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2014 DIGILAW 511 (KAR)

Lingarajaiah v. H. N. Jambappa

2014-04-30

Aravind Kumar

body2014
ORDER Aravind Kumar, J. 1. Decree holder in execution petition No. 181/1998 had filed I.A. No. 15 under Order 21 Rule 95 read with Section 151 CPC seeking delivery of possession of schedule property which came to be dismissed by I Addl. Civil Judge (Sr. Dn) & CJM, Shimoga by order dated 08.06.2010 and same is sought for being revised in this revision petition. 2. I have heard the arguments of Sri M. Rudraiah, learned Advocate appearing for petitioner - Decree Holder and Sri Prithvi Wodeyar, learned Advocate appearing for respondent - Judgment Debtor. Parties are referred to as per their rank in Executing Court. 3. Facts in brief leading to the filing of this revision petition are as under: Decree holder had filed a suit O.S. No. 222/1996 on the file of Civil Judge (Sr. Dn), Shimoga for recovery of a sum of Rs. 1,15,500/- against respondent herein. Said suit came to be decreed on 27.03.1998. Even prior to the suit being decreed, petitioner had obtained an order of attachment before judgment of respondent - judgment debtor's property, which is the subject matter of the execution proceedings. On account of non payment of decretal amount, petitioner filed an execution petition in Ex. No. 181/1998 and sought for sale of immovable property belonging to defendant/Judgment Debtor. However, Judgment Debtor did not appear and sale proclamation came to be issued. Decree holder filed an application under Order 21 Rule 72 CPC seeking permission of the Executing Court to participate in the bid as one of the auction purchasers and Executing Court permitted the decree holder to participate in the auction. In the spot sale held on 15.02.2002 and also in the Court sale held on 16.02.2002 decree holder was declared as the highest bidder. Executing Court passed an order confirming the sale on 26.03.2002 and ordered for issuance of sale certificate in respect of the property sold in Court auction to the decree holder if necessary, non-judicial stamp paper being duly furnished. Judgment debtor filed an application under Order 21 Rule 90 CPC and also filed a Miscellaneous Petition No. 70/2002 for setting aside the sale. I.A. filed under Order 21 rule 90 CPC came to be dismissed with costs on 13.04.2010. Judgment debtor filed an application under Order 21 Rule 90 CPC and also filed a Miscellaneous Petition No. 70/2002 for setting aside the sale. I.A. filed under Order 21 rule 90 CPC came to be dismissed with costs on 13.04.2010. Thereafter, decree holder filed two applications on 29.05.2010 namely, I.A. No. 14 under Order 21 Rule 94 CPC for issuance of sale certificate and I.A. No. 15 under Order 21 Rule 95 CPC to put him in possession of the property sold to him in auction. Said applications came to be resisted by the judgment debtor contending inter alia that he has challenged the sale on the ground of irregularity and fraud by filing an application under Order 21 Rule 90 CPC and same is pending adjudication, as such, no sale certificate can be issued in favour of decree holder and matter is yet to reach the stage of issuance of sale certificate and it was also contended that he is ready to deposit the decretal amount. It was also contended that one M. Nagaraja has filed an application for rateable distribution of the property and as such, prayer sought for by the decree holder cannot be granted. Executing Court allowed I.A. No. 14 by holding that sale has become absolute and title passes on to the purchaser on confirmation of sale and also on the ground that issuance of sale certificate is a ministerial act and not a judicial act. However, I.A. No. 15 filed for possession of the property came to be dismissed on the ground that it was not filed within one year from the date when the sale became absolute. It is this order of rejection of I.A. No. 15 which is sought for being revised by this Court in exercise of the power under Section 115 CPC. 4. It is the contention of Sri Rudraiah, learned Advocate appearing for Decree Holder that only after grant of sale certificate decree holder has to apply for delivery of possession and sale certificate having been issued on 08.06.2010, application I.A. No. 15 was within time. 4. It is the contention of Sri Rudraiah, learned Advocate appearing for Decree Holder that only after grant of sale certificate decree holder has to apply for delivery of possession and sale certificate having been issued on 08.06.2010, application I.A. No. 15 was within time. He would also contend that even otherwise, delay in filing the application from the date of confirmation of sale of attached property is due to the judgment debtors filing applications one after another by colluding with third parties and said application having been dismissed recently, decree holder had filed the application I.A. No. 15 for delivery of possession. On these grounds, he seeks for allowing the revision petition. In support of his submission, he has relied upon the following judgments: (1) Narayana Pillai Krishna Pillai v. Damodaran Pillai Velayudhan Pillai reported in AIR 1967 KERALA 159. (2) Pandurangan & Another v. Dasu Reddy reported in AIR 1973 Madras 107. 5. Per contra, Sri Prithvi Wodeyar, learned Advocate appearing for Judgment Debtor would defend the order under challenge and contends that application for delivery of possession ought to have been filed within one year from the date of confirmation of sale and same having not been filed within one year from the date of confirmation of sale which was on 26.03.2002 the present application filed under Order 21 Rule 95 CPC seeking for possession of property sold in auction is liable to be rejected. In support of his submission, he relies upon following judgments: (1) Ganpal Singh (Dead) by L.Rs. v. Kailash Shankar & Others reported in AIR 1987 SC 1443 . (2) Ratan Bapu Patil (Dead) by L.Rs. & Others v. Dathu & Others reported in AIR 2005 SC 1500 . (3) Sashi Bhusan Mitra & Others v. Ramlal Mitra reported in AIR 1977 Calcutta 351. 6. Having heard the learned Advocates appearing for the parties, I am of the considered view that following points would arise for my consideration: (1) Whether the interlocutory application No. 15 filed under Order 21 Rule 95 CPC seeking delivery of possession was barred by limitation? OR When does the limitation commence for filing of an application by the decree holder seeking possession of the immovable property sold in auction which is in occupation of a judgment debtor or any other person on his behalf claiming title? (2) What Order? 7. OR When does the limitation commence for filing of an application by the decree holder seeking possession of the immovable property sold in auction which is in occupation of a judgment debtor or any other person on his behalf claiming title? (2) What Order? 7. In order to answer the points formulated herein above, it would be necessary to extract the relevant provisions of Code of Civil Procedure which may have bearing on this issue as also the Limitation Act, 1963. Hence, the relevant provisions are extracted herein below: Order 21 Rule 92 CPC 92. Sale when to become absolute or be set aside:--(1) Where no application is made under Rule 89, Rule 90 or Rule 91, or where such application is made and disallowed, the Court shall make an order confirming the sale and thereupon the sale shall become absolute. Provided that, where any property is sold in execution of a decree pending the final disposal of any claim to, or any objection to the attachment of, such property, the Court shall not confirm such sale until the final disposal of such claim or objection. (2) Where such application is made and allowed, and where, in the case of an application under Rule 89, the deposit required by that rule is made within (sixty days) from the date of sale, or in cases where the amount deposited under Rule 89 is found to be deficient owing to any clerical or arithmetical mistake on the part of the depositor and such deficiency has been made good within such time as may be fixed by the Court, the Court shall make an order setting aside the sale. Provided that no order shall be made unless notice of the application has been given to all persons affected thereby. Provided further that the deposit under this sub-rule may be made within sixty days in all such cases where the period of thirty days, within which the deposit has to be made, has not expired before the commencement of the Code of Civil Procedure (Amendment) Act, 2002. (3) No suit to set aside an order made under this rule shall be brought by any person against whom such order is made. (4) Where a third party challenges the judgment-debtor's title by filing a suit against the auction-purchaser, the decree holder and the judgment debtor shall be necessary parties to the suit. (3) No suit to set aside an order made under this rule shall be brought by any person against whom such order is made. (4) Where a third party challenges the judgment-debtor's title by filing a suit against the auction-purchaser, the decree holder and the judgment debtor shall be necessary parties to the suit. (5) If the suit referred to in sub-rule (4) is decreed, the Court shall direct the decree holder to refund the money to the auction-purchaser, and where such an order is passed the execution proceedings in which the sale had been held shall, unless the Court otherwise directs, be revived at the stage at which the sale was ordered. Order 21 Rule 95 CPC Where the immovable property sold is in the occupancy of the judgment-debtor or of some person on his behalf or of some person claiming under a title created by the judgment-debtor subsequently to the attachment of such property and a certificate in respect thereof has been created under Rule 94, the Court shall, on the application of the purchaser, order delivery to be made by putting such purchaser or any person whom he may appoint to receive delivery on his behalf in possession of the property, and, if need be, by removing any person who refuses to vacate the same. Article 127 & 134 of Limitation Act, 1963 Description of application Period of limitation Time from which period begins to run 127. To set aside a salein execution of a decree, including any such application by a judgment debtor. The date of the sale 134. For delivery of possession by a purchaser of immovable property at a sale in execution of a decree One Year When the sale become absolute 8. Possession means such possession as the nature of the property is capable of. Under the law there are two modes of delivery of possession of a property both when there is a decree for possession and when the auction purchaser is to be given possession. These two modes do not depend upon the discretion of the Court but upon the nature of the property. Under the law there are two modes of delivery of possession of a property both when there is a decree for possession and when the auction purchaser is to be given possession. These two modes do not depend upon the discretion of the Court but upon the nature of the property. If the property is in occupation of the judgment debtor or of some person on his behalf, etc., the possession is to be given under one mode, namely, by removing the judgment debtor and putting the auction purchaser or decree holder in possession of it vide Order 21 Rule 35 and 95 CPC. On the other hand, if the delivery is of a property not in occupation of the judgment debtor, but of a tenant or other person entitled to occupy the same, delivery of possession is to be given by proclaiming the possession of the decree holder or auction purchaser vide Order 21 Rule 36 or Rule 96 CPC. 9. A perusal of Rule 95 CPC would indicate that where the immovable property is sold, is in occupation of judgment debtor or of some person on his behalf or of some person claiming a title created by Judgment debtor subsequent to the attachment of such property and certificate in respect thereof has been granted under Rule 94 CPC, the Executing Court on an application of the purchaser can order delivery of possession to be made by putting such purchaser or decree holder if necessary, by removing such person who refuses to vacate the same. Rule 95 CPC as such, does not indicate the time within which such an application is to be made. As such, time prescribed under schedule to the Limitation Act, 1963 would be applicable namely, Third Division of Part I of Limitation Act, 1963 which relates to the applications specified thereunder. Article 134 of the Limitation Act would indicate that an application for delivery of possession by a purchaser of immovable property at a sale in execution of a decree has to be made within one year when the sale becomes absolute. 10. A sale becomes absolute when no application is made under Rules 89, 90 or Rule 91or when such an application is made and disallowed. The title of the auction purchaser becomes complete on confirmation of sale under Order 21 Rule 92 CPC. 10. A sale becomes absolute when no application is made under Rules 89, 90 or Rule 91or when such an application is made and disallowed. The title of the auction purchaser becomes complete on confirmation of sale under Order 21 Rule 92 CPC. Sale certificate would entitle the decree holder to obtain possession under Rule 95 of Order 21. There is nothing in Rule 95 to make it incumbent for the purchaser to file certificate along with his application. On confirmation of sale, it is compulsory to issue certificate. The failure to issue certificate whether delay arises due to the action of the Court or on account of inaction of the purchaser has no bearing on the limitation for an application under Article134 of Limitation Act. The Decree Holder cannot seek to extend the limitation on the ground that sale certificate had not been issued. Therefore, issue of sale certificate is not sine-qua-non for filing of an application within time prescribed under Article 134. Once sale has been confirmed by the Court, it confers absolute title on the auction purchaser, whether he be the Decree Holder or a stranger. It has been held in catena of judgments that sale certificate does not create any title, but is merely evidence of title. Title can also be proved independently of the sale certificate. The sale certificate is rather a formal acknowledgment of a fact already accomplished, stating as to what stood sold. 11. This view is fortified by the law laid down by Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Pattam Khander Khan v. Pattam Sardar Khan reported in (1996) 5 SCC 48 . It has been held in the said judgment to the following effect: 11. Order 21 Rule 95 xxxxxxxxx, which is a pointer. It therefore becomes clear that the title of the Court auction-purchaser becomes complete on the confirmation of the sale under Order 21, Rule 92, and by virtue of the thrust of Section 65 CPC, the property vests in the purchaser from the date of sale; the certificate of sale, by itself, not creating any title but merely evidence thereof. The sale certificate rather is a formal acknowledgement of a fact already accomplished, stating as to what stood sold. Such act of the Court is pristinely a ministerial one and not judicial. It is in the nature of a formalisation of the obvious. 12. The sale certificate rather is a formal acknowledgement of a fact already accomplished, stating as to what stood sold. Such act of the Court is pristinely a ministerial one and not judicial. It is in the nature of a formalisation of the obvious. 12. Such being the state of law on the subject, we fail to see how the High Court could have come to the conclusion that even though the sale becomes absolute on confirmation under Order 21 Rule 92 CPC effectively passing title, the same can only be complete when evidenced by a sale certificate issued under Order 21 Rule 94, and that unless the sale certificate is issued, limitation cannot start for the purpose of an application under Order 21 Rule 95 CPC, vis-a-vis, Article 134 of the Limitation Act, 1963. 12. In an application for possession by the purchaser of a property in a Court auction, the limitation starts from the date of sale becoming absolute vide Article 134 of the Limitation Act, 1963. For this proposition, judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Balakrishnan v. Malaiyandi Konar reported in AIR 2006 SC 1458 can be looked up. 13. The residual question is the effect of Article 134 of the Limitation Act, as appearing in the Schedule to the Limitation Act relatable to Sections 2(j) and 3 providing for periods of limitation. Article 134 reads as follows: Description of application Period of limitation Time from which period begins to run 134. For delivery of possession by a purchaser of immovable property at a sale in execution of a decree One Year When the sale becomes absolute 14. The limitation for the purpose of Article 134 starts from the date of confirmation of sale. (See Ganpat Singh (dead) by L.Rs. v. Kailash Shankar and Ors. 1987 (3) SCC 146 ). In Pattam Khader Khan v. Pattern Sardar Khan and Anr. ( 1996 (5) SCC 48 ) this court held that it is not from the date when sale certificate is issued that the limitation starts running. The sale becomes absolute on confirmation under Order XXI Rule 92 of the Code effectively passing title. It cannot be said to attain finality only when sale certificate is issued under Order XXI Rule 94. There can be variety of factors conceivable for which delay can be caused in issuing a sale certificate. The sale becomes absolute on confirmation under Order XXI Rule 92 of the Code effectively passing title. It cannot be said to attain finality only when sale certificate is issued under Order XXI Rule 94. There can be variety of factors conceivable for which delay can be caused in issuing a sale certificate. The period of one year limitation now prescribed under Article 134 of the Limitation Act in substitution of a three year period prescribed under Article 180 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908 is reflective of the legislative policy of finalizing proceedings in execution as quickly as possible by providing a quick forum to the auction purchaser to ask for the delivery of possession of the property purchased within that period from the date of the sale becoming absolute rather than from the date of issuance of the sale certificate. On his failure to avail such a quick remedy the law relegates him to the remedy of a regular suit for possession based on title, subject again to limitation. 13. The Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Ganapat Singh (dead) by L.Rs. v. Kailash Shankar & Others reported in AIR 1987 SC 1443 while examining as to whether Article 134 or whether Article 136 of the Limitation Act, 1963 would be applicable when an application under Order 21 Rule 95 is filed by the auction purchaser for delivery of possession of the property, held that Article 134 would be applicable. It has also been held that such an application has to be filed within the prescribed period of limitation of One year from the date of sale becoming absolute. It has been held in the said judgment as under: 9. Section 47 xxx Executing Court. When a property is sold in execution of a decree, an application for setting aside the sale may be made under R. 89, 90 or 91 of O. XXI C.P.C. by the persons and on grounds as mentioned therein. Such an application has to be made within the prescribed period of limitation of sixty days from the date of sale under Art. 127, Limitation Act, 1963. Article 134prescribes a limitation of one year for an application for delivery of possession by a purchaser of immovable property at a sale in execution of a decree. The limitation of one year will be computed from the date the sale becomes absolute. 14. Article 134prescribes a limitation of one year for an application for delivery of possession by a purchaser of immovable property at a sale in execution of a decree. The limitation of one year will be computed from the date the sale becomes absolute. 14. In this background, the facts on hand are required to be examined and for the said purpose dates noted herein below would be relevant and necessary. As such, they are extracted herein below: Sl.No. 1 Spot sale of the property 15.02.2002 2 Court sale 16.02.2002 3 Confirmation of sale by Executing Court and ordering for issue of sale certificate 26.03.2002 4 Application – I.A. No.6 filed by J.Dr. under Order 21 Rule 90 CPC for setting aside the sale 30.09.2002 5 Application under Order 21 Rule 94 CPC filed by Decree holder seeking issuance of sale certificate and producing stamp papers worth Rs.30,015/- 16.12.2002 6 Order passed by Executing Court directing return of the stamp papers furnished by decree holder 09.06.2003 7 Application – I.A. 14 and 15 filed under Order 21 Rule 95 CPC by decree holder 05.09.2009 8 Executing Court ordered J.Dr. to lead evidence on I.A. No.6 filed under Order 21 Rule 90 CPC 15.02.2010 9 Application filed by the J.Dr. on I.A. No. 6 under Order 21 Rule 90 dismissed with cost of Rs.1,000/- 13.04.2010 10 I.A.14 allowed and I.A.15 dismissed 08.06.2010 In the light of above noted dates, let me examine as to when the sale becomes absolute as envisaged under Order 21 Rule 92 CPC. A perusal of Rule 92 of Order 21 CPC would indicate that when no application is made under Rule 89, Rule 90 or Rule 91 or where such application is made and disallowed, the Court shall make an order confirming the sale and thereupon the sale becomes absolute. The said provision would give a succor to a Judgment Debtor to file an application when sale of the property takes place. The Executing Court will examine before confirming the sale as to whether the provisions of Order 21 Rule 66 CPC is complied or not. Only on being satisfied with the same, the sale would be confirmed. Thus, the Executing Court assumes the Judgment Debtor knew about the date of sale either actually or constructively when he makes an application for setting aside the sale. Only on being satisfied with the same, the sale would be confirmed. Thus, the Executing Court assumes the Judgment Debtor knew about the date of sale either actually or constructively when he makes an application for setting aside the sale. If such an application is not filed within the time limit prescribed under Article 127 of the Limitation Act, it cannot be gain said that Executing Court will have to wait for eternity for such an application being filed. This would tend to multiply the litigation and visualising this aspect, the legislature in its wisdom has set a limitation for filing an application to set aside the sale which should be within sixty days (prior to 1996 amendment, it was thirty days) from the date of sale. Likewise, the decree holder - auction purchaser who seeks for delivery of possession of a immovable property sold at a sale in execution of a decree has to file such application within one year. 15. It has been held by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Ganpat Singh (dead) by L.Rs. V/S Kailashshankar and Others reported in AIR 1987 SC 1443 that an application has to be filed within one year after the dismissal of the application filed under Order 21 Rules 89, 90, 91, 92 & 95 by any one of Judgment Debtors. It has been held in the said judgment as under: 9. Section 47 itself has nothing to do with the question of limitation. Article 136 prescribes a period of limitation of 12 years for the execution of a decree from the date on which the decree or order becomes enforceable or where the decree or any subsequent order directs any payment of money or the delivery of any property to be made at a certain date or at recurring periods when default in making any payment or delivery in respect of which execution is sought takes place. After a decree is put into execution within the period of limitation under Article 136, questions relating to execution, discharge or satisfaction of the decree may arise and such questions including the question as to the delivery of possession shall be determined by the executing court. After a decree is put into execution within the period of limitation under Article 136, questions relating to execution, discharge or satisfaction of the decree may arise and such questions including the question as to the delivery of possession shall be determined by the executing court. When a property is sold in execution of a decree, an application for setting aside the sale may be made under Rules 89,90 or 91 of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure by the persons and on grounds as mentioned therein. Such an application has also to be made within the prescribed period of limitation of sixty days from the date of sale under Article 127 of the Limitation Act, 1963. Article 134 prescribes a limitation of one year for an application for delivery of possession by a purchaser of immovable property at a sale in execution of a decree. The limitation of one year will be computed from the date the sale becomes absolute. Such an application for delivery of possession can be filed only after the decree is put into execution within the period of limitation as prescribed by Article 136 of the Limitation Act. The periods of limitation prescribed by Articles 136 and 134 are for two different purposes, the former being for the execution of a decree for possession in respect of which decree is passed and the latter for an application for delivery of possession of immovable property which is purchased in the course of execution of a decree. The two articles have nothing in common for their operation and it is not readily understandable how the two articles stand in conflict with each other. An application for delivery of possession of immovable property purchased in execution cannot, by any stretch of imagination, be construed as an application for execution of a decree for possession of property so as to invoke the provision of Article 136 of the Limitation Act. An application for delivery of possession of immovable property purchased in execution cannot, by any stretch of imagination, be construed as an application for execution of a decree for possession of property so as to invoke the provision of Article 136 of the Limitation Act. Merely because the auction-purchaser will be deemed to be a party in the suit in which the decree has been passed, as provided in clause (a) of Explanation II to section 47 of the Code, and by virtue of clause (b) of Explanation II all questions relating to delivery of possession of the property shall be deemed to be questions relating to execution, discharge or satisfaction of the decree within the meaning of section 47, an application for delivery of possession under Order XXI Rule 95 of the Code of Civil Procedure cannot be equated with an application for the execution of a decree for possession so as to apply 12 years' period of limitation as prescribed by Article 136 of the Limitation Act. 14. We may now consider the above contention of the learned Counsel for the respondent decree-holder. It has been already noticed that on January 2, 1979 while dismissing the application of the judgment-debtor under Order XXI Rule 90 of the Code, the learned District Judge also confirmed the sale. The said order of the learned District Judge confirming the sale is binding not only on the judgment-debtor, who made the application under Order 21 Rule 90, but also on all other parties to the execution proceedings including the 4th judgment-debtor. Accordingly, there can be no doubt that the application filed by the 4th judgment-debtor praying for the setting aside of the sale on grounds other than those mentioned in Rules 89, 90 and 91, was not maintainable after the confirmation of the sale. Indeed, by the order dated July 21, 1979 the learned District Judge while dismissing the application of the 4th judgment-debtor observed that after the confirmation of the sale, the court was not authorised to entertain the application. We do not think that the decision of the Privy Council in Chandra Mani's case (supra) lends any support to the contention of the learned Counsel for the respondent decree-holder that an auction-sale can be set aside even on grounds other than those mentioned in Rules 89, 90 and 91. We do not think that the decision of the Privy Council in Chandra Mani's case (supra) lends any support to the contention of the learned Counsel for the respondent decree-holder that an auction-sale can be set aside even on grounds other than those mentioned in Rules 89, 90 and 91. All that has been ruled in that decision is that in construing the meaning of the words "when the sale becomes absolute" in Article 180 of the old Limitation Act, regard must be had not only to the provision of Order XXI Rule 92(1) of the Code, but also to the other material sections and orders of the Code including those which relate to appeals from orders made under Order XXI Rule 92(1). No provision of the Code has been pointed out to us under which a sale can be set aside apart from the provisions of Rules 89, 90 and 91 of order XXI of the Code. There can be no doubt that when an application for setting aside the sale is made, the order passed by the executing court either allowing or dismissing the application will be final and effective subject to an appeal that may be made under the provisions of the Code. It is inconceivable that even though no appeal has been filed against an order dismissing an application for setting aside the sale, another application for setting aside the sale can be made without first having the order set aside. Such an application will be barred by the principle of res judicata. In the circumstances, there is no merit in the contention made on behalf of the respondent decree-holder that the application for delivery of possession having been made within one year of the dismissal of the application of the 4th judgment-debtor for setting aside the sale, it was within the period of limitation as prescribed by Article 134 of the Limitation Act. 15. In Kamakshi Ammal v. Arukkani Ammal, AIR 1957 Mad. 440 , which has been relied on by the learned Counsel for the decree-holder respondent, there was an application under Order XXI Rule 58 of the Code of Civil Procedure by one Nagammal who claimed under a possessory mortgage and that claim was allowed on June 14, 1913. 15. In Kamakshi Ammal v. Arukkani Ammal, AIR 1957 Mad. 440 , which has been relied on by the learned Counsel for the decree-holder respondent, there was an application under Order XXI Rule 58 of the Code of Civil Procedure by one Nagammal who claimed under a possessory mortgage and that claim was allowed on June 14, 1913. The decree-holder filed a suit to set aside this claim as she was entitled to do under the Code before it was amended in 1976. The suit terminated in a compromise decree on August 15, 1944 and the application under Order XXI Rule 95 of the Code was made by the decree-holder on August 14, 1947, that is, within three years from the date when the claim-suit was disposed of. It was held by the Madras High Court that the sale could not be said to have become absolute till the claim-suit was finally disposed of on August 16, 1944. In holding that, the Madras High Court has placed reliance upon the decision of the Privy Council in Chandra Mani's case ( AIR 1934 PC 134 ) (supra) to the effect that though the third column of Article 190 of the old Limitation Act refers to the date when the sale becomes absolute, that clause must be read not only with the provision of Order XXI Rule 92(1) of the Code, but also with the other material provisions and orders of the Code. 16. The Hon'ble Apex Court after referring to the judgment of Pattam Khader Khan referred to supra, in the case of Ratan Bapu Patil (dead) by L.Rs. & Others v. Dodhu & Others reported in AIR 2005 SC 1500 has held that application for possession of property sold in auction under 21 Rule 95 CPC has to be filed within one year from the date sale is confirmed and limitation of one year prescribed under Article 134 of the Limitation Act commences from the date of confirmation of such sale. It has been held in the said judgment to the following effect: 6. We have gone through the judgment rendered in Pattam Khader Khan (supra). It has been held in the said judgment to the following effect: 6. We have gone through the judgment rendered in Pattam Khader Khan (supra). It has been held in the aforesaid judgment that title of the Court auction-purchaser becomes complete on the confirmation of the sale under Order 21, Rule 92 and by virtue of the thrust of Section 65, CPC the property vests in the purchaser from the date of the sale. Issuance of sale certificate is only the evidence of the title which can always be supplied later on to satisfy the requirements of Order 21 Rule 95. The limitation starts running under Article 134 of the Limitation Act from the date of confirmation of the sale deed. The point involved in the present case is squarely covered by the rule laid down by this Court in Pattam Khader Khan (supra). In the present case the sale was confirmed on 17-4-1968 and the limitation of one year provided under Article 134 would start running from the said date. The present application having been filed in the year 1985 was clearly barred by time. 17. In the light of discussion made herein above, when the facts on hand are examined, it would indicate that the spot sale of the property was held on 15.02.2002 and thereafter, Court sale was conducted on 16.02.2002. The sale conducted came to be confirmed by the Executing Court on 26.03.2002. An application -I.A. No. 6 under Order 21 Rule 90 CPC to set aside the sale came to be filed by the judgment debtor on 30.09.2002 i.e., after sixty days period prescribed under Article 127 of the Limitation Act. Said application came to be adjudicated and an order came to be passed rejecting the said application on 13.04.2010. In view of Judgment Debtor having not filed an application within the prescribed period of sixty days namely, as prescribed under Article127 of the Limitation Act, the purchaser namely, Decree Holder's right to seek for delivery of possession commenced on the sixty first day (61st) i.e., from 24th May, 2002 and came to an end on 23rd May, 2003 whereas, in the instant case, application I.A. No. 15 under Order 21 Rule 95 CPC for delivery of possession came to be filed on 05.09.2009 which was clearly time barred under Article 134 of the Limitation Act. 18. 18. In view of the above discussion, I am of the considered view that trial Court was fully justified in dismissing the application and there is no infirmity whatsoever in the order passed by the trial Court. 19. For reasons aforestated, I proceed to pass the following: ORDER Civil Revision Petition is hereby dismissed. (1) Order passed by the I Addl. Civil Judge (Sr. Dn), Shimoga in Execution No. 181/1998 dated 08.06.2010 is hereby affirmed. (2) Parties to bear their respective costs.