ORDER : S.V. Bhatt, J. 1. The grievance in the writ petition arises under the A.P Land Reforms (Ceiling on Agricultural Holdings) Act, 1973 (for short 'Act 1 of 1973) and the A.P. Land Reforms (Ceiling on Agricultural Holdings) Amendment Act, 1977 (for short 'Act 10 of 1977'). The subject matter of present writ petition is an extent of Ac.5-28 cents at Pedakallepalli. The details of petition schedule are as follows: Name of the Village R.S. No. Extent Ac. cts Pedakallepalli 278/2 3 4 5 Total 0-01 0-54 1-52 3-21 Ac. 5-28 2. The petitioners invoked the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India for issuance of Writ of Mandamus declaring proceedings Rc. No. CC/1924/D/75 dated 08.12.1998 of 1st respondent, as illegal, violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. 3. The effect of impugned proceedings is that the 1st respondent decided to acquire the petition lands in terms of Section 7(5) of Act 10 of 1977 without dispossessing the assignees/respondents 3 to 21 from the petition schedule lands. The 2nd respondent is further requested to report the probable amount of compensation payable to the petitioners for getting funds from social welfare department. In short, through the impugned proceedings, the 1st respondent in exercise of the purported power under Act 10 of 1977 directed acquisition of petition lands instead of restoration of possession to the writ petitioners who are found to be non-surplus holders under Act 1 of 1973. 4. The petitioners on the one hand have been canvassing for re-transfer of petition lands to them and on the other respondent Nos. 3 to 21 are contesting for continuation of possession. As a result, a series of cases under Act 1 of 1973 and under Act 10 of 1977 have been filed and decided. The parties on both sides rely upon the same chronology of dates and events but the submission is made which suits the stand the party has taken. With a view to appreciating the real controversy between the parties, I consider it appropriate to refer to the events in the matter in the same chronological order. 5. The writ petitioners are daughters of one Prabhala Venkata Krishna Sastry. Prabhala Venkata Krishna Sastry and Prabhala Seetharamaiah were the sons of late Adinarayana Avadani. With a view to appreciating the real controversy between the parties, I consider it appropriate to refer to the events in the matter in the same chronological order. 5. The writ petitioners are daughters of one Prabhala Venkata Krishna Sastry. Prabhala Venkata Krishna Sastry and Prabhala Seetharamaiah were the sons of late Adinarayana Avadani. It is admitted fact that the said Adinarayana Avadani was the absolute owner of the petition lands including other ancestral and self-acquired properties. He died in the year 1927 leaving behind him his two sons, to share both ancestral and self-acquired properties. It is a concluded finding of fact in the earlier round of litigation that late Prabhala Venkata Krishna Sastry and Prabhala Seetharamaiah partitioned the ancestral and self-acquired properties of Adinarayana Avadhani. The father of petitioners was given one third share in the ancestral properties and half share in the self-acquired properties. Proportionately, Seetharamaiah was given two-thirds share in ancestral properties and one third share in self-acquired properties of Adinarayana Avadhani. On 01.06.1947, Prabhala Krishna Sastry died leaving behind him the petitioners as successors/legal heirs since their mother pre-deceased the father. It is the case of petitioners that Seetharamaiah was looking after all the properties fallen to their shares as well. The petitioners aver that Seetharamaiah filed a declaration in CC. No. 1924/Divi/75 under Section 8 of Act 1 of 1973, including the petition schedule lands. 6. At the first instance, it was found by the Land Reforms Tribunal that Seetharamaiah possessed 1.2639 standard holdings and the same is in excess of one standard holding. On 09.12.1976, the respondents have taken possession of petition lands from the declarant i.e., P. Seetharamaiah towards surrender of excess lands. On 25.04.1977, the same land was assigned to 21 landless poor, who belong to scheduled caste. The original assignees or their successors-in-interest are now impleaded as respondent Nos. 3 to 21 in writ petition. In December 1980, the declarant-Seetharamaiah died. On 09.02.1982, a sum of ` 5,000/- was paid to the declarant towards compensation under Act 1 of 1973. 7. It is the case of petitioners that on coming to know that their paternal uncle, without reference to the partition between brothers, included the agricultural land in CC. No. 1924/Divi/75. In December 1980, the declarant-Seetharamaiah died. On 09.02.1982, a sum of ` 5,000/- was paid to the declarant towards compensation under Act 1 of 1973. 7. It is the case of petitioners that on coming to know that their paternal uncle, without reference to the partition between brothers, included the agricultural land in CC. No. 1924/Divi/75. The inclusion of petition lands in the very declaration is factually and legally unsustainable and, therefore, through representation dated 18.01.1988 filed before the Land Reforms Tribunal contended that declarant late Seetharamaiah was not the owner of the petition land and the land included shall have to be excluded from the declaration of Seetharamaiah and the same shall be re-transferred/restored to petitioners. Through endorsement dated 26.02.1988, the Primary Tribunal refused to re-consider the matter. Aggrieved by the order dated 26.02.1988, the petitioners filed an appeal before Land Reforms Appellate Tribunal, Krishna at Machilipatnam in LRA. No. 8/1988. 8. On 19.03.1990, the Appellate Tribunal set aside the endorsement dated 26.02.1988 in C.C. No. 1924/Divi/75. In the instant order, it was further held by the Appellate Tribunal that the declarant late Seetharamaiah was entitled to one Standard Holding and the petitioners are entitled to one Standard Holding that there was no excess land liable for surrender under Act 1 of 1973. The Authorised Officer, Bandar aggrieved by the order dated 19.03.1990 in L.R.A. No. 8/1988 filed C.R.P. No. 3101 of 1990 in this Court. Likewise, assignees/respondent Nos. 3 to 21 filed W.P. No. 16255 of 1990 against the threatened action of dispossession. In the meantime, it is averred by petitioners that the 2nd respondent through order dated 06.08.1990 directed restoration of petition land to the petitioners herein. The petitioners were further directed to re-deposit the compensation amount of Rs. 5,000/- stated to have been paid in the year 1982. 9. It is contextual to refer at this stage that the petitioners through challan dated 03.09.1990 re-deposited the compensation amount of Rs. 5,000/-. In view of these developments, it is the case of the petitioners that the authorities are under obligation to restore or redeliver possession of petition lands to them. The assignees filed a writ petition complaining inaction in re-transfer. This Court through order dated 17.04.1992 considered the controversy presented for decision and finally allowed the revision filed by the Authorized Officer, remanded the case to Appellate Tribunal for consideration of their representation dated 18.01.1988 afresh. The assignees filed a writ petition complaining inaction in re-transfer. This Court through order dated 17.04.1992 considered the controversy presented for decision and finally allowed the revision filed by the Authorized Officer, remanded the case to Appellate Tribunal for consideration of their representation dated 18.01.1988 afresh. Before parting with narration, I consider it appropriate to refer to a few findings of the learned Judge in the common order dated 17.04.1992 which have bearing on the final disposal of the present writ petition. The excerpts are as follows: "There is nothing to indicate that one who had not asserted his right at the time of the enquiry under Section 9 cannot file objections claiming his right at the state of surrender or taking possession of the land. If a person having title to the land in question had no knowledge of the public notices issued, he could not file objections either at the time of determination of the enquiry under Section 9 or surrender proceedings under Section 10. If the person having title or his representative is at the land at the time of taking delivery by the Revenue Divisional Officer or the Officer authorized by him necessarily an objection will be raised and if the Revenue Divisional Officer or the officer authorized by him persists in taking possession, the objector can move the Appellate Court. But if the person possessing title or his representative is not present at the time of taking delivery of the land by the Revenue Divisional Officer or the officer authorized by him and thereby the possession is taken, can it be said that the person having title for the land independently of the declarant is left without any remedy" (emphasis added) "It is urged for the revision petitioner and the writ petitioners that the remedy of the concerned person, after the possession is taken by the Revenue Divisional Officer or the Officer authorised by him is only by way of a suit. But the said contention cannot be acceded to."...... "........Then the only remedy of the person claiming title is to move the primary tribunal and he./she can so move even after the possession is taken for there is no bar of limitation. But the said contention cannot be acceded to."...... "........Then the only remedy of the person claiming title is to move the primary tribunal and he./she can so move even after the possession is taken for there is no bar of limitation. Of course, the person claiming title cannot so move if he/she lose title if the Government or all other from Government perfect title by adverse possession." "Rule 10-A of the Rules provided for re-transfer of the land was taken possession and allotted prior to 30.4.1977. If it is subsequent to that date, it had to be seen whether any improvement has been made, and in case of re-transfer, the allottee or assignee had to be compensated for the same if re-transferred had to be ordered. Of course, Rule 10-A was incorporated as re-determination was made necessary in view of the amendment by Act 10 of 1977. But the same procedure can be adopted on equitable grounds. If the land of a person who establishes title independently of the declarant had to be retransferred. In such a case the allottee or the assignee had to be assigned some other land which is vested in the Government." 10. The Land Reforms Appellate Tribunal through order dated 02.11.1994 in L.R.A. No. 159/94 set aside the endorsement dated 26.02.1988 and directed the Primary Tribunal to consider Exs. A-1 to A-26 and pass appropriate orders. The Land Reforms Appellate Tribunal through order dated 20.10.1995 accepted the case of petitioners and finally disposed of the application in the following terms: "Accordingly, I hold that the declarant is entitled to one Standard Holding and the petitioners herein are entitled to one Standard Holding. The total holding of the declarant is 1.2639 Standard Holding. Therefore, there is no excess land for the family/unit of the declarant." 11. This was followed by consequential order dated 25.11.1995 to re-transfer the petition land to the petitioners. The order dated 20.10.1995 of the Primary Tribunal was confirmed in L.R.A. No. 15/95 and C.R.P. No. 98 of 1998. The final determination in CC. No. 1924/Divi/75 is that late Seetharamaiah and petitioners who were majors and legal heirs of late Prabhala Venkata Krishna Sastry are entitled for one Standard Holding each. It was further found that there was no surplus holding at the hands of petitioners and their paternal uncle. 12. The final determination in CC. No. 1924/Divi/75 is that late Seetharamaiah and petitioners who were majors and legal heirs of late Prabhala Venkata Krishna Sastry are entitled for one Standard Holding each. It was further found that there was no surplus holding at the hands of petitioners and their paternal uncle. 12. The petitioners filed W.P. No. 26495 of 1996 with a prayer to direct respondents to pass orders on the representation dated 02.11.1996 for implementing the orders of Land Reforms Tribunal, Bandar. On 12.12.1996, the writ petition was disposed of directing the respondents to take appropriate action within a period of four weeks from the date of receipt of the copy of order. On 16.01.1997, the 2nd respondent cancelled the assignment in favour of respondents 3 to 21. Respondents 3 to 21 filed L.R.A. No. 4 of 1997 before L.R.A.T., West Godavari, Eluru and W.P. No. 7201 of 1997 against these orders. It is matter of record that on 18.02.2002 L.R.A. No. 4 of 1997 was dismissed. It is the case of the petitioners that on 03.04.1997 the M.R.O., Mopidevi delivered possession of petition lands to the petitioners. However, this is contested by respondents 3 to 21. The writ petition filed by respondents 3 to 21 was disposed of by this Court and the same was subjected to review and recall by the aggrieved parties. I consider it appropriate to refer to the order of this Court dated 13.02.1998. "However, I am of the opinion that it is necessary to place on record the fact that this is not a case where Rule 10-A of the Rules is applicable on its terms, but this will not prevent the 1st respondent- District Collector, Krishna at Machilipatnam from disposing of the petition dated 5-5-1997 given by the petitioners, in accordance with law, but without reference to Rule 10-A of the Land Ceiling Rules. The District Collector will dispose of the said application within one month from the date of receipt of a copy of this order after giving an opportunity of being heard to the respondents in the writ petition. Meanwhile, status quo shall be maintained." The 1st respondent in exercise of his purported power under Section 7(5) of Act 10 of 1977 has called upon the 2nd respondent to acquire the land without dispossessing respondents 3 to 21. Meanwhile, status quo shall be maintained." The 1st respondent in exercise of his purported power under Section 7(5) of Act 10 of 1977 has called upon the 2nd respondent to acquire the land without dispossessing respondents 3 to 21. In other words, treating the case as falling under Act 10/1977 a decision to pay compensation was taken instead of re-transfer of petition lands to petitioners. Aggrieved by the said order, the present writ petition is filed. 13. Heard learned counsel for the petitioners, learned Government Pleader and Sri Ravi Kondaveeti, learned counsel for respondents 3 to 21. Sri V.S.R. Anjaneyulu, learned counsel for the petitioners vehemently contends that the order of the 1st respondent suffers from patent illegalities and irregularities, and that the 1st respondent either in fact or in law has no jurisdiction under Section 7(5) of Act 10 of 1977 to pass the order impugned in the writ petition. The contention of the learned counsel is that the finding of fact recorded by the Primary Tribunal, Bandar, is that the petitioners as on 01.01.1975 were majors and in their own right they were entitled to hold one Standard Holding. Therefore, in the case on hand, there is no surplus holding for surrender by the petitioners and consequently, the petition lands are liable to be re-transferred to petitioners. In view of the findings of the Primary Tribunal, dated 20.10.1995 the respondents have no option except to retransfer/restore petition lands to the petitioners. It is further contended that the scheme under Act 10 of 1977 has no application to the case on hand. It may be true that on 09.12.1976 assignment to respondents 3 to 21 was made, but if re-transfer arises for any one or the other circumstances referred in sub-sections (1) to (5) of Section 7 of Act 10 of 1977, the 1st respondent has authority to exercise his discretion as to whether the land should be re-transferred or the same is acquired and compensation paid to the petitioners. It is further contended that in view of the findings of this Court in C.R.P. No. 3101 of 1990 and W.P. No. 16255 of 1990, the 1st respondent cannot give a different finding on concluded matters i.e., in the event the petitioners herein establishing that their land is erroneously included in the declaration of their paternal uncle, the petition land has to be transferred to the petitioners. It is further contended that being unsuccessful before every forum, respondents 3 to 21 firstly do not have any independent right and secondly to deprive the proprietary right of the petitioners, the actions of respondents are not in line with Article 300-A of the Constitution of India. The learned counsel relied upon decisions reported in M.V. Thimma Reddy and others v. The Special Tahsildar, Land Reforms, Kumool and another : 1995 (1) An.W.R. 484 : 1995(1) ALD 575 , Medipally Pentaiah and others v. Revenue Divisional Officer and others : 2006 (6) ALT 247 , and B.P. Venkata Subba Reddy v. Obanna and others : 2004 (3) ALT 214 . 14. Per contra, Mr. Ravi Kondaveeti tried to persuade this Court that the material available on record if examined would disclose a few aspects of the matter which ultimately would go to the root of the controversy in the case i.e., the petitioners both by record and depositions are bound by declaration of late Seetharamaiah and the same was rightly found to be a surplus holding and the petitioners even on redetermination of surplus holding are not entitled as a matter of right for retransfer but their cases are required to be considered under Section 7 of the Amendment Act 10 of 1977 read with Rule 10-A of the Rules. The learned counsel further contends that the competing interests of the petitioners and respondents 3 to 21 are for possession of petition lands. Compared between petitioners and respondents, the respondents are totally dependent on the assigned land and the petitioners are not deprived of their property, for a decision to pay compensation is taken through impugned proceedings. If the petitioners for any reason are aggrieved by the quantum of compensation offered by the respondents, they can certainly move the Civil Court under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act. The learned counsel relies upon the decisions reported in K. Ramachandra Reddy v. Government of A.P. and another, AIR 1982 A P 137. 15. Prima facie, I am of the opinion that the decision relied upon by the learned counsel for respondents has no application to the facts of the present case. Further, respondents 3 to 21 do not have a vested right to continue to retain petition land for their right to enjoy depends on the out of declaration filed by late Seetharamaiah. Prima facie, I am of the opinion that the decision relied upon by the learned counsel for respondents has no application to the facts of the present case. Further, respondents 3 to 21 do not have a vested right to continue to retain petition land for their right to enjoy depends on the out of declaration filed by late Seetharamaiah. Once the extent is re-determined and found to be within ceiling limit, the respondents cannot refuse to part with the possession of petition lands being beneficiaries of alleged surplus ceiling land. 16. On a conspectus of the chronology of events, applicable law to the grievance and the submissions of the learned counsel appearing for the parties, the following points arise for consideration: "(a) Whether the order impugned in the writ petition is liable to be set aside as the same is contrary to the conclusive findings recorded by this Court/LRAT; and (b) Whether in view of the findings of the primary Tribunal, the case on hand can be considered under Act 10 of 1977?" 17. The factual background has been stated in sufficient detail in the preceding paragraphs. I will examine respective contentions by considering the effect of findings recorded by this Court and as well as the authorities under Act 1 of 1973 etc., and also by construing the legal implication of Act of 1 of 1973 and Act 10 of 1977. 18. Briefly stated, the object of Act 1 of 1973 is to consolidate and amend the law relating to the fixation of ceiling on agricultural holdings and taking over surplus lands and to provide for the matters connected therewith. 19. The scheme under the Act 1 of 1973 is as follows: "Under Section 8, the declaration has to be filed in regard to the holding of every person if the holding exceeds the specified limit as on the notified date. Rule 4 of the Rules 1974 lays down inter alia that a copy of declaration or information shall be kept in the office of the Tribunal for public inspection and that a public notice in Form 4 containing the particulars of the land and the person holding such land shall be published by affixing a copy thereof on the notice board of the office of the Tribunal. Under Rule 6, the Tribunal shall fix the date of enquiry in respect of such declaration, notices to persons interested are sent, objections received and on completion of enquiry, the Primary Tribunal passes order under Section 9 determining whether the person holds agricultural land within the ceiling limit or has surplus holding. Thereafter, Section 10 creates obligation on the declarant to surrender the excess land so determined under Section 9 of the Act." 20. Further, procedure stipulated under Section 10(2) is that if he fails to surrender or surrenders a part of surplus holding, steps are to be taken by the Primary Tribunal for selecting the land to be surrendered. Briefly stated, the details of the land considered for surrender are stated. Section 22 (3) empowers the R.D.O. or an Officer authorized by him to take possession of any land vesting in the Government under Act 1 of 1973. The Act provides for receiving objections from any person who claims title independently of the declarant. The person aggrieved by the determination of Primary Tribunal can pursue the remedy of appeal and a further revision under the Act. 21. From the scheme of Act 1 of 1973, it is clear that a person holding agricultural land is under obligation to file a declaration and the same is enquired into and appropriate orders on the holding of agricultural land of the declarant is passed and if that order becomes final, the declaration is under obligation to surrender the excess land stated to be in his possession. On the other hand, if there is no excess land held by the declarant, there is no obligation on the declarant to surrender land to Government, much less any land shall vest in the Government. The decision of Primary Tribunal is subject to appeal and revision. Likewise, the surplus holding and surrender thereunder are subject to further orders of appeal and revision. 22. In the case on hand, the petitioners filed representation for re-consideration of the holding of late Seetharamaiah. The prayer for reconsideration was refused by the Primary Tribunal. But on appeal, the Land Reforms Appellate Tribunal allowed the case of the petitioners. It is contextual to note that against the order of the Land Reforms Appellate Tribunal, the Government, represented by its Authorized Officer, filed C.R.P. 3101 of 1990 in this Court and respondents 3 to 21 filed W.P. No. 16255 of 1990. But on appeal, the Land Reforms Appellate Tribunal allowed the case of the petitioners. It is contextual to note that against the order of the Land Reforms Appellate Tribunal, the Government, represented by its Authorized Officer, filed C.R.P. 3101 of 1990 in this Court and respondents 3 to 21 filed W.P. No. 16255 of 1990. This Court considered the scheme of Act 1 of 1973 and decided that the independent title holder cannot be denied of re-delivery under the Act, for a suit is barred by Act 1 of 1973. This Court further held that the Tribunal shall consider the representation submitted by the petitioners. On remand, the Appellate Tribunal being satisfied that the matter requires re-consideration by the Primary Tribunal, remitted the matter to Primary Tribunal for a decision afresh on merits. The petitioners have proved that the declarant viz., late Seetharamaiah and the petitioners are independently not surplus holders of agricultural land and are well within the standard holdings. Once the petitioners successfully proved that there is no obligation cast on the petitioners or late Seetharamaiah to surrender any land under Act 1 of 1973, the decision to continue to retain land by the respondents is illegal and contrary to the findings recorded by this Court in C.R.P. No. 3101 of 1990. This Court while disposing of the revision has in unequivocal terms held that if the land of person who establishes title independently of the declarant, he is entitled for re-transfer of the same. It is further held by this Court that in such a case, the allottee or the assignee had to be assigned some other land. The finding of the Primary Tribunal that the petitioners are not under obligation to surrender land and they have independently established their right and title are relevant facts in the decision making process of 1st respondent. The order impugned failed to take note of the effect of the order of this Court in C.R.P. No. 3101 of 1990. Further, the order of the Primary Authority was confirmed in L.R.A. No. 15/1995 and also by this Court in C.R.P. No. 98 of 1998. The order impugned failed to take note of the effect of the order of this Court in C.R.P. No. 3101 of 1990. Further, the order of the Primary Authority was confirmed in L.R.A. No. 15/1995 and also by this Court in C.R.P. No. 98 of 1998. Once the petitioners establish that the holdings of late Seetharamaiah on one hand and the petitioners on the other are independent and it is ultimately established that there is no surplus holding in the hands of petitioners, the order passed by the 1st respondent directing payment of compensation in lieu of re-transfer of land under Section 7 (5) of Act 10 of 1977 is contrary to the findings recorded by this Court at the first instance and secondly the redetermination has become final and binding between the parties. 23. Further, the 2nd respondent through proceedings dated 16.01.1997 directed delivery of petition lands and this order was confirmed in L.R.A. No. 4 of 1997. Thus, the decision to re-transfer the land has received the seal of approval of L.R.A.T. Now, by reference to the order of this Court in W.P. No. 7201 of 1997, the 1st respondent cannot change the complexion of the grievance canvassed by the petitioners all these years. The order impugned suffers from patent illegalities and fails to consider the decisions in the right perspective. Mere reference to Section 7(5) of Act 10 of 1977 is illegal and unauthorised, won't clothe the respondents with authority. The impugned order, cannot otherwise be sustained as well. 24. The other point namely whether the case on hand comes under Act 10 of 1977 is required to be independently considered. Section 7 of Act 10 of 1977 reads as follows: "7. The impugned order, cannot otherwise be sustained as well. 24. The other point namely whether the case on hand comes under Act 10 of 1977 is required to be independently considered. Section 7 of Act 10 of 1977 reads as follows: "7. Special provisions for cases affected by the provisions of the Principal Act as amended by this Act- Notwithstanding anything in the Principal Act,- (1) Wherein any case to which the provisions of the principal Act as amended by this Act are applicable, the Tribunal has determined under Section 9 of the principal Act, the extent of land in excess of the ceiling area (hereafter in this section referred to as "the excess land") before the date on which the assent of the President to this Act is first published in the Andhra Pradesh Gazette (hereinafter in this section referred to as " the said date",) but a proceeding in respect thereof under Section 10 of the principal Act is pending before the Tribunal on the said date the Tribunal may suo motu and shall, on an application made in this behalf by any person affected, determine the excess land under Section 9 of the principal Act afresh, or approve a surrender of the excess land made by the person concerned afresh, or as the case may be, select the land to be surrendered, under Section 10 of the principal Act afresh, in accordance with the provisions of the principal Act as amended by this Act. (2) Where any proceeding which is affected by the provisions of the principal Act as amended by this Act is pending before the Appellate Tribunal of the High Court on the said date, the Appellate Tribunal or the High Court may, suo motu and shall, on an application made in this behalf by the person affected, remand the case relating to such proceeding to the Tribunal, for fresh determination of excess land; or for approval of fresh surrender of excess land, or as the case may be, for fresh selection of the land to be surrendered, in accordance with the provisions of the principal Act as amended by this Act; (3) In any case not provided in Clauses (1) and (2) of this section any person, to whom the provisions of the principal Act as amended by this Act are applicable, may within sixty days from the said date file an application before the Tribunal for fresh determination of the excess land under Section 9 of the principal Act or approval of the surrender of excess land under Section 10 of the Principal Act; (4) The provisions of the principal Act shall apply to every case falling under clause (1) or Clause (2) or Clause (3) of this section as if the fresh determination of excess land or approval of fresh surrender of excess land, or as the case may be, selection of the land to be surrendered, made thereunder, were made under Section 9, or as the case may be, under Section 10, of the principal Act; (5) Where, as a result of the fresh determination of excess land or approval of fresh surrender of excess land or selection of the land to be surrendered in accordance with the provisions of the principal Act as amended by this Act, any land vested in the Government under Section 11, or the principal act is to be re-transferred to the person who surrendered such land, the land shall, subject to such rules as may be prescribed, be re-transferred to such person on repayment of the amount paid to him by the Government in respect of that land, and where such land was allotted or transferred to any person in accordance with the provisions of Section 14 of the principal Act prior to the date, it shall be lawful of the District Collector to resume the land from the person to whom the land is so allotted or transferred and in lieu thereof allot or transfer to the allottee or transferee any other land vesting in the Government, subject to the provisions of Section 14 aforesaid: Provided that where the District Collector considers that the resumption of such land is likely to cause undue hardship to the allottee or transferee thereof, he shall, subject to the approval of the Government, pay to the person, who is entitled to receive the amount in respect of the land under the principal Act, in lieu o/retransferring the land, a sum equal to the amount that would have been payable for such land as if a notification under sub-section(1) of Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 had been issued for the acquisition of that land on the first day of January, 1975, after deducting the amount already paid to him in respect thereof" 25. I am relieved of considering the applicability of Act 10 of 1977 to limited situations for in M.V. Thimma Reddy and others v. The Special Tahsildar, Land Reforms, Kurnool and another: 1995 (1) An.W.R. 484 : 1995(1) ALD 575 (supra), a learned Single Judge on construction of history, intention and object of Act 10 of 1977 held as follows: "...The very opening words of subsection (5) are that the provision applies only where the re-transfer becomes necessary because of the operation of the Principal Act as amended by the Amendment Act leading to fresh determination of the excess land or approval of fresh surrender of excess land or the selection of the land to be surrendered. These are the key words for applicability of sub-section (5) to Section 7 and hence unless a particular situation is covered or has arisen because of the operation of the Principal Act as retrospectively amended by the Amendment Act. Section 7(5) would have no application. The proviso to Section 7(5) is an exception to the generality of Section 7(5) itself and, as is well known, the provisions of a proviso or an exception would only operate to the extent it excepts the general provision and has no wider sweep or application. In other words, the proviso operates only to restrict the operation of the substantive provision to which it is a rider." (emphasis added) "I agree with the observations. A determination under Section 9 by the primary tribunal is subject to appeal and revision and hence until the appeal and revision are disposed of, the decision cannot be said to be final. If as a result of appeal or revision or a redetermination otherwise some lands which are purported to have been vested earlier are found to be actually not liable for vesting, it must be taken that the title of the landholder throughout continued in respect of that land because of which it could never have vested in the Government. The distribution on the surplus land of which the landholder continued as an owner was nullity and without jurisdiction and he becomes entitled for a re-transfer of the land under Rule 10 A(5). The provisions of the proviso to Section 7(5) of the Amendment Act is an exception only in a particular context and not otherwise." (emphasis added) 26. The distribution on the surplus land of which the landholder continued as an owner was nullity and without jurisdiction and he becomes entitled for a re-transfer of the land under Rule 10 A(5). The provisions of the proviso to Section 7(5) of the Amendment Act is an exception only in a particular context and not otherwise." (emphasis added) 26. The principle laid down by this Court is that Section 7 is intended to deal with the situations arising because of the applicability of the Amendment Act to the Principal Act. As explained above, in the case on hand, the re-determination is not on account of any of the situations referred to in Section 7 of Act 10 of 1977. The redetermination of ceiling limit has arisen on account of erroneously including the land of petitioners in the holding of late Seetharamaiah though they were majors by the time the Act has come into force. Therefore, the case on hand comes under Act 1 of 1973 alone. Having due regard to the principle laid down by this Court in the decision referred to above, it is held that the facts of the case do not attract Act 10 of 1977 and the exercise of power under Section 7(5) of Act 10 of 1977 does not arise. Further, to the same effect, is another decision in Medipally Pentaiah and others v. Revenue Divisional Officer and others : 2006 (6) ALT 247 (supra). The relevant portion reads as follows: "The conspicuous (sic. conspectus) of the above sub-rules is as follows. When an appeal or revision petition filed by the declarant against a finding of being surplus landholder, is allowed, the Tribunal shall have to pass an order entitling the declarant for retransfer of the land. The RDO thereafter has to ascertain whether the land has been allotted or transferred to any person and then a notice has to be issued to the declarant that the land will be retransferred on payment of money to the Government. On such a payment, the RDO shall authorize the Revenue Inspector to deliver possession and furnish a certificate in Form XI-A. Sub-rule (7) of Rule 10-A of the Rules is to the effect that when the land in question has been transferred/assigned to any person, the same shall have to be resumed from the transferee for retransfer to the person who surrendered the land. In such an event, under clause (b) of sub-rule (7) of Rule 10-A, the RDO has to take steps to allot or transfer to the allottee or transferee any other land vesting in the Government. This legal position is not denied. Here, a reference may be made to sub-rule (4) of Rule 10-A, which is to the effect that if the District Collector considers that the resumption of the land from the allottee or transferee is likely to cause hardship to such transferee/allottee, the District Collector after obtaining permission from the Government, pay to the person (declarant, who surrendered the land) a sum equal to the amount determined in accordance with Section 7(5) of the Act. It is interesting to note that such procedure is contemplated by Rule Making Body only when the land is to be transferred to a declarant pursuant to a fresh determination of an excess land, in accordance with the provisions of the Act as amended by A.P,. Land Reforms (Ceiling on Agricultural Holdings) Amendment Act, 1977. Such procedure is not contemplated when the land has to be retransferred pursuant to the order of the appellate Tribunal under Section 20 of the Act and/or the High Court under Section 21 of the Act. The difference between the two situations is glaring and this provision is not available to the petitioner, as in this case pursuant to the order of the High Court, primary Tribunal redetermined the holding of the declarant and ordered redelivery of the land. The redetermination or retransfer of the land is not in accordance with the provisions of the Amended Act No. 10 of 1977 and, therefore, Rule 10-A (4) of the Rules has no application to the facts of this case" 27. I am of the view that the impugned order, calling upon the 2nd respondent to acquire the petition land in lieu o/re-transfer under Section 7(5) of Act 10 of 1977, amounts to illegal exercise of power and contrary to the categorical findings recorded by this Court between the parties. Consequently, I answer first two points in favour of petitioners and against the respondents. Consequently, I answer first two points in favour of petitioners and against the respondents. It is relevant to observe that respondents by passing the order impugned have denied possession to petitioners and they have rendered themselves liable to pay compensation to petitioners for such denial of possession all these years, otherwise the same amounts to violation of Article 300-A of the Constitution of India. The writ petition is, accordingly, allowed. No order as to costs. Miscellaneous petitions, if any, pending in this writ petition shall stand closed.