JUDGMENT Dipankar Datta, J. 1. The petitioner belonged to the Indian Police Service. He was the Additional Director General of Police (Provisioning), West Bengal Police, when he retired from service on February 28, 2014 having reached the age of superannuation. Seeking orders for quashing of two departmental proceedings initiated against him vide charge-sheets dated November 22, 2012 and May 15, 2013, the petitioner had the occasion to approach the Central Administrative Tribunal, Calcutta (hereafter the tribunal) by filing two original applications (OA No.1122 of 2012 and OA No.506 of 2013). Feeling aggrieved by the orders dated March 19 and 20, 2014 passed by the tribunal on such applications, two writ petitions (tribunal applications, as they are commonly called) have been preferred by the Chief Secretary, Government of West Bengal and the Additional Chief Secretary, Home Department and Home Secretary, Govt. of West Bengal (hereafter the first and the second proforma respondents, when referred to collectively) being WPCT Nos. 90-91 of 2014. The said writ petitions were called on for consideration on May 13, 2014 by the Hon’ble Division Bench having determination. Since one of the members of the Hon’ble Division Bench was not inclined to hear the writ petitions, the same were directed to be placed before the Hon’ble the Chief Justice for necessary orders. The Hon’ble the Chief Justice has specially assigned the said two writ petitions by orders dated June 3, 2014 for hearing by the Hon’ble Division Bench presided over by the senior most puisne judge of this Court (hereafter DB-II). These orders of assignment form the subject matter of challenge in these two writ petitions. 2. Since common issues of fact and law are involved, I shall proceed to dispose of the two writ petitions by this common judgment and order. 3. Mr. Samanta, learned advocate for the petitioner contended that the petitioner has been subjected to very unfair treatment, which has compelled him to challenge the orders of assignment made by the Hon’ble the Chief Justice. According to him, well in advance of the impugned orders of assignment, the petitioner had expressed by his letter dated April 11, 2014 that the writ petitions may be assigned to any bench other than DB-II, yet, it is the said DB to which the writ petitions have been assigned. 4. According to him, well in advance of the impugned orders of assignment, the petitioner had expressed by his letter dated April 11, 2014 that the writ petitions may be assigned to any bench other than DB-II, yet, it is the said DB to which the writ petitions have been assigned. 4. Referring to the oft-quoted saying “justice must not only be done, but must manifestly be seen to be done” Mr. Samanta placed the facts leading to the writ petitions. The petitioner, it was claimed, had been denied promotion to the post of Director General of Police. He challenged the selection process before the tribunal. The tribunal by its order dated February 3, 2014 had granted relief by quashing the selection. High ranking police officials, including the incumbent on the post of Director General and Inspector General of Police, West Bengal were directed to step down from their respective offices. The order was challenged by the State by presenting WPCT No. 40 of 2014. Separate writ petitions (WPCT Nos. 41-43 of 2014) were presented by the promotee police officials. On release of the same by the Hon’ble Division Bench having determination, the writ petitions were assigned by the Hon’ble the Chief Justice to DB-II. The manner in which the said DB conducted the proceedings left the petitioner to fear that he would not receive justice from it. His worst fears came true when the aforesaid writ petitions were allowed and the order under challenge set aside by judgment and order dated February 25, 2014. A special leave petition was preferred immediately thereafter before the Hon’ble Supreme Court against such judgment and order, whereupon notice has since been issued and the records called for. Close on the heels of presentation of the special leave petition, the tribunal passed the orders dated March 19 and 20, 2014. Personal presence of the first and the second proforma respondents was directed. Feeling aggrieved thereby, the said orders were challenged by them by presenting writ petitions, being WPCT Nos. 77-78 of 2014. These writ petitions were again released by the regular bench and assigned to DB-II. Onbehalf of the petitioner, it was submitted before the said DB that the petitioner does not expect justice to be administered and a prayer for release of the writ petitions was made. 77-78 of 2014. These writ petitions were again released by the regular bench and assigned to DB-II. Onbehalf of the petitioner, it was submitted before the said DB that the petitioner does not expect justice to be administered and a prayer for release of the writ petitions was made. The said DB called upon the petitioner to file an affidavit, which was complied with, yet, the writ petitions were not released. Since the said DB continued with the hearing without disposing of the petitioner’s objection, he and his learned advocate had no other option but to walk out of the Court and abstain from participating in further proceedings before it. Ultimately, however, WPCT Nos. 77-78 of 2014 were dismissed as withdrawn because of a technical hitch but the petitioners thereof were granted liberty to file afresh after curing the defects. Upon WPCT Nos. 90-91 of 2014 being presented, and the same learned judges who had earlier released WPCT Nos. 77-78 of 2014 still having the determination to hear tribunal applications, release of WPCT Nos. 90-91 of 2014 was only a matter of time. Anticipating release thereof, the petitioner had written the letter dated April 11, 2014. Since payment of the petitioner’s retiral dues have been held up due to pendency of WPCT Nos. 90-91 of 2014, the petitioner had made a further request by his letter dated June 4, 2014 to assign the same before an Hon’ble Division Bench upon obtaining information that orders of assignment were yet to be made in regard to the said wit petitions. Not only did the Hon’ble the Chief Justice not accede to the request of the petitioner, the writ petitions were assigned again to DB-II on June 3, 2014 with a back date even though the presiding judge of the said DB has been away from Kolkata, holding circuit in Port Blair. 5. It ought to be placed on record that Mr. Samanta sensed trouble when confronted by the Court and immediately withdrew the submission that the orders of assignment were signed with a back date. 6. The crux of Mr. Samanta’s submission is that the presiding judge of DB-II has not been fair to the petitioner and there are good grounds to believe that His Lordship is biased and inclined to hold against the petitioner. 7. 6. The crux of Mr. Samanta’s submission is that the presiding judge of DB-II has not been fair to the petitioner and there are good grounds to believe that His Lordship is biased and inclined to hold against the petitioner. 7. To support the contention that even an order of assignment made by an Honble Chief Justice of a High Court is not free from judicial scrutiny, reliance was placed on the decision reported in AIR 1998 SC 1344 = (1998) 8 SCC 1 : State of Rajasthan vs. Prakash Chand. 8. Finally, it was prayed that the impugned orders of assignment may be set aside and the Hon’ble the Chief Justice directed to re-assign the writ petitions to any other Hon’ble Division Bench. 9. The writ petitions were opposed by Mr. Datta, learned senior advocate representing the Hon’ble the Chief Justice. The contentions raised by him are as follows: (i) Assignment of a matter, be it a suit or a writ petition or an application or an appeal, is the exclusive prerogative of the Hon’ble the Chief Justice and the order of assignment cannot be challenged in judicial proceedings. (ii) While a matter is pending consideration before the Hon’ble the Chief Justice for assignment to a judge or judges, a party to the lis has no right to choose the judge/judges who ought to hear his grievance. The prayer of the petitioner that any bench of which the senior most puisne judge is not a member, if granted, would amount to acceptance of the choice exercised by the petitioner which is not desirable. (iii) An Hon’ble Chief Justice of a High Court cannot in his administrative capacity decide, on the prayer made by a litigant, whether any of his companion judge is biased or not and the impugned orders of assignment do not suffer from any infirmity. (iv) Should the petitioner have any feeling that he would not receive justice from DB-II, the proper course for him is to approach the judges of the said DB and to request Their Lordships to decide his prayer. (v) Any direction to the Hon’ble the Chief Justice would set a dangerous precedent, for, that would allow disgruntled litigants to flood the chamber of His Lordship with similar such unmeritorious requests. He, accordingly, prayed for dismissal of the writ petitions. 10. Mr. Banerjee, learned Govt. (v) Any direction to the Hon’ble the Chief Justice would set a dangerous precedent, for, that would allow disgruntled litigants to flood the chamber of His Lordship with similar such unmeritorious requests. He, accordingly, prayed for dismissal of the writ petitions. 10. Mr. Banerjee, learned Govt. Pleader representing the first and the second proforma respondents contended, relying on the decision reported in AIR 1990 Calcutta 168, Sohan Lal Baid vs. State of West Bengal & other, that the Hon’ble the Chief Justice is the master of the roster and it is he alone who has the right to decide which judge is to hear a specially assigned matter. It was further contended that the petitioner can have no valid reason to feel aggrieved by the impugned orders of assignment inasmuch as the petitioner has not been able to demonstrate that there has been any miscarriage of justice in course of hearing of the earlier writ petitions by DB-II. He also contended that the conduct of the petitioner in levelling baseless allegations against the judiciary borders on contempt and the Court ought not to be lenient. He too prayed for summary dismissal of the writ petitions. 11. I have heard the parties. 12. Two principal points arise for consideration: (i) Is an order of assignment of a matter (suit/writ petition/application/appeal, etc.) made by the Hon’ble the Chief Justice justiciable? (ii) Should the answer to the above question be in the affirmative, has the petitioner set up any case for quashing of the impugned orders? 13. Point (i) The decision in Prakash Chand (supra) has been relied on by Mr. Samanta in support of his contention. It has been held there as follows: “In the instant case, it was the statutory duty of the Chief Justice to assign Writ Petition No. 2949 of 1996 to a Division Bench of the High Court for hearing since it involved constitutional issues and Rule 55 of the High Court Rules required such a case to be so heard. No exception whatsoever could, therefore, be taken to the order of the Chief Justice made on 9-9-1997, referring that writ petition for hearing to a Division Bench. In the facts and circumstances of the case the Chief Justice was statutorily obliged to take cognizance of the application filed by the Additional Advocate General of the State and pass appropriate orders. No exception whatsoever could, therefore, be taken to the order of the Chief Justice made on 9-9-1997, referring that writ petition for hearing to a Division Bench. In the facts and circumstances of the case the Chief Justice was statutorily obliged to take cognizance of the application filed by the Additional Advocate General of the State and pass appropriate orders. He could not shut his eyes as regards the requirements of Rule 55 (supra) only because a Single Judge of the High Court was treating the case as part heard. The correctness of the order of the Chief Justice could only be tested in judicial proceedings in a manner known to law. No Single Judge was competent to find fault with it.” (Underlining for emphasis by me) 14. Referring to the last sentence of the aforesaid extract, I had enquired from Mr. Samanta as to how a single judge could find fault with an order of assignment made by the Hon’ble the Chief Justice. He immediately referred to paragraphs 2 to 4 of the report to show how and in what manner a learned judge of the Rajasthan High Court had made caustic comments against the Hon’ble the Chief Justice of the said Court and had even drawn up proceedings for criminal contempt, after a writ petition that had been heard-in-part by the said learned judge was withdrawn pursuant to an order of the Hon’ble the Chief Justice and on being placed before an Hon’ble Division Bench, was disposed of as infructuous. It is in such circumstances, Mr. Samanta submitted, that the observation came to be made. 15. I quite agree with Mr. Samanta. The facts the learned judges of the Hon’ble Supreme Court were seized of required a finding that the learned single judge could not have found fault with the order made by the Hon’ble the Chief Justice withdrawing the part-heard writ petition from the former’s board. There cannot be any dispute that the decision in Prakash Chand (supra) provides a complete answer to point (i). 16. However, in view of Mr. Datta arguing on behalf of the Hon’ble the Chief Justice that an order of assignment cannot be called in question at all and that a litigant has no right to choose a judge for hearing his grievance, I propose to deal with the arguments in some more detail. 17. 16. However, in view of Mr. Datta arguing on behalf of the Hon’ble the Chief Justice that an order of assignment cannot be called in question at all and that a litigant has no right to choose a judge for hearing his grievance, I propose to deal with the arguments in some more detail. 17. To be elevated as the Hon’ble the Chief Justice of a High Court is no mean achievement. The incumbent is selected by the collegium of senior most judges of the Hon’ble Supreme Court and only a very few make the grade. The high constitutional office that an Hon’ble Chief Justice holds calls for, on the administrative side, sound judgment on considerations of what is reasonable and non-arbitrary tempered with an exercise of wise, vigilant and prudent discretion to advance fairness, secure transparency and aid equity, without being obliged to hear any party who might have raised an issue calling for His Lordship’s decision thereon. Experience would show that it has always been the endeavour of Hon’ble Chief Justices to eliminate any impression of lack of objectivity and fairness and to strive to curb mal-practices in the system. The Hon’ble the Chief Justice in such matters exercises parens patriae jurisdiction, and to attribute motives to an Hon’ble Chief Justice is a serious allegation, which if not proved, would expose the person levelling such allegation to serious consequences. 18. Even then, I am inclined to the view that an order of the Hon’ble Chief Justice of a High Court assigning a matter to a particular bench for decision or constituting a bench and assigning a matter to such bench for decision, is not entirely immune from being questioned. However, I hasten to add that only limited judicial review of an order of assignment may be permissible. It cannot be gainsaid that it would require very strong ground(s) to interfere in an order of assignment. It is difficult to enumerate situations where interference may be called for and each case that would very rarely arise before the Court for its decision has to be dealt with bearing in mind its own peculiarities. Considering the responsibilities that an Hon’ble Chief Justice of a High Court has to shoulder, it is highly unlikely that an order of assignment would be so outrageous to common sense and logic that a litigant might feel aggrieved thereby. Considering the responsibilities that an Hon’ble Chief Justice of a High Court has to shoulder, it is highly unlikely that an order of assignment would be so outrageous to common sense and logic that a litigant might feel aggrieved thereby. Nonetheless, drawing from personal experience gained during my stint as a judge of this Court, two possible situations come to my mind which could give rise to litigations involving constitution of benches by orders of assignment made by the Hon’ble the Chief Justice. First, reference may be made to the administrative order dated December 21, 2010 of the Hon’ble the Chief Justice. I need not discuss its contents in details. Suffice it to note that the Hon’ble the Acting Chief Justice by a further order dated November 9, 2012 made suitable modification thereof. Fortunately, there was no challenge to the administrative order dated December 21, 2010, but take a case where a writ petition is being heard by a judge for days together, is marked part-heard in course thereof and hearing is on the verge of completion. If at this stage the writ petition is withdrawn from the board of the learned judge hearing it by the Hon’ble the Chief Justice in the absence of any complaint levelled by the parties against the said learned judge and the same is assigned to another learned judge without reason(s) being recorded therefor, a party to the lis could most certainly have a grievance to espouse citing the decision reported in (2007) 13 SCC 580 , High Court of Andhra Pradesh vs. Special Deputy Collector (L.A.). For, in such a case, not only the writ petition would require a fresh hearing by the learned judge to whom it is assigned, thereby eating up precious judicial hours, that would pinch the litigant’s pocket too apart from the fact that judicial time taken by the learned judge who was hearing it before the withdrawal is wasted. If such a litigant questions the order of assignment in judicial proceedings, can it be contended that the order of assignment made by the Hon’ble the Chief Justice cannot be examined on the ground that it is the sole prerogative of His Lordship to decide which judge or judges is/are to hear a particular matter and that relief should be declined because the party approaching the Court seeks to choose his judge? The answer cannot but be in the negative. Take for instance another case where a learned judge differs with the view expressed by another learned judge on a point of law and refers the issue in terms of the extant rules of the Court to the Hon’ble the Chief Justice for constitution of an appropriate bench to decide the reference. Suppose, a bench of two learned judges is constituted by the Hon’ble the Chief Justice to hear the reference with the referring judge as one of its members. The referring judge would in all probability stick to the view expressed by him while referring the issue to the Hon’ble the Chief Justice and, therefore, at the very commencement of the proceedings, a litigant involved in the matter would have good reason to believe that the bench constituted by His Lordship is having a learned judge who is disposed to take a particular view adverse to his interest. The question is, would it be fair to constitute a bench with the referring judge as one of its members? Here also, the answer may not be in the affirmative. In both the aforesaid situations, the oft-quoted saying referred to by Mr. Samanta would apply. True it is, these situations are few and far between but there being previous occurrences, possibility of future occurrences cannot be totally ruled out. 19. Constitution of benches by the Hon’ble the Chief Justice by orders of assignment is not in discharge of judicial duty but out an out an administrative order passed by a constitutional authority. An administrative order, it is trite, may confer rights or impose duties as well as abridge rights. If a litigant feels that his right has been abridged by an order of assignment passed by the Hon’ble the Chief Justice, there is no reason as to why the High Court on the judicial side would feel precluded to examine the propriety of such an order for no better reason than that the order is of the Hon’ble the Chief Justice of the Court. 20. The contention of Mr. Datta that it is not open to a litigant to choose his judge is much too broadly stated. A distinction inevitably has to be drawn between a choice intended to promote institutional interest and the one designed for achieving personal interest without any element of institutional interest being remotely connected to it. 20. The contention of Mr. Datta that it is not open to a litigant to choose his judge is much too broadly stated. A distinction inevitably has to be drawn between a choice intended to promote institutional interest and the one designed for achieving personal interest without any element of institutional interest being remotely connected to it. If in a given case the Court finds that its interference would promote institutional interest, I see no reason as to why the Court should shy away from doing so. 21. Point (i) Above is thus answered in favour of the petitioner and against the respondents. 22. Point (ii) While answering the second point, one has to examine in some detail the circumstances by reason of which the petitioner apprehends that he would not receive justice if WPCT Nos. 90-91 of 2014 are heard by DB-II, of which the seniormost puisne judge of this Court is the presiding judge. The reasons assigned by the petitioner in his letter dated April 11, 2014 addressed to the Hon’ble the Chief Justice as to why the prayer for assignment of the said writ petitions to any Hon’ble Division Bench other than DB-II ought to be made, are quoted hereunder: “(i) No accommodation was given even for a day although prayed for. (ii) Though my COCT was not listed, it was taken on as on day’s list and it was recorded as if it was with consent though not so. (iii) Stay of the Judgment and Order of the Ld. CAT was granted on that day itself (the very first day) without any hearing, in a premeditated manner. (iv) The adjudication was unnecessarily delayed although it was well known that I was scheduled to retire on 28-02-2014. (v) Ultimately on 25-02-2014, with just three days remaining for my retirement, the well considered Judgment and Order of Ld. CAT was quashed in denial of existing relevant laws as well as against the records.” 23. One finds a reference to COCT No. 1 of 2014 in the above grounds. It was an application under Article 227 of the Constitution that the petitioner had presented challenging a part of the order of the tribunal dated February 3, 2014. 24. CAT was quashed in denial of existing relevant laws as well as against the records.” 23. One finds a reference to COCT No. 1 of 2014 in the above grounds. It was an application under Article 227 of the Constitution that the petitioner had presented challenging a part of the order of the tribunal dated February 3, 2014. 24. It would appear from a reading of the aforesaid grounds that the same relate to judicial orders passed by DB-II, which the learned judges comprising the bench in their discretion considered to be wise and proper. 25. I have checked up the orders passed on WPCT Nos. 40-43 of 2014 and COCT No. 1 of 2014. WPCT No. 40 of 2014 and COCT No. 1 of 2014 were released by the regular bench on February 10, 2014 and February 12, 2014 respectively. Upon WPCT No. 40 of 2014 being assigned to DB-II, it was listed on February 13, 2014. While it was being considered, the learned judges noticed that COCT No.1 of 2014 had reached the board on assignment. Accommodation was prayed for by the learned advocate for the petitioner. Although hearing was adjourned till the next day, the learned judges granted stay of operation of the impugned order of the tribunal (by which the promotees had been directed to step down), to be operative in the meantime. One can take judicial notice of the fact that if effect were to be given to the order of the tribunal, that would create a vacuum in the top brass of the West Bengal Police and law and order in the State would have to be maintained without there being any one discharging the duties of the Director General and Inspector General of Police and other Director Generals. That no contempt application was filed by the petitioner for non-compliance of the order of the tribunal, as submitted by Mr. Samanta and, thus, there was no reason to grant stay, is not a sound argument. With the order setting aside the selection and the consequent promotions that were granted on the basis thereof, it would have been well-nigh difficult for the police administration to take an urgent policy decision if the situation so warranted. Samanta and, thus, there was no reason to grant stay, is not a sound argument. With the order setting aside the selection and the consequent promotions that were granted on the basis thereof, it would have been well-nigh difficult for the police administration to take an urgent policy decision if the situation so warranted. It must have been on consideration of the gravity of the situation and to fill up the vacuum that the learned judges of DB-II granted ad-interim stay and fixed hearing of WPCT No.s 40-43 of 2014 alongwith COCT No.1 of 2014 on the following day. It is, therefore, neither correct to suggest that accommodation prayed for was refused nor proper to allege that the judges acted in a premeditated manner. The first and the third grounds are not at all sound. 26. The second ground that COCT No. 1 of 2014 was treated as on day’s list despite not being listed is a ground urged in desperation. I shall assume that the petitioner had not consented to COCT No. 1 of 2014 being taken up for hearing along with WPCT No. 40 of 2014, but little turns on it. Both were directed against a common judgment and order and, therefore, to prevent conflicting judgments (if the writ petition and the Article 227 application were taken up by different Hon’ble Division Benches) as well as wastage of precious judicial time, the learned judges comprising DB-II, in my humble opinion, did exactly that which was the need of the hour. 27. The penultimate ground is also without merit. WPCT Nos. 40-43 of 2014 and COCT No. 1 of 2014 were heard on February 14, 19, 20 and 24, 2014 and the judgment was delivered on February 25, 2014. It would, therefore, appear that within a span of 12 days from first hearing, the matters were finally decided. I wonder how much faster the said DB could have disposed of such an important and sensitive issue which WPCT Nos. 40-43 of 2014 and COCT No. 1 of 2014 threw up. Incidentally, the petitioner blew hot and cold while claiming that accommodation was not granted for a day and that DB-II unnecessarily delayed its decision. 28. Insofar as the final ground is concerned, the Hon’ble Supreme Court is in seisin of the special leave petition filed by the petitioner challenging the judgment and order dated February 25, 2014. Incidentally, the petitioner blew hot and cold while claiming that accommodation was not granted for a day and that DB-II unnecessarily delayed its decision. 28. Insofar as the final ground is concerned, the Hon’ble Supreme Court is in seisin of the special leave petition filed by the petitioner challenging the judgment and order dated February 25, 2014. Whether or not the judgment and order dated February 25, 2014 was rendered contrary to the records and in violation of existing laws would necessarily arise for decision before the Hon’ble Supreme Court and it is an issue which does not require any comment, except that rendering of a judicial decision by a judge or judges against a litigant per se does not and cannot lead to the conclusion that the judge or the judges was/were biased. 29. Suffice it to note, the grounds assigned by the petitioner did not justify the apprehension that the senior-most puisne judge of this Court, the presiding judge of DB-II, had adopted such an approach that there could be a real likelihood of bias in the mind of the petitioner. 30. I enter a caveat here. The observations made above are only for the purpose of disposal of these writ petitions and are not to be construed otherwise. 31. Turning to Mr. Samanta’s contention that the letter dated April 11, 2014 should have been looked into before the orders of assignment were made, it needs to be observed that accepting the petitioner’s tall claims expressed in the letter dated April 11, 2014 and assigning WPCT Nos. 90-91 of 2014 to some other Hon’ble Division Bench would tantamount to discrediting the senior-most puisne judge of this Court, without just reason. Simply because an earlier round of litigation did not go the way the petitioner desired, is no ground to doubt the impartiality and fairness of the learned judge. It may not proper for the Hon’ble the Chief Justice to decide, at the time an order of assignment is made, the question as to whether a companion judge is or is not biased. It is rightly contended by Mr. Datta that a dangerous precedent would be set, if on the mere allegation of a litigant, the Hon’ble the Chief Justice were to assign the matter to another bench. The apprehensions expressed by the petitioner in his said letter did not call for any notice being taken. 32. It is rightly contended by Mr. Datta that a dangerous precedent would be set, if on the mere allegation of a litigant, the Hon’ble the Chief Justice were to assign the matter to another bench. The apprehensions expressed by the petitioner in his said letter did not call for any notice being taken. 32. There is absolutely no material to suggest that bias is likely to operate when WPCT Nos. 90-91 are taken up for consideration and that the senior-most puisne judge of this Court, as the presiding judge of DB-II, is disposed to decide the matter only in a particular way. On the contrary, that the allegation of bias is unfounded and baseless would only be too obvious from the fact that despite the petitioner abstaining from attending proceedings before DB-II while WPCT Nos. 70-71 of 2014 were being considered, no relief was granted to the petitioners thereof and the writ petitions were dismissed on the ground that the rules of the Court relating to presentation of writ petitions had been observed in the breach, a point not raised by the petitioner. An adjudicator, who is allegedly biased, would have made the most of the opportunity. That was not to be. 33. In the ultimate analysis, the saying relied on by Mr. Samanta is not attracted on facts and in the circumstances and I hold that the Hon’ble the Chief Justice has not in any manner abridged the right of the petitioner. Point (ii) is accordingly answered against the petitioner. 34. I would have ended my judgment here, the principal points having been answered. However, I am not oblivious of the strong observations made by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the decision reported in (1995) 1 SCC 421 , Chandra Shashi vs. Anil Kumar Verma. Paragraphs 1 and 2 of the decision in Chandra Shashi (supra) read as follows: “1. The stream of administration of justice has to remain unpolluted so that purity of court’s atmosphere may give vitality to all the organs of the State. Polluters of judicial firmament are, therefore, required to be well taken care of to maintain the sublimity of court’s environment; so also to enable it to administer justice fairly and to the satisfaction of all concerned. 2. Polluters of judicial firmament are, therefore, required to be well taken care of to maintain the sublimity of court’s environment; so also to enable it to administer justice fairly and to the satisfaction of all concerned. 2. Anyone who takes recourse to fraud, deflects the course of judicial proceedings; or if anything is done with oblique motive, the same interferes with the administration of justice. Such persons are required to be properly dealt with, not only to punish them for the wrong done, but also to deter others from indulging in similar acts which shake the faith of people in the system of administration of justice.” 35. I wish to place on record the severe displeasure that the petitioner has incurred arising out of the following. 36. The pleadings are replete with allegations of malice levelled against the Hon’ble the Chief Justice. It is quite well-known that while it is easy to allege mala fide, it is rather difficult to substantiate it. The allegations have not been substantiated, to say the least. While accusing a learned judge of this Court of bias, the petitioner either knowingly or unknowingly has suggested that the Hon’ble the Chief Justice is also biased. 37. Next in the series is an off-the-cuff argument of Mr Samanta. According to him, repeated assignments of the writ petitions involving the State and the petitioner to DB-II would seem to suggest that there is dearth of competent judges in this Court who could decide the same. To express doubt about the competence of the judges of this Court, in effect, is to question the wisdom of the senior-most judges of the collegium of the Hon’ble Supreme Court who had recommended all the present judges of this Court for elevation. In his over zealousness, Mr. Samanta perhaps failed to realize that it is not the question of competence of any learned judge or the lack of it to deal with the writ petitions in question but that the Hon’ble the Chief Justice may have thought it fit and proper to assign the writ petitions to DB-II, which is presided over by the senior-most puisne judge of this Court, to obviate any misgiving in the mind of any party. 38. The last is the alleged ante-dating of the orders of assignment. 38. The last is the alleged ante-dating of the orders of assignment. Contents of subparagraphs (xvi) and (xvii) of paragraph 5 reveal that on enquiry being made on behalf of the petitioner on June 3, 2014, it was ascertained that orders of assignment of WPCT Nos. 90-91 of 2014 were yet to be made, whereafter a reminder dated June 4, 2014 followed. It was then that information could be gathered about the orders of assignment made on June 3, 2014. It was, therefore, not even the pleaded case that the orders of assignment were ante-dated. That the orders of assignment were made on June 3, 2014 itself after an enquiry was made on behalf of the petitioner and before the reminder dated June 4, 2014 was submitted, is a distinct possibility. But for Mr. Samanta’s withdrawal of his submission as to ante-dating of the order of assignment, definitely the petitioner would have exposed himself to proceedings being initiated for his interference in the administration of justice. 39. The petitioner has been a part of the police force of the State for over 3 decades, and during such period the force has been known for anything but integrity, impartiality and independence. Although there were/are some honest officers in the force and the petitioner could lay claim to be one of them, but having seen a host of scheming people around him, the driving force behind presentation of these writ petitions seems to be a misconceived notion about the honesty and integrity of the people entrusted to man the higher judiciary that the petitioner might have developed. Without being boastful of the judiciary’s credentials and achievements, one can safely use as a guide the spurt in litigation against the State which betrays the general feeling of the people that legislative and administrative justice from the concerned organs are a far cry and that this temple of justice is their last resort where they expect their grievances to be redressed without extraneous influences being a factor in the justice delivery mechanism. However, since Mr. Datta has not invited the Court to take cognisance of the irresponsible conduct of the petitioner and over-stepping of his limits for the purpose of proceeding against him in accordance with law, I allow the matter to rest but let the petitioner off by warning him to be cautious in future. 40. However, since Mr. Datta has not invited the Court to take cognisance of the irresponsible conduct of the petitioner and over-stepping of his limits for the purpose of proceeding against him in accordance with law, I allow the matter to rest but let the petitioner off by warning him to be cautious in future. 40. The writ petitions are without merit and, accordingly, stand dismissed. The petitioner shall bear costs assessed at Rs. 3,400/- to be paid to the West Bengal State Legal Services Authority and the Calcutta High Court Legal Services Authority in equal shares. 41. It is made abundantly clear that dismissal of the writ petitions shall not preclude the petitioner to make legitimate prayers in a polite and decent manner before the concerned Court in accordance with law.