JUDGMENT All these writ petitions have been filed by industrial consumers of the electricity distribution companies impleaded as respondents no.2 in the present set of writ petitions, namely, Jaipur Vidyut Vitran Nigam Limited, Ajmer Vidyut Vitran Nigam Limited and Jodhpur Vidyut Vitran Nigam Limited (for short, the respondent-Discoms), inter-alia with the prayer that respondent no.1 Rajasthan Electricity Regulatory Commission (for short, the Regulatory Commission) be directed to look into the issue why the respondent-Discoms have not followed its direction regarding replacement of meters as stipulated in Rajasthan Electricity Regulatory Commission (Metering) Regulations, 2007 and ensure that petitioners are not deprived of the benefit of 3rd digit power factor incentive on account of their failure in replacing meters of the required specification, and further that the respondents be restrained from making any recovery from the petitioners any amount for the benefit of the 3rd digit power factor incentive so far granted and they be directed to allow 3rd digit power factor incentive in the existing meters of petitioners. Since all the writ petitions involve identical questions of law and facts, the matters were heard together and are being decided by this common judgment. The Regulatory Commission has been constituted by the State Government under Section 82 of the Electricity Act, 2003 (for short, the Act). It is under obligation to discharge functions enumerated in Section 86 of the Act. The respondent-Discoms are licensees under Sections 14 and 15 of the Act, to transmit, distribute and trading in electricity. Section 55 of the Act, inter alia provides that no licensee shall supply electricity, after the expiry of two years from the appointed date, except through installation of a correct meter in accordance with the regulations to be made in this behalf by the Authority provided that the licensee may require the consumer to give security for the price of a meter and enter into an agreement for the hire thereof, unless the consumer elects to purchase a meter. While the Central Electricity Authority (for short, the CEA) has in exercise of its powers under Section 55 (1) and under Section 73(e) read with Section 177(2) of the Act, has framed the Central Electricity Authority (Installation and Operation of Meters) Regulations, 2006. The Regulatory Commission has, invoking its power under Section 51 read with Section 88 of the Act, prescribed the Rajasthan Electricity Regulatory Commission (Metering) Regulations 2007, which were notified on 29.05.2007. The Regulatory Commission has, invoking its power under Section 51 read with Section 88 of the Act, prescribed the Rajasthan Electricity Regulatory Commission (Metering) Regulations 2007, which were notified on 29.05.2007. They shall be hereinafter referred to as the CEA Regulations and RERC Regulations, respectively. According to Clause 3 of the RERC Regulations, such regulations were intended only to supplement CEA Regulations and in case of any inconsistency between the two, the latter shall prevail. Clause 4 of the CEA Regulations, which came into operation on 17.03.2006, provides that meter not complying with these Regulations shall be replaced by the licensee on his own or on request of the consumer. The meters may also be replaced as per the regulations or directions of the Appropriate Commission or pursuant to the reform programme of the Appropriate Government. Clause 6 of the CEA Regulations provides that consumer meters shall generally be owned by the licensee. If any consumer elects to purchase a meter, the same may be purchased by him. Meter purchased by the consumer shall be tested, installed and sealed by the licensee. Clause 10 of the CEA Regulations provides that operation, testing and maintenance of all types of meters shall be carried out by the generating company or the licensee, as the case may be. Clause 13 of the RERC Regulations provides that proper operation and maintenance of the meters shall be the exclusive responsibility of the licensee or generating company or STU as provided therein. RERC Regulation in Clause 15 has provided for replacement of all existing meters. It provides that the correct meter instrument of required specifications as specified in these Regulations read with CEA Regulations shall be installed by the licensee within specified time as per Annexure-III appended with these Regulations. Annexure-III of the RERC Regulations has given the time schedule for replacement of existing meters, which in the present case was one year. Bone of contention between the parties as to the grant or withdrawal of 3rd digit power factor incentive, is sought to be linked with substitution of existing meters recording consumption of electricity by latest metering equipment of 2S class, which can give reading upto three decimals. Genesis of the dispute in the present set of petitions lies in the order passed by the Commission dated 31.08.2007 in Suo Motu Petition No. 130 of 2007. Genesis of the dispute in the present set of petitions lies in the order passed by the Commission dated 31.08.2007 in Suo Motu Petition No. 130 of 2007. It would be therefore instructive to reproduce relevant paras 126 to 129 thereof, which are as under:- “126. Sh. D.S. Agarwal on behalf of Rudraksh Tradelink, RCCL & Rajasthan Steel Chamber and Sh. P.N. Bhandari on behalf of HZL, J.L. Laxmi Cement & Binani Cement, in their written statements as well as during the hearing raised the issue of power factor clause stating that the existing provision of allowing incentive disincentive on account of power factor is not fair and requires relook in view of the fact that with the electronic meters now available/used have better accuracy class and can read power factor upto third decimal place. It was pleaded by them that the energy efficiency measures of whatever manner, if attempted, should be encouraged and corresponding incentive be provided to the consumers. They proposed that the incentive should be provided for each 0.1% improvement in average power factor beyond 90.0% and surcharge may be levied for fall of each 0.1% of average power factor below 90.0% and there should not be any band, as prevailing at present (90.0 to 95.0%) within which no incentive disincentive is applicable. 127. The Nigams in reply to above, have stated that the consumers are required to maintain an average power factor within a band of 90.0 to 95.0% and no incentive or disincentive should be allowed within this power factor band. However, they have shown their no objection if the present step of 1% is reduced to 0.1% of power factor for the purpose of allowing incentive/disincentive, beyond the present band of 90.0 to 95.0%, provided proper meters are installed at consumer's premises. Commission's decision: 128. On hearing the both sides, the Commission considers that the arguments given by the objectors in allowing the incentive-disincentive with more fine turning by reducing the existing steps of 1% (0.01) to new steps of 0.1% (0.001), has some force. It will encourage the consumers to improve their power factor to the extent possible so as to get more & more incentive and penalize for corresponding short fall in the power factor in identical steps. This attitude will not only be beneficial to the consumers but simultaneously it will improve the system. 129. It will encourage the consumers to improve their power factor to the extent possible so as to get more & more incentive and penalize for corresponding short fall in the power factor in identical steps. This attitude will not only be beneficial to the consumers but simultaneously it will improve the system. 129. The Commission, therefore decides that incentive be provided for each 0.1% (0.001) improvement in average power factor beyond 95.0% (.950) and surcharge be levied for fall of each 0.1% (0.001) of average power factor below 90.0% (0.900) beyond the prevailing band of 90.0% to 95.0% (0.900 to 0.950), within which no incentive disincentive is applicable. This facility shall, however, be applicable only where the installation of the meters at the consumer's premises, comply with the requirements of the CEA (Installation & Operation of Meters) Regulations, 2006. Wherever the meters of required specifications are not provided, the existing incentive scheme may continue till these are replaced by the licensee within the time frame specified in RERC (Metering) Regulations, 2007 notified on 29.05.2007 (1 year for EHT/HT consumers). In case the consumer is willing to avail the benefit of higher power factor prior to this, he may arrange for the proper metering system at his own cost for which no meter rent shall be chargeable by the licensee.” Indisputably, the meters were not replaced by the respondent-Discoms within the time frame of one year, yet they continued to extend the benefit of 3rd digit power factor incentive to petitioners for as long as two years thereafter, until it was objected to by their internal audit. It was thereupon that they decided not only to discontinue the benefit of the power factor incentive but also recover differential amount between 2nd and 3rd digit power factor incentive already paid, from the petitioners in their running bills. Aggrieved thereby, the petitioners have approached this court by filing these writ petitions. I have heard Shri P.N. Bhandari and Shri A.K. Bhandari, learned senior counsel for the petitioners, Shri Bipin Gupta, learned counsel for respondent RERC, Jaipur Vidyut Vitran Nigam Limited and Jodhpur Vidyut Vitran Nigam Limited and Smt. Parinitoo Jain, learned counsel for respondent Ajmer Vidyut Vitran Nigam Limited. Shri P.N. Bhandari, learned counsel for petitioner submitted that liability of installing correct meter as per the CAE Regulations and also under RERC Regulations is that of licensee i.e. the respondent-Discoms. Shri P.N. Bhandari, learned counsel for petitioner submitted that liability of installing correct meter as per the CAE Regulations and also under RERC Regulations is that of licensee i.e. the respondent-Discoms. In this connection, learned counsel referred to clause 15(1) of the RERC Regulations which inter-alia provides that correct meter instrument of required specifications as specified in these Regulations read with CEA Regulation shall be installed by the licensee within specified time as per Annexure-III appended thereto. If the respondent-Discoms were not able to stick to the time schedule of one year laid down by the Regulations for replacing the meters, this is essentially a matter between the Regulatory Commission and the licensee. The consumers cannot be made to suffer for the delay on the part of the licensee. Learned counsel in this connection also referred to Clause 13 of the RERC Regulations and argued that according to that, appropriate operation and maintenance of meters shall be the exclusive responsibility of licensee. Clause 4 of the CEA Regulations also provides that meters not complying with these regulations shall be replaced by the licensee on his own or on request of the consumer. Learned counsel argued that replacement of meters has to be done by the licensee alone and none else. Reference was made to clause 6 of the CEA Regulations, according to which the consumer meters shall generally be owned by the licensee and that if any consumer elects to purchase a meter, the same may be purchased by him. Meter purchased by the consumer shall be tested, installed and sealed by the licensee. The consumer shall claim the meter purchased by him as his asset only after it is permanently removed from the system of the licensee. According to clause 7(c) of the CEA Regulations, a consumer’s meter shall be installed by the licensee either at the consumer premises or outside but the licensee has been obligated to provide real time display unit at the consumer premises to indicate the electricity consumption by the consumer. Learned counsel therefore argued that as per the scheme of both the Regulations, the meter is property of the licensee. Shri P.N. Bhandari, learned counsel, further submitted that even though the practice that was prevalent with respondent-Discoms was to round off the figures upto three digit while calculating power factor incentive but this practice was discontinued by order dated 21.04.2004. Learned counsel therefore argued that as per the scheme of both the Regulations, the meter is property of the licensee. Shri P.N. Bhandari, learned counsel, further submitted that even though the practice that was prevalent with respondent-Discoms was to round off the figures upto three digit while calculating power factor incentive but this practice was discontinued by order dated 21.04.2004. The consumers as well as the industrial associations approached the coordination committee of the Discoms. The coordination committee on 29.05.2004 decided that the procedure prescribed by order dated JPR-183 dated 21.04.2004 is not to be followed and instead the procedure that was being followed prior to issuance of the said order shall be continued. It was therefore that by order dated 05.06.2004 the order dated 21.04.2004 was withdrawn. This situation continued for about three years. In the meanwhile, the Regulatory Commission issued two clarifications regarding power factor surcharge. The JVVNL however issued an order dated 26.03.2007 to withdraw the order dated 05.06.2004 and directed that the power factor incentive/surcharge is to be calculated by taking average power factor up to two places of decimals ignoring third and subsequent digits after decimal. In the meantime, the Regulatory Commission vide order dated 26.12.2006 clarified that rounding off formula cannot be made applicable. This was again clarified by subsequent order dated 19.05.2007. It was then that the matter was taken to the coordination committee for deliberation on 21.06.2007, and on that basis the fresh order dated 27.06.2007 was issued by the Discoms. Admittedly, the order of the Regulatory Commission dated 31.08.2007 was not given effect to even by respondent-Discoms themselves for as long as two years. 3rd digit power factor incentive has been allowed to the consumers in the past also on the basis of reading of existing metering equipment. Learned counsel has, in this connection, referred to the Circular dated 17.06.2004 issued by the Ajmer Vidyut Vitran Nigam Limited, Ajmer, to show that power factor incentive was in operation even prior to 2004. Shri P.N. Bhandari, learned counsel for petitioner, argued that the Regulatory Commission has committed serious illegality in mixing up the issues of meter and power factor incentive in its order dated 31.08.2007. While metering is governed by meter regulations, power factor incentive is allowed from time to time by tariff orders. Shri P.N. Bhandari, learned counsel for petitioner, argued that the Regulatory Commission has committed serious illegality in mixing up the issues of meter and power factor incentive in its order dated 31.08.2007. While metering is governed by meter regulations, power factor incentive is allowed from time to time by tariff orders. In none of tariff order, the grant of power factor incentive has been made subject to the condition of meter replacement. There was no condition in tariff order regarding type of meter to be installed for grant of power factor incentive. Grant of benefit of power factor incentive has thus been made to depend upon the fortuitous circumstance of replacement of meters by Discoms. Such an interpretation creates hostile discrimination between the consumers, who are otherwise similarly situated. Consumers, who may be lucky enough to get their meters replaced timely, would become entitled to benefit of incentive but in other cases, where the respondent-Discoms do not or fail to replace the meters, the incentive would be denied. A consumer, who has no role in replacement of meter, cannot be denied incentive when there is no lapse on his part. Denial of incentive cannot be linked with the inaction of the respondent-Discoms. This would amount to the respondent-Discoms benefiting from their own fault. Action of the respondents is wholly unjust, unfair, irrational and arbitrary. Shri P.N. Bhandari, learned counsel for petitioner argued that neither the tariff order has been replaced nor metering regulations have been amended. The order passed by the Regulatory Commission dated 31.08.2007 cannot have the effect of amending either the tariff or the metering regulations, wherefor an elaborate procedure has been prescribed. Power factor incentive is allowed to each consumer for quality of electricity consumption. If his consumption parameters are good, he gets incentive but if quality goes down, he has to even pay the power surcharge. Incentive is thus based entirely on the personal efforts of performance by each consumer. On the other hand replacement of meter is the exclusive responsibility of the Discoms. The respondent-Discoms have themselves admitted before this court that even though they were ready to install the correct meters but there was shortage of such meters in the market. Since large number of meters were required to be replaced, the delay occurred in changing the meters. On the other hand replacement of meter is the exclusive responsibility of the Discoms. The respondent-Discoms have themselves admitted before this court that even though they were ready to install the correct meters but there was shortage of such meters in the market. Since large number of meters were required to be replaced, the delay occurred in changing the meters. Having admitted so, the respondents could not fasten liability of replacement of meters on the petitioners by contending that consumer should have themselves got their own meters installed for availing 3rd digit power factor incentive. Linkage of power factor incentive with the type of meters is therefore arbitrary and illegal. Shri P.N. Bhandari, learned counsel, argued that action of the respondents in seeking to recover the amount of power factor incentive already granted to the petitioners tantamounts to retrospective reversal of the grant of such benefit. Retrospective effect to such action can be given only by Parliament or State Legislature. No order, notification, rule or regulation can have the retrospective effect. The power factor incentive received by the petitioners in the past cannot be retrospectively withdrawn because of the delay on the part of the Discoms in not replacing the meters. Learned counsel, in support of this argument, relied on judgment of the Supreme Court in Bakul Cashew Co. and other vs. Sales Tax Officer, (1986) 2 SCC 365 , wherein it has been held that an authority, which has the power to make subordinate legislation, can not make the same effective retrospectively, unless it is so authorized by the legislative which has conferred power upon it. Reliance is also placed on LML Limited vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and other, (2008) 3 SCC 128 to argue that therein the Supreme Court held that if the licensee violates the tariff approved by the Regulatory Commission, appropriate legal action can be taken against it. But it would be too much to contend that for a mistake on the part of the licensee, the consumer should suffer. In those facts, doctrine of estoppal was held applicable. Shri P.N. Bhandari, learned counsel, submitted that the petitioners had to approach this court because there is no alternative remedy available to them. But it would be too much to contend that for a mistake on the part of the licensee, the consumer should suffer. In those facts, doctrine of estoppal was held applicable. Shri P.N. Bhandari, learned counsel, submitted that the petitioners had to approach this court because there is no alternative remedy available to them. Even if in the past some of the petitioners/consumers approached the Ombudsman, he would thereby not get any jurisdiction to entertain a dispute like the present one as the action of the respondent-Discoms is founded on the order passed by the Regulatory Commission and the Ombudsman has no jurisdiction to decide upon the correctness of the orders of the Regulatory Commission. Section 42 (6) of the Electricity Act confers powers on the Ombudsman to entertain individual consumer dispute with the Discoms. The petitioners also cannot raise dispute before the committee of the Discoms because appeal from these orders also goes to the Ombudsman, who himself is appointed by the Regulatory Commission under Section 42(6) of the Act, the redressal committee of Discoms and the Ombudsman thus functions under the effective supervision and control of the Regulatory Commission and therefore cannot possibly deal with grievance of the petitioners against the order of the Regulatory Commission. Learned counsel in this connection referred to the provisions of Section 86(1)(f) and argued that the dispute of the present nature cannot be brought even before the Regulatory Commission, which is according to Section 86(1)(f) of the Act empowered to adjudicate upon the dispute between the licensee and the generating companies and referring the dispute for arbitration. Herein action of the respondent-Discoms is triggered by the order of the Regulatory Commission therefore it would be futile to approach Regulatory Commission against its own order. Shri P.N. Bhandari, learned counsel for petitioner, has, in support of his argument, also relied on the judgments of the Supreme Court in Urban Improvement Trust, Bikaner vs. Mohan Lal, (2010) 1 SCC (LS) 178, State of Orissa vs. Mangalam Timber Products Limited, (2004) 1 SCC 139 , Hukam Chand vs. Union of India, (1972) 2 SCC 601 and Bejgam Veeranna Venkata Narasimloo vs. State of Andhra Pradesh, AIR 1998 SC 542 . Shri A.K. Bhandari, learned Senior Counsel for petitioners, has mostly adopted the arguments made by Shri P.N. Bhandari, learned counsel. Shri A.K. Bhandari, learned Senior Counsel for petitioners, has mostly adopted the arguments made by Shri P.N. Bhandari, learned counsel. He has, however, in addition, submitted that according to Section 56 (2) of the Act and Clause 49 of the terms and conditions for supply of electricity 2004, no sum due from any consumer on account of the charges of electricity or any other charge for electricity, shall be recoverable after a period of two years when the same became first due. The respondents therefore in any case cannot make recovery of the amount paid by incentive to petitioners relating to the period older than two years. It is argued that action of the respondent-Discoms is violative of the principles of natural justice as they have not provided an opportunity of hearing to the petitioners prior to reversal of the decision granting benefit of incentive. Action of the respondents would be hit by doctrine of legitimate expectations as the petitioners have made huge investment in their industries on the expectations of receiving 3rd digit power factor incentive on such representation being held by the respondents. The respondent-Discoms are now estopped by application of doctrine of promissory estoppal from withdrawing that benefit. It was further argued that meters earlier installed were/are perfectly functional making correct readings. They have been made use of in the past also for grant of 3rd digit power factor incentive and therefore insistence of the respondent-Discoms for installation of fresh meters for grant of such incentive, is wholly arbitrary and illegal. It was argued that incentives once granted by taking one particular interpretation of the tariff and the regulations, cannot be retrospectively withdrawn. Shri A.K. Bhandari, learned Senior Counsel, appearing for petitioners, has, in support of his arguments, relied on a judgment of the Supreme Court in State of Orissa and other, vs. Mangalam Timber Products Limited, (2004) 1 SCC 139 . Per contra, Shri Bipin Gupta, learned counsel for the respondent Regulatory Commission, Jaipur Vidyut Vitran Nigam Limited and Jodhpur Vidyut Vitran Nigam Limited, argued that the petitioners have alternative remedy before either the Corporate Level Settlement Forum or the Ombudsman or the Regulatory Commission itself. They cannot directly maintain the writ petitions before this court. He has, in this connection, referred to provisions of sub-sections (5) and (6) of Section 42 of the Act. They cannot directly maintain the writ petitions before this court. He has, in this connection, referred to provisions of sub-sections (5) and (6) of Section 42 of the Act. It is argued that some of the consumers/petitioners approached the Ombudsman, which is statutory body constituted under Section 42 of the Act and their claim was rejected. If for that reason they do not want to go to the Ombudsman, the petitioner can approach the Regulatory Commission, which has got ample power under Section 86 read with Section 142 of the Act to examine their grievance and pass appropriate order. This court ought to therefore decline to interfere in the matter and relegate the petitioners to the alternative remedy. Shri Bipin Gupta, learned counsel for respondents, argued that power factor has been defined in Tariff order 2004 issued by the Regulatory commission on 17.12.2004 by exercising its powers under Section 62 and 64 of the Act. Learned counsel referred to the power factor clause (e) of Part (V) relating to large industrial service (Schedule LP/HT-V) of the Tariff for Supply of Electricity, 2004, and argued that the term power factor was clear and unambiguous without having any two meanings. However, the respondent-Discoms illegally started giving benefit of 3rd digit power factor incentive by considering 3rd digit recorded in the meter and if 3rd digit being more than 5, than by rounding it to 0.01. In fact, the Regulatory Commission in its order dated 26.12.2006 found this practice to be wrong and informed the Managing Director of the Discoms that rounding off is not permissible. Pursuant to that decision, the Coordinate Committee of all the three Discoms issued an order dated 27.06.2007 to comply with the order of the Regulatory Commission. They resolved that if on account of rounding off, wrong incentive has been given or any wrong surcharge has been levied, the same may be corrected. Electricity bills in respect of such consumers therefore are caused for surcharge as well as incentives. Many consumers challenged the recoveries of incentives sought to be made, before the Ombudsman, who, by order dated 07.08.2008 and 05.03.2009, decided such disputes against them. Electricity bills in respect of such consumers therefore are caused for surcharge as well as incentives. Many consumers challenged the recoveries of incentives sought to be made, before the Ombudsman, who, by order dated 07.08.2008 and 05.03.2009, decided such disputes against them. Shri Bipin Gupta, learned counsel for the respondents further submitted that Regulatory Commission by its order dated 31.08.2007 after hearing all stake holders on due publication of notice determined the tariff under the provisions of Sections 62 and 64 of the Act, afresh and in doing so it revisited the power factor clause. Learned counsel in this connection referred to paras 126 to 127 of the order extracted above and argued that the decision was taken by the Regulatory Commission that now onwards, 3rd digit power factor incentive shall be allowed only on installation of electric meters having accuracy class, which can read power factor upto three decimal place accurately. Some of the petitioners were represented before the Regulatory Commission and were heard before passing the aforesaid order. The aforesaid order had effect of modifying definition of the power factor subject to the condition that it shall be payable only on installation of a meter class regulation as per CAE Regulations 2006. It was further made clear that till such meters are not installed, the existing incentive of 2nd digit incentive be continued to be granted. Though one year time period was provided under RERC Regulations notified on 30.05.2007 but if any consumer wanted to avail 3rd digit power factor incentive benefit earlier, it was open to him to install meter at his own cost, wherefor no rent would be chargeable by the licensee. Shri Bipin Gupta, learned counsel further submitted that the respondent-Discoms despite specific order dated 31.08.2007 wrongly started giving benefit of 3rd digit power factor incentive to the petitioners without change of meters. This illegality was discovered by the audit. Thus, recovery of incentive was ordered to be made. Delay took place in replacement of the meters by the respondent-Discoms because there was scarcity of meters of this kind in the market. If any consumer wanted to avail such benefit from earlier date, he could on his own install such meter. Since the petitioners failed to install any such meter, they would not be entitled to avail any benefit, even if the respondent-Discoms also have not been able to install the meter. If any consumer wanted to avail such benefit from earlier date, he could on his own install such meter. Since the petitioners failed to install any such meter, they would not be entitled to avail any benefit, even if the respondent-Discoms also have not been able to install the meter. Installation of meter of .2S class equipment in every situation is condition precedent for grant of 3rd digit power factor incentive. Shri Bipin Gupta, learned counsel for respondents, relying on the judgment of the Supreme Court in Chandi Prasad Uniyal and other vs. State of Uttarakhand and other, (2012) 8 SCC 417 , argued that therein it was held by the Supreme Court that any amount received without authority of law can be recovered. Law imposes an obligation on payee to repay the money, lest it would amount to unjust enrichment. Reliance is placed on a single bench judgment of the Jharkhand High Court in M/s. Tata Steel Limited vs. Jharkhand State Electricity Board and other, AIR 2008 Jharkhand 60, wherein it was held that Section 56(2) of the Electricity Act is not applicable if less is charged by mistake. This was also a case of allowing rebate not admissible. This single bench judgment was upheld by division bench in M/s. Tata Steel Limited vs. Jharkhand State Electricity Board and other, AIR 2008 Jharkhand 99. Learned counsel for the respondent also relied on the judgment of the Supreme Court in T.N. State Electricity Board vs. Central Electricity Regulatory Commission and other, (2007) 7 SCC 636 , wherein jurisdiction of the Regulatory Commission has been explained and it has been held that the courts should refrain from searching wisdom of the legislature. Learned counsel also relied on judgment of the Supreme Court in Ram Talkies and other vs. Government of Andhra Pradesh and another, (2003) 1 SCC 40 , in which it was held that levy has to be collected from the date when it was originally imposed. Smt. Parinitoo Jain, learned counsel for the respondent Ajmer Vidyut Vitran Nigam Limited, largely adopted the argument of Shri Bipin Gupta, learned counsel who represented the Regulatory Commission, Jaipur Vidyut Vitran Nigam Limited and Jodhpur Vidyut Vitran Nigam Limited. She, however, also submitted that the remedy of the petitioners lies before the Regulatory Commission. There is therefore no necessity of seeking any direction from this court. She, however, also submitted that the remedy of the petitioners lies before the Regulatory Commission. There is therefore no necessity of seeking any direction from this court. The writ petitions have been filed at premature stage and deserve to be dismissed. Even if the petitioners feels that it was inaction or failure on the part of the respondent-Discoms in installing the meters, they could have approached the Ombudsman first. It was however argued that Ajmer Vidyut Vitran Nigam Limited has on direction of the Regulatory Commission changed almost all the meters of the petitioners. In so far as the period during which the meters could not be changed, the respondent-Discoms in further compliance of the direction of the Regulatory Commission started giving the power factor incentive as per the existing scheme dated 05.07.2007 Circular Commercial AJ 306, which was made effective from May, 2005 in terms of decision of the coordination committee. It was submitted that meter comprises of CTPT also and the time for changing the meter along with the CTPT was two years. In the absence of the CTPT, the meter was not complete and could not function and record consumption properly, hence the delay has been caused in procuring and installing the meters. As regards Section 56(2) of the Act and Clause 49, supra, it was argued that this provision cannot be read in isolation because this is in respect of supply in default of payment. It is submitted that this provision specifically provides about charge for electricity due from the consumers, which cannot be recovered after the period of two years from the date when such sum became first due unless the same has been shown continuously recoverable as arrears of charges. The incentive that was wrongly paid to the petitioners has now been shown in their recurring bill as recoverable. There cannot be any impediment in law because this recovery has been made pursuant to direction of the Regulatory Commission. I have given my anxious consideration to rival submissions, carefully perused the material on record and respectfully studied the cited precedents. Question whether this court should entertain the writ petition in a dispute like the present one in view of the objection of alternative remedy raised by the respondents, deserves to be decided as a preliminary issue. I have given my anxious consideration to rival submissions, carefully perused the material on record and respectfully studied the cited precedents. Question whether this court should entertain the writ petition in a dispute like the present one in view of the objection of alternative remedy raised by the respondents, deserves to be decided as a preliminary issue. Moot question that thus needs immediate answer is whether the High Court in exercise of its power of judicial review, should intervene or relegate the petitioners to alternative remedy, and if so, before which forum? Section 42 of the Act, provides for duties of distribution licensees and open access. Sub-section (5) of Section 42 however enjoins upon every distribution licensee to establish a forum within six months from the appointed date or the date of grant of licence, whichever is earlier, to establish a forum for redressal of grievance of consumers in accordance with the guidelines as may be specified by the State Commission. The respondents have for this purpose provided the forum of consumer redressal. Sub-section (6) of Section 42 also gives a remedy to any consumer upon non-redressal of his grievance under sub-section (5) of Section 42 to make representation to an authority known as Ombudsman. Section 86 of the Act of 2003, which deals with the function of the State Commission enumerated therein in its clause (f) of sub-section (1) includes the power of adjudication upon the dispute between the licensees and generating companies and to refer any dispute for arbitration. It may be pertinent to notice at this stage that some of the consumers had approached the redressal forum under Section 42(5) of the Act against discontinuation as well as recovery of power factor surcharge incentive from May, 2005. Their applications were dismissed by redressal forum. Aggrieved thereby, they filed appeal under Section 42 (6) of the Act before the Ombudsman. Perusal of the order passed by the Ombudsman for JVVNL, Jaipur, dated 07.08.2008 indicates that as many as 43 consumers approached him raising the same grievance, which has been raised before this court in the present writ petitions. One of writ petitioners had also approached the Ombudsman, namely, M/s. Synergy Steels Limited. Perusal of the order passed by the Ombudsman for JVVNL, Jaipur, dated 07.08.2008 indicates that as many as 43 consumers approached him raising the same grievance, which has been raised before this court in the present writ petitions. One of writ petitioners had also approached the Ombudsman, namely, M/s. Synergy Steels Limited. The Ombudsman however dismissed the application/appeal of such consumers on the ground that Ombudsman has no authority to scrutinize the orders passed by the Regulatory Commission, which is clear in Clause 9(3) of the Electricity Rules, 2005 that "Ombudsman shall consider the representation of the consumer consistent with the provisions of the act, the rules and regulations made here under or general order or directions given by the appropriate government or the appropriate commission in this regard before setting their grievances." The Ombudsman therefore dismissed the application/appeal taking the view that the relief that has been sought by the complainants is clearly against the order passed by the Regulatory Commission. In the circumstances therefore when the issue has already been decided against the consumers, namely the petitioners, by the redressal forum, as also the Ombudsman, on the premise that they cannot adjudicate upon this dispute because they have no authority to scrutinize the order of the Regulatory Commission and impugned recovery was founded on such order, it would be futile to require the petitioners to go back to the redressal forum or the Ombudsman. Now comes the question whether the petitioners can be required to go to the Regulatory Commission complaining against action of the respondent-Discoms that they have failed to replace the meters within the scheduled period of one year, yet they are seeking to recover retrospectively the benefit of power factor incentive already granted to the petitioners. Section 86(1) (f) of the Act, inter alia empowers the State Commission to adjudicate upon the dispute between the licensee and the generating company and to refer the dispute to arbitration. The said provision does not gives any remedy to the consumer against the action of the Discoms to approach the Regulatory Commission. This issue was examined by the Supreme Court in Maharashtra Electricity Regulatory Commission vs. Reliance Energy Limited and other, (2007) 8 SCC 381 . The said provision does not gives any remedy to the consumer against the action of the Discoms to approach the Regulatory Commission. This issue was examined by the Supreme Court in Maharashtra Electricity Regulatory Commission vs. Reliance Energy Limited and other, (2007) 8 SCC 381 . In that case, the Regulatory Commission issued a notice to all its licensees/distribution companies in Maharashtra and made an inquiry from them with regard to raising of the bills by the said licensees/ distribution companies on the basis other than the actual meter reading for the relevant period. When large variations in consumption were noticed. the licensees/ distribution companies in Maharashtra made their respective submissions before the Commission explaining under what circumstances the supplementary/amended bills were sent to the consumers. The Regulatory Commission issued certain directions. The matter was taken up in appeal before the Appellate Tribunal for Electricity, which by the impugned order dated 29th March, 2006 set aside the orders passed by the Commission and directed that each consumer should approach the forum created under Section 42(5) of the Act for the individual grievances. In those facts, the Supreme Court held that comprehensive reading of all the provisions of the Act leaves no manner of doubt that the Regulatory Commission is invested with all powers right from granting licence and laying down the conditions of licence and to frame regulations and to see that the same are properly enforced and also power to enforce the conditions of licence. The Regulatory Commission has full power to pull up any of its licensee or distribution company to see that the rules and regulations laid down by the Commission are properly complied with. However, the Supreme Court held that in view of Section 86(1)(f) of the Act the State Commission has power to only adjudicate upon disputes between licensees and generating companies. It follows that the Commission cannot adjudicate disputes relating to grievances of individual consumers. The adjudicatory function of the Commission is thus limited to the matter prescribed in Section 86(1)(f). Before embarking upon consideration of the merits of the case, a brief resume of the background in which the present dispute has arisen would not be out of order. It follows that the Commission cannot adjudicate disputes relating to grievances of individual consumers. The adjudicatory function of the Commission is thus limited to the matter prescribed in Section 86(1)(f). Before embarking upon consideration of the merits of the case, a brief resume of the background in which the present dispute has arisen would not be out of order. The impugned bills seeking to make recovery of the amount of incentive granted, have been raised, albeit with delay of two years or so, on the basis of the order of the Regulatory Commission dated 31.08.2007. The Regulatory Commission has passed this order in the scope of Sections 62 and 64 of the Electricity Act, for rationalizing retail tariff from the Discoms, the same provisions which it invoked while framing the original tariff order. It is in that process that the Regulatory Commission has made the condition of the grant of 3rd digit power factor incentive dependent on installation of meters of 2S class. In fact, several consumers were represented before the Regulatory Commission including some of the petitioners in these matters, namely, Hindustan Zinc Limited, J.K. Laxmi and Binani Cement, before the Regulatory Commission by Shri P.N. Bhandari, who has put in appearance on their behalf in these matters before this Court as well. In fact, several consumers were represented before the Regulatory Commission including some of the petitioners in these matters, namely, Hindustan Zinc Limited, J.K. Laxmi and Binani Cement, before the Regulatory Commission by Shri P.N. Bhandari, who has put in appearance on their behalf in these matters before this Court as well. Their argument before the Commission was that “the existing provision of allowing incentive disincentive on account of power factor is not fair and requires relook in view of the fact that with the electric meters now available/used have better accuracy class and read power factory upto third decimal place.” It was also pleaded by them that “the energy measures of whatever manner, if attempted, should be encouraged and corresponding incentive be provided to the consumers.” The Discoms responded to that argument by maintaining that “the consumers are required to maintain an average power factor within a point of 90.0 to 95.0% and no incentive or disincentive should be allowed within this power factor band.” However, the Discoms did not object if “the present subject of 1% is reduced to 0.1% of power factor for the purpose of allowing incentive/disincentive, beyond present point of 90.0% to 95.0% provided proper metering are installed at consumer’s premises.” This rather joint submission was appreciated by the Regulatory Commission observing that it will encourage the consumers to improve their power factor to the extent possible so as to get more and more incentive and penalize for the corresponding shortfall in the power factor in identical steps. This would not only be beneficial to consumers but simultaneously it will improve the system. It was on that note that the Regulatory Commission directed that this facility shall be applicable only where the new meters have been installed at the consumers premises, in compliance with the requirement of CEA installation and operation of meters Regulations 2006. Until the meters of the required specification are installed, the existing incentive scheme may continue till they are replaced by the licensee within the time frame specified in RERC metering Regulations, 2007 notified on 29.05.2007 (one year for EHT/HT consumers). Until the meters of the required specification are installed, the existing incentive scheme may continue till they are replaced by the licensee within the time frame specified in RERC metering Regulations, 2007 notified on 29.05.2007 (one year for EHT/HT consumers). But the Regulatory Commission further observed that “in case the consumer is willing to avail the benefit of higher power factor prior to this, he may arrange for the proper metering system at his own cost for which no meter rent shall be chargeable by the licensee.” Question now arises as to what is meant by “power factor” and related question would be what is “power factor incentive.” Power factor for grant of incentive is defined in clause (e) of Part (V) relating to large industrial service (Schedule LP/HT-V) of the Tariff for Supply of Electricity of 2004, which reads as under:- “(e) Power Factor clause Consumers having sanctioned Connected Load more than 25HP (18.65KW) shall maintain an Average Power Factor of not less than 0.90 (90%). In case the Average Power Factor falls below 0.90 (90%), a surcharge at 1% of Energy Charges for every 0.01 (1%) fall in average power factor below 0.90 (90%), shall be charged. Also an incentive of 1% of Energy Charges shall be provided if average power factor is above 0.95 (95%) for each 0.01 (1%) improvement above 0.95 (95%). If the average power factor falls below 0.70 (70%), the installation shall be disconnected and will not be reconnected till the average power factor is improved to the satisfaction of the Jaipur Discom.” What emerges from the submissions advanced on behalf of the Discoms at the Bar, the term “power factor” means - energy being a vector quantity is made up of two elements i.e. active energy and reactive energy. The consign of angle between active and reactive energy is called power factor. The quantity of active/reactive energy consumption by any consumer depends upon the apparatus installed by him. The resistive apparatus does not consume reactive energy. All motion load consumes reactive energy also with active energy. Thus, the active and reactive energy together make resultant energy which flows through the Discoms system to consumer. In tariff structures of the Discoms, energy charges are only for active energy therefore the power factor incentive/surcharge has been incorporated in the Rules. The resistive apparatus does not consume reactive energy. All motion load consumes reactive energy also with active energy. Thus, the active and reactive energy together make resultant energy which flows through the Discoms system to consumer. In tariff structures of the Discoms, energy charges are only for active energy therefore the power factor incentive/surcharge has been incorporated in the Rules. When power factor is lower than 0.9, surcharge is levied and because of this surcharge, consumer tries to keep lower reactive energy and thereby improve the power factor. Keeping in view the aforesaid power factor, the Regulatory Commission has passed the order dated 31.07.2008 making the installation of .2S class meters mandatory for grant of 3rd digit power factor incentive. A bare reading of power factor clause would indicate that every industrial concern was required to maintain power factor of 0.90 (90%). This requirement was mandatory because maintaining of power factor at 0.90 indicates that healthy system is being maintained. If the power factor falls below 0.90 (90%), a surcharge at 1% of average charges for every 0.01 (1%) below 0.90 (90%) shall be charged. Thus, there was penalty provision of charging surcharge in ratio indicated. Similarly there is provision of giving incentive of 1% of energy charge provided average power factor is above 0.95 (95%) for each 0.01 (1%) improvement above 0.95 (95%). Reading the order dated 31.08.2007 makes it evident that the Regulatory Commission clearly ordained that “in case the consumer is willing to avail the benefit of higher power factor prior to this” since it appears immediately after the period of one year for installation of meter as per the RERC Regulations, 2007, only indicates that if the consumers want to avail the benefit of 3rd digit power factor incentive prior to expiry of such period of one year, they may get the meter installed on their own and at their own cost, for which no meter rent shall be chargeable by the licensee. And the order of the Regulatory Commission has not indicated any consequence or non-installation of proper metering system by the licensee i.e. the Discoms within one year, prescribed by Appendix-III to RERC Regulations. The aggregate revenue requirement for 2006-07 of three Discoms, was determined by the Commission vide its orders dated 21.07.2006. And the order of the Regulatory Commission has not indicated any consequence or non-installation of proper metering system by the licensee i.e. the Discoms within one year, prescribed by Appendix-III to RERC Regulations. The aggregate revenue requirement for 2006-07 of three Discoms, was determined by the Commission vide its orders dated 21.07.2006. These orders indicate revenue deficit of Rs.306.85 crores for Ajmer Vidyut Vitran Nigam Limited, Rs.51.68 crores for Jaipur Vidyut Vitran Nigam Limited and Rs.280.08 crores for Jodhpur Vidyut Vitran Nigam Limited based on targeted distribution losses given by the Commission. Since the Discoms did not file tariff petitions till aforesaid orders, the Commission, in its orders, stated that Discoms may file tariff petitions as per said orders and such petitions may, inter alia, cover cross subsidy targeted to each consumer category with and without State Government subsidies, fuel price adjustment, time of day/peak load hour tariff, rational classification of tariff category as well as rationalization of tariffs. It further directed that in case any tariff petition is not filed within thirty days, the Commission might undertake suo-motu determination of tariff in accordance with Para 8.1(7) of the tariff policy. The Commission extended the date of submission of tariff petitions upto 23.09.2006 but no tariff petitions were received. In that background, when the respondent-Discoms failed to file the tariff petitions, the Commission suo-motu initiated the process for rationalization of retail tariff in Rajasthan. In Transmission Corporation of Andhra Pradesh Limited and Another vs. Sai Renewable Power Limited and Others - (2011) 11 SCC 34 , the Supreme Court was dealing with a case where the Andhra Pradesh Electricity Regulatory Commission undertook review of tariff applicable to producers of electricity for non-conventional energy resources. The Commission, vide order dated 20.03.2004 fixed the price at Rs.2.25 per unit and also made provision for 5% escalation per annum from 1994-95, that being the base year. The Commission later on vide order dated 20.03.2004 reduced the amount of tariff. The producers from non-conventional energy resources challenged the order before the Appellate Tribunal for Electricity, which vide order dated 02.06.2006 declared the order of the Commission dated 20.03.2004 as valid. The Commission later on vide order dated 20.03.2004 reduced the amount of tariff. The producers from non-conventional energy resources challenged the order before the Appellate Tribunal for Electricity, which vide order dated 02.06.2006 declared the order of the Commission dated 20.03.2004 as valid. One of the arguments raised before the Appellate Tribunal for Electricity was that since purchase price of Rs.2.25 per unit was fixed on the basis of the Central Government letter dated 07.09.1993, and Government of Andhra Pradesh on 18.01.1997 and 22.12.1998, the Commission could not back out from the premise of the Government communication. The Tribunal allowed the appeal setting aside the order passed by the Commission. However, the Supreme Court in further appeal while reversing the judgment of the Tribunal held that it fell into error in coming to the conclusion that Commission had no power either to allow or otherwise recall the tariff or so-called incentive. Every document on record refers to the power of the Regulatory Commission to take a review on all aspects including that of the tariff. The Tribunal also erred in law in treating these inter-se letters and guidelines between the Government of India, State Government and the Commission/the State Electricity Board as unequivocal commitment to the respondent/ purchasers/generators/developers so as to bind the State for all times to come. For the principle of estoppel to be attracted, there has to be a definite and unambiguous representation to a party which then should act thereupon and then alone the consequences in law can follow. It was held that framing of tariff regulations is a policy matter which can be performed by the specialized body i.e. the Regulatory Commission. The Supreme Court in exercise of its power under Article 136 of the Constitution would not sit as an appellate authority over the formation of opinion and determination of tariff by the specialized bodies. The only explanation for judicial intervention in tariff fixation/revision is where the person aggrieved can show that the tariff fixation was illegal, arbitrary or ultra virus the Act. But, it would be termed as illegal only if statutorily prescribed procedure is not followed or it is so perverse and arbitrary that it hurts the judicial conscious of the Court so as to make it necessary for the Court to intervene. But, it would be termed as illegal only if statutorily prescribed procedure is not followed or it is so perverse and arbitrary that it hurts the judicial conscious of the Court so as to make it necessary for the Court to intervene. In view of the law laid so down by the Supreme Court, the contention that the Regulatory Commission acted outside its authority in subjecting the grant of 3rd digit power factor incentive to the installation of the meters at the consumer's premises, has to be rejected. That now brings me to the question whether 3rd digit power factor incentive can be denied to the petitioners for the reason of failure of the respondent-Discoms to replace/install meters of required specification within the time frame of Regulations, 2007. The directions issued by the Commission in Para 129 of the order dated 31.08.2007 is quite categorical and emphatic, which would be evident from following excerpts thereof:- “Whenever the meters of required specifications are not provided, the existing incentive scheme may continue till these are replaced by the licensee within the time frame specified in RERC (Metering) Regulations, 2007 notified on 29.05.07 (1 year for EHT/ HT consumers). In case the consumer is willing to avail the benefit of higher power factor prior to this, he may arrange for the proper metering system at his own cost for which no meter rent shall be chargeable by the licensee.” The first and foremost direction that was issued by the Commission was that till the meters of required specification are not provided, the existing incentive scheme may continue till these are replaced by the licensee within the time frame specified in the Regulations, 2007. So the implication of this would be that till the meters are not replaced, the existing incentive scheme i.e. 2nd digit reading may continue to be provided. In the ultimate part of the said para, it was left open to the consumer willing to arrange for the proper metering system at his own cost, if he wanted to avail the benefit of higher power factor prior to this for which no meter rent shall be chargeable by the licensee. The benefit of rd digit power factor incentive could not have been extended to the consumers/petitioners unless and until the metering equipment of the required standard of .2S class was installed in place of existing meters. The benefit of rd digit power factor incentive could not have been extended to the consumers/petitioners unless and until the metering equipment of the required standard of .2S class was installed in place of existing meters. Failure of the respondents to replace old meters by the new ones, of the required standard within one year obviously could not have resulted in automatic extension of the benefit of 3rd digit power factor incentive to the consumers. None of the petitioners have come forward to claim that upon failure of respondent-Discoms to install the new meters within the period of one year prescribed by the Regulations of 2007, it had offered to install the metering equipment of the required standard at his own costs. Despite the law therefore that the consumer meter shall be the property of the licensee/Discoms and that their operation, testing and maintenance can be carried out by them alone and further that even in the case of meters offered by the consumers themselves, such meters would be the property of the Discoms, the fact remains that the petitioners were not be able to procure the meter on their own, which condition, on failure of the licensee/Discoms they were required to fulfill if they wanted to avail the benefit of 3rd digit power factor incentive. Contention that action of the respondents would be hit by doctrine of legitimate expectation deserves to be rejected, as no promise was held out to the petitioners by the respondent-Discoms to extend the benefit of 3rd digit power factor incentive without installation of the meter of the required standard, whether by licensee themselves or by consumer, which was the condition precedent for grant of such incentive as per the order of the Regulatory Commission. The Supreme Court in Transmission Corporation of Andhra Pradesh Limited, supra, while dealing with the question of grant of incentive vis-à-vis the power of the Regulatory Commission to determine or revise the tariff and the conditions in relation to procurement of power from the generating companies, rejected the similar argument and held that neither doctrine of promissory estoppel nor legitimate expectation would be applicable. In fact, the Supreme Court held that the principle of promissory estoppel is based on equity and equity lay in favour of the Government. Where equity is in favour of the Government, it can escape from its liability under promissory estoppel. In fact, the Supreme Court held that the principle of promissory estoppel is based on equity and equity lay in favour of the Government. Where equity is in favour of the Government, it can escape from its liability under promissory estoppel. In the present case the equity lies in favour of licensee/ Discoms, which are already overburdened with huge recurring losses. If the petitioners were not entitled to receive the benefit of power factor incentive, and yet it was erroneously granted to them, its reversal can not be resisted by invoking the twin doctrines of promissory estoppal and legitimate expectation. Such doctrines are basically founded on the principles of equity. It would be rather inequitable to allow the petitioners to retain such undeserving benefit in view of the said specific condition in the order of the Regulatory Commission. The argument of promissory estoppel as well as legitimate expectation merits rejection and is accordingly rejected. Adverting now to the submissions made on behalf of the petitioners that the recovery of the amount of power factor incentive already extended to the petitioners from retrospective effect would be incompetent in view of the settled proposition of law that only an Act of Parliament or State Legislature can be retrospective and no rule, regulation, order or notification can have retrospective effect, suffice to say that the argument proceeds on the fallacious assumption of retrospectivity in the recovery, which in fact it is not. What is being recovered is the amount, benefit of which has wrongly been extended to the petitioners. In other words, what benefit has been extended to the petitioners, was not payable on the date it was granted to them. Therefore, what is being recovered now by the respondent-Discoms is an amount benefit of which has unduly been granted to the petitioners. They are merely seeking to rectify this mistake. Not making such recovery would tantamount to unjust enrichment of the petitioners. Thus viewed, recovery of the incentive granted or extended by way of under-billing to the petitioners cannot be said to be retrospective recovery. The cited judgments are therefore wholly inapplicable. The judgment of the Supreme Court in M/s. Bejgam Veeranna Venkata Narasimloo vs. State of Andhra Pradesh and other, AIR 1998 SC 542 , relied on by learned counsel for petitioners, has no application to the facts of the present case because therein the Government by retrospective subordinate legislation viz. The cited judgments are therefore wholly inapplicable. The judgment of the Supreme Court in M/s. Bejgam Veeranna Venkata Narasimloo vs. State of Andhra Pradesh and other, AIR 1998 SC 542 , relied on by learned counsel for petitioners, has no application to the facts of the present case because therein the Government by retrospective subordinate legislation viz. the notification, tried to take away a portion of the money the millers had lawfully obtained. Here, no such benefit has been lawfully obtained by the petitioners. The relied judgment of the Supreme Court in Manglam Timbers Products Limited, wherein assurance extended under the industrial policy of the State was subsequently curtailed by revising the price from a back date and recovering the same from the consumers to whom finished products had been sold at a fixed price, the doctrine of promissory estoppel was held applicable, but such are not the facts of the present case where the question is whether the petitioners could be granted benefit of third digit power factor incentive despite non installation of the standard meter of required specification. Reliance on the judgment of the Supreme Court in LML Limited, supra, is wholly misplaced. Para 2(a) of the Circular dated 08.09.2000 referred to in that case and tariff order dated 27.07.2000, framed by the Regulatory Commission, provided that 15% surcharge would be levied on the consumers, who opt for continuous supply during restricted/peak hour. It was also provided that additional surcharge of 15% on demand and energy charges will be payable by consumers getting supply on independent feeders subject to the condition that they will get assured supply of 500 hours in a month. Subsequently as per the decision of the Commission, it was clarified by the Uttar Pradesh Power Corporation Limited vide Circular dated 08.09.2000 that levy of 15% surcharge on consumers on independent feeder will be subject to their giving option. The Allahabad High Court held that this amounted to clear alteration of the approved tariff and in so far as this was inconsistent with the tariff approved by the Commission, is void and wholly inoperative. The Supreme Court held that if the licensee violates tariff approved by the Commission, appropriate legal action can be taken against it. But it would be too much to contend that for a mistake on the part of the Corporation, the consumer would suffer. The Supreme Court held that if the licensee violates tariff approved by the Commission, appropriate legal action can be taken against it. But it would be too much to contend that for a mistake on the part of the Corporation, the consumer would suffer. In those facts, the doctrine of estoppel was held applicable and it was held that equity does not postulate that although the supplier did not fulfill its obligation, still it would be entitled to the benefits envisaged under the law. Ratio of that judgment cannot be projected upon the facts of the present case because herein benefit of 3rd digit power factor incentive has been wrongly availed of by the petitioners contrary to the stipulations/conditions, laid down by the Commission in its order dated 31.08.2007. The Jharkhand High Court in M/s. Tata Steel Limited and other vs. Jharkhand State Electricity Board and others, AIR 2008 Jharkhand 60, dealt with the case where JSEB was short charging HT consumers by mistake by allowing rebate, which was not admissible. The judgment arose out of identical facts. In that case, Regulatory Commission framed Jharkhand State Electricity Regulatory Commission (Tariff) Regulations, 2003, with a view to encourage the higher consumption, the JSERC introduced various incentives in the said 2004 Tariff for industrial consumers. For HT and HTSS consumers certain rebates were provided, such as, Voltage Rebate, Load Factor Rebate and Power Rebate. Subsequently the petitioners were served with demand notice in the nature of supplementary bills mentioning therein that excess rebate than what was permissible was given to petitioners therein and the balance short amount is payable by them by the month of March, 2007. The argument of recovery being barred by limitation, similar to the one raised in the present matters, was also raised before the High Court in the aforesaid case and was rejected holding that the amount of short payment became due only after realization of mistake and the assessment of the short-charged amount, and on raising the bill for the same by the JSEB and not on the date the electricity was consumed. Amount of revised bill was never demanded earlier and therefore it cannot be said to be due at earlier point of time. Amount of revised bill was never demanded earlier and therefore it cannot be said to be due at earlier point of time. Contention that recovery would now be barred by limitation having been raised in view of sub-section (2) of Section 56 of the Act, with the delay of more than two years, is wholly without substance because the said Section 56(2) only provides that any sum due from the consumer under this Section shall not be recoverable after a period of two years from the date such sum became due unless the same has been shown continuously recoverable as arrears of charges. On same analogy, similar argument was rejected by the Jharkhand High Court in M/s. Tata Steel Limited, supra. In the present case, the amount that is being demanded by the respondent-Discoms from the petitioners was not shown as due against them at any point of time earlier. This sum is being demanded now when the Discoms realized their mistake. The Supreme Court in Collector of Central Excise, Jaipur vs. Raghuvar (India) Limited, (2000) 5 SCC 299 , applying the same analogy, rejected the argument of limitation raised by the assessee that notice for demand of recovery issued by Assistant Collector under Section 11A of the Central Excise Act and Rule 57-I of the Rules framed there-under was issued beyond the period of six months, therefore, was time barred. In that case, the manufacturer had wrongly availed of the benefit of MODVAT credit in respect of certain inputs used by him in the manufacturing. He was merely required to reverse the credit so wrongly and undeservedly made by readjustment and if need be, to recover the amount equivalent to such credit wrongly availed of and disallowed by the proper officer. It was held by the Supreme Court that the recovery of credit availed of and utilized in utter breach of the faith and mutual trust and confidence, which is required for proper and successful working of the MODVAT scheme and that too in gross violation of mandatory requirements necessarily to be fulfilled before ever claiming or availing of such benefits cannot be said to be the same as the demand for payment to be made under Section 11A of the Act of any excise duty not levied or paid or has been short-levied or short-paid. They fall into two distinct and different categories altogether with basic as well as substantial differences to distinguish them from each other. (Emphasis supplied) It is trite that benefit of exemption in clause or notification or circular or a rule and incentive there-under has to be granted on strict construction thereof and if such benefit is admissible on fulfillment of certain condition, it would not be granted unless that condition is satisfied. A provision or notification granting concession/incentive has to be in the first stage interpeted strictly. If on such construction, the subject falls within its scope, then full play is to be given to the same so as to extend the intended benefit. In case of any ambiguity or doubt regarding interpretation of ordinary tax statute, the relevant provision has to be construed in favour of assess. If however, there be any doubt about interpretation of any provision or notification granting exemption/incentive, the benefit thereof has to go to the revenue. A constitution bench of the Supreme Court in Commissioner of Central Excise vs. Hari Chand Shri Gopal, (2011) 1 SCC 236 , while revisiting the previous judgments on the subject, held that a provision providing for an exemption, concession or exception, as the case may be, has to be construed strictly with certain exceptions depending upon the setting on which the provision has been placed in the Statute and the object and purpose to be achieved. If exemption is available on complying with certain conditions, the conditions have to be complied with. That decision has been followed in a recent judgment of the Supreme Court in Indian Oil Corporation Limited vs. Commissioner of Central Excise, Vadodara, (2012) 5 SCC 574 , holding that exemption notification relied therein, required that for availing such exemptions two conditions must be satisfied. Unless both the conditions stipulated in the notification are complied with, the appellant was not entitled to exemption. The Supreme Court in Collector of Customs vs. Presto Industries, (2001) 3 SCC 6 , while reiterating the law that exemption notification should be strictly construed, further held that onus of proof of fulfillment of condition subject to which an exemption may be admissible lies on the assessee or upon a party claiming such benefit under the notification. So far the question of construing an exemption Notification is concerned, such notifications are to be strictly construed. So far the question of construing an exemption Notification is concerned, such notifications are to be strictly construed. Where a condition precedent is not fulfilled before claiming any exemption, such benefit would not be admissible. In Sanghvi Reconditioners Private Limited vs. Union of India and other, (2010) 2 SCC 733 , also the Supreme Court while emphasizing the need for strict compliance with the conditions specified in an exemption notification, held that such notification should be strictly construed. In Novopan India Limited, Hyderabad vs. Collector of Central Excise and Customs, Hyderabad, 1994 Supp (3) SCC 606, the Supreme Court held that in case of ambiguity, a taxing statute should be construed in favour of the assessee assuming that the said principle is good and sound does not apply to the construction of an exception or an exempting provision; they have to be construed strictly. A person invoking an exception or an exemption provision to relieve him of the tax liability must establish clearly that he is covered by the said provision. In case of doubt or ambiguity, benefit of it must go to the revenue. Following the judgment in Novopan India Limited, supra, the Supreme Court recently in State of Gujarat and other vs. Essar Oil Limited and another, (2012) 3 SCC 522 , held that general principle that in case of ambiguity, a taxing statute should be construed in favour of the assessee, does not apply to the construction of an exception or an exempting provision, as the same have to be construed strictly and that in construing the exemption notification, question of equity does not arise. The exception or exemption provision must be construed strictly. Give it or does not give it at all. An exemption is a standalone process. Such being the position of law, even if there was any doubt or ambiguity as to the consequence of failure of respondent-Discoms to replace the existing meters by standard meters within the prescribed period, there being further stipulation that the consumers, if they wanted to avail the benefit of incentive earlier, could get such meters installed by themselves, and petitioners having failed to do so, the benefit of incentive would not be available to them. If there be any doubt arising out of failure of respondent-Discoms to install such meters within the prescribed time frame, the benefit of such doubt has to go to the revenue and not to the consumers. In view of the above discussion, action of the respondents in seeking reversal of the benefit of incentive unduly granted to the petitioners cannot be faulted. All the writ petitions, being devoid of merit, thus fail and are dismissed with no order as to costs. This also disposes of stay applications. Since this judgment disposes of bunch of writ petitions, office to place its copy in all the connected writ petitions.