JUDGMENT : Heard. 2. ADMIT. Heard finally by consent of the parties. 3. The petitioners are accused for the offences punishable under sections 489-B and 489-C read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code in First Information Report No. 218 of 2013. The maximum punishment provided for 489-B of the Indian Penal Code is Life Imprisonment. As such, the respondents were under obligation to file charge-sheet within a period of 90 days from the date of arrest of the petitioners to prevent possibility of petitioners getting bail under section 167 (2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Admittedly, charge-sheet was not filed within a period of 90 days. Bail was, therefore, granted to them by order dated 27th November, 2013, which runs as under : "1. Accused Nos. 1 and 2 are hereby released on their P.R. Bonds of Rs. 25,000/- each with solvent surety of like amount each vide section 167 (2) of Criminal Procedure Code. 2. Issue show cause notice to I.O. of Crime No. 218/2013 of PS Kalmana as to why he has not filed charge-sheet against accused within statutory limit provided under Sec. 167 (2) of Criminal Procedure Code as accused are in Jail since arrest." 4. Charge-sheet was filed on next day i.e. on 28-11-2013. The petitioners moved an application for acceptance of surety pursuant to the order passed by the learned Magistrate on 27th November, 2013. The learned Magistrate, after hearing the learned counsel for the petitioners and the learned Additional Public Prosecutor, took a following view : "... The present application has been filed on 30-11-2013. The learned counsel for the accused has placed his reliance on verdict of Hon'ble High Court reported in 2012 ALL M.R. (Cri.) 1204 Umaji Shende vs. State. I have gone through the said verdict. Hon'ble High Court has held that the filing of charge-sheet does not affect the indefeasible right to release on bail. However, the Hon'ble High Court, Bombay (Full Bench) in its verdict reported in 2001 (4) Mh.L.J. 582 Rehmankha Kukha vs. State of Maharashtra has held that surety surety of accused cannot be accepted after filing of charge-sheet inconsonance with order passed under Sec. 167 (2) of Criminal Procedure Code. Hon'ble High Court Full Bench has also considered the verdict of Hon'ble Supreme Court reported in 2000 (4) Mh.L.J. 742 = 2001 SCC (Cri.) 760 Uday Mohanlal Acharya vs. State of Maharashtra." 5. Hon'ble High Court Full Bench has also considered the verdict of Hon'ble Supreme Court reported in 2000 (4) Mh.L.J. 742 = 2001 SCC (Cri.) 760 Uday Mohanlal Acharya vs. State of Maharashtra." 5. In my considered opinion, the learned Magistrate has misdirected himself and has misconstrued the judgment of this Court, reported at 2001 (4) Mh.L.J. 582 in the matter of Rehmankha Kalukha vs. State of Mah. This Court has followed the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the matter of Uday Mohanlal Acharya, 2000 (4) Mh.L.J. 742 . A portion of the judgment of this Court can be reproduced as under : "8.By referring to catena of authorities on the point, Supreme Court has summarised the legal position in the case of Uday Mohanlal Acharya vs. State of Maharashtra reported in 2000 (4) Mh.L.J. 742 = AIR 2001 SC 1910 as under : "On the aforesaid premises, we would record our conclusions as follows : 1. Under sub-section (2) of section 167, a Magistrate before whom an accused is produced while the police is investigating into the offence can authorise detention of the accused in such custody as the Magistrate thinks fit for a term not exceeding 15 days in the whole. 2. Under the proviso to aforesaid sub-section (2) of section 167, the Magistrate may authorise detention of the accused otherwise than the custody of police for a total period not exceeding 90 days where the investigation relates to offence punishable with death, imprisonment for life or imprisonment for a term of not less than 10 years, and 60 days where the investigation relates to offence punishable with death, imprisonment for life or imprisonment for a term of not less than 10 years, and 60 days where the investigation relates to any other offence. 3. On the expiry of the said period of 90 days or 60 days, as the case may be, an indefeasible right accrues in favour of the accused for being released on bail on account of default by the Investigating Agency in the completion of the investigation within the period prescribed and the accused is entitled to be released on bail, if he is prepared to and furnish the bail, as directed by the Magistrate. 4. 4. When an application for bail is filed by an accused for enforcement of his indefeasible right alleged to have been accrued in his favour on account of default on the part of the investigating agency in completion of the investigation within the specified period, the Magistrate/ Court must dispose it of forthwith, on being satisfied that in fact the accused has been in custody for the period of 90 days or 60 days, as specified and no charge-sheet has been filed by the Investigating Agency. Such prompt action on the part of the Magistrate/ Court will not enable the prosecution to frustrate the object of the Act and the legislative mandate of an accused being released on bail on account of the default on the part of the Investigating Agency in completing the investigation within the period stipulated. 5. If the accused is unable to furnish bail, as directed by the Magistrate, then the conjoint reading of Explanation I and proviso to sub-section (2) of section 167, the continued custody of the accused even beyond the specified period in paragraph (a) will not be unauthorised, and therefore, if during that period the investigation is complete and charge-sheet is filed then the so called indefeasible right of the accused would stand extinguished." 6. It is thus, clear that if the accused has applied for bail and bail has been granted to him and he is ready to offer surety he has availed the indefeasible right available to him under section 167 (2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. In the present case, the order of bail was passed on 27th November, 2013. Charge-sheet was filed on 28th November, 2013. The application for acceptance of surety was filed on 30th November, 2013. As such, the charge-sheet was filed in the period intervening the order of bail and the application for acceptance of surety. In my opinion, filing of charge-sheet immediately after grant of bail will not frustrate the order already passed by the Court. It may take some time for the accused in whose favour the bail order has been passed to arrange for sureties and furnish the same before the competent authority. It may also take some time for the authority concerned (Magistrate or the Registrar, as the case may be) to consider the surety application and to pass necessary orders. It may take some time for the accused in whose favour the bail order has been passed to arrange for sureties and furnish the same before the competent authority. It may also take some time for the authority concerned (Magistrate or the Registrar, as the case may be) to consider the surety application and to pass necessary orders. Time consumed in such a process cannot frustrate the order passed by the Magistrate in favour of the accused. In a recent judgment in the matter of Sayed Mohd. vs. State, reported at AIR 2013 SC 152 has, at paragraph 24, said as under : "24. Having carefully considered the submissions made on behalf of the respective parties, the relevant provisions of law and the decision cited, we are unable to accept the submissions advanced on behalf of the State by the learned Additional Solicitor General, Mr. Raval. There is no denying the fact that on 17th July, 2012, when CR No. 86 of 2012 was allowed by the Additional Sessions Judge and the custody of the Appellant was held to be illegal and an application under section 167 (2) Criminal Procedure Code was made on behalf of the Appellant for grant of statutory bail which was listed for hearing. Instead of hearing the application, the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate adjourned the same till the next day when the Public Prosecutor filed an application for extension of the period of custody and investigation and on20th July, 2012 extended the time of investigation and the custody of the Appellant for a further period of 90 days with retrospective effect from 2nd June, 2012. Not only is the retrospectivity of the order of the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate untenable, it could not also defeat the statutory right which had accrued to the Appellant on the expiry of 90 days from the date when the Appellant was taken into custody. Such right, as has been commented upon by this Court in the case of Sanjay Dutt (supra) and the other cases cited by the learned Additional Solicitor General, could only be distinguished once the charge-sheet had been filed in the case and no application has been made prior thereto for grant of statutory bail. Such right, as has been commented upon by this Court in the case of Sanjay Dutt (supra) and the other cases cited by the learned Additional Solicitor General, could only be distinguished once the charge-sheet had been filed in the case and no application has been made prior thereto for grant of statutory bail. It is well-established that if an accused does not exercise his right to grant of statutory bail before charge-sheet is filed, he loses his right to such benefit once such charge-sheet is filed and can, thereafter, only apply for regular bail." 7. In the present case, the application was made before expiry of 90 days from the date of arrest. Bail has also been granted before filing of the charge-sheet. Charge-sheet is filed on next day of grant of bail. As already stated by me, filing of charge-sheet before processing of surety application cannot defeat the right already accrued to the petitioners. As such, the petitioners have availed bail and have offered sureties also. In the circumstances, the order passed by the learned Magistrate, rejecting the application of the petitioners for acceptance of surety, is required to be set aside. Hence, I pass the following order. i) The impugned order dated 3rd December, 2013, rejecting application of the petitioners for acceptance of surety, is set aside. ii) The learned Magistrate is directed to entertain the surety application filed by the petitioners pursuant to the order passed by the learned Magistrate on 27th November, 2013. iii) The surety application shall be decided on merits. The present writ petition stands disposed of accordingly.