People's Movement for Civic Action through its General Secretary, Patricia Pinto v. Goa Coastal Zone Management Authority
2014-02-26
F.M.REIS, ROSHAN DALVI
body2014
DigiLaw.ai
JUDGMENT Mrs. Roshan Dalvi, J. 1. Rule. Made returnable forthwith. The petitioners have filed Petition No.403 of 2007 challenging the construction of a hotel by Respondent No.6 upon permission granted by respondent No.2 under orders dated 31st July, 1995, 8th October, 1998, 1st September, 2001 and 17th September, 2005 in respect of a specific plan dated 31st May, 1995 and the renewals thereto. Upon the prayer of quashing of these orders the petitioners require directions against respondent Nos. 6 and 7 to restore the original nature of the land upon which they have constructed the hotel in the Coastal Regulation Zone (CRZ). 2. Upon having seen that the hotel premises has been constructed in the No Development Zone (NDZ) of the CRZ without the approval of the Ministry of Environment and Forests (MEF), which is mandatorily required, the petitioners have filed Petition No. 659 of 2010 for quashing the NOCs of respondent No.4 dated 16th September, 2008, 5th July, 2010 and 6th July, 2010 and construction licence of respondent No.2 dated 4th October, 2008 and 11th July, 2010 and the consequent occupancy certificate issued by the respondent No.2 dated 11th July, 2010 to respondent Nos. 1, 2 and 3 who are the same as respondent Nos. 6 & 7 in Petition No.403 of 2007 (respondent No.6). 3. There has been a continuous litigation between the parties consequent upon the initial CRZ notification dated 19th February, 1991 specifying NDZ along tidal rivers in CRZ III areas which have been reduced from 100 m from the High Tide Line (HTL) to 50 m under an amendment thereto dated 18th August, 1994. 4. Prior to the said amendment to the said notification respondent Nos. 6 obtained the approval and licence of the Chief Town Planner of the Town and Country Planning Department, respondent No.4, (TP) under Section 44 of the Town & Country Planning Act, 1974 (TP Act) and the Village Panchayat Curea, Bambolim & Talaolim, Tiswadi, Goa, respondent No.2, (VP) under Regulation 83 of the Goa, Daman & Diu Village Panchayats Regulations, 1962 (VP Rules). 5. There are numerous documents showing the initial TP approval and VP construction licence/permission along with the initial plan of respondent Nos. 6 and the later approvals and plans after the amendment to the notification.
5. There are numerous documents showing the initial TP approval and VP construction licence/permission along with the initial plan of respondent Nos. 6 and the later approvals and plans after the amendment to the notification. These have been referred to by all the parties by the specific page numbers of the petition (rather than the exhibit numbers as per the usual practice). Hence it would be convenient to refer to the documents showing the page numbers for easy reference. 6. The initial TP approval, dated 29th October, 1993 (p.116) with which the petitioners have no grievance, was given in respect of the plan approved by the TP (p.115). Consequent thereupon the VP licence dated 26th November, 1993 (p.27) was issued by the VP. This initial permission of the TP bears reference No.DE/ 5453/ ATP/93/39. It relates to the residential complex of the hotel building proposed to be put up by respondent No.6. It specifies that the NOC/approval is granted provided there is no development within 100 m of HTL. It calls upon respondent No.6 to shift the HT block of its building falling within 100 m outside 100 m. This was in view of the CRZ notification dated 19th February, 1991 under which the NDZ was up to 100 m of HTL of a river bank. The VP licence (p.27) dated 26th November, 1993 issued consequent upon the NOC of the TP referes to the aforesaid reference number of the TP/DE/5453/ATP/93/39 dated 29th October, 1993 and is issued as per the plan approved under the said number (p.115). This plan shows 69 cottages to be constructed by respondent No.6 outside the 100m setback line for the NDZ. The hotel of respondent No.6 also was specifically directed to be constructed outside the 100m setback line. The plan 115 bears the aforesaid number DE/5453/ATP/93. The plan bears the stamp of the VP and is accompanied by the licence of the VP (p.27) in terms of the plan. Consequently it is seen that the TP approval 116 and the VP licence (p.27) is in respect of the plan (p.115), each of them bearing the aforesaid reference number. 7.
The plan bears the stamp of the VP and is accompanied by the licence of the VP (p.27) in terms of the plan. Consequently it is seen that the TP approval 116 and the VP licence (p.27) is in respect of the plan (p.115), each of them bearing the aforesaid reference number. 7. After the amendment to the notification which relaxed the CRZ from 100 m to 50 m of the HTL respondent No.6 got another plan approved with the approval of the TP and the licence of the VP for a similar construction, but within the 100 m HTL also. The TP approval in respect of that plan is dated 31st May, 1995 (p.118) and relates to a revised plan also dated 31st May, 1995 (p.117). The approval bears reference No.DE/5453/95/119. It has no ATP in the reference number. It relates to plan (p.117). It mentions about the revised plan within 50 m from the river bank. It refers to the construction of “revised plan-residential”. It specifies that the letter is issued in continuation of the letter bearing reference No. DE/544/53/ATP/93 dated 29th October, 1993, but also specifies that the construction will be allowed within 50 m from the river bank as shown on the site plan. It also shows that the permission was liable to be revoked if it was based on false information or wrong plan, calculations or documents. 8. The plan accompanying the TP approval (p.117) shows 18 blocks within the 50 m from the river bank. This is in addition to the construction approved under the earlier plan of 1993 DE/5453/ATP/93/39 dated 29th October, 1993. The plan bears the same reference No. DE/5453, but being of 1995 bears a further reference No.95/119 in place of ATP/93/39. 9. The VP licence has been issued on 31st July, 1995 for permitting construction as per this plan (p.29). The VP licence dated 31st July, 1995 bears No.95-96/149. It is also in respect of construction of “18 blocks – residential complex GR + 2”. It specifies that the construction shall be as per the plan approved by the VP. It also specifies that the construction should be as per plans approved by the TP under No.DE/5453/95/119 dated 31st May, 1995. 10.
It is also in respect of construction of “18 blocks – residential complex GR + 2”. It specifies that the construction shall be as per the plan approved by the VP. It also specifies that the construction should be as per plans approved by the TP under No.DE/5453/95/119 dated 31st May, 1995. 10. Consequently upon the amendment to the CRZ notification respondent No.6 came to have an approval for a residential project including a hotel of 69 cottages as earlier approved in 1993 + 18 further blocks approved in 1995. The construction of the 18 blocks is in sinc with the construction of the 69 cottages. 11. This plan has been accepted by the petitioners. This plan was also accepted by the respondent No.6 earlier, as shall be seen presently, but has later been sought to be rejected in view of another plan that is relied upon by the respondent No.6. 12. The respective construction of respondent No.6 contemplated in 1993 and 1995 may be seen to be crystallized under the aforesaid documents read together: Sr.No. Year VP licence TP approval Plan 1. 1993DE/5453/ATP/93/39 26/11/1993(27) 29/10/1993(116) 29/10/1993(115) 2 1995DE/5453/95/119 31/7/1995(29) 31/5/1995(118) 31/5/1995(117) (No ATP) 13. The VP licence of 1995 was issued for a period of 3 years. It has been extended from time to time thereafter by the VP in 1998 (p.39) 2001(p.45) and is stated to be further extended in 2005(p.48). The last extension is stated to be up to 2008 during which period respondent No.6 has put up the disputed construction. It would be interesting to see the renewals applied for and granted. 14. The renewal of VP licence dated 8th October, 1998 bears reference No.95-96/149 dated 31st July, 1995. The renewal of VP licence dated 1st September, 2001 also bears reference No.95-96/149. The renewal of VP licence of 17th September, 2005 shows reference No.2005-2006/613. It is the new number given in the VP licence for the first time. This licence is in respect of “construction of residential complex and hotel project”. It refers to a plan dated 22nd July, 2005 approved by the VP. Though it refers to an attached plan, the plan is not attached. No such plan is produced by respondent No.6. The petitioner has requested certified copies of the plan amongst other plans. The VP has stated that the plan cannot be traced amongst other such plans which also cannot be traced.
Though it refers to an attached plan, the plan is not attached. No such plan is produced by respondent No.6. The petitioner has requested certified copies of the plan amongst other plans. The VP has stated that the plan cannot be traced amongst other such plans which also cannot be traced. The plan for which construction licence is issued by the VP has to be approved by the TP before such licence is issued. This plan is not shown to be approved by the TP. 15. In view of these licences the applications of respondent No.6 become important as well as interesting to consider. The application of 1998 is neither produced nor disputed. The application of 2001 is dated 7th May, 2001 (p.40). It refers to construction licence 1995- 1996/149 as also the earlier construction licence 1993-1994/9/328 dated 26th November, 1993. It calls for merging of the two licences into a single merged licence. The application of respondent No.6 dated 27th August, 2004 (p.46) refers to the VP licence 1995-1996/149. It is in respect of the “residential complex and hotel project”. The licence was not extended within its validity period. It expired on 1st September, 2004. Another application is made by respondent No.6 on 22nd July, 2005 (p.47). This also bears reference to VP licence 95-96/149. It is also for permission for “residential complex and hotel project”. Respondent No.6 is not shown to have attached any plan dated 22nd July, 2005 to its application dated 22nd July, 2005. Thereafter the VP licence has been granted on 17th September, 2005 (p.48) also without showing any plan dated 22nd July, 2005. It can be seen that the initial VP licence of 31st July, 1995 which was in consonance with the TP approval of the plan dated 31st May, 2005 shown above has been renewed and applied to be renewed from time to time until 2005. It is only in 2005 that despite the application bearing VP licence No.95-96/149, the renewal is granted under the new number 613 without any plan shown by any party annexed thereto. 16. Such is the initial construction sought to be made and permitted by VP & TP within 100m of the river bank and the later additional construction sought to be made and permitted by VP & TP within 50 m of the river bank upon the amendment to the notification. 17.
16. Such is the initial construction sought to be made and permitted by VP & TP within 100m of the river bank and the later additional construction sought to be made and permitted by VP & TP within 50 m of the river bank upon the amendment to the notification. 17. It is the construction under the plan dated 31st May, 1955 (p.117) which is permitted by law as shall be seen presently. It has been contended on behalf of the petitioners that no renewals could have been granted in respect of the construction approved and licenced but not put up and only repairs could be permitted to the construction which would be put up in view of the Supreme Court declaring the amendment notification dated 18th August, 1994 illegal and bad. It would be seen that in view of the allowance made by the Supreme Court and the interpretation of the Supreme Court for grant of such allowance in an earlier petition filed by the respondent No.6 before the Supreme Court that the construction initially sought and approved in 1993 with addition of the construction sought and approved in 1995 would be permissible. 18. There is no dispute that the amendment notification dated 18th 11 WP.403/2007 & WP.659/2010-Judgment August, 1994 was challenged before the Supreme Court amongst other challenges therein. No interim relief was granted pending that petition. The Supreme Court declared the amendment notification illegal on 18th April, 1996. In the interregnum several constructions were put up by various parties along the river banks throughout India. The construction under the TP approval dated 31st May, 1995 as per the plan dated 31st May, 1995 and the VP licence dated 31st July, 1995 was of respondent No.6 which is the disputed construction in this petition. 19. There has been other lis between the parties with regard to such construction. However the sanctity of the construction has been considered by the Supreme Court in its judgment dated 31st March, 2010 (p.190) by which alone the parties are covered and this Court is bound. 20.
19. There has been other lis between the parties with regard to such construction. However the sanctity of the construction has been considered by the Supreme Court in its judgment dated 31st March, 2010 (p.190) by which alone the parties are covered and this Court is bound. 20. The judgment came to be passed in a petition filed by the respondent No.6 under Article 32 of the Constitution of India being Writ Petition (Civil) No.329 of 2008 for a declaration that the building plans sanctioned pursuant to the amended notification dated 16th August, 1994 in the year 1995 duly re-validated till date are valid and subsisting and the construction pursuant to the said building plans is also valid. 21. The Supreme Court held in the aforesaid judgment dated 31st March, 2010 that all constructions put up by various parties throughout India pending the determination of the challenge to the notification would be required to be saved and not destroyed. Hence, if they were completed or ongoing construction in the interregnum and pending the petition pursuant to plans sanctioned on the basis of the notification dated 16th August, 1994, the Supreme Court would save the constructions made. It would be implicit in such saving that it would save the constructions which are sanctioned or licenced. The Supreme Court would never save constructions not sanctioned or licenced by the relevant planning authorities. The construction being put up must, therefore, be in accordance with plans sanctioned by the Municipality which is the Planning Authority or the Town Building Department with the Village Panchayat in urban and rural areas respectively. Despite such implicit condition the Supreme Court has, at five places in the aforesaid judgment, specified the saving of ongoing constructions or completed constructions “pursuant to plans sanctioned”. 22. It must be noted that the respondent applied for declaration not only with regard to the building plans sanctioned, but also the further renewals and re-validation till the date of the petition as can be evinced by the aforesaid prayer. The Supreme Court nevertheless has not granted any declaration in respect of any re-validation. The introductory para 1 of the Supreme Court judgment dated 31st March, 2010 makes no mention of any re-validation. It shows the petition having been filed for declaration that building plans sanctioned and constructions made and ongoing constructions were valid.
The Supreme Court nevertheless has not granted any declaration in respect of any re-validation. The introductory para 1 of the Supreme Court judgment dated 31st March, 2010 makes no mention of any re-validation. It shows the petition having been filed for declaration that building plans sanctioned and constructions made and ongoing constructions were valid. Similarly the ultimate paragraph 18 of the judgment shows that the petition only partly succeeded. The Supreme Court declared that declaration of the notification dated 16th August, 1994 would not effect completed or ongoing constructions undertaken pursuant to the notification. The Supreme Court has not granted the declaration that the re-validations made till the date of the petition were also declared as not affected by the notification. It is elementary that what is not granted must be taken to be rejected. It is to that extent alone that the petition of the respondent No.6 succeeded before the Supreme Court. 23. Consequently only the plan sanctioned and the construction by respondent No.6 made in the year 1995 pursuant to the amended notification dated 16th August, 1994 is declared valid. 24. The lis between the parties continued before various authorities including the office of the Collector, the Ministry of Environment and the Goa Coastal Zone Amendment Authority (GCZMA). The contentions of various authorities may not be considered as they have been crystallized in the aforesaid Supreme Court judgment. 25. It is an admitted position and it is reflected and demonstrated also in the aforesaid applications for extensions of respondent No.6 and the extensions granted from time to time by the VP that the construction was not made by respondent No.6 until 2006 or even later. Hence the initial sanction/approval/permission/licence of 31st May, 1995 has not resulted in any construction as per the contention of respondent No.6 itself at least until 2006. What has been saved by the Supreme Court is “completed or ongoing constructions”. 26. The Court has been shown a site visit made and a report prepared by the Directorate of Settlement and Land Records (DSLR) dated 4th May, 2007 that only three structures were constructed up to plinth level between the 50m – 100 m mark (p.23). However little the construction of respondent No.6 may be, it would be “ongoing construction” if the first step towards the construction is taken.
However little the construction of respondent No.6 may be, it would be “ongoing construction” if the first step towards the construction is taken. Consequently the construction as per the sanctioned plan dated 31st May, 1995 and the TP approval dated 31st May, 1995 r.w. the VP licence dated 31st July, 1995 would be ongoing construction so that the construction of respondent No.6 pursuant to plans sanctioned until the date of the declaration of the amendment notification invalid excluding any re-validation, has been specifically permitted by the Supreme Court, without more. In view of the aforesaid judgment of the Supreme Court the applications for re-validation and the re-validation of the same licence or the fresh licence, if any under Nos. 149 and/or 613 issued by the VP assumes no importance and cannot be countenanced. 27. Respondent No.6 itself contends and accepts that there was a lull in its construction activity from 1997 till at least 2006 because of the economic situation. The latest construction licence issued by the VP, be it renewal or be it a fresh licence, dated 17th September, 2005 under the new No.613 (instead of 149) (p.48) as per plans attached, which never were, is sought to be acted upon by respondent No.6 since 2006 when respondent No.6 commenced its construction activity and 2008 when it claims to have completed it (but which claim is seen to be erroneous as shall be shown presently). 28. Since 1995 plan of respondent No.6 is stated to have been revised from time to time for a period of three years each time under Regulation 7 of the Goa Daman and Diu Panchayat Regulations and Building Rules 1971 under the Village Panchayat Regulations Act, it is contended that plan (p.122) duly re-validated from time to time approving the deviations would be in order. Indeed the plan of 1995 may be re-validated/revised from time no time. However in view of the Supreme Court judgment dated 31st March, 2010 no re-validation revision or modification of the plan sanctioned under which the construction was ongoing is permitted. In fact it has specifically rejected the re-validation prayed for by the petitioners. Consequently the plan of 1995 which was within the interregnum period duly sanctioned by the approval of the TP and the licence of the VP would be the only grant for construction.
In fact it has specifically rejected the re-validation prayed for by the petitioners. Consequently the plan of 1995 which was within the interregnum period duly sanctioned by the approval of the TP and the licence of the VP would be the only grant for construction. Strictly speaking, if that plan expires by efflux of time it cannot be re-validated since no Supreme Court order has been passed in that behalf and revalidation is specifically not granted. 29. It is argued on behalf of the respondent No.6 that pursuant to the revision of the plans, the construction put up is as per the reduced FAR and the reduced permissible coverage and hence must be allowed. That however would tantamount to re-validating the sanctioned plan which would go against the mandate of the Supreme Court. 30. Having noticed the construction activity of respondent No.6 within the 50m set back line from the river bank in about December, 2006, the petitioners sought the plans under which respondent No.6 was carrying on construction. The petitioners obtained a wholly new and different plan under which respondent No.6 sought to construct. This had no resemblance to the 69 bungalows or the 18 residential blocks with a hotel structure that was earlier sanctioned, approved and licenced and which could be taken to be ongoing construction as allowed by the Supreme Court. The petitioners have shown such entirely new construction in the plan obtained by the petitioners (p.122). This plan has been a bone of much contention. It has been considered by this Court, and upon various directions of this Court from time to time, by various authorities. It is referred to as 122 plan. It is different from the plans at page 115 and 117 (115 plan and 117 plan). Respondent No.6 contends that 122 plan is the plan dated 31st May, 1995 approved by the TP on 31st May, 1995 in terms of which the VP issued its licence on 31st July, 1995. The petitioners contend that the plan is a complete fabrication and a forgery and consequently a fraud upon the Court in view of the reliance by the respondent No.6 upon such a plan to save its construction. Strangely respondent No.6 would contend that the petitioners have forged 117 plan and played a fraud upon the Court. They would contend that that was never the plan for which any approval was sought or granted.
Strangely respondent No.6 would contend that the petitioners have forged 117 plan and played a fraud upon the Court. They would contend that that was never the plan for which any approval was sought or granted. It will have to be seen how and when 122 plan emerged. 31. Counsel on behalf of the petitioners has meticulously and with much industry shown the Court the admitted circumstantial evidence contained in the admitted documents of the parties to demonstrate the correctness of 117 plan and the falsity of 122 plan. Counsel on behalf of respondent No.6 has sought to show how 122 plan was the correct plan and 117 was the plan that never was. 32. It would be material to go into the aforesaid evidence, but before which the Court may bear reference to the para 13 of the affidavit of respondent No.6 itself filed in MCA (ST) No. 76 of 2014 taken out in Writ Petition No. 403 of 2007 in which respondent No.6 has admitted that prior to the submission of 122 plan, 117 plan (annexure X to the Writ Petition No.403 of 2007) was got prepared by respondent No.6. It is further stated and amplified that 117 plan, annexure X to the petition, was not pursued by respondent No.6 and “immediately thereafter” 122 plan was submitted by respondent No.6 to the VP for its approval. I may, therefore, rest with the conviction that the initial plan of 1995 approved by the TP and for which licence was issued by the VP was 117 plan, annexure X to the petition. 33. The Court would now have to see whether “immediately thereafter” also 122 plan came to be or it ever saw the light of the day then. Respondent No.6 would be expected to travel through more than a decade with 122 plan submitted “immediately after” 117 plan and got sanctioned. Respondent No.6 must show the other sanction accompanying that plan. That would be the TP approval and the VP licence. Such approval and the licence would be other than the TP approval (p.118) and the VP licence (p.29). It is clear that there can be no gainsaying that the TP approval (p.118) and the VP licence (p.29) are the only approval and licence on record. 34. I may mention that the respondent No.6 has been unable to show any construction activity from 1995 to 2006.
It is clear that there can be no gainsaying that the TP approval (p.118) and the VP licence (p.29) are the only approval and licence on record. 34. I may mention that the respondent No.6 has been unable to show any construction activity from 1995 to 2006. Not only is there a plethora of circumstantial evidence with regard to 117 plan shown by the petitioners, as shall be enumerated presently, but a complete vacuum of the evidence of any construction under 122 plan for that entire period of time. This led me to allow and in fact call upon respondent No.6 to produce any other documentary evidence to satisfy our conscience that 122 plan was approved in 1995 “immediately after” 117 plan. Though respondent No.7 produced certain correspondence relating to a certain loan taken by it from a financial institution, it falls woefully short of allowing me to be persuaded that the respondent No.6 used 122 plan even in that area. Despite the letter dated 19th June, 1998 of the Tourism Finance Corporation India Ltd (TFCIL) from which a loan is sought by the respondent No.6 calling upon respondent No.6 to show the status of building plan approval and CRZ approval, respondent No.6 has not shown the Court which was the building plan approved then that was sent to TFCIL under its letter as requested by TFCIL. 35. The riddle that remains unresolved is that if 122 plan was submitted after (albeit immediately after) 117 plan, how does it bear the same date 31st May, 1995? It is not the case of respondent No.6 or VP or TP that two plans diametrically different were issued to a single party, respondent No.6, on the same day! 36. The Court must, therefore, essentially consider the corroborating evidence shown by the petitioners to conclude whether or not 122 plan ever existed prior to 2006 when the construction was taken up by the respondent No.6 and completed by 2008. The evidence is thus: (a) 117 and 122 plans are both dated 31st May, 1995. The reference number of 117 plan is DE/5453/95/119 and of 122 plan is DE/5453/ATP/95/119. 122 plan shows the stamp of the VP thereon without any endorsement. The VP licence does not accompany it unlike 117 plan which has the corresponding VP licence (p.29) and 115 plan which has the corresponding VP licence (p.27).
The reference number of 117 plan is DE/5453/95/119 and of 122 plan is DE/5453/ATP/95/119. 122 plan shows the stamp of the VP thereon without any endorsement. The VP licence does not accompany it unlike 117 plan which has the corresponding VP licence (p.29) and 115 plan which has the corresponding VP licence (p.27). It is seen and it is argued by the petitioners and not contradicted by the respondent No.6 that the plans approved by the TP must bear construction licence of the VP. It is contended on behalf of respondent No.6 that 117 plan does not show the stamp of the VP. It is not understood why the stamp would have to be shown in view of the separate VP licence (p.29). It is contended on behalf of respondent No.6 that 117 plan is a forgery and a fraud though it is the plan initially prepared by the respondent No. 6 itself which is seen to have been approved under the TP approval p.118 and the VP licence p.29 immediately after which 122 plan is stated to have been submitted. If 117 plan is an illegality it is, therefore, an illegality perpetrated by none other than respondent No.6. (b) The reference number on 117 plan and the TP approval p.118 is the same. The VP licence p.29 relates to the construction approved under that plan number. The TP approval is for “residential construction”. The VP licence shows the construction of “18 blocks – residential GR+2”. Both the VP licence and the TP approval (p.118) relate to the 20 WP.403/2007 & WP.659/2010-Judgment precise number of 117 plan and not the number of 122 plan. 122 plan is neither for any cottages as in 115 plan nor the blocks as in 117 plan. The VP licence which is for “18 blocks – residential complex” cannot be for 122 plan which shows a wholly different kind of construction, without such blocks. Two vastly different plans can never be issued by any public authority on the same day. Hence once it is seen that 117 plan accepted by respondent No.6 is seen to be duly approved, another plan of that date can never be acted upon. Besides the VP licence dated 31st July, 1995 (p.29) refers to the TP letter dated 31st May, 1995 (p.118) which is in respect of 117 plan and not 122 plan.
Hence once it is seen that 117 plan accepted by respondent No.6 is seen to be duly approved, another plan of that date can never be acted upon. Besides the VP licence dated 31st July, 1995 (p.29) refers to the TP letter dated 31st May, 1995 (p.118) which is in respect of 117 plan and not 122 plan. The reference number does not show ATP in any of these documents. 122 plan, on the other hand has no corresponding approval of the TP and no corresponding construction licence of the VP. (c) In the process of applying for re-validation of the VP licence by the respondent No.6 and the re-validation granted by the VP from time to time at an interval of 3 years from 1998 to 2005, the licence number has changed from 149 to 613 only in 2005 as amplified earlier. Within this period the application of 2001 (p.40) assumes importance. It refers to the licence of 1993 under No.328 and the licence of 1995 under No.149 and not 613. It calls upon the VP to merge the two licences. A million Dollar question was asked by the petitioners' Counsel most justifiably – if 122 plan was approved in 1995, why merge the licence of 1993 with 1995? Though we were struck by the question, respondent No.6 has had no answer. (d) The petitioners have produced two certified copies issued under RTI of 117 plans. One plan was issued by the TP to a third party. The other was issued by the Additional Collector, Goa District, Panaji Goa to the petitioners personally. Though the petitioners have produced 117 plan obtained by themselves under their affidavit dated 4th December, 2007 under RTI, no inspection has been sought by any of the respondents and the plan has not been denied. The respondent No.6 has contended that the petitioners cannot rely upon a plan issued to a third party and the third party has stated that she had not given the plan furnished to her under the RTI to any person. The oral contentions of third parties cannot be countenanced. However it is academic in view of the RTI plan obtained by the petitioners themselves. The respondent No.6 questions as to how the Additional Collector could have issued the plan. The proceedings with regard to the disputed property have been undertaken in the office of the Collector.
The oral contentions of third parties cannot be countenanced. However it is academic in view of the RTI plan obtained by the petitioners themselves. The respondent No.6 questions as to how the Additional Collector could have issued the plan. The proceedings with regard to the disputed property have been undertaken in the office of the Collector. The stop-work order initially issued has been discharged by the Additional Collector, North Goa, District Panaji. In view thereof the plan issued by the authority is not only in order, but assumes a lot of significance. The order of the Additional Collector, North Goa, District Panaji dated 23rd May, 2007 (p.59) mentions about the production of the VP licence of 1995 (precisely p.29) and the copy of 122 plan submitted as late as in 2007 by respondent No.6 to the Additional Collector. Whereas, therefore, respondent No.6 submits 122 plan along with the VP licence of 117 plan to the Collector, the office of the Collector issues the 117 plan to the petitioners under their RTI application. The TP office has not explained how 117 plan came to be issued by it to that third party, if 122 plan was submitted by respondent No.6 and on its record “immediately after” 117 plan, already approved by it. (e) The Chief Town Planner (CTP) of the TP submitted a report of the construction of respondent No.6 which was approved and which was deviated or varied by respondent No.6 as per order of this Court dated 28th April, 2008. In his affidavit dated 20th May, 2008 he has considered the three plans 115, 117 and 122. There is no dispute with regard to the 115 plan. He has shown 117 to be the correct plan. He has shown the approved buildings which are in consonance with the 115 and 117 plans. He has shown 122 plan as “stated to be of 1995”. He has not shown any construction as approved buildings in the 122 plan. He has shown deviations in the construction made by respondent No.6. The report of the CTP also shows construction of basement under three buildings though there is no provision for any basement in the two sanctioned plans 115 and 117. It also shows another basement in another building on the North-East side which is not envisaged in the sanctioned plans at all.
The report of the CTP also shows construction of basement under three buildings though there is no provision for any basement in the two sanctioned plans 115 and 117. It also shows another basement in another building on the North-East side which is not envisaged in the sanctioned plans at all. This would be in consonance with the RTI plan of 31st May, 1995 being 117 plan obtained by the petitioner from his office (TP office). The 122 plan would, therefore, stare in the face of the approval granted to 117 plan by the TP (p.118) and the licence of the VP (p.29). (f) The respondent No.6 had to obtain permission of the MEF for construction of a hotel within the NDZ. As late as on 28th December, 2006 the respondent No.6 has referred to 117 plan in its letter to the MEF (p.62). It states about approval of that project under plan No.DE/5453/95/119 dated 31st May, 1995, but bears no reference to any plan DE/5453/ATP/93/39 which is 122 plan. This was when the petitioners noticed construction coming up in NDZ, which resulted in the first petition filed in 2007. As late as a few months prior to the filing of Petition No. 403 of 2007 respondent No.6 sought approvals only to 117 plan. (g) The VP also refers to 117 plan only as late as in its letter dated 28th June, 2007 (p.123) calling for certified copy of the NOC dated 31st May, 1995 from the TP's office; there has been no other NOC of 31st May, 1995 issued by the TP's office for any other plan. (h) The respondent No.6 applied as late as on 14th February, 2008 for approval of what they call their revised plan (p.327 in Petition No.659 of 2010). The respondent No.6 has sought revision of the plan precisely under DE/5453/95/119 dated 31st May, 1995 which is 117 plan and not 122 plan. There is no mention of ATP in the letter of respondent No.6. The letter is respondent No.6 addressed to the VP with the cc to the TP. The TP's reply dated 26th March, 2008 (p.72 of Petition No. 659 of 2010) makes a reference to the letter dated 14th February, 2008.
There is no mention of ATP in the letter of respondent No.6. The letter is respondent No.6 addressed to the VP with the cc to the TP. The TP's reply dated 26th March, 2008 (p.72 of Petition No. 659 of 2010) makes a reference to the letter dated 14th February, 2008. The TP's NOC to the revised plans makes a specific mention of an ongoing project of respondent No.6 with no development in the NDZ within 50m from the river bank and is subject to the applicability of environmental clearance. (i) The signboard at the entrance of construction site of respondent No.6 is also shown to carry the reference of the 117 plan and bears no reference to 122 plan. (j) 117 plan unmistakably has 18 blocks in the 50m – 100m setback line, which was the additionally approved construction consequent upon the amendment to the CRZ notification issued in 1994. This was in addition to the 69 cottages in 115 plan of 1993 totalling to 87 structures in the construction of respondent No.6. The Supreme Court has observed about 18 blocks approved in the 50m – 100m setback line in 1995. This is wholly in consonance with 117 plan. 37. It is this construction in 117 plan which has been allowed to remain as ongoing construction though the only construction put up by respondent No.6 was three plinths in the interregnum period as shown in the report of the site visit of the DSLR dated 4th May, 2007. It is that much construction as per the sanctioned 117 plan which is permitted by the Supreme Court and which can be allowed to be carried out, the objection of the petitioners notwithstanding. 38. 122 plan is wholly different. It has not seen the light of the day until after February, 2008 when respondent No.6 itself referred to only the 117 plan. It shows a wholly different construction which is wholly deviated from the earlier construction approved and sanctioned by the TP and licenced and permitted by the VP. It shows one main block, 17 other small blocks including guest rooms, public places, banquet hall, meeting halls, service buildings, spa and houses in the entire construction from the 50m setback line until the Northern end of the plan. It does not show 69 cottages + 18 blocks which came to be in the 115 and 117 plans respectively.
It shows one main block, 17 other small blocks including guest rooms, public places, banquet hall, meeting halls, service buildings, spa and houses in the entire construction from the 50m setback line until the Northern end of the plan. It does not show 69 cottages + 18 blocks which came to be in the 115 and 117 plans respectively. It is not the construction which is approved. It is shown to be not approved in the report of the CTP dated 5th May, 2008 made as per the order of this Court dated 28th April, 2008. It shows construction wholly deviated from what was approved/ sanctioned/ permitted/licenced. 39. It is argued on behalf of respondent No.6 that the construction sought to be put up under the revised plans must be accepted because the total construction is not in excess of the construction sanctioned. That argument may have been attractive had there been no capping of construction as per the Supreme Court order. In the ordinary course, if a construction is deviated from the sanctioned plan, but the total construction is within the permissible limits, the building authority may have the discretion to allow, validate and regularise such deviation in construction. However in the NDZ where no construction was allowed as per the initial CRZ notification of 1991 and construction was permitted only if it was put up pending the petition challenging an amendment thereto and was later expressly allowed only to the extent of what has been sanctioned as per approved plans and not what was re-validated thereafter, no deviations from the sanctioned plans can be permitted by the Court even if it was re-validated by any planning authority. It is in this light that the Petition No. 329 of 2008 filed by respondent No.6 under Article 32 of the Constitution of India for declaration that the building plans duly re-validated till date were valid and the order of the Supreme Court granting relief only in respect of the ongoing construction, but not any re-validation that 122 plan falls completely foul. 40.
40. The construction of respondent No.6 has been directed by this Court in the order dated 17th September, 2007, the Supreme Court in its order dated 28th August, 2008 as also in the NOC of the TP dated 16th September, 2008 (p.82 in Writ Petition No.659 of 2010) and the further NOC of the TP dated 5th July, 2010 which was in terms of the NOC dated 16th September, 2008 (p.94 in petition No.659 of 2010) to be at the risk and costs of respondent No.6. I am satisfied that the construction put up by respondent No.6 is wholly illegal and without sanction and not ongoing construction as per the sanctioned plans of 1993 and 1995 (p.115 and p.117) without any re-validation. I am also satisfied that 122 plan is a plan that never was. It surfaced only after February, 2008. It is conspicuous by its absence in the correspondence of respondent No.6 itself in 2001 when it claimed merger of 115 and 117 plans, in 2006 when respondent No.6 sought permission of the MEF, in 2007 even by the VP in calling for the copies of the plan, as also on 14th February, 2008 when respondent No.6 applied for revised plans to the VP. 122 plan never surfaced in the period between 1995 and 2006 when there was a complete lull in the construction activity of respondent no.6 and hence has not even been shown to have been sent to the TFCIL in reply to its letter dated 19th June, 1998 which the Court was prepared to see, if shown, though not relied upon by respondent No.6 in its reply to the aforesaid petitions. 41. In fact respondent No.6 sought to construct further four restaurants and applied for NOC of the VP on 2nd August, 2010 as per certain further approved plans showing restaurant areas (p.328 in Petition No. 659 of 2010). The VP granted provisional NOC on 21st August, 2010.
41. In fact respondent No.6 sought to construct further four restaurants and applied for NOC of the VP on 2nd August, 2010 as per certain further approved plans showing restaurant areas (p.328 in Petition No. 659 of 2010). The VP granted provisional NOC on 21st August, 2010. Since respondent No.6 put up construction of a hotel with restaurants in 2010, the petitioners sought an RTI query as to whether respondent No.6 had obtained the clearance of the MEF since the hotel was in the NDZ being in the 50m – 100m setback line where the sanctioned plan (p.117) allowed only 18 blocks and the Supreme Court declared such construction to be ongoing and allowed respondent No.6 to carry it on, of course, at its risk and costs and subject to the above petition No.403 of 2007. The department of Science Technology and Environment informed the petitioners' representatives under RTI by its letter dated 29th September, 2010 that there was no record of environmental clearance granted to the hotel project of respondent No.6. This was as per the information derived from the GCZMA under its letter dated 22nd September, 2010 addressed to the department of Science Technology and Environment, Goa in that behalf which came to be annexed with the letter dated 29th September, 2010. The petitioners would acquire knowledge of the hotel project only in about September, 2010 when they saw the hotel construction coming up. The RTI query revealed construction of four restaurants without any permission of the MEF wholly against the sanctioned 117 plan in September, 2010. The petitioners filed the second petition No.659 of 2010 on 20th September, 2010 even pending their RTI query upon the premise that no hotel was earlier sanctioned in the NDZ of CRZ III where Bambolim village fell under 117 plan and that only residential constructions were approved in the 50m – 100m zone. The petitioners contended that the approval of the MEF was required under clause 6(2) CRZ III (iii) of the CRZ notification dated 19th February, 1991, which was not obtained by respondent No.6.
The petitioners contended that the approval of the MEF was required under clause 6(2) CRZ III (iii) of the CRZ notification dated 19th February, 1991, which was not obtained by respondent No.6. Hence even pending their RTI query the petitioners immediately filed second petition No.659 of 2010 on 20th September, 2010 with utmost expedition for quashing the NOCs of the TP dated 16th September, 2008 (p. 82 in that petition), further NOCs dated 5th July, 2010 and 6th July, 2010 of the TP (p.94 of that petition), the construction licence of the VP dated 4th October, 2008 (p.88) and 11th July, 2010 (p.97 in that petition) and its occupancy certificate dated 11th July, 2010 (p.99 in that petition). 42. In the face of such vigilance and expedition it has been contended by respondent No.6 that the petitioners are barred by delay and latches. This Court is hardly required to enter upon that dispute in view of the aforesaid facts and the delay of respondent No.6 itself in putting up its own construction as per the sanctioned plan obtained by itself (p.117) from 1995 until 2006. Though the respondent No.6 contends that it commenced its construction in 2006 and completed it in 2008 the contention is incorrect and this would be demonstrated by its own letter dated 27th February, 2009 addressed to the VP intimating the VP of the completion of the construction of only the plinth of its hotel project (p.335 in the second petition) aside from the aforesaid letters detailed above. Since the respondent did not put up construction, there was none that the petitioners could challenge until after February 2009 when the plinth itself was constructed. Since the hotel construction actually came up in the latter part of 2010, the petitioners were only then put on their guard and acted with dispatch in making the RTI query with regard to the MEF approval and challenging the aforesaid NOCs of the VP and the TP for the hotel construction for the NDZ within the 50m – 100m setback line of the project of respondent No.6. Reliance by respondent No.6 upon the cases of State of Madhya Pradesh Vs. Nandlal Jaiswal AIR 1987 SC 251 ; Indian Council for Enviro Legal Action Vs. Union of India 1996 (5) SCC 281 ; Narmada Bachao Andolan Vs. Union of India 2000(10) SCC 664 ; Delhi Development Authority Vs. Rajendra Singh & Anr.
Reliance by respondent No.6 upon the cases of State of Madhya Pradesh Vs. Nandlal Jaiswal AIR 1987 SC 251 ; Indian Council for Enviro Legal Action Vs. Union of India 1996 (5) SCC 281 ; Narmada Bachao Andolan Vs. Union of India 2000(10) SCC 664 ; Delhi Development Authority Vs. Rajendra Singh & Anr. 2009(8) SCC 582 ; Star Wire (India) Ltd. Vs. State of Haryana 1996 (11) SCC 698 ; V.A. Kamat Vs. State of Goa, Writ Petition No. 380/2005. Relevant paras:- 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13 & 15 that Writ Petitions cannot be allowed after long delay is misplaced since I do not find either of the petitions delayed. 43. Of course, the petitioners would have no complaint with any hotel premises being constructed outside the 50m – 100m NDZ as a part of the residential project of respondent No.6. Indeed the initial 115 plan of 1993 also shows a small part of the construction of respondent No.6 as a hotel, but is beyond the 100m setback line. The TP approval for the 115 plan (p.116) specifies that the proposed HT-block, which is the hotel block, falling within 100m shall be shifted outside 100m and specifies that no development falls within 100m of the HTL. Similarly the later plan 117 allows hotel premises, which is the same small portion in the plan beyond 50m as per the law then prevailing. 44. Respondent No.6 would contend that the petitioners knew about the construction of the hotel and yet did not challenge it for years. The fact of the construction of the hotel in the residential complex was known to the petitioners since the inception, it having been shown in the earliest plan of 1993 itself (p.115). However since the hotel was beyond 100m the petitioners had not challenged its construction. When it was actually constructed within 100m, which was well after 2009, when only the plinth construction was completed, and well into 2010 when the hotel complex actually came up that the petitioners acquired knowledge that the hotel was being constructed within 100m of the setback line in the NDZ necessitating MEF approval which was not produced by the respondent No.6 during the pendency of petition No.403 of 2007. 45.
45. The petitioners would contend that when the Supreme Court declared the amendment notification to the CRZ dated 16th August, 1994 invalid no hotel could be constructed after its judgment dated 18th April, 1996 within 100m of the setback line as enjoined in the original notification dated 19th February, 1991 without the approval of the MEF. The petitioners would also contend that the entire construction of respondent No.6 which has been put up at its risk and costs pending this petition and for which the TP approval was granted subject to this petition is wholly invalid because no part of the construction is under any sanctioned plan, it having been put up under 122 plan which has not been sanctioned or approved. The respondents would contend that their construction is “ongoing construction” having commenced between 1994 and 1996 as per 122 plan of which the approval, as aforesaid is shown to be of 117 plan alone, there being no VP licence issued in respect of 122 plan. 46. However the Court has been shown the site inspection of the VP showing foundation work up to plinth level on three separate positions in the premises of respondent No.6 under the report of the VP dated 25th September, 1996 (p.31). This Court may accept, as sought to be contended by respondent No.6, that the putting up of three plinths would constitute ongoing construction, without more. This is in the face of the letter of respondent No.6 itself dated 27th February, 2009 (p.335 in Petition No. 659 of 2010) about the completion of the plinth only as late as 2009. 47. This Court would, therefore, have countenanced and conceded to the construction of respondent No.6 had it been in accordance with the 117 plan as ongoing construction permitted by the Supreme Court on 31st March, 2010 in Writ Petition No. 329 of 2008 of respondent No.6. 48. Though only such construction was allowed by the Supreme Court, the respondent has unabashedly put up a wholly different construction under 122 plan which was never approved. I cannot permit myself to allow such construction to remain. Not only was respondent No.6 allowed to put up construction at his own risk and costs, but the Supreme Court directed this Court to expedite and dispose off the hearing of the first of these petitions.
I cannot permit myself to allow such construction to remain. Not only was respondent No.6 allowed to put up construction at his own risk and costs, but the Supreme Court directed this Court to expedite and dispose off the hearing of the first of these petitions. The Supreme Court also rejected the application for transfer made by respondent No.6 of petition No.403 of 2007 to the Supreme Court to be heard along with its petition No. 329 of 2008. This Court itself allowed the respondent No.6 to carry on construction at his risk and costs and the TP has granted NOC subject to the first of these petitions. The respondent must bear the risk and the cost of the construction which is impermissible and cannot be allowed by the Court. 49. Hence which law was applicable to the case of the parties and which governed the parties at the time of sanctioning the plan would have to be seen. 50. Counsel on behalf of the petitioners has relied upon the judgment in the case of Jimmy Jal Gazdar Vs. Panjim Planning & Development Authority & 2 Ors. 1989(1) Goa Law Times (189) to show the applicable law to the given case. In that case the petitioner sought to put up construction of a bungalow/house. He had obtained a VP licence albeit after certain construction was put up on the ground that it not having been granted until then was deemed to have been granted. The TP had refused permission. He nevertheless constructed. At the time he commenced the construction the area where the construction was put up was not declared “planning area”. Upon its amalgamation with the area of the capital city it was made a planning area by publication in the official gazette after part construction was put up. It was contended on behalf of the petitioner that Section 44 of the TP Act under which permission of the TP was to be obtained did not apply to the petitioner's case and the construction could not be prohibited under Section 43 of the TP Act for want of such permission. The Court had to see when Section 44 become applicable to a given construction.
The Court had to see when Section 44 become applicable to a given construction. Considering the object of the TP Act upon declaration under Section 18 thereof and the issue of the development plan which is made under Section 37 thereof, the Court considered the effect of a “trend of consequences” of unregulated development of land in the interregnum frustrating the object of making the area “planned area”. The Court considered that an area declared by the TP to be a planned area would bring it within the sway of the Act for regulation to apply therein. Upon considering the purport of Section 134 along with Sections 47, 48, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54 and 55 of the TP Act the Court observed at page 198 of the judgment thus: “It would be more reasonable to interpret section 43 of the Act to mean that irrespective of the date of commencement all development and use of land on a development area would be subject to restrictions under said section 43. After an area is notified under section 18(1) of the Act all development and use of land come under control under the Act.” This was to take precedence over the Rule 83 of the VP rules even if there was to be a repugnancy between the two legislations. Accordingly the Court held at page 199 of the judgment that the combined effect of Sections 43, 44 and 134 of the TP Act led to the conclusion that after a village formed a part of a development area all developments or changes of user of land must conform to the development plan. Consequently all construction work to be carried out must be notified to the TP and would require modification in the construction upon the objection of the TP. The Court repelled the argument that “on-going development works” would not require permission under Section 44 of the TP Act. Hence at page 200 of the judgment it is held that revocation or modification of any permission cannot be ordered after the construction was completed or after the change had already taken place. But when construction activities were incomplete the temporary permission could be revoked or modified. Hence the contention that Section 55 of the TP Act would not apply in case where development work commenced before the area was declared a planned area was repelled.
But when construction activities were incomplete the temporary permission could be revoked or modified. Hence the contention that Section 55 of the TP Act would not apply in case where development work commenced before the area was declared a planned area was repelled. Consequently it was held at page 202 of the judgment that permission under Section 44 of the TP Act was required in addition to the permission required under any other law which prevailed at the relevant time for “ongoing construction”. Such permission could be modified and revoked also. 51. There is, therefore, much substance in the argument on behalf of the petitioners that the law at the time of the on-going construction would apply. In this case that is the law relating to the 100m setback line in the NDZ. The Supreme Court allowed only “ongoing construction” under sanctioned plans without revalidation. Re-validation or renewal even if made would, therefore, would have to be in accordance with law in force and not as per the law which governed at the time the initial plan was sanctioned or the initial construction commenced, which was not later applicable, it having been declared illegal. 52. The Counsel on behalf of the petitioners has also relied upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Usman Gani J. Khatri of Bombay Vs. Cantonment Board & Ors., Pune being SLP No. 647 of 1992 Jt 1992(4) SC 538 with other matters in which the applicability of a law which came to be amended in respect of the sanctioning of plan and putting of construction was considered. In that case the petitioner submitted building plans. The Cantonment Board, Pune sanctioned the plans subject to the NOC of another authority. Thereafter the Cantonment Board passed a resolution streamlining the grant of lease of their land and setting out a new scheme of building restrictions. The resolution took into account the setback land as also the compulsory open space. After passing such a resolution when the new rules came into effect the petitioner's plan was rejected and returned as not being in confirmation of the new scheme of building restrictions. The petitioner contended that he was entitled to construct as per the building plans duly sanctioned by the Board prior to the new scheme of building restrictions came into effect.
The petitioner contended that he was entitled to construct as per the building plans duly sanctioned by the Board prior to the new scheme of building restrictions came into effect. The petitioner contended that such a plan could not be effected by the further resolution of the board. The minimum open space which was required to be left and the maximum Floor Space Index (FSI) /FAR was changed. The petitioner had not submitted fresh building plans in accordance with the restrictions on the construction newly imposed. The contention of the respondent that the building plans can only be sanctioned if they were in accordance with the law prevailing at the time of sanctioning the building plans was accepted. It was observed that fresh building plans required to be submitted by the petitioners would “now” be governed by the bye-laws prevailing at that time and not the bye-laws which are no longer in force. The Supreme Court observed that: “If we consider a reverse case where building regulations are amended more favourably to the builders before sanctioning of building plans already submitted, the builders would certainly claim and get the advantage of the regulations amended to their benefit”. 53. In this case also I may apply the same analogy. If 115 plan and 117 plan was for construction of a simple structure of 100 sq. mts, upon a plot having FSI/FAR of 1000 sq. mts, sanctioned thereunder, could respondent No.6 have constructed further structures to the extent of 900 sq. mts after the Supreme Court judgment allowing construction “pursuant to plans sanctioned” as per its judgment dated 31st March, 2010? The answer would guide this litigation. Since 900 sq. mts available to the petitioners would not have been sanctioned, such construction later cannot be put up. Consequently it would be upon the law then prevailing that additional construction can be made by way of revision in sanctioned plans. In this case neither re-validation nor such revision can be permitted and the leeway granted by the Supreme Court would be in terms of the ultimate decision of holding the 50m NDZ illegal. Consequently construction within 50m cannot be allowed. It must be beyond 100m except whatever was sanctioned in the interregnum period. No construction not sanctioned until then could be sanctioned later in view of the declaration of illegality of the amended notification. 54.
Consequently construction within 50m cannot be allowed. It must be beyond 100m except whatever was sanctioned in the interregnum period. No construction not sanctioned until then could be sanctioned later in view of the declaration of illegality of the amended notification. 54. Rather preposterous and even impertinent contentions have been taken up by respondent No.6 despite the above. The respondent No.6 would contend that 117 plan relied upon by the petitioners as the sanctioned plan is fraudulent. The respondent No.6 has made bold to take out an application for taking criminal action for perjury alleged to be committed by the petitioners. The respondent No.6 would contend that 117 plan is “doubtful” (in its note of comparison of two plans) and that the authenticity of 122 plan has been established. The doubt is raised because not the petitioners but the third party was issued the plan under the RTI by the TP office, which third party later threw her hands up with regard to giving the plan to any person. The respondent No.6 would also contend that 117 plan is in contravention of Regulation 26 of the PDA Regulations 1989 which allows maximum permissible coverage area in a construction of 40% of the area of the plot while 117 plan shows 41.89%! 55. As aforesaid the plan has been expressly accepted by respondent No.6 which respondent No.6 appears to have forgotten whilst taking out the perjury application. The express acceptance of its 117 plan, Annexure X to Petition No.403 of 2007, by respondent No.6 is in para 13 of its affidavit dated 14th December, 2007. Respondent No.6 has stated that it was a duly approved plan by the TP dated 31st May, 1995 (p.118) and for which construction licence came to be granted by the VP on 31st July, 1995 (p.29). The respondent No.6 has in no uncertain terms accepted and admitted that prior to the submission of 122 plan, the 117 plan (as per annexure X to the Petition No.403 of 2007) was got prepared by respondent No.6. It was not pursued by respondent No.6 and immediately thereafter 122 plan, described as “the present plan” was submitted by respondent No.6 to the VP for approval. Once respondent No.6 accepts this, 117 plan must find firm ground.
It was not pursued by respondent No.6 and immediately thereafter 122 plan, described as “the present plan” was submitted by respondent No.6 to the VP for approval. Once respondent No.6 accepts this, 117 plan must find firm ground. If 117 plan is doubtful or in contravention of Regulation 26 of the PDA Regulations the blame must point to respondent No.6 and respondent No.6 must be held liable for extending the maximum permissible coverage area of construction albeit by 1.89%. The respondent No.6 has relied upon the judgments in the case of Dalip Singh Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors. (2010) 2 SCC 114 ; Kishore Samithi Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh 2013(2) 398; S. Pchengalvaraya Naidu Vs. Jagannath 1994(1) SCC 1 ; Hari Narain Vs. Badri Das, 1963 AIR 1558; Abhyudya Sanstha Vs. Union of India & Ors. 2011(6) SCC 145 while contending that the petitioners suppressed facts and misled the Court in producing before it 117 plan which constitutes an abuse of process since it is fraudulent (though stated to be “doubtful” in its note). The above discussion would show no abuse by the petitioners and in fact a sharp practice of respondent No.6 in so contending. 56. Like respondent No.6 the other authorities before the Court – the TP, the VP and the MEF – have all sung the same song. It is only the petitioners who have alone steadfastly opposed the wholly illegal construction of respondent No.6 in the NDZ of the CRZ within the 100m setback line. The petitioners have justifiably contended that there is connivance between the government authorities and respondent No.6. Not strangely all the files of the TP and the VP's offices are stated to be missing. When the petitioners applied for certified copy of the plan of the construction of respondent No.6 from the VP's office the VP office referred to the TP's office, but contended that its files were missing. The TP has affirmed 122 plan modified and deviated from the initial approved plan and not affirmed to be approved construction and yet approved it as late as in 2010. It has however not been able to state before us that 117 plan is not correct.
The TP has affirmed 122 plan modified and deviated from the initial approved plan and not affirmed to be approved construction and yet approved it as late as in 2010. It has however not been able to state before us that 117 plan is not correct. Indeed the duly approved 117 plan was issued by the TP's office under its own seal to the third party much as the certified copy of 117 plan issued by the Additional Collector to the petitioners which has come to be accepted by respondent No.6. 57. The petitioners have informed the Court that the police inquiry was also directed by this Court during the long history of the lis whilst the petition remained pending. Four reports of the crime branch have been received. Though the Court may not concern itself with the criminal offences, if any, of any party, it must be guided by the intrinsic evidence in ruling upon the aforesaid plans and allowing or disallowing construction put up thereunder. In the face of such evidence evidenced from the admitted documents respondent No.6 has sought to show certain factors in a bid to establish the “authenticity” of 122 plan. They are rather nebulous. They run thus: (a) In support of 122 plan respondent No.6 would contend that much prior to “this litigation” the Additional Collector referred to 122 plan in his order dated 23rd May, 2007. The order is a mere three months prior to the filing of the Petition No.403 of 2007. It was well after the various lis between the parties before various authorities including the NCZMA as also the Supreme Court and this Court. It was when the illegal construction of respondent No.6 was rife. The reference by the additional Collector is not in accepting 122 plan. The reference has made only by way of a narration/recital in the order of the Additional Collector dated 23rd May, 2007 showing what respondent No.6 produced before the Additional Collector. If respondent No.6 produces such a plan months prior to the filing of the petition, the Additional Collector would refer to such a plan. That would not authenticate the plan or enhance its authenticity. In fact, the Collector has issued the certified copy of 117 plan to the petitioners, which as stated above, has not been challenged or even demanded for inspection.
That would not authenticate the plan or enhance its authenticity. In fact, the Collector has issued the certified copy of 117 plan to the petitioners, which as stated above, has not been challenged or even demanded for inspection. (b) Respondent No.6 tendered an affidavit as late as on 15th January, 2014 after this petition was part-heard before the Court submitting that the RTI query confirmed that respondent No.6 had submitted 122 plan to the Additional Collector. The submission was indeed made as stated in item (a) above. The submission leads the respondent No.6 no further. The affidavit dated 15th January, 2014 filed so belatedly cannot even be considered. In fact it was tendered after the arguments on behalf of the petitioners was over and has been allowed to be taken on record as it does not contain any additional facts and subject to the statements therein being taken as denied by the petitioners. (c) The respondent No.6 would contend that the NCZMA in its order dated 30th October, 2010 referred to the plan of respondent No.6 for “residential houses and a hotel”. This was indeed illustrated in 115 as well as 117 plans having a hotel shown to the East of the plan and specifically directed to be shifted beyond 100m in the NOC of the TP (p.116) which was in respect of 115 plan of 1993 itself. Having a hotel together with a residential complex was, therefore, even initially contemplated. It is only because a hotel within the NDZ cannot be brought up without the MEF approval that the petitioners sought information under the RTI in that behalf and challenged the construction. The contention with regard to the hotel is, therefore, wholly flawed. (d) It is amusing that respondent No.6 would contend that because its construction has been done as per 122 plan which has been modified and approved in 2008 that its authenticity is established. That cannot be. (e) The reliance upon the affidavit of the TP who may have colluded with respondent No.6 (despite 117 plan furnished by the TP office itself to the third party which was produced by the petitioner and which is not explained by the TP office) cannot enhance its case.
That cannot be. (e) The reliance upon the affidavit of the TP who may have colluded with respondent No.6 (despite 117 plan furnished by the TP office itself to the third party which was produced by the petitioner and which is not explained by the TP office) cannot enhance its case. Of course, the affidavit of the TP's office dated 23rd May, 2007 confirms 122 plan, and Counsel on behalf of the TP also argued before the Court vehemently confirming 122 plan, with all intrinsic evidence contained in admitted documents ignored. Such affidavit, therefore, obtained by whatever means which the Court may not dwell into, cannot take the case of respondent No.6 further in establishing its authenticity. (f) The 122 plan was never in existence prior to 2007 or even in 2008 as seen from the discussion above. Reliance upon references and orders after the years 2007–2008 only, therefore, shows the last straw that respondent No.6 would choose to cling to. 58. This case is of brazen, wholly illegal construction. The petitioners have sought the rule of law. The respondent No.6 has breached the rule of law blatantly. To grant or refuse the reliefs in the petition upon a clear case being made out by the petitioners and to set aside or affirm the orders of the various governmental authorities who have sided and backed the construction of respondent No.6 I must be guided by a similar exercise undertaken by the Supreme Court not very long ago in the case of Esha Ekta Apartments Cooperative Housing Society Limited & Others Vs. Municipal Corporation of Mumbai & Others (2013) 5 SCC 357 in which the Supreme Court not only frowned upon, but deprecated and refused to countenance unauthorised and illegal construction of the petitioner society and ordered the demolition of the entire illegal portion. That was the case of construction beyond the permissible FSI which was wholly illegal; this is the case of construction in the NDZ as per the amended notification of the CRZ which is declared illegal by the Supreme Court. The construction is in excess of the leeway granted by the Supreme Court for ongoing construction as per sanctioned plans and without their re-validation. The construction is long delayed and after the right expired by afflux of time. It has also wholly deviated from the sanctioned plans.
The construction is in excess of the leeway granted by the Supreme Court for ongoing construction as per sanctioned plans and without their re-validation. The construction is long delayed and after the right expired by afflux of time. It has also wholly deviated from the sanctioned plans. The similar analogy would apply as in the case of Esha Ekta (supra). The Supreme Court lamented the unrestrained construction activity beyond the sanction of the planning authority in the case of Esha Ekta (Supra); I lament construction in an area held to be so ecologically and environmentally fragile as not to allow any development activity being the NDZ within 100m of the HTL of the river bank. The Court cannot lose sight of the misfortune of our other countrymen in not so far away State of Uttaranchal which must be an example for the construction in the State of Goa as elsewhere in India. The Court must take judicial notice of the misfortune begotten out of similar misconduct of unplanned and unabated construction on the river bank. I may remind myself that it was with pride that it has been known that Goan rivers never flood. The CRZ notification of 1991 which has stood the test of the Supreme Court's scrutiny is meant for ecological balance that would be maintained but only if the devastating and destructive hands of men permit it to be left as meant by nature and as ruled by the Supreme Court. 59. When I find that that noble law has been ignobly breached I cannot bear myself to permit the breach as all the public authorities before the Court have done. 60. Though in another context, the verse reproduced by the Supreme Court from Telugu language translated in English in the case of Usman Gani J. Khatri Vs. Cantonment Board, Pune in SLP No. 647 of 1992 – Judgment 1992(4) SC 538. “I will not stop cutting down trees, Though there is life in them. I will not stop plucking out leaves Though they make nature beautiful I will not stop hacking off branches, Though they are the arms of a tree Because – I need a hut”. would apply with equal force in our case. 61.
“I will not stop cutting down trees, Though there is life in them. I will not stop plucking out leaves Though they make nature beautiful I will not stop hacking off branches, Though they are the arms of a tree Because – I need a hut”. would apply with equal force in our case. 61. This Court may also be further guided by the similar case of breach albeit of a contract for construction of housing which was not countenanced by this Court in the case of Kamlakar Motiram Satve & Ors. Vs. State of Maharashtra & Ors. 2012(5) Bom. C.R. 460. The Court in that case also accepted and upheld the contract strictly and directed all constructions which were outside the purview of the contract to be rectified. (In that case there was scope for rectification as a part of the construction was, until then, not made). 62. Consequently 122 plan shown to be dated 31st May, 1995 and the construction made by respondent Nos. 6 & 7 in Petition No.403 of 2007 and respondent Nos. 1 to 3 in Petition No.659 of 2010 pursuant to 122 plan as also the sanctions/approvals of the TP dated 16th September, 2008, 8th July 2010 and 6th July, 2010 and the licences/permissions of the VP dated 4th October, 2008 and 11th July, 2010 as also the Occupation Certificate dated 11th July, 2010 are declared illegal and invalid to the extent of the area within 100m of the HTL of the River bank being the NDZ. 63. Respondent Nos. 6 & 7 in Writ Petition No.403 of 2007 and respondent Nos. 1 to 3 in Writ Petition No. 659 of 2010 shall remove the entire construction put up within 100m of the HTL of the River Bank being the NDZ. Respondent Nos. 1 to 5 in Writ Petition No.403 of 2007 and Respondent Nos. 4 to 8 in Writ Petition No.659 of 2010 shall demolish the construction put up by respondent Nos. 6 & 7 in Writ Petition No.403 of 2007 and respondent Nos. 1 to 3 in Writ Petition No.659 of 2010. 64. Rule is granted to the above extent. 65. Both Writ Petitions are disposed off accordingly. F. M. Reis, J. 66.
4 to 8 in Writ Petition No.659 of 2010 shall demolish the construction put up by respondent Nos. 6 & 7 in Writ Petition No.403 of 2007 and respondent Nos. 1 to 3 in Writ Petition No.659 of 2010. 64. Rule is granted to the above extent. 65. Both Writ Petitions are disposed off accordingly. F. M. Reis, J. 66. Although I agree with my learned sister Smt. R.S. Dalvi, J that the plan which is at page 117 is the plan which was duly approved on 31.05.1995 and not the plan at page 122 as claimed by the respondent nos. 6 and 7, for the reasons stated in the judgment, I deeply regret my inability to agree with the findings in the judgment with regard to the effect of the judgment passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court while disposing of Writ Petition (C) No.329 of 2008 dated 31.03.2010 and the relief which can be granted in the above Writ Petitions. 67. To understand the controversy between the parties, it would be appropriate to examine the petitions as well as the orders passed during the course of the proceedings. The petitioners approached this Court in the above Writ Petitions as originally filed raising the grievance of the public that the respondent nos. 6 and 7 had carried out a construction in CRZ of Bambolim and that this was done where there was a complete ban. The claim of the petitioners proceeded on the assumption that the development work in 100 metres No Development Zone of the concerned survey number was not permissible in law. The petitioners went on the footing that the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Indian Council for Enviro-Legal Action (supra) is retrospectively applicable. What emerges from the averments of the petition is that the construction had commenced based on the approval of the Town and Country Planning Department, Village Panchayat etc. It was further averred that the Town and Country Planning Department cancelled the 1995 permission dated 31.05.1995 and thereafter on 21.09.1996 the Panchayat officials conducted a site inspection in respect of the said activity. It is pertinent to note that at the time of the notification, the CRZ along the sea and along the estuaries was 500 metres from the High Tide Line with a no Development Zone from the High Tide Line.
It is pertinent to note that at the time of the notification, the CRZ along the sea and along the estuaries was 500 metres from the High Tide Line with a no Development Zone from the High Tide Line. In case of rivers, the CRZ was 100 metres or the width of the river whichever is less. The Town and Country Planning Department approved the project with 100 metres setback on 29.10.1993. The CRZ notification was amended in 1994 relaxing 100 metres zone along rivers to 50 metres. The private respondent nos. 6 and 7 immediately filed a fresh proposal for additional construction between 50 to 100 metres zone. No objection certificate was granted by the Town and Country Planning Department and subsequently by order dated 31.05.1995 the local Village Panchayat approved the construction which refers to 18 blocks. The relaxation to 50 metres for rivers from the H.T.L. was struck down by the Apex Court in 1996. During the pendency of the above petition, issue as to whether the construction could be permitted within 50 metres and 100 metres from the High Tide Line was put in issue before the National Coastal Zone Management Authority upon direction of this Court. The said authority came to the conclusion that the project which was being undertaken by the respondent nos. 6 and 7 was an “ongoing” project. The order of the said authority was sought to be challenged by the petitioners by moving an application for amendment which was allowed by this Court. There was also an order passed in the above petition by this Court to maintain the status quo with regard to the disputed construction activity being carried out by the private respondents. The order to maintain the status quo dated 10.07.2008 was challenged by the private respondents before the Apex Court in Civil Appeal No. 5281 of 2008 which came to be disposed of by judgment dated 28.08.2008. In the said judgment which is reported in (2008) 8 SCC 645 in the case of Goan Real Estate and Construction Limited and another V/s People's Movement for Civic Action and others it has been observed at paras 5 and 8 thus: “5. In Indian Council for Enviro- Legal Action vs. Union of India this Court held that the amendment reducing the No Development Zone from 100 meters to 50 meters was illegal.
In Indian Council for Enviro- Legal Action vs. Union of India this Court held that the amendment reducing the No Development Zone from 100 meters to 50 meters was illegal. The case of the appellants is that in view of financial constraints and depressed market conditions, the construction was not actively progressed but building plans were revalidated by the Panchayat from time to time and respondent No. 4 has granted extension for a period of three years from 17.9.2005. 8. As noted earlier, the project of the appellants is treated to be an ongoing project. The decision dated 30.10.2007 rendered by the National Coastal Zone Management Authority is in favour of the appellants, which is now challenged by the respondents in PIL by amending the petition. Without considering the validity of the same the impugned interim direction should not have been granted, more particularly, when interim relief was earlier refused to the respondent. Grant of stay of construction activity would result into considerable loss to the appellants who have invested huge amount in the project. On the facts and in the circumstances of the case this Court is of the opinion that interest of justice would be served if the appellants are permitted to complete incomplete construction at their own risk and cost.” 68. The private respondents also challenged the order allowing the amendment besides filing a Writ Petition (C) No. 329 of 2008 before the Hon'ble Supreme Court. The said Writ Petition came to be disposed of by judgment dated 31.03.2010 which is reported in (2010) 5 SCC 388 in the case of Goan Real Estate and Construction Limited and another V/s Union of India. The Apex Court has observed at paras 29, 30, 31, 33, 38, 39, 40 and 41 thus: “29. A critical study of the judgment in Indian Council For Enviro-Legal Action (supra) makes it clear that this Court had examined the validity of six amendments made by the Notification dated 16.08.1994 in the Notification dated 19.02.1991. Two out of the six amendments were found by this Court to be arbitrary and illegal and, therefore, they were struck down. When one part of the Notification was found to be legal and another part of the said Notification to be bad in law, it would not be proper to construe the judgment affecting past transactions. 30.
Two out of the six amendments were found by this Court to be arbitrary and illegal and, therefore, they were struck down. When one part of the Notification was found to be legal and another part of the said Notification to be bad in law, it would not be proper to construe the judgment affecting past transactions. 30. The Tenor of the judgment indicates that this Court intended to give prospective effect to the judgment dated 18.04.1996 rendered in the case of Indian Council for Enviro-Legal Action (supra). It is to be noted that this Court in its judgment dated 18.04.1996 had not specifically directed demolition of existing structures. It is also pertinent to note that this Court had not stated as to what will be the fate of ongoing constructions which were coming up or ongoing as per sanctions during the period when the said amending Notification dated 16.08.1994 was valid and in force. In view of the circumstances, now it has become essential to understand the real intention of this Court ingrained in the judgment dated 18.04.1996. 31. It is well settled that an order of a Court must be construed having regard to the text and context in which the same was passed. For the said purpose, the judgment of this Court is required to be read in its entirety. A judgment, it is well settled, cannot be read as a statute. Construction of a judgment should be made in the light of the factual matrix involved therein. What is more important is to see the issues involved therein and the context wherein the observations were made. Observation made in a judgment, it is trite, should not be read in isolation and out of context. On perusal of paragraph 10 of the judgment, it is abundantly clear that even under 1991 Notification which is the main Notification, it was stipulated that all development and activities within CRZ will be valid and will not violate the provisions of the 1991 Notification till the Management Plans are approved. Thus, the intention of legislature while issuing Notification of 1991 was to protect the past actions/transactions which came into existence before the approval of the 1991 Notification. 32......................................... 33.
Thus, the intention of legislature while issuing Notification of 1991 was to protect the past actions/transactions which came into existence before the approval of the 1991 Notification. 32......................................... 33. While interpreting the judgment in Indian Council for Enviro-Legal Action, it is important to take into consideration the view expressed over the matter in controversy by various Governmental Authorities formed under the purview of the Environment (Protection) Act, 1986 to implement the provisions of the Environment (Protection) Act, 1986 although such view or opinion is not binding on the Court. By communication dated 24.01.2007, 13.02.2007 and 16.05.2007 issued by the Additional Director of Ministry of Environment and Forests and decision of National Coastal Zone Management Authority dated 30.10.2007, it is brought on record that all the authorities unanimously opined that judgment of this Court dated 18.04.1996 will operate prospectively and further clarified that any developmental activity which has been initiated between 16.08.1994 and 18.04.1996 after obtaining all requisite clearances from the concerned agencies including the Town and Country Planning should be construed as ongoing projects and are not hit by the judgment of this Court dated 18.04.1996. 34............ 35............. 36............. 37............. 38. The contention raised on behalf of the respondents that the construction already completed would not be affected in any manner by decision of this Court in Indian Council for Enviro-Legal Action (supra) but incomplete construction cannot be permitted to be completed is devoid of merits. Two amendments made in the year-1994 were declared to be illegal vide judgment dated 18.04.1996. Till then, its operation was neither stayed by this Court nor by the Government. Therefore, a citizen was entitled to act as per the said notification. This Court finds that the rights of the parties were crystallized by the amending notification till part of the same was declared to be illegal by this Court. Therefore, notwithstanding the fact that part of the amending notification was declared illegal by this Court, all orders passed under the said notification and actions taken pursuant to the said notification would not be affected in any manner whatsoever. 39. The plea that the petitioner would get benefit of interpretation placed by the statutory bodies and others would not get any benefit and, therefore, the petition should be dismissed has no substance.
39. The plea that the petitioner would get benefit of interpretation placed by the statutory bodies and others would not get any benefit and, therefore, the petition should be dismissed has no substance. A bare glance at the minutes of the 16th meeting of the NCZMA held on 30.10.2007 makes it more than clear that it was concluded by the authority that the stand taken by the Ministry vide letters dated 24.01.2007, 13.02.2007 and 16.05.2007 was correct and was in accordance with the Coastal Regulation Zone Notification of 1991. What is relevant to notice is that the said authority has in terms held that the clarification given by the MOEF is applicable to all such cases in the coastal areas of the country. Therefore, the plea that only petitioners have been favoured by the authority and, therefore, the petition should be dismissed cannot be accepted. 40. On the facts and in the circumstances of the case, this Court is of the opinion that a good case has been made out by the petitioners for issuance of a declaration that the judgment dated 18.04.1996 rendered in the case of Indian Council for Enviro-Legal Action (supra) will not affect the on-going constructions or completed constructions pursuant to the plans sanctioned under the amending Notification of 1994 till two clauses of the same were set aside by this Court. 41. For the foregoing reasons, the petition partly succeeds. It is declared that the judgment dated 18.04.1996 in Indian Council for Enviro-Legal Action vs. Union of India, (1996) 5 SCC 281 , declaring part of the amending Notification dated 16.08.1994 to be illegal, will not affect the completed or the ongoing constructions being undertaken pursuant to the said Notification The rule is made absolute to the extent indicated hereinabove. There shall be no order as to costs.” (emphasis supplied). 69. The challenge to the order allowing the amendment was also disposed of in Civil Appeal No. 5282 of 2008 by order dated 31.03.2010 which is reported in (2010) 5 SCC 441 in the case of Goan Real Estate and Construction Limited and another V/s People's Movement for Civic Action and others as infructuous as the validity of the said order dated 30.10.2007 passed by the National Coastal Zone Management Authority came to be upheld in the said Writ Petition. 70.
70. On going through the said observations of the Apex Court, it becomes clear that the ongoing constructions undertaken by the private respondents pursuant to the amended notification dated 16.08.1994 would not be affected. NCZMA has held that the construction being put up by the private respondents was an ongoing project and as such the question of holding that as far as the activity being pursued by the private respondents within 50 and 100 metres is in the 'No Development Zone' would not arise. The construction by the private respondents was pursuant to the amended notification which relaxed the CRZ area to 50 metres from the High Tide Line of the rivers and as such, the distance of 100 metres which has been revived in view of the said judgment of Indian Council for Enviro-Legal Action (supra) would not be applicable to such ongoing projects. In this connection the only aspect which remains to be examined is whether the constructions which have been put up by the private respondents pursuant to the licence in the year 1995 dated 31.05.1995 from the Town and Country Planning Authority comes within the statutory regulations applicable to such locality. 71. It is to be noted that the project of the private respondents which was within the said distance of 50 to 100 metres from the High Tide Line was an extension of the same project which was intended to be started pursuant to the approval dated 29.10.1993 in the remaining portion of the same property beyond 100 metres from the High Tide Line. The project intended by the private respondents was a consolidated construction project in the property surveyed under nos.12/1 and 99/2 of Bambolim Village leaving a set back of 50 metres from the High Tide Line. The construction activity between 50 and 100 metres was not a separate project being put up by the private respondents. It is also nobody's case that the project being put up by the private respondents and held to be an ongoing project by the Apex Court, had already been completed and a new independent project was undertaken by the private respondents. 72. On this background I shall proceed to find out whether the construction put up by the private respondents is in breach of the regulations applicable to such village.
72. On this background I shall proceed to find out whether the construction put up by the private respondents is in breach of the regulations applicable to such village. Before that it would be appropriate also to note the restrictions of construction activities in CRZ areas. Clause 1(ii) of CRZ notification of 1991 provides thus: “The distance from the High Tide Line shall apply to both sides in the case of rivers, creeks and backwaters and may be modified on case to case basis for reasons to be recorded in writing while preparing the Coastal Zone Management Plans, provided that this distance shall not be less than 100 meters or the width of creek, river or backwaters, whichever is less. The distance upto which development along rivers, creeks and backwaters is to be regulated shall be governed by the distance upto which the tidal effects are experienced which shall be determined based on salinity concentration of 5 parts per thousand (ppt). For the purpose of this notification, the salinity measurements shall be made during the driest period of the year and the distance upto which the tidal effects are experienced shall be clearly identified and demarcated accordingly in the Coastal Zone Management Plans.” It may be mentioned that pursuant to the said amendment, the distance of 100 metres referred to hereinabove was reduced to 50 metres which would be applicable to the ongoing project carried out by the private respondents in view of the said judgment of the Apex Court. Clause 6(2)CRZ III (i) and (iv) reads thus: “The area upto 200 meters from the HTL is to be earmarked as 'No Development Zone' (provided that such area does not fall within any notified port limits or any notified Special Economic Zone). [No construction shall be permitted within this zone except for repairs of existing authorised structures not exceeding existing FSI, existing plinth area and existing density, and for permissible activities under the notification including facilities essential for such activities.(omitted)]. However, the following (uses/activities) may be permissible in this zone – agriculture, horticulture, gardens, pastures, parks, play fields, forestry, (projects relating to the Department of Atomic Energy) (mining of rare minerals) and salt manufacture from sea water.
However, the following (uses/activities) may be permissible in this zone – agriculture, horticulture, gardens, pastures, parks, play fields, forestry, (projects relating to the Department of Atomic Energy) (mining of rare minerals) and salt manufacture from sea water. (iv) Reconstruction/alterations of an existing authorised building permitted subject to (i) to (iii) above.” Thus, the CRZ notification clearly provides that even in the areas which come within CRZ III, re-construction and alteration of the existing authorised buildings are permissible subject to maintaining the restrictions of FSI, existing plinth area and density. Even in No Development Zone repairs can be permitted provided it does not exceed the existing FSI, plinth area and density. As such, it can be clearly noted that the restrictions to put up a construction in CRZ areas is essentially to ensure that any such activity would not exceed the existing FSI, plinth area and density. The said norms are maintained primarily to ensure that there is no congestion and conglomeration of structures in such area which could result in degradation of the environment and ecology. Even in No Development Zone area repairs to existing buildings is permitted provided the density and the plinth area is not exceeded. This itself suggests that in case FSI and/or plinth area is not exceeded, such activity can be carried out subject to complying with the statutory regulations. 73. It is not in dispute that the Planning and Development Authority (Development Plan) Regulations, 1989 (herein after referred to as the Regulation of 1989) would govern the construction activities carried out by the private respondents. Regulation 8 provides thus: “8. Deviation during development or change and revocation of permission : 1) The holder of any development permission issued under these Regulations shall follow the approved plans and subsequent conditions laid down. If such holder wishes to make any major change/deviation from the approved plans in the course of executing the project the same could be done under intimation to the authority and subsequently the revised plans with such deviations are submitted and obtained, the approval prior to the occupancy of the building. 2) The authority may subject to the provisions of the Act, revoke any permission given under these Regulations if it is found that subsequent major deviations have taken place during development and proper permission for these changes have not been obtained.
2) The authority may subject to the provisions of the Act, revoke any permission given under these Regulations if it is found that subsequent major deviations have taken place during development and proper permission for these changes have not been obtained. The authority may also proceed against the holder of the permission in the manner laid down in the Act. If the deviations do not materially alter the project and are within the framework of these regulations holder may carry out such development and should clearly show such deviations in the plans at the time of obtaining occupancy certificate.” Thus, it can be seen that deviations and alterations are permissible provided it is within the framework of the regulations and the revised plan is approved before obtaining the occupancy certificate. 74. In the circumstances stated hereinabove, the rights of the private respondents to carry out the construction in the area between 50 and 100 metres from the High Tide Line had crystallized provided such construction activity was in accordance with the statutory regulation which governed the field at the relevant time. This can also be gathered from the observations of the Apex Court in the said judgment in the case of Goa Real Estate and Construction Limited (supra) wherein at para 38, the Apex Court has clearly observed that the rights of the parties have crystallized by the amending notification till part of the same was declared to be illegal by the Apex Court and as such notwithstanding the fact that a part of the amending notification was declared as illegal by the Apex Court, all orders passed under the said notification and the actions taken pursuant to the said notification would not be affected in any manner whatsoever. As such the right to carry out alteration and deviation in terms of the said regulation cannot be said to have been taken away from the private respondents. Such right was available in terms of the existing laws prevailing at the time when the plans were approved and the 1991 notification was made applicable to the private respondents. In this connection, it would be pertinent to note the observations of the Apex Court in the judgment reported in (2007) 14 SCC 439 in the case of Suresh Estates Private Limited and others V/s Municipal Corporation of Greater Mumbai and others, at para 19 which reads thus: “19.
In this connection, it would be pertinent to note the observations of the Apex Court in the judgment reported in (2007) 14 SCC 439 in the case of Suresh Estates Private Limited and others V/s Municipal Corporation of Greater Mumbai and others, at para 19 which reads thus: “19. The word ”existing” as employed in the CRZ Notification means the Town and Country Planning Regulations in force as on 19.02.1991. If it had been the intention that the Town and Country Planning Regulations as in force on the date of the grant of permission for building would apply to the building activity, it would have been so specified. It is well to remember that CRZ Notification refers also to structures which were in existence on the date of the notification. What is stressed by the notification is that irrespective of what Local Town and Country Planning Regulations may provide in future the building activity permitted under the notification shall be frozen to the laws and norms existing on the date of the notification.” 75. Apart from that, CRZ regulation does not contemplate that the plinth area should only be at a particular place but however neither the plinth area nor the FSI or density can be exceeded in CRZ areas. In this connection, it would be pertinent to note the observations of this Court in the judgment reported in 2000(4) Mh.L.J. 708 in the case of Kisan Mehta and others V/s State of Maharashtra and others has observed at para 38 thus: “38. It has not been denied that an authorised structure existed on the plot in question, which had been constructed up to the 10th floor. This was done pursuant to a sanctioned plan and Commencement Certificate, the said structure had to be demolished on account of the original structure having weakened due to the delay. It is, therefore, apparent that respondent Nos. 5 and 6 were really re-constructing an authorised building. It cannot be denied that the old structure which is in the shape of a 10 storeyed building was an authorised building, since it had been constructed pursuant to sanctioned plan and Commencement Certificate. There is nothing in the CRZ notification of 19th February, 1991 requiring that the plinth area should be the same as that of the earlier building sought to be reconstructed.
There is nothing in the CRZ notification of 19th February, 1991 requiring that the plinth area should be the same as that of the earlier building sought to be reconstructed. All that is required is that the reconstruction should be permitted subject to the existing FSI or the FAR norms and without change in the existing use. It is nobody's case that there has been any change in the existing use. There is also nothing in the aforesaid Notification to support the plea of the petitioners that the plinth area of the re-constructed building must be the same as that of the earlier building.” (emphasis supplied ) The observations of the Division Bench of this Court clearly suggest that the existing plinth area need not be at the same place as sought to be contended by the learned counsel appearing for the petitioners. 76. In the first part of the judgment, the conduct of the respondents including the private respondents with regard to the approved plan which has been held to be the one at page 117 has been elaborately discussed. The plan which has been re-validated in the year 2008 was on the basis of the plan at page 122 and consequently, such revision and/or re-validation of the plans cannot be said to be valid. Such revision if at all had to be examined by the statutory authority including the Town and Country Planning Authority and the Village Panchayat on the basis of the plan which is at page 117. In such circumstances, it would be appropriate to quash and set aside the revision of the plan by the authorities dated 16.09.2008 and any other sanctions passed thereby. The learned counsel appearing for the petitioners has submitted that as the construction put up by the private respondents is not in accordance with the sanctioned plan at page 117, the construction activity carried out by the private respondents within 50 and 100 metres deserves to be demolished. It cannot be disputed that the major part of the construction activity therein carried out by the private respondents was after the status quo order came to be vacated by the Apex Court though it was at the risk of the private respondents.
It cannot be disputed that the major part of the construction activity therein carried out by the private respondents was after the status quo order came to be vacated by the Apex Court though it was at the risk of the private respondents. Directing the demolition of such construction within 50 to 100 metres from the High Tide Line when the Apex Court held, that the project was an ongoing project wherein some construction had already been put up and a part was incomplete, would be very harsh and inequitable in the facts of the case. Mr. C. A. Ferreira, learned Assistant Solicitor General appearing for respondent no.5 has submitted that as per the Ministry of Environment and Forest there is no breach of any CRZ notification of 1991. It was also pointed out that even the plan produced at page 122 could have been sanctioned by the authorities on 31.05.1995 in view of the amendment to the CRZ notification of 1991. The learned Senior Counsel appearing for the private respondent nos. 6 and 7 has also pointed out that the actual construction put up by them in the area between 50 and 100 metres of the High Tide Line of the river had consumed much less coverage plinth area and FSI as compared to the one sanctioned even based on the plan at page 117 which permitted the construction of 18 blocks therein. I have held that the plan at page 117 was the plan approved on 31.05.1995. As pointed out earlier the essence in controlling the construction activity in CRZ areas is essentially to ensure that the existing plinth area, FSI and density are not disturbed. Even on perusal of the judgment of the Apex Court while disposing of the said Civil Appeal No. 5281 of 2008 the fact that the building plans were re-validated by the Panchayat from time to time and the authorities had granted extension for a period of three years from 17.09.2005 was noted at para 5 of the said judgment and the construction activity was permitted at their own risk.
The contention of the learned counsel appearing for the petitioners that the private respondents were not permitted to put up any construction within 50 and 100 metres of the High Tide Line as it was in a No Development Zone cannot be accepted in the facts of the present case as the Apex Court has held that the judgment dated 18.04.1996 in Indian Council for Enviro-Legal Action V/s Union of India, declaring part of the amendment notification dated 16.08.1994 to be illegal will not affect the completed or ongoing constructions being undertaken pursuant to the said notification. There is no adjudication by the statutory authorities as to whether the construction put up by the private respondents is in accordance with the statutory norms as provided under the regulation of 1989 on the basis of sanctioned plan at page 117. While carrying out such exercise besides ascertaining whether it fits into the statutory norms the authorities have also to examine whether the plinth area, FSI and density as was sanctioned by the plan at page 117 is not exceeded by the private respondents. The discretion to find out whether such construction is permissible or not on the basis of the plan at page 117 in terms of the regulation of 1989 and any other statutory restrictions is a matter which has to be examined by the statutory authorities. This exercise will have to be carried out in terms of the provisions of the said regulation in accordance with law. In this connection, the Apex Court in the judgment reported in (2006) 8 SCC 590 in the case of Muni Suvrat-Swami Jain S. M. P. Sangh V/s Arun Nathuram Gaikwad and others, has observed at paras 33, 34, 57, 59 and 60 thus: “33. The above judgment was followed in Abdul Rehman Siddique vs. Ahmed Mia Gulam Mohuddin Ahmedji, 1996 (2) Mh. L.J. 1042 wherein a learned Single Judge of the Bombay High Court held thus: (Mah LJ pp. 1047-48, paras 9, 10 & 10-A) "9........Such discretion of the Commissioner or such authority cannot be substituted by the court nor can court direct the Commissioner or such authority to exercise discretion in a particular manner.
L.J. 1042 wherein a learned Single Judge of the Bombay High Court held thus: (Mah LJ pp. 1047-48, paras 9, 10 & 10-A) "9........Such discretion of the Commissioner or such authority cannot be substituted by the court nor can court direct the Commissioner or such authority to exercise discretion in a particular manner. If the discretion by the Commissioner or such authority appears to have not been exercised in accordance with law then court can only call upon the Commissioner or such authority to consider the matter afresh in accordance with law.............” 34. In Syed Muzaffar Ali vs. Municipal Corporation of Delhi, 1995 Supp (4) SCC 426, This Court in paras 4 & 5 held as under: (SCC pp. 427-28) "4. However, it is to be pointed out that the mere departure from the authorised plan or putting up a construction without sanction does not ipso facto and without more necessarily and inevitably justify demolition of the structure. There are cases and cases of such unauthorized constructions. Some are amenable to compounding and some may not be. There may be cases of grave and serious breaches of the licensing provisions or building regulations that may call for the extreme step of demolition. 5. These are matters for the authorities to consider at the appropriate time having regard to nature of the transgressions. It is open to the petitioners to move the authorities for such relief as may be available to them at law. The petitioners may, if so advised, file a plan indicating the nature and extent of the unauthorized constructions carried out and seek regularization, if such regularization is permissible. The dismissal of the petitions will not stand in the way of the authorities examining and granting such relief as the petitioners may be entitled to under law. The petitioners may move the authorities in this behalf within one week for such compounding or regularization and also for stay of demolition pending consideration of their prayer. During the period of one week from today, however, no demolition shall be made." 57................. In our opinion, Section 351 obliges the Municipal Commissioner if the construction of any building or the execution of any work is commenced contrary to the provisions of the Act to give notice requiring the person doing the work to show cause why it should not be pulled down. The word used in this context is shall.
In our opinion, Section 351 obliges the Municipal Commissioner if the construction of any building or the execution of any work is commenced contrary to the provisions of the Act to give notice requiring the person doing the work to show cause why it should not be pulled down. The word used in this context is shall. If sufficient cause is not shown it is left to the Commissioner's discretion whether or not to demolish the unauthorized construction and, therefore, the High Court, in our opinion, cannot impede the exercise of that discretion by the issuance of a mandatory order. We, therefore, direct the Commissioner to decide the question as to whether he should pass an order for demolition or not. 59. As pointed out by this Court in Syed Muzaffar Ali vs. Municipal Corporation of Delhi that the mere departure from the authorized plan or putting up of a construction without sanction does not ipso facto and without more necessarily and inevitably justify demolition of the structure. There are cases and cases of such unauthorized construction and some are amenable to compounding and some may not be. According to learned counsel for the first respondent, the appellants have constructed the temple without obtaining any sanction whatsoever. There is serious breach of the licensing provisions or building regulations which may call for extreme step of demolition. In our view, these are matters for the Municipal Commissioner to consider at the appropriate time. 60. Taking into consideration of all the relevant facts and circumstances and while deciding the matter, we make it clear that we are not expressing any opinion on merits of the rival claims. The authorities are entitled to examine and grant such relief as the appellants may be entitled to under the law. The respondent-Commissioner is directed to decide the matter absolutely on merits after affording opportunity to the first respondent herein within 3 months from the date of this judgment. During this period, however, no demolition shall be made.” Considering the observations of the Apex Court, the High Court cannot impede the exercise of discretion by the authorities in terms of the said regulation to save the construction by issuing a mandatory order. As such, the authorities have to adjudicate whether the construction put up by the respondent nos.
During this period, however, no demolition shall be made.” Considering the observations of the Apex Court, the High Court cannot impede the exercise of discretion by the authorities in terms of the said regulation to save the construction by issuing a mandatory order. As such, the authorities have to adjudicate whether the construction put up by the respondent nos. 6 and 7 as existing at loco comes within the parameters of the provisions of the said regulation of 1989 and other such statutory provisions. 77. In this connection, it would also be appropriate to note the observations of the Division Bench of this Court in connection with the interference by the High Court in petition raising the grievance of the public under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In the judgment reported in 2001(1) Bom.C. R. 261 in the case of Sadanand S. Varde and others V/s State of Maharashtra and others, it has been observed at paras 24, 25 and 26 thus :- “24. Before we take up the specific contentions urged by the petitioners, it is necessary to chalk out the compass within which this Court exercises jurisdiction under Article 226 in such matters. Doubtless, judicial review has been held to be a basic feature of the Indian Constitution and the power of the constitutional Courts, whether they be High Courts exercising jurisdiction under Article 226, or the Supreme Court under Article 32, is virtually limitless except for self-imposed limitations in the interest of administration of justice and the dictates of prudence. A public interest litigation is not adversary in nature, but is intended to focus the public interest aspect before the Court. If the Court is apprised of substantial injury to public interest, the Court is empowered and duty bound to interfere to do justice to the inarticulate public whose interest is projected as affected. Despite the awesome powers available in writ jurisdiction, the Courts have constructively bridled this power and deferred to experts in matters of public interest where, in view of the amplitude of complexity and technical nature involved, a judicial proceedings in the nature of a writ petition would be wholly inappropriate for determination of the issues thrown up. Policy matters have also been rightly left for the public authorities to decide and the final say in such matters should normally not come within the purview of judicial review. 25.
Policy matters have also been rightly left for the public authorities to decide and the final say in such matters should normally not come within the purview of judicial review. 25. In Dahanu Taluka Environment Protection Group and another v. Bombay Suburban Electricity Supply Company Ltd. & others, 1991(2) S.C.C. 539 the Supreme Court observed with respect to judicial review as under: "The limitations, or more appropriately, the self-imposed restrictions of a Court in considering such an issue as this have been set out by the Court in Rural Litigation and Entitlement Kendra v. State of U. P. [1986] Supp. SCC 517 and Sachidanand Pandey v. State of West Bengal. 1987 (2) S.C.C. 295 . The observations in those decisions need not be reiterated here. It is sufficient to observe that it is primarily for the Governments concerned to consider the importance of public projects for the betterment of the conditions of living of the people on the one hand and the necessity for preservation of social and ecological balances, avoidance of deforestation and maintenance of purity of the atmosphere and water free from pollution on the other in the light of various factual, technical and other aspects that may be brought to its notice by various bodies of laymen, experts and public workers and strike a just balance between these two conflicting objectives. The Court's role is restricted to examine whether the Government has taken into account all relevant aspects and has neither ignored nor overlooked any material considerations nor been influenced by extraneous or immaterial considerations in arriving at its final decision." 26. In a recent judgment in Tata Iron and Steel Co. Ltd. v. Union of India and another, 1996(9) S.C.C. 709 , these principles were reiterated by the Supreme Court in the following words: "At this juncture, we think it fit to make a few observations about our general approach to the entire case. This is a case of the type where legal issues are intertwined with those involving determination of policy and a plethora of technical issues. In such a situation, courts of law have to be very wary and must exercise their jurisdiction with circumspection for they must not transgress into the realm of policymaking, unless the policy is inconsistent with the Constitution and the law............" 78.
In such a situation, courts of law have to be very wary and must exercise their jurisdiction with circumspection for they must not transgress into the realm of policymaking, unless the policy is inconsistent with the Constitution and the law............" 78. At this juncture, I am also reminded of the function of a Judge described thus by Lawton LJ: “A Judge acts as a referee who can blow his judicial whistle when the ball goes out of play, but when the game restarts he must neither take part in it nor tell the players how to play”. Considering the observations of this Court referred to hereinabove and the overall facts and circumstances of the case as stated hereinabove, I find it appropriate to quash the N.O.C. dated 16.09.2008 issued by the Town and Country Planning Authority as well as the construction licence dated 4.10.2008 and direct the said authorities to examine the revision/re-validation of the plan afresh on the basis of the plan at page 117 in the light of the observations made hereinabove in accordance with law. Directing the demolition of the structures put up by the private respondents in the writ jurisdiction without such adjudication which requires technical and specialized knowledge would be wholly unreasonable for the reasons stated above. It is made clear that in case the construction put up by the private respondent nos. 6 and 7 or any part thereof does not satisfy the requirements of the said regulation, the authorities would have to take immediate action with that regard in accordance with law. 79. For the reasons stated hereinabove, the plan at page 122 was not the approved plan of the year 1995. The records also reveal that both the plans at page 117 and 122 have emanated from the office of the private respondents and have an approved seal of the statutory authority. In such circumstances, it was expected of the private respondent nos. 6 and 7 to explain the circumstances in which the said two plans have the endorsement of the statutory authorities approving such plans. The attitude of resiling from the truth on the part of the private respondents deserves to be deprecated and this Court cannot countenance such abusive stand by the respondents. The said conduct of the respondent nos. 6 and 7 in not explaining how such plans have surfaced resulted in a prolonged litigation between the parties.
The attitude of resiling from the truth on the part of the private respondents deserves to be deprecated and this Court cannot countenance such abusive stand by the respondents. The said conduct of the respondent nos. 6 and 7 in not explaining how such plans have surfaced resulted in a prolonged litigation between the parties. As such, I find it appropriate to award exemplary and punitive costs on the respondent nos. 6 and 7. Such costs are fixed at Rs. 25,00,000/- (Rupees Twenty Five Lakhs Only), out of which a sum of Rs.5,00,000/- (Rupees Five Lakhs Only) shall be paid to the petitioners herein. The remaining sum of Rs.20,00,000/- (Rupees Twenty Lakhs Only) shall be deposited with the State Government so that such amount can be used by the State Government to avoid environmental and ecological degradation of the coastal belt of the State of Goa. 80. The grievance of the petitioners with regard to the running of the hotel activity in the disputed structure would be re-examined by the GCZMA after the Town and Country Planning and the Village Panchayat authorities consider the legality of the construction put up by the private respondents in the said area between 50 to 100 metres from the High Tide Line in the light of the observations made hereinabove in accordance with law. 81. In view of the above, Rule stands disposed of in above terms. The Writ Petitions stand disposed of accordingly.