral evidence of the complainants, the oral evidence of Shri Manohar Zade (Exhibit 48) and Shri Nandeshwar Bawne (Exhibit 62), examined by the Corporation, and the balance-sheets of the Corporation prepared on 31.3.1991 (Exhibit-57) and 31.3.1997 (Exhibit 58). It has been held that there are more than 100 employees working in the Corporation and hence the provisions of Chapter V-B consisting of Sections 25-L and Section 25-N of the Industrial Disputes Act were applicable. It has been held that there is a total noncompliance of Section 25-N( 1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, as undisputedly three months' prior notice of retrenchment was not given and no prior permission of the appropriate Government was obtained, as required therein With these findings, the Labour Court by its judgments and orders set aside the order of retrenchment and directed reinstatement with continuity in service and full back wages as a consequence of subsection (7) of Section 25-N of the said Act. 10. 10. The Industrial Court in Revisions (ULP) Nos.325 of 1996; 199 to 212 of 1998; 144 to 152 of 1999; 344 of 1999; 88 and 89 of 2001; and 22 of 2008, decided on 12.6.2001; 6.7.2001, 6.12.2004, 8.3.2002 and 29.7.2004, has concurred with all the findings of fact recorded by the Trial Court, and particularly it has further been held that the finding of the Labour Court to the effect that 131 employees were surplus, has not been challenged by the complainants, which unequivocally established that there was no work to continue all such 131 employees. The Industrial Court, however, took into consideration the heavy recurring losses incurred by the Corporation and recorded the finding that the action of the Corporation is bona fide and in the facts and circumstances of the case, it would be quite unreasonable to grant reinstatement with continuity in service and full back wages to the complainants. The Industrial Court has held that granting of relief is a prerogative of the Labour or the Industrial Court and it can always mould the relief of reinstatement and back wages into one of payment of compensation. The Industrial Court has, therefore, determined the quantum of compensation after taking into consideration the length of service rendered by the employees and the entitlement of the retrenchment compensation is worked out by granting three times' increase in the retrenchment compensation payable under Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act. The total compensation payable for retrenchment is worked out to Rs.29,415/- payable to each of the complainants within a period of three months; failing which it has been ordered that such amount shall carry interest at the rate of 6% per annum till realization. 11. In view of the findings recorded by the Courts below, the following questions fall for determination of this Court in all these petitions : (1) Whether the complainants can be said to have worked in an “industrial establishment” within the meaning of Section 25-L( a)(i) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, inviting the compliance of Section 25-N( 1) therein ? (2) If it is so, whether the noncompliance of Section 25N( 1) of the Industrial Disputes Act should result in consequences of reinstatement with continuity in service and full back wages in view of the provisions of subsection (7) of Section 25-N therein ? (2) If it is so, whether the noncompliance of Section 25N( 1) of the Industrial Disputes Act should result in consequences of reinstatement with continuity in service and full back wages in view of the provisions of subsection (7) of Section 25-N therein ? (3) Whether the Industrial Court can, in exercise of its jurisdiction under Section 44 of the MRTU & PULP Act, convert the relief of reinstatement with continuity in service and full back wages into the grant of compensation only ? (4) Whether the relief of compensation, as has been granted by the Industrial Court, is adequate, sufficient, just and proper, or is required to be enhanced ? As To Question No.(1) : 12. It is not disputed by Smt. Dangre, the learned counsel for the Corporation, that there is a total noncompliance of Section 25-N( 1) of the Industrial Disputes Act. Her submission is that it is the burden of the complainants to plead and prove that at the time of their retrenchment from service, they were working in an “industrial establishment” within the meaning of Section 25-L( a)(i) of the said Act. She further submits that the Courts below have erred in holding that there is a functional integrality between the dye house of the Corporation, which is a “factory” within the meaning of clause (m) of Section 2 of the Factories Act with the other units of the Corporation, which are not the factories. 13. The contention of the learned counsels appearing for the complainants is that the burden is upon the Corporation to establish that the Departments in which the complainants were working were not the industrial establishments. It is their further submission that both the Courts below have recorded the finding of fact, after taking into consideration the evidence available on record, that there is a functional integrality between the dye house and the other Departments of the Corporation. It is their submission that the findings of fact being based upon the appreciation of evidence, no jurisdictional error is pointed out calling for interference in exercise of jurisdiction under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India. 14. To deal with the rival submissions on the question No.(1), the decision of the Apex Court in the case of State of Gujarat and others v. PratamsinghNarsing Parmar, reported in (2001) 9 SCC 713 , needs to be seen. 14. To deal with the rival submissions on the question No.(1), the decision of the Apex Court in the case of State of Gujarat and others v. PratamsinghNarsing Parmar, reported in (2001) 9 SCC 713 , needs to be seen. The question involved before the Apex Court was whether the Forest Department in the State of Gujarat wherein the respondent therein was appointed as a Clerk can be held to be an “industry” within the meaning of the said expression under the Industrial Disputes Act so that an order of termination without compliance with the provisions of Section 25-F of the said Act would get vitiated. Para 5 of the said decision being relevant, is reproduced below : “5. If a dispute arises as to whether a particular establishment or part of it wherein an appointment has been made is an industry or not, it would be for the person concerned who claims the same to be an industry, to give positive facts for coming to the conclusion that it constitutes “an industry”. Ordinarily, a department of the Government cannot be held to be an industry and rather it is a part of the sovereign function. To find out whether the respondent in the writ petition had made any assertion that with regard to the duty which he was discharging and with regard to the activities of the organisation where he had been recruited, we find that there has not been an iota of assertion to that effect though, no doubt, it has been contended that the order of dismissal is vitiated for noncompliance with Section 25-F of the Act. The State in its counter-affidavit, on the other hand, refuted the assertion of the respondent in the writ petition and took the positive stand that the Forest Department cannot be held to be an industry so that the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act cannot have any application. The State in its counter-affidavit, on the other hand, refuted the assertion of the respondent in the writ petition and took the positive stand that the Forest Department cannot be held to be an industry so that the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act cannot have any application. In the absence of any assertion by the petition in the writ petition indicating the nature of duty discharged by the petitioner as well as the job of the establishment where he had been recruited, the High Court wholly erred in law in applying the principles enunciated in the judgment of this Court in Jagannath Maruti Kondhare to hold that the Forest Department could be held to be “an industry” In view of the aforesaid decision of the Apex Court, the burden to plead and prove that the complainants had worked in an “industrial establishment” within the meaning of Section 25L( a)(i) of the Industrial Disputes Act is upon the complainants. 15. My attention is invited to the copies of some complaints placed on record. In Complaint (ULP) No.533 of 1991 filed by one Mohammad Hifzur Rehman, the averment is made in para 8-A as under : “8-A. The termination by way of retrenchment is also bad for noncompliance of the mandatory provisions of sec.25-N ( 1)(a) and (b) & (c) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. The complainant submits that the strength of workers in respondent Corporation is more than 100 for the last more than 12 months. As such, the provisions of Chapter V-B of I.D. Act are very much attracted in respect of the instant industry. The respondent has neither complied with provisions of section 25-N( 1)(a) or 25(1)(b)(c). As such order of termination dated 25/6/1991 is bad and illegal abinitio.” In Complaint (ULP) No.994 of 1990 filed by Wasudeo Ganpatrao Warhade, the following averments are made in paras 2, 4 and 9 : “2. ... The respondent is an industry engaged in manufacturing of Handloom Cloth and Selling the same. That for the aforesaid purpose several employees are appointed. The Respondent is thus an industry engaged in manufacturing of Handloom Clothes. It is an Industrial establishment as defined in section 25 L(9) of Chapter V-B of Industrial Disputes Act 1947. That the respondent is a factory as defined under the Factories Act. That for the aforesaid purpose several employees are appointed. The Respondent is thus an industry engaged in manufacturing of Handloom Clothes. It is an Industrial establishment as defined in section 25 L(9) of Chapter V-B of Industrial Disputes Act 1947. That the respondent is a factory as defined under the Factories Act. The respondent industry engages more than 100 employees at common weaving shed and model dye house at Umred Road, Nagpur. Therefore, the provisions of Chapter VB of the Industrial Disputes Act 1947 are applicable.” “4. It is further submitted that, the factory and the administrative office both are situated in the same premises. The employees working at Factory and in the office can be transferred from Head Office to Factory and vice-versa. ...” “9. ... In the instant case, no permission was sought from the Government before retrenching the complainant from service as per the provisions of Chapter V-B of the Industrial Disputes Act 1947. Moreover, no notice of change was given as required by the Section 42 of the Bombay Industrial Relations Act, 1946.” 16. If the complaints are read as a whole, a definite case is made out that the Corporation is an “industrial establishment” within the meaning of Section 25-L(a)(i) of the Industrial Disputes Act where the complainants were working. The establishment consists of more than 100 employees and it is a “factory”, as defined under the Factories Act, engaged in the activities of production and sale of handloom clothes. The complainants have worked in the production centres and in the administrative offices situated in the same premises, and thus they have worked in an industrial establishment. It is the pleading that in view of this, the provisions of Chapter V-B of the Industrial Disputes Act are attracted for retrenchment of the complainants and the mandatory provisions of Section 25-N( 1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, requiring the employer to give three months' notice or salary in lieu of notice for such period and obtaining of prior permission of the appropriate Government, have not been complied with. Thus, all material facts are pleaded in the complaints. The contention of the learned counsel for the Corporation that the complainants have failed to plead that they were working in an “industrial establishment”, as defined under Section 25-L( 1)(a) of the said Act is, therefore, rejected. 17. Thus, all material facts are pleaded in the complaints. The contention of the learned counsel for the Corporation that the complainants have failed to plead that they were working in an “industrial establishment”, as defined under Section 25-L( 1)(a) of the said Act is, therefore, rejected. 17. The decision of the learned Single Judge of this Court in the case of PwdSc. St. And Obc Employees v. State of Maharashtra And Ors., reported in (1994) II L.L.J. 1192 (Bom.), relied upon by Smt. Dangre for the Corporation holds that the question as to whether a Department is an “industrial establishment” or not, needs to be enquired into by going into the factual aspects and appreciating the evidence on record. The enquiry has to be made qua each division as to whether the whole division could be termed to be an “industrial establishment”. It is only then the question of noncompliance of Section 25-N( 1) of the Industrial Disputes Act can be considered by the Court. 18. The proposition laid down in the aforesaid decision cannot be disputed. However, it was not the question of burden of proof in respect of the Department being the industrial establishment, was involved in the said decision. Undisputedly, the Courts below have, in the present cases, made an enquiry and on the basis of the pleadings and appreciation of the evidence, recorded the finding that the complainants have established that they have worked in an “industrial establishment” within the meaning of Section 25-L( a)(i) of the Industrial Disputes Act at the time of their retrenchment from service. Hence, the said judgment is of no help to the Corporation. 19. It is not the pleading of the Corporation in its written statement that there is no functional integrality between the dye house of the Corporation, which is a “factory” within the meaning of clause (m) of Section-2 of the Factories Act, and the other establishments of the Departments of the Corporation where the complainants were working. As pointed out earlier, the findings of both the Courts below that the complainants were working in an industrial establishment, and that there was functional integrality between the Departments where they were working and the dye house, which is registered as a factory under the Factories Act, are based upon the evidence on record. As pointed out earlier, the findings of both the Courts below that the complainants were working in an industrial establishment, and that there was functional integrality between the Departments where they were working and the dye house, which is registered as a factory under the Factories Act, are based upon the evidence on record. The Courts below have held that the entire establishment of the Corporation, including its Head Office, located at Umrer Road, Nagpur, consisted of more than 600 employees whose services were transferable interdepartmentally. The weaving sheds, model dye house, design centres, raw material go-downs, finished goods go-downs and administrative departments are and were located in the same compound at Umrer Road, Nagpur, and all these units belong to the Corporation. Even in the model dye house, there were sanctioned posts of three Junior Clerks, one Manager, one Dyeing Master, one Senior Clerk, one Boiler Attendant, one Fireman, four Labourers, and the other posts. The Corporation exercised ownership, control, supervision, finance and management of employees working in different Departments and there was geographical proximity and general unity of purchase and sale. It has been held that there was central employment process with the Corporation and the employees in all the Departments were controlled by the Head Office of the Corporation. On the basis of the oral evidence led by the Corporation itself, the finding is recorded that the activities of dye house, which is a factory, are not severable from the other units of the Corporation and the Handloom Corporation is, therefore, an “industrial establishment” within the meaning of Section 25-L( a)(i) of the Industrial Disputes Act, consisting of all the units. There is neither any perversity nor any jurisdictional error brought to my notice, and hence no interference is called for in the said findings recorded by the Courts below. The question No.(1) is, therefore, answered accordingly. As To Question No.(2) : 20. Once it is held that the complainants were working in an industrial establishment at the time of their retrenchment, then undisputedly the provision of Section 25-N of the Industrial Disputes Act is attracted. The question No.(1) is, therefore, answered accordingly. As To Question No.(2) : 20. Once it is held that the complainants were working in an industrial establishment at the time of their retrenchment, then undisputedly the provision of Section 25-N of the Industrial Disputes Act is attracted. Subsection (1) of Section 25-N of the said Act being relevant, is reproduced below : “25-N. Conditions precedent to retrenchment of workmen.(1) No workman employed in any industrial establishment to which this Chapter applies, who has been in continuous service for not less than one year under an employer shall be retrenched by that employer until,- (a) the workman has been given three months' notice in writing indicating the reasons for retrenchment and the period of notice has expired, or the workman has been paid in lieu of such notice, wages for the period of the notice; and (b) the prior permission of the appropriate Government or such authority as may be specified by that Government by notification in the Official Gazette (hereafter in this section referred to as the specified authority) has been obtained on an application made in this behalf.” 21. In the decision of the Apex Court in the case of OswalAgro Furane Ltd. and another v. OswalAgro Furane Workers Union and others, reported in (2005) 3 SCC 224 , the question arose as to whether the provision of Section 25-N of the Industrial Disputes Act is imperative in nature. After holding that the provision is held to be constitutionally valid, the Apex Court has held in paras 14 and 15 of its decision as under : “14. A bare perusal of the provisions contained in Sections 25-N and 25-O of the Act leaves no manner of doubt that the employer who intends to close down the undertaking and/or effect retrenchment of workmen working in such industrial establishment, is bound to apply for prior permission at least ninety days before the date on which the intended closure is to take place. They constitute conditions precedent for effecting a valid closure, whereas the provisions of Section 25-N of the Act provide for conditions precedent to retrenchment; Section 25-O speaks of procedure for closing down an undertaking. Obtaining a prior permission from the appropriate Government, thus, must be held to be imperative in character.” “15. They constitute conditions precedent for effecting a valid closure, whereas the provisions of Section 25-N of the Act provide for conditions precedent to retrenchment; Section 25-O speaks of procedure for closing down an undertaking. Obtaining a prior permission from the appropriate Government, thus, must be held to be imperative in character.” “15. A settlement within the meaning of Section-2(p) read with subsection (3) of Section-18 of the Act undoubtedly binds the workmen but the question which would arise is, would it mean that thereby the provisions contained in Sections 25-N and 25-O are not required to be complied with? The answer to the said question must be rendered in the negative. A settlement can be arrived at between the employer and workmen in case of an industrial dispute. An industrial dispute may arise as regards the validity of a retrenchment or a closure or otherwise. Such a settlement, however, as regards retrenchment or closure can be arrived at provided such retrenchment or closure has been effect in accordance with law. Requirements of issuance of a notice in terms of Sections 25-N and 25-O, as the case may be, and/or a decision thereupon by the appropriate Government are clearly suggestive of the fact that thereby a public policy has been laid down. The State Government before granting or refusing such permission is not only required to comply with the principles of natural justice by giving an opportunity of hearing both to the employer and the workmen but also is required to assign reasons in support thereof and is also required to pass an order having regard to the several factors laid down therein. One of the factors besides others which is required to be taken into consideration by the appropriate Government before grant or refusal of such permission is the interest of the workmen. The aforementioned provisions being imperative in character would prevail over the right of the parties to arrive at a settlement. Such a settlement must conform to the statutory conditions laying down a public policy. The aforementioned provisions being imperative in character would prevail over the right of the parties to arrive at a settlement. Such a settlement must conform to the statutory conditions laying down a public policy. A contract which may otherwise be valid, however, must satisfy the tests of public policy not only in terms of the aforementioned provisions but also in terms of Section-23 of the Indian Contract Act.” The Apex Court has held that the provision of Section 25-N regarding obtaining prior permission of the appropriate Government is imperative in character and the objects of issuing notice and obtaining prior permission, are suggestive of the fact that a public policy has been laid down. It has been held that the requirement should prevail over the rights of the parties to arrive at a settlement and it should conform to the statutory conditions incorporated under the said provision. In para 6 of the said decision, the Apex Court has held that the imperative character of the statutory requirements are borne out from the fact that in terms of subsection (7) of Section 25-N of the Industrial Disputes Act, a legal fiction has been created, and the consequences flowing from the mandatory requirements contained in Section 25-N of the said Act must, therefore, be given full effect. The Apex Court has dismissed the appeal upholding the decision of the High Court declaring the retrenchment of employees in violation of Section 25-N of the said Act to be illegal and void. 22. In another decision of the Apex Court in the case of Uttaranchal Forest Development Corporation and another v. JabarSingh and others, reported in 2007 I CLR 1056, the question of noncompliance of Section 25-N of the Industrial Disputes Act was involved. After taking review of all the earlier decisions, the Apex Court has held in para 29 of its decision as under : “29. After taking review of all the earlier decisions, the Apex Court has held in para 29 of its decision as under : “29. The Appellant-Corporation, while issuing the retrenchment notices dated 31st May, 1995, as well as other notices issued between 31st March, 1995, to 31st May, 1995, did not comply with either of the two requirements of Section 25-N, namely, giving three months notice to the workman in writing or paying them three months wages in lieu thereof and taking of prior permission from the appropriate Government, the retrenchment of the Respondent-Workmen by the Corporation was done contrary to the provisions of Clause (1) of Section 25-N and is illegal. Clause-7 of Section-25 statutorily provides that “where no application for permission under Subsection (1) is made or where the permission for any retrenchment has been refused, such retrenchment shall be deemed to be illegal from the date on which the notice of retrenchment was given to the workman and the workman shall be entitled to all the benefits under any law for the time being in force as if no notice had been given to him”. The submission made in this behalf by the learned Counsel for the Respondents merit acceptance. Thus, the retrenchment notices mentioned above being illegal from the date of the said notices and the workmen being entitled to all the benefits, in the present case, all the concerned workmen are entitled to be reinstated with full back-wages and continuity of service.” It has been held that in terms of sub-section (7) of Section 25-N of the Industrial Disputes Act, the workmen therein were entitled to a declaration that the notices of retrenchment are illegal from the date of the said notices for violation of subsection (1) of the said Act and the workmen are entitled to all the benefits of reinstatement with continuity of service and full back wages. The retrenchment notices are declared to be illegal and nonestin the eyes of law. 23. It is not in dispute that the complainants were working in the Department consisting of more than 100 employees. It is also not disputed that the complainants had rendered more than one year's continuous service in the Corporation and that they were permanent. The requirements of subsection (1) of Section 25-N of the Industrial Disputes Act are twofold as conditions precedent to retrenchment of a workman. It is also not disputed that the complainants had rendered more than one year's continuous service in the Corporation and that they were permanent. The requirements of subsection (1) of Section 25-N of the Industrial Disputes Act are twofold as conditions precedent to retrenchment of a workman. One is of giving three months' notice in writing or the wages for such period, and the second is of obtaining prior permission of the appropriate Government. The same are mandatory. There is no dispute that there is no compliance of twin requirements of subsection (1) of Section 25-N of the Industrial Disputes Act. In view of the aforesaid decisions of the Apex Court, it has to be held that the consequences of noncompliance of subsection (1) of Section 25-N of the Industrial Disputes Act would be the reinstatement of the complainants in service with continuity and full back wages in view of subsection (7) of the said Section. The question No.(2) is answered accordingly. 24. On the question of payment of back wages, several decisions are cited by the learned counsels appearing for the parties in support of their rival claims. Some of the decisions are on the provisions of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act. In the case of J.K. Synthetics Ltd. v. K.P. Agrawal and another, reported in (2007) 3 SCC 433, the Apex Court was considering the powers of the Industrial Court under Section 11A of the Industrial Disputes Act, and a distinction is made between the cases of entitlement to back wages on “misconduct reinstatement” and “reinstatement on illegal termination”. Taking change in the view adopted by the Apex Court, it has been held that the back wages are no longer considered to be an automatic or natural consequence of reinstatement. The question of pleading and proof in respect of gainful employment has also been considered. 25. In the recent decision of the Apex Court in the case of DeepaliGundu Surwase v. KrantiJunior Adhyapak Mahavidyalaya (D.ED.) and others, reported in (2013) 10 SCC 324 , the ratio of the decision of the Apex Court in the case of J.K. Synthetics Ltd., cited supra, has been considered, explained and diluted. 25. In the recent decision of the Apex Court in the case of DeepaliGundu Surwase v. KrantiJunior Adhyapak Mahavidyalaya (D.ED.) and others, reported in (2013) 10 SCC 324 , the ratio of the decision of the Apex Court in the case of J.K. Synthetics Ltd., cited supra, has been considered, explained and diluted. It has been held that the Courts must always keep in view that in case of wrongful or illegal termination of service, the wrongdoer is the employer and the sufferer is the employee/workman, and there is no justification to give a premium to the employer of his wrongdoings by relieving him of the burden to pay the employee/workman his dues in the form of full back wages. It has been held that the observations made in J.K. Synthetics Ltd.'s case that on reinstatement the employee/workman cannot claim continuity of service as of right is contrary to the ratio of the judgments three-Judge Benches and, therefore, cannot be treated as good law. It has further been held that the said part of the judgment is also against the very concept of reinstatement of an employee/workman. 26. In the present case, it is the employer, who is at fault in complying with the mandatory provision of subsection (1) of Section 25-N of the Industrial Disputes Act. Nothing prevented the Corporation to follow the provision of subsection (1) of Section 25-N when it decided to follow the provisions of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act. Apart from this, the case of violation of subsection (1) of Section 25-N of the Industrial Disputes Act stands on a totally different footing in view of the specific provision under subsection (7) therein. The consequences provided under subsection (7) for violation of subsection (1) are not the consequences provided for violation of Section 25F of the Industrial Disputes Act. Hence, the principles laid down by the Apex Court in respect of pleadings and proof about gainful employment, would not be attracted in the present case. To invoke these principles for violation of subsection (1) of Section 25-N of the Industrial Disputes Act, would amount to committing breach of subsection (7) therein. Hence, the principles laid down by the Apex Court in respect of pleadings and proof about gainful employment, would not be attracted in the present case. To invoke these principles for violation of subsection (1) of Section 25-N of the Industrial Disputes Act, would amount to committing breach of subsection (7) therein. The consequences provided for violation of subsection (1) of Section 25N of the Industrial Disputes Act are clearly laid down by the Apex Court in the earlier two decisions in the cases of OswalAgro Furane Ltd. and another v. OswalAgro Furane Workers Union and others; and Uttaranchal Forest Development Corporation and another v. JabarSingh and others, cited supra, to grant reinstatement, continuity in service and full back wages, as if no notice of retrenchment was issued. As To Question No.(3) : 27. In order to consider the question No.(3), the provisions of Section 44 of the MRTU & PULP Act needs to be seen and the same are reproduced below : “44. The Industrial Court shall have superintendence over all Labour Courts and may, (a) call for returns; (b) make and issue general rules and prescribe forms for regulating the practice and procedure of such Courts in matters not expressly provided for by the Act, and in particular, for securing the expeditious disposal of cases; (c) prescribe form in which books, entries and accounts shall be kept by officers of any such Courts; and (d) settle a table of fees payable for process issued by a Labour Court or the Industrial Court.” 28. In the decisions of this Court in the cases of Hindustani Prachar Sabha and others v. Dr. (Miss) Rama Sen Gupta and another, reported in 1986(52) F.L.R. 312 – Para 8; Maharashtra State Road Transport Corporation v. R.D. Toplewar, ExConductor, Pusad and another, reported in 1987 Mh.L.J. 85 Para 7; VithalGatlu Marathe v. Maharashtra State Road Transport Corp. & Ors., reported in 1996 I L.L.J. 494 – Para 1; and JayhindVithoba Mahadik v. General Manager, Maharashtra Scooters Ltd., reported in 2004(3) Mh.L.J. 733 – Para 7, a consistent view has been taken by this Court that the provisions of Section-44 of the MRTU & PULP Act are almost in parimateria with the provisions of Article 227 of the Constitution of India. It is the jurisdiction of superintendence, which the Industrial Court exercises under Section-44 of the MRTU & PULP Act and, therefore, the scope of interference in the orders passed by the Labour Court is very limited. The Industrial Court has no power to review or re-appreciate the evidence on record and disturb the findings of fact unless those are found to be perverse, or the evidence cannot justify the conclusion of the Labour Court, or on such other grounds as are permissible for interference. 29. In the decision of the Apex Court in the case of RameshChandra Sankla and others v. VikramCement and others, reported in (2008) 14 SCC 58 , the Apex Court had an occasion to deal with the jurisdiction of the High Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India. Paras 90, 91, 92 and 98 of the said decision being relevant, are reproduced below : “90. Now, it is well settled that jurisdiction of the High Courts under Articles 226 and 227 is discretionary and equitble. Before more than half a century, the High Court of Allahabad in the leading case of Jodhey v. State ( AIR 1952 All 788 ) observed: (AIR p.792, para 10) “10. ... There are no limits, fetters or restrictions placed on this power of superintendence in this clause and the purpose of this article seems to be to make the High Court the custodian of all justice within the territorial limits of its jurisdiction and to arm it with a weapon that could be wielded for the purpose of seeing that justice is meted out fairly and properly by the bodies mentioned therein.” “91. The power of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution conferred on every High Court over all courts and tribunals throughout the territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction is very wide and discretionary in nature. It can be exercised ex debito justitiae i.e. to meet the ends of justice. It is equitable in nature. While exercising supervisory jurisdiction, a High Court not only acts as a court of law but also as a court of equity. It is, therefore, power and also the duty of the Court to ensure that power of superintendence must “advance the ends of justice and uproot injustice.” “92. It is equitable in nature. While exercising supervisory jurisdiction, a High Court not only acts as a court of law but also as a court of equity. It is, therefore, power and also the duty of the Court to ensure that power of superintendence must “advance the ends of justice and uproot injustice.” “92. In Roshan Deen v. Preeti Lal [ (2002) 1 SCC 100 ], dealing with an order passed by the High Court setting aside an order of the Commissioner for Workmen's Compensation, this Court stated: (SCC p. 106, para 12) “12. ... Time and aga in this Court has reminded that the power conferred on the High Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution is to advance justice and not to thwart it (vide State of U.P. v. District Judge, Unnao – AIR 1984 SC 1401 ). The very purpose of such constitutional powers being conferred on the High Courts is that no man should be subjected to injustice by violating the law. The lookout of the High Court is, therefore, not merely to pick out any error of law through an academic angle but to see whether injustice has resulted on account of any erroneous interpretation of law. If justice became the byproduct of an erroneous view of the law the High Court is not expected to erase such justice in the name of correcting the error of law.” “98. From the above cases, it clearly transpires that powers under Articles 226 and 227 are discretionary and equitable and are required to be exercised in the larger interest of justice. While granting relief in favour of the applicant, the court must take into account the balancing of interest and equities. It can mould relief considering the facts of the case. It can pass an appropriate order which justice may demand and equities may project. As observed by this Court in Shiv Shankar Dal Mills v. State of Haryana [1980) 2 SCC 437] courts of equity should go much further both to give and refuse relief in furtherance of public interest. Granting or withholding of relief may properly be dependent upon consideration of justice, equity and good conscience.” Thus, the Industrial Court exercises the same jurisdiction under Section 44 of the Industrial Disputes Act over the Labour Court, as the High Court exercises under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. Granting or withholding of relief may properly be dependent upon consideration of justice, equity and good conscience.” Thus, the Industrial Court exercises the same jurisdiction under Section 44 of the Industrial Disputes Act over the Labour Court, as the High Court exercises under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. The Industrial Court is, therefore, armed with the weapon that could be wielded for the purpose of seeing that justice is meted out fairly and properly to the parties. The power can be exercised ex debito justitiae, i.e. to meet the ends of justice. It is equitable in nature, and while exercising jurisdiction under Section-44 of the MRTU & PULP Act, the Industrial Court not only acts as a Court of law, but also as a Court of equity. It is, therefore, power and also the duty of the Court to ensure that the power of superintendence must “advance the ends of justice and uproot injustice”. The power is required to be exercised in the larger interest of justice, and while granting relief, the Court must take into consideration the balancing of interests and equities. It can mould the relief, considering the facts of the case, and can pass appropriate order, which justice may demand and equities may project. The considerations for moulding the relief must be justice, equity and good conscience. 30. The exercise of jurisdiction of superintendence under Section-44 of the MRTU & PULP Act by the Industrial Court is against the order passed by the Labour Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Section-28 of the said Act. Section-30 of the said Act deals with the powers of the Industrial and Labour Courts, and subsection (1) of Section-30 being relevant, is reproduced below : “30. Section-30 of the said Act deals with the powers of the Industrial and Labour Courts, and subsection (1) of Section-30 being relevant, is reproduced below : “30. Powers of Industrial and Labour Courts (1) Where a Court decides that any person named in the complaint has engaged in, or is engaging in, any unfair labour practice, it may in its order (a) declare that an unfair labour practice has been engaged in or is being engaged in by that person, and specify any other person who has engaged in, or is engaging in the unfair labour practice; (b) direct all such persons to cease and desist from such unfair labour practice, and take such affirmative action (including payment of reasonable compensation to the employee or employees affected by the unfair labour practice, or reinstatement of the employee or employees with or without back wages, or the payment of reasonable compensation), as may in the opinion the Court be necessary to effectuate the policy of the Act; (c) where a recognised union has engaged in or is engaging in, any unfair labour practice, direct that its recognition shall be cancelled or that all or any of its rights under subsection (1) of section 20 or its right under section-23 shall be suspended.” Once the Industrial Court under Section-44 of the MRTU & PULP Act finds that a case is made out for interference or exercise of the jurisdiction of superintendence, then it has jurisdiction to pass all such orders as the Labour Court is empowered to pass under subsection (1) of Section-30 of the said Act. Under clause (b) of the said provision, the Labour Court has jurisdiction to direct all such persons to cease and desist from such unfair labour practice and take such affirmative action (including payment of reasonable compensation to the employee or the employees affected by the unfair labour practice or reinstatement of the employee or employees with or without back wages or payment of reasonable compensation), as may, in the opinion of the Court, be necessary to effectuate the policy of the Act. It has, therefore, to be held that the Industrial Court can, in exercise of its jurisdiction under Section-44 of the MRTU & PULP Act convert the relief of reinstatement with continuity in service and full back wages into the grant of compensation only. As to Question No.(4) : 31. It has, therefore, to be held that the Industrial Court can, in exercise of its jurisdiction under Section-44 of the MRTU & PULP Act convert the relief of reinstatement with continuity in service and full back wages into the grant of compensation only. As to Question No.(4) : 31. It has already been held while answering question No.(2) that the necessary consequence of violation of subsection (1) of Section 25-N of the Industrial Disputes Act would be the reinstatement of the complainants in service with continuity and full back wages. The Industrial Court has held that the retrenchment was on the basis of the report submitted by M/s. Kirloskar Consultants, which had recommended retrenchment of 131 employees as surplus. It has been found by the Courts below that as a matter of fact, there was no work available for the complainants and they have been rendered surplus. This finding of fact has not been challenged by the complainants. The Industrial Court has worked out the total compensation payable to each of the complainants to Rs.29.415/-, and the complainants are held entitled to such retrenchment compensation along with interest at the rate of 6% per annum till realization of the said amount. It is an undisputed position that all the complainants have attained the age of superannuation, and hence, from such dates, they shall cease to be the employees of the Corporation. 32. As pointed out earlier, the High Court acts as a Court of equity while exercising its jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India; and keeping in view the law laid down by the Apex Court in the case of RameshChandra Sankla, cited supra, the conflicting interest of the parties is required to be balanced to meet the ends of justice and the amount of compensation payable to the complainants needs to enhanced. There is a consensus between the parties, though without prejudice to their rights in the event if the matter is carried to the Apex Court, that the compensation of Rs.1,00,000/- to each of the complainants can be treated as just, fair and equitable. The complainants have claimed interest at the rate of 9% per annum from the date of the notice of retrenchment till the actual payment is made. The employer has, however, refused to accept the payment of interest. The complainants have claimed interest at the rate of 9% per annum from the date of the notice of retrenchment till the actual payment is made. The employer has, however, refused to accept the payment of interest. Hence, in the facts and circumstances of the case, the interest of justice would be met if the complainants are held entitled to the amount of interest at the rate of 6% per annum from the date of the notice of retrenchment till the actual payment is made. This would be apart from the other benefits, which the complainants would be entitled to in law, i.e. provident funds dues or gratuity, etc. The question No.(4) is, therefore, answered accordingly. 33. In view of above, all the writ petitions are disposed with the following order: (i) The order of retrenchment of all the complainants passed on 25.6.1991, is hereby quashed and set aside. (ii) All the complainants are directed to be notionally reinstated with continuity in service with effect from 25.6.1991 till the date on which they attained the age of superannuation. (iii) All the complainants shall be entitled to the compensation of Rs.1,00,000/-each along with the simple interest at the rate of 6% per annum from the date of retrenchment, i.e. 25.6.1991, till the actual date of payment of compensation, within a period of three months from today. (iv) If the complainants are entitled to other consequential benefits, like provident funds dues, gratuity, etc., in accordance with law, the same shall not be affected by the amount of compensation and interest awarded by this Court. (v) The judgments and orders passed by the Labour Court in all the complaints and by the Industrial Court in all the revisions, stand modified in terms of the aforesaid order. (vi) There shall be no order as to costs.