Judgment : Rajiv Sharma, Judge (oral): This petition is instituted against the order dated 2.3.2013 rendered by learned Additional District Judge, Solan in Civil Appeal No.68-S/6 of 2010/11. 2. Pertinent facts necessary for adjudication of this petition are that the plaintiffs/petitioners (hereinafter referred to as the “plaintiffs” for the sake of convenience) filed a suit for declaration and injunction under Sections 34 and 38 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 against the defendants/respondents (hereinafter referred to as the “defendants” for the sake of convenience). The suit was contested by the defendants. Replication to the written statement was filed by the plaintiffs. 3. Learned trial court dismissed the suit vide order dated 4.9.2009 for want of prosecution. Feeling aggrieved, the plaintiffs filed an appeal against order dated 4.9.2009 before the learned first appellate court. Since the appeal was barred by limitation, an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act for condonation of delay was also filed. The application was contested by the defendants. Learned first appellate court framed the issues for disposal of the application for condonation of delay on 16.11.2012. It was dismissed by the learned first Appellate Court on 2.3.2013. Hence, the present petition. 4. There was delay of about 14 months in filing the appeal. According to the averments contained in the application for condonation of delay, Annexure P-7, there were many officials with whom the matter for filing the appeal was discussed and the approval of Director was sought for filing the appeal. The file moved from one table to another table for approval and in that process, the appeal could not be filed. According to the reply filed by the defendants, the delay has not been satisfactorily explained. 5. AW1 Yog Raj Chauhan, Major (Retired), led his evidence by way of filing an affidavit, Ext.AW1/A. He deposed that he was posted as Deputy Director in District Sainik Welfare Board. He was authorized to make statement. According to him, after the decision of the case on 4.9.2009, he wrote a letter to the Director, State Sainik Welfare Board, Hamirpur on 11.9.2009 seeking approval to file the appeal. Nobody was appointed as regular Director in the office at that time and charge of the Additional Director was with the Deputy Commissioner, Hamirpur. In these circumstances, the approval could not be obtained within time. 6. Nobody was appointed as regular Director in the office at that time and charge of the Additional Director was with the Deputy Commissioner, Hamirpur. In these circumstances, the approval could not be obtained within time. 6. RW1, Om Parkash Sahni, General Power of Attorney of respondents No. 5 and 6 also led his evidence by way of filing an affidavit, Ext. RW1/A. According to him, delay in filing the appeal was not bona fide. 7. The averments contained in the application seeking condonation of delay lack material particulars. Name of the official/officer, with whom the matter was discussed, has not been disclosed. Date, on which the matter was discussed, has not been given. It was necessary for the plaintiffs to give details of the correspondence exchanged between the functionaries of the plaintiffs’ Board. Merely that the file travelled from one table to another table is not a sufficient cause to condone the delay. AW1 Yog Raj Chauhan has not even proved letter dated 11.9.2009. The matter ought to have been pursued in accordance with law. It has also come on record that the charge of the Additional Director was with the Deputy Commissioner, Hamirpur. AW1 Yog Raj should have pursued the matter with him for taking final decision to file an appeal. The date, on which the approval is alleged to have been given, has not been mentioned. The application for condonation of delay was filed in a casual manner. The reasons assigned are not sufficient to condone the delay. There is no justification for delay. 8. It is settled law that the Courts have to take a liberal approach while considering the application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, but it is equally true that the rights accrued to the other party have to be taken into consideration. 9. Their Lordships of Hon’ble Supreme Court in Oriental Aroma Chemical Industries Limited vs. Gujarat Industrial Development Corporation, (2010) 5 SCC 459 have held that there shall be liberal approach in condoning delay of short duration and stricter approach in cases of inordinate delay. Their Lordships have further held that same yardstick should be applied for deciding applications of private individuals and the State. However, certain amount of latitude is not impermissible with regard to the State. Their Lordships have held as under:- 14. We have considered the respective submissions. The law of limitation is founded on public policy. Their Lordships have further held that same yardstick should be applied for deciding applications of private individuals and the State. However, certain amount of latitude is not impermissible with regard to the State. Their Lordships have held as under:- 14. We have considered the respective submissions. The law of limitation is founded on public policy. The legislature does not prescribe limitation with the object of destroying the rights of the parties but to ensure that they do not resort to dilatory tactics and seek remedy without delay. The idea is that every legal remedy must be kept alive for a period fixed by the legislature. To put it differently, the law of limitation prescribes a period within which legal remedy can be availed for redress of the legal injury. At the same time, the courts are bestowed with the power to condone the delay, if sufficient cause is shown for not availing the remedy within the stipulated time. 15. The expression "sufficient cause" employed in Section 5 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1963 and similar other statutes is elastic enough to enable the courts to apply the law in a meaningful manner which sub serves the ends of justice. Although, no hard and fast rule can be laid down in dealing with the applications for condonation of delay, this Court has justifiably advocated adoption of a liberal approach in condoning the delay of short duration and a stricter approach where the delay is inordinate - Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag v. Mst. Katiji (1987) 2 SCC 107 , N. Balakrishnan v. M. Krishnamurthy (1998) 7 SCC 123 and Vedabai v. Shantaram Baburao Patil (2001) 9 SCC 106 . 16. In dealing with the applications for condonation of delay filed on behalf of the State and its agencies/instrumentalities this Court has, while emphasizing that same yardstick should be applied for deciding the applications for condonation of delay filed by private individuals and the State, observed that certain amount of latitude is not impermissible in the latter case because the State represents collective cause of the community and the decisions are taken by the officers/agencies at a slow pace and encumbered process of pushing the files from table to table consumes considerable time causing delay - G. Ramegowda v. Spl. Land Acquisition Officer (1988) 2 SCC 142 , State of Haryana v. Chandra Mani (1996) 3 SCC 132 , State of U.P. v. Harish Chandra (1996) 9 SCC 309 , State of Bihar v. Ratan Lal Sahu (1996) 10 SCC 635 , State of Nagaland v. Lipok Ao (2005) 3 SCC 752 , and State (NCT of Delhi) v. Ahmed Jaan (2008) 14 SCC 582 . 10. Their Lordships of Hon’ble Supreme Court in Lanka Venkateswarlu vs. State of Andhra Pradesh (2011) 4 SCC 363 have held that liberal approach in considering sufficiency of cause for delay should not override substantial law of limitation, especially when court finds no justification for delay. Their Lordships have held as under:- “19. We have considered the submissions made by the learned counsel. At the outset, it needs to be stated that generally speaking, the courts in this country, including this Court, adopt a liberal approach in considering the application for condonation of delay on the ground of sufficient cause under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. This principle is well settled and has been set out succinctly in the case of Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag & Ors. Vs. Katiji & Ors. ( (1987) 2 SCC 107 ). 23. The concepts of liberal approach and reasonableness in exercise of the discretion by the Courts in condoning delay, have been again stated by this Court in the case of Balwant Singh (supra), as follows:- "25. We may state that even if the term "sufficient cause" has to receive liberal construction, it must squarely fall within the concept of reasonable time and proper conduct of the party concerned. The purpose of introducing liberal construction normally is to introduce the concept of "reasonableness" as it is understood in its general connotation." "26. The law of limitation is a substantive law and has definite consequences on the right and obligation of party to arise. These principles should be adhered to and applied appropriately depending on the facts and circumstances of a given case. Once a valuable right has accrued in favour of one party as a result of the failure of the other party to explain the delay by showing sufficient cause and its own conduct, it will be unreasonable to take away that right on the mere asking of the applicant, particularly when the delay is directly a result of negligence, default or inaction of that party. Justice must be done to both parties equally. Then alone the ends of justice can be achieved. If a party has been thoroughly negligent in implementing its rights and remedies, it will be equally unfair to deprive the other party of a valuable right that has accrued to it in law as a result of his acting vigilantly." 26. Having recorded the aforesaid conclusions, the High Court proceeded to condone the delay. In our opinion, such a course was not open to the High Court, given the pathetic explanation offered by the respondents in the application seeking condonation of delay. 28. We are at a loss to fathom any logic or rationale, which could have impelled the High Court to condone the delay after holding the same to be unjustifiable. The concepts such as "liberal approach", "justice oriented approach", "substantial justice" can not be employed to jettison the substantial law of limitation. Especially, in cases where the Court concludes that there is no justification for the delay. In our opinion, the approach adopted by the High Court tends to show the absence of judicial balance and restraint, which a Judge is required to maintain whilst adjudicating any lis between the parties. We are rather pained to notice that in this case, not being satisfied with the use of mere intemperate language, the High Court resorted to blatant sarcasms. 29. The use of unduly strong intemperate or extravagant language in a judgment has been repeatedly disapproved by this Court in a number of cases. Whilst considering applications for condonation of delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, the Courts do not enjoy unlimited and unbridled discretionary powers. All discretionary powers, especially judicial powers, have to be exercised within reasonable bounds, known to the law. The discretion has to be exercised in a systematic manner informed by reason. Whims or fancies; prejudices or predilections can not and should not form the basis of exercising discretionary powers.” 11. All discretionary powers, especially judicial powers, have to be exercised within reasonable bounds, known to the law. The discretion has to be exercised in a systematic manner informed by reason. Whims or fancies; prejudices or predilections can not and should not form the basis of exercising discretionary powers.” 11. Their Lordships of Hon’ble Supreme Court in Maniben Devraj Shah vs. Municipal Corporation of Brihan Mumbai (2012) 5 SCC 157 have held that even though a liberal and justice-oriented approach is required to be adopted in the exercise of power under Section 5 of the Limitation Act and other similar statutes, the courts can never become oblivious of the fact that the successful litigant has acquired certain rights on the basis of the judgment under challenge and a lot of time is consumed at various stages of litigation apart from the cost. Their Lordships have further held that a distinction must be made between a case where the delay is inordinate and a case where the delay is of few days and whereas in the former case the consideration of prejudice to the other side will be a relevant factor, in the latter case no such consideration arises. Their Lordships have held as under:- “20. In Vedabai v. Shantaram Baburao Patil, (2001) 9 SCC 106 , the Court observed that a distinction must be made between a case where the delay is inordinate and a case where the delay is of few days and whereas in the former case the consideration of prejudice to the other side will be a relevant factor, in the latter case no such consideration arises. 23. What needs to be emphasised is that even though a liberal and justice oriented approach is required to be adopted in the exercise of power under Section 5 of the Limitation Act and other similar statutes, the Courts can neither become oblivious of the fact that the successful litigant has acquired certain rights on the basis of the judgment under challenge and a lot of time is consumed at various stages of litigation apart from the cost. 24. What colour the expression sufficient cause would get in the factual matrix of a given case would largely depend on bona fide nature of the explanation. 24. What colour the expression sufficient cause would get in the factual matrix of a given case would largely depend on bona fide nature of the explanation. If the Court finds that there has been no negligence on the part of the applicant and the cause shown for the delay does not lack bona fides, then it may condone the delay. If, on the other hand, the explanation given by the applicant is found to be concocted or he is thoroughly negligent in prosecuting his cause, then it would be a legitimate exercise of discretion not to condone the delay. 25. In cases involving the State and its agencies/instrumentalities, the Court can take note of the fact that sufficient time is taken in the decision making process but no premium can be given for total lethargy or utter negligence on the part of the officers of the State and / or its agencies / instrumentalities and the applications filed by them for condonation of delay cannot be allowed as a matter of course by accepting the plea that dismissal of the matter on the ground of bar of limitation will cause injury to the public interest. 29. Unfortunately, the learned Single Judge of the High Court altogether ignored the gapping holes in the story concocted by the Corporation about misplacement of the papers and total absence of any explanation as to why nobody even bothered to file applications for issue of certified copies of judgment for more than 7 years. In our considered view, the cause shown by the Corporation for delayed filing of the appeals was, to say the least, wholly unsatisfactory and the reasons assigned by the learned Single Judge for condoning more than 7 years delay cannot but be treated as poor apology for the exercise of discretion by the Court under Section 5 of the Limitation Act.” 12. Accordingly, in view of the discussions and analysis, made hereinabove, there is no merit in the petition and the same is dismissed. Pending application(s), if any, are also disposed of. No order as to costs.