JUDGMENT Dr. B.R. SARANGI, J. : The petitioner, an employee of the Dhenkanal Gramya Bank, has filed this petition with a prayer to quash the order dated 20.05.1999, vide Annexure-7 passed by the Disciplinary Authority, imposing a major penalty of his removal from his in the Bank under Regulation 30(1) of Dhenkanal Gramya Bank Staff Service Regulations, 1982, hereinafter to be referred to as “1982 Regulation”, in short, and the subsequent order dated 28.08.1999, vide Annexure-8, passed by Appellate Authority directing to reinstate him in Bank’s service with cut in increment, fitting him in the initial Pay Scale and treating the period of his suspension as period not spent on duty and debarring him from first line assignment for a period of five years from the date of reinstatement and rejecting his further appeal preferred on 14.05.2002, vide Annexure-14, against the order of imposition of the aforesaid penalty. 2.The short facts of the case, in hand, is that the petitioner was a Scale-I Officer in Dhenkanal Gramya Bank. On allegation of serious acts of commissions and omissions having been committed by him, charge was framed against him on 29.10.1998, vide Annexure-1, with statement of imputations while he was serving as Manager at Indipur Branch and he was called upon to file show cause reply. In compliance to that, the petitioner filed his show cause reply on 11.11.1998, vide Annexure-2, indicating that by the alleged acts of commissions or omissions, the Bank had not sustained any pecuniary loss. On consideration of show cause reply, one N.P. Pradhan, an office of the Bank, was appointed as Enquiry Officer. The Presiding Officer as well as the petitioner submitted list of witnesses as well as documents on 30.12.1998. The petitioner requested the Enquiry Officer to take the assistance of one Sri B.K. Mohanty, a retired Gazetted Officer of Central Government, as defence assistance, but the same was turned down on 16.01.1999. Thereafter, on 27.01.1999 the petitioner made a representation to opposite party No.1 to change the Enquiry Officer as he was biased and was not following the rules and regulations of departmental proceeding. On 01.02.1999 after receiving such representation, the petitioner was placed under suspension and he was debarred from visiting any of the branches of the Bank during the period of suspension, vide Annexure-4. On 01.02.1999 after receiving such representation, the petitioner was placed under suspension and he was debarred from visiting any of the branches of the Bank during the period of suspension, vide Annexure-4. On 16.02.1999 enquiry was completed and on 17.05.1999, vide Annexure-6, a letter was issued to the petitioner by opposite party No.1 to file show cause reply to the proposed punishment of his removal from service, which would not be a disqualification for his future employment and provided a chance of personal hearing on 18.05.1999 at 4 P.M. 3.On 20.05.1999 vide Annexure-7, the Disciplinary Authority passed the final order removing the petitioner from Bank’s service with immediate effect, which would not be a disqualification for future employment. The period of suspension was treated as the period not spent on duty and during the period of suspension no other amount/allowance was paid other than the subsistence allowance. 4.Against the said order of penalty imposed by the Disciplinary Authority, the petitioner preferred an appeal before Board of Directors on 16.06.1999. On 28.08.1999, the Board of Directors on consideration of the appeal, modified the order of the Disciplinary Authority directing reinstatement of the petitioner in Bank’s service with cut in increment and fitting him in the initial stage of pay scale presently drawn by him and the period of his suspension was treated as period not spent on duty with no other allowance or amount to be paid to him, other than subsistence allowance already paid and debarring him from the first line assignment for a period of 5 years from the date of reinstatement and there would be a review after completion of said 5 years regarding suitability for giving him first line assignment and decision was taken by the Chairman vide Annexure-8. 5.Having not satisfied with the order passed by Disciplinary Authority, the petitioner preferred a review petition on 28.09.1999 vide Annexure-9 before the Board of Directors with a request to reconsider the punishment and exonerate him of such punishment. 5.Having not satisfied with the order passed by Disciplinary Authority, the petitioner preferred a review petition on 28.09.1999 vide Annexure-9 before the Board of Directors with a request to reconsider the punishment and exonerate him of such punishment. On 27.12.1999 the petitioner filed a representation for sanction of pay leave from 21.05.1999 to 29.08.1999, but opposite party No.1 issued a letter on 6.09.2000 vide Annexure-10 to the petitioner stating that the period between 01.02.1999 and 29.08.1999, which has been decided to be treated as one, “not spent on duty” by the Appellate Authority should be treated that the period will not be adjusted against any leave including that of leave on loss of pay, it would be treated as break in service and it would not rank for calculation of total number of active service put in by the employee for the purpose of P.F., gratuity and pension for the purpose of increment or promotion. The petitioner was promoted to Scale-II Officer on 10.10.2001 vide Annexure-12. On 14.05.2002, vide Annexure-13, the petitioner filed an appeal before opposite party No.2 requesting to save his financial loss of Rs.5000/- per month and release 16 increments. On 15.07.2002, vide Annexure-14, opposite party No.2, on consideration of such appeal, rejected the same stating that there was no provision in service regulation for making further representation. Hence this writ petition. 6.Ms. S. Mohapatra, learned counsel for the petitioner strenuously urged that major penalty passed by Disciplinary Authority, was modified by Appellate Authority and the punishment imposed did not fall within any penalty categorized in the 1982 Regulation. If such punishment as indicated in Annexure-8 was not categorized in the 1982 Regulation, the order so passed is required to be quashed. Apart from the same, it is urged that there is non-compliance with the principles of natural justice to the effect that memorandum of charges did not disclose the documents relied upon and the list of witnesses was not supplied to him. The petitioner was also denied defence assistance of his choice by the Enquiry Officer which is evident from the records. The request for change of the Enquiry Officer before the Disciplinary Authority had been rejected though there was an allegation that the Enquiry Officer was biased. On the other hand, on receipt of such representation, the Appellate Authority put the petitioner under suspension to compel him to participate in the proceeding. The request for change of the Enquiry Officer before the Disciplinary Authority had been rejected though there was an allegation that the Enquiry Officer was biased. On the other hand, on receipt of such representation, the Appellate Authority put the petitioner under suspension to compel him to participate in the proceeding. The Enquiry Officer had also not summoned any defence witness, which contravened the provisions of law. Therefore, the enquiry so conducted against the petitioner cannot be sustained and on that basis the punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority should be quashed. It is further urged that there was no pecuniary loss to the Bank. In view of the aforesaid contention he seeks to quash the order of punishment imposed by the Authority. 7.In order to substantiate her contention, learned counsel for the petitioner has relied upon the judgments in *Ram Avtar v. Union of India, Vol.99 (2005) CLT 698, Mathura Prasad v. Union of India and others., (2007) 1 S.C.C. 437 , Ranjit Thakur v. Union of India and others, AIR 1987 SC 2386 , Anant R. Kulkarni v. Y.P. Education Society and others, (2013) 6 SCC 515 , Chairman, LIC of India and others v. A. Masilamani, (2013) 6 SCC 530 , Hardwarilal v. State of U.P. and others, 2000 SCC (L & S) 85. 8.Mr. G.A.R. Dora, learned Senior Counsel for opposite party-Bank submitted that the action taken by the Bank authorities was wholly and fully justified and the Appellate Authority on consideration of the materials when reversed the punishment from removal from service to reinstatement in Bank Service with cut off increment, fixing his pay at the initial scale that ipso facto cannot be said to be illegal. The authorities never acted arbitrarily and unreasonably and rather they acted in consonance with the provisions of law. He emphatically argued that the petitioner committed misconduct while working as the Manager of Indipur Branch suppressing the facts, accepting spurious Jewels for financing the Jewel loan to a person who never existed and in order to write off the existing amount after auction of the Jewels, thereby causing financial loss to the Bank and allowing closure of the loan accounts with less interest. He further urged that the Branch Manager’s monthly certificate (BMC) regarding tally of small loan balance as on 31.03.1998 submitted by him was false and the petitioner himself admittedly in his explanation that he reported to Head Office basing upon the Field Officer’s report and the differential amount left the Jewel loan was not brought to his notice. He should have personally checked up before forwarding to the Head office and that itself was a negligence on his part. During course of enquiry, the petitioner admitted that such lapses which according to him were minor and so far as change of defence assistance is concerned, since the petitioner wanted to engage a retired postal authority, the same was not permissible because had it been a person from the Bank, the matter would have been considered in accordance with law, more so in each stage opportunity had been given to the petitioner in compliance with the principles of natural justice, and as such, there was no violation of principles of natural justice and this Court should not interfere with the punishment imposed by the Appellate Authority. Abiding by such punishment, petitioner has joined the service and has got promotion to Scale-II Officers. 9.In order to substantiate his contention, Mr. Dora has relied upon the judgment in FCI v. Bant Singh and another, 1997 LIC 2877 . 10.Admittedly, the petitioner was serving as a Scale-I Officer under the erstwhile Dhenkanal Gramya Bank and after amalgamation, the Nilanchal Gramya Bank has come into existence. In any case, while the petitioner was serving in Dhenkanal Gramya Bank, a Disciplinary Proceeding was initiated against him under the provisions of 1982 Regulation. 10.Admittedly, the petitioner was serving as a Scale-I Officer under the erstwhile Dhenkanal Gramya Bank and after amalgamation, the Nilanchal Gramya Bank has come into existence. In any case, while the petitioner was serving in Dhenkanal Gramya Bank, a Disciplinary Proceeding was initiated against him under the provisions of 1982 Regulation. 11.Regulation 30 of 1982 Regulation deals with penalties which reads as follows : “30(1) Without prejudice to the provisions of other regulations, an officer or employee who commits a breach of these regulations or who displays negligence, inefficiency or indolence, or who knowingly does anything detrimental to the interests of the Bank or in conflict with its instructions or who commits a breach of discipline or is guilty of any other act of misconduct, shall be liable to the following penalties - (a)Reprimand; (b)delay or stoppage of increments or promotion; (c)degradation to a lower post or grade or to a lower stage in his incremental scale; (d)recovery from pay of the whole or part of any perunicary loss caused to the Bank by the officer or employee; (e)removal from service which shall not be a disqualification for future employment. (f)Dismissal. (2) No officer or employee shall be subjected to the penalties referred to in clause (b), (c), (d), (e) or (f) of sub-regulation (1) except by an order in writing signed by the Chairman and no such order shall be passed without the charge being formulated in writing and given to the said officer or employee so that he shall have reasonable opportunity to answer them in writing or in person, as he prefers and in the latter case his defence shall be taken down in writing and read to him : Provided that the requirements of this Sub-regulation may be waived, if the facts on the basis of which action is to be taken have been established in a Court of law or Court martial or where the officer or employee has absented or where it is for any other reason impracticable to communicate with him or where there is difficulty in observing them and the requirements can be waived without injustice to him. In every case where all or any of the requirements of this sub-regulation are waived, the reasons for so doing shall be recorded in writing. In every case where all or any of the requirements of this sub-regulation are waived, the reasons for so doing shall be recorded in writing. (3) The inquiry under this regulation and the procedure with the exception of the final order, may be delegated in case the person against whom proceedings are taken is an officer to any officer who is in a grade higher than such officer and in the case of an employee to any officer. For purpose of the inquiry, the officer or employee may not engage a legal practitioner. (4) An officer or employee may be placed under suspension by the officer empowered to pass the final order under this regulation. During such suspension, the officer or employee shall receive subsistence allowance equal to one-third of basic pay the officer or employee was receiving on the date prior to the date of suspension, plus dearness allowance and other allowances excluding conveyance allowance, entertainment allowance and special allowance calculated on the reduced pay for the first three months of suspension. For the subsequent period after three months he shall be entitled to draw ½ of the basic pay plus the dearness allowance and other allowances specified above calculated on the reduced pay. Provided that if no penalty under clause (b), (c), (d), (e), or (f) of sub regulation (1) is imposed the officer or employee shall be refunded the difference between the subsistence allowance and the emoluments which he would have received but for such suspension, for the period he was under suspension and that, if a penalty is imposed on him under all or any of the said clauses, no order shall be passed which shall have the defect of compelling him to refund such subsistence allowance. The period during which an officer or employee is under suspension shall, if he is not dismissed from the service, be treated as period spent on duty, leave or period not spent on duty as the officer who passes the final order may direct.” 12.Due to commissions and omissions made by the petitioner during his tenure of service, charge was framed on 29.10.1998 vide Annexure-1 with statement of imputations against him and he was called upon to show cause. To that the petitioner submitted his show cause reply on 11.11.1998 vide Annexure-2 and categorically denied the Bank having sustained any pecuniary loss and stated that the proceeding should be dropped against him. The Enquiry Officer after conducting enquiry submitted the enquiry report on 17.05.1999, vide Annexure-6, basing upon which opposite party No.1 called upon the petitioner to show cause against the proposed punishment of removal from service and provided a chance of personal hearing. 13.On 20.05.1999 vide Annexure-7 the Disciplinary Authority passed the final order removing the petitioner forms service with immediate effect which shall not be a disqualification for future employment as per the clause-1(e) of Regulation-30 of 1982 Regulation. 14.Against such order of imposition of penalty, the petitioner preferred an appeal before the Board of Directors on 16.06.1999. Considering the contentions raised in the appeal, the Board of Directors modified the order of Disciplinary Authority and reinstated the petitioner in Bank’s service with cut in increment and fitted in the initial stage of pay scale presently drawn by him and the period beginning from the date of suspension till the date of reinstatement was treated as period not spent on duty and no other allowance or amount was to be paid to him by the Bank such as subsistence allowance already paid and debarred him from 1st line assignment for a period of five years from the date of reinstatement and there would be review of his case after completion of five years regarding his suitability for giving 1st line assignment, vide Annexure-8. 15.The contentions raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the punishment, imposed by the appellate authority does not fall within any category of punishment mentioned in Regulation 30 of 1982 Regulation. If such punishment was not prescribed, imposition of the same by the appellate authority cannot be sustained. To this, it appears that the punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority under Clause 1(e) of Regulation 30 has been converted to punishment under clause 1(b) of Regulation 30 by awarding stoppage of increment to the initial stage. If such punishment was not prescribed, imposition of the same by the appellate authority cannot be sustained. To this, it appears that the punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority under Clause 1(e) of Regulation 30 has been converted to punishment under clause 1(b) of Regulation 30 by awarding stoppage of increment to the initial stage. Therefore, this Court is not in agreement with the contentions raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner, rather, there punishments imposed by the disciplinary authority under clause 1(e) of Regulation 30 have been converted to minor penalties under clause 1(b) of Regulation 30 of Regulation, 1982 and, as such, punishment was imposed in conformity with the provisions contained in Regulation 30 of 1982 Regulation. 16.Coming to the question of non-compliance with the principles of natural justice, in reply to the contention raised that the petitioner was denied defence assistance by engaging one B.K. Mohanty, a Retired Gazetted Officer of the Central Government, Mr. G.A.R. Dora, learned Sr. Counsel appearing for the Bank has referred to the proceedings of the Enquiry Officer held on 16.1.1999 vide Annexure-6, which reads as follows : “E.O. - Time now is 10.40 A.M. we may go ahead with the enquiry. P.O. to head his evidence. P.O.- I went to produce Mr. B.K. Sahu as M.I.O.(I). E.O.- C.S.O. you were to inform by today about your defence assistant and confirm having completed inspection of documents. C.S.O. - I have not completed inspection of documents. Mr. B.K. Mohanty, Retired Central Govt. Officer of village-Kantapada, P.O. Kanakpur, Dist. Jagatsinghpur will assist me as defence assistant. His consent letter is produced herein. E.O.- The C.S.O. has not availed the opportunity given to him for inspection of documents. P.O.- I object to Sri B.K. Mohanty, being the D.A. (Defence Assistant) as he is neither a Bank Employee nor he is representing a Trade Union to which the C.S.O. belong. C.S.O. - Sir, I could not find any suitable defence assistant other than Sri B.K. Mohanty even though I met so many persons in our and other Banks. So, he may be allowed to be my D.A. E.O.- This being a departmental enquiry and the inntrutations are reportedly well understood by the CSO, participation of an outsider in defence assistant is unwarranted. So, he may be allowed to be my D.A. E.O.- This being a departmental enquiry and the inntrutations are reportedly well understood by the CSO, participation of an outsider in defence assistant is unwarranted. The C.S.O. is not allowed to engage Sri Mohanty as D.A. in his defence assistant, who has also not appeared today before me though regular enquiry has to go ahead from today. C.S.O. - Sir, I may be permitted to search another defence assistant and allowed another 7 days time for this purpose. P.O.- The C.S.O. should have arranged his assistant much before regular proceedings of enquiry. If allowed, this will result in undue delay. C.S.O. - Since, I received the memorandum of enquiry on 25.12.1998 and had earlier requested for one month time, I may now be allowed one week to search for a defence assistant. E.O.- The C.S.O. has failed to get a proper defence assistant and for the same, enquiry cannot be held up. P.O. may go ahead and produce M.W. (I).” 17.In view of the above, it cannot be said that there was non-compliance with the principles of natural justice by not allowing the petitioner to engage one B.K. Mohanty as his defence assistant. Rather, Sri B.K. Mohanty being a employee of the Central Government, not being an employee of the Bank, his engagement was refused by the Enquiry Officer. However, liberty was also given by the Enquiry Officer to find out a defence assistant, who could assist the petitioner in the proceeding, but the petitioner failed to get proper defence assistant and for the same, the proceeding could not wait. That itself cannot be said to be any opportunity was given to the petitioner. Further, the petitioner himself in the proceeding of the Departmental Enquiry held on 10.2.1999 stated as follows : “Since Management witnesses have given their witness, the role of defence assistant at this stage will linger the enquiry and we may go back in the proceedings. Again my defence assistant Sri B.K. Mohanty has not been summoned by the E.O. Hence, I am obliged to participate in the enquiry henceforth without defence assistant.” 18.With regard to the contention that there is non-supply of documents and therefore, the proceeding is vitiated, Mr. Again my defence assistant Sri B.K. Mohanty has not been summoned by the E.O. Hence, I am obliged to participate in the enquiry henceforth without defence assistant.” 18.With regard to the contention that there is non-supply of documents and therefore, the proceeding is vitiated, Mr. Dora has referred to Annexure-6 at page 49, i.e., the proceedings of the Departmental Enquiry held on 30.12.1998, the relevant portion of which is quoted below : P.O.- I am submitting the list of documents and list of witnesses in duplicate. E.O.- C.S.P., Please acknowledge the above. C.S.O.- Yes, Sir. P.O.-The documents listed are readily available me. E.O.- C.S.O. you may go through the listed documents and obtain copies of relevant part, if any. You are required to submit certificate on the genuineness and authenticity of the same. C.O.- I acknowledge receipt of 25 documents which have been detailed in the list of documents and certify that they are genuine and authentic. 19.With regard to the allegation of the petitioner regarding non-examination of witness, Mr. Dora, has referred to the deposition of the petitioner in the departmental proceeding held on 10.2.1999, wherein he has stated as follows : “C.S.O.- I want to produce myself as my (defence) witness. E.O.- Permitted.” Further in his deposition, the petitioner in his examination-in-chief in the departmental proceeding held on 10.2.1999 has admitted as follows : “x x x x I may not be made a delinquent for his lapses. Sir, on the whole, the lapses are minor in nature. X x x” “x x x I issued a Regd. Notice and the same was returned back undelivered with an endorsement “address is not available.” This led me to suspect the gold pledged by Rama Sahu to be a non-existed person. X x x ” “x x x Concludingly I state that in a/c. the four article of charges, I have not made the Bank sustaining a loss with any deliberate action, but I have made sincere effort to safeguard the interest of the Bank excepting Rs.15/-, in regard to which I owe the responsibility. Xx x x ” 20.By the above consistent statements made by the petitioner in his deposition, he clearly admitted that he owned the responsibility of any commission or omission during his tenure as Branch Manager. Xx x x ” 20.By the above consistent statements made by the petitioner in his deposition, he clearly admitted that he owned the responsibility of any commission or omission during his tenure as Branch Manager. In the counter affidavit filed by the Bank, it has been specifically stated in paragraphs 6 and 7, which reads as follows : “6. That the alleged infirmities mentioned in para-51 of the writ petition are misconceived on the very 1st day of commencement of the departmental enquiry on 29.10.98, list of witnesses and documents were supplied to the petitioner, which the petitioner acknowledged (running page 49). The petitioner was allowed time to produce defence witnesses (D.Ws.). He undertook to produce and was permitted (Running page 70). D.Ws. refused to come and the petitioner agreed to conclude without Defence witnesses (D.W.) (pages 34-85). The petitioner participated in the enquiry (page 70)” 7. That enquiry report was enclosed to the 2nd show cause. He was afforded personal hearing by the Disciplinary Authority and also by the Board. As regards defence assistant, the petitioner gave the name of a retired postal employee to which the presenting officer objected stating that only an employee of the Bank or the Office bearer of the Union can be engaged as Defence Assistant. The petitioner was allowed sufficient time for arranging defence assistant, but he did not arranged with an intent to drag on enquiry. However, he participated in the enquiry till its conclusion. In the case of FCI v. Bant Singh and another (1997 LIC P.2877 SC), the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that taking assistant of retired employee would amount to permitting the retired employee to have regular practice and the same is erroneous.” 21.In that view of the matter, it is made clear that the allegation of non-compliance with principles of natural justice is absolutely a myth. Rather, each and every opportunity was given to the petitioner at all stages and after availing the same, it was proposed to impose major penalty by the Enquiry Officer and the disciplinary authority imposed the major penalty of removal of the petitioner from service by passing a reasoned order, vide Annexure-7. Rather, each and every opportunity was given to the petitioner at all stages and after availing the same, it was proposed to impose major penalty by the Enquiry Officer and the disciplinary authority imposed the major penalty of removal of the petitioner from service by passing a reasoned order, vide Annexure-7. The Enquiry Officer merely suggested imposition of major penalty under clause 1(e) of Regulation 30, but the Board on consideration of the contentions of the petitioner felt that the punishment awarded by the Disciplinary Authority was comparatively harsh an therefore, modified the punishment by cutting down increment so that it will fit in the initial stage of scale of pay presently drawn by the petitioner. 22.Such cutting down of increment comes within the meaning of Clause 1(b) of Regulation 30, i.e., stoppage of increments. After the appellate authority imposed such punishment, the petitioner was reinstated in service and vide Annexure-9, he acknowledged such punishment stating as follows : “I am really fortunate that considering my appeal dated 18.6.1999, the punishment awarded by the Disciplinary Authority has been modified to the following extent :- (a)Reinstatement with cut in increment fitted in the initial stage of pay scale presently drawn. (b)Period beginning from the date of suspension till the date of reinstatement shall be treated as period not spent on duty and no other allowance up or amount to be paid by the Bank, other than subsistence allowance already paid. (c)Debarred from first line assignment for a period of 5 years from the date of reinstatement and there will be review after completion of 5 years regarding suitability for giving first line assignment and the decision to be taken by the Chairman as deemed fit.” With the above acknowledgment, it appears that the petitioner was satisfied with the modified punishment imposed by the appellate authority, pursuant to which he joined the service and in the meantime he has also been promoted to the next higher rank(s). 23.In Ram Avtar case (supra) this Court decided the case with regard to the appointment of defence assistant of choice and refusal by the authority. But as it appears, in the present case, the principles so decided in the case supra are not applicable. Rather on the basis of the materials available, opportunity was given to the petitioner to take defence assistance of a person belonging to the Bank. But as it appears, in the present case, the principles so decided in the case supra are not applicable. Rather on the basis of the materials available, opportunity was given to the petitioner to take defence assistance of a person belonging to the Bank. For that purpose, he wanted time which was granted by the Enquiry Officer, but he failed to produce any defence assistant and therefore, that itself cannot be a reason to quash the punishment imposed on the petitioner by the disciplinary authority. 24.In Mathura Prasad case (supra), the apex Court held that if there is non-compliance of principles of natural justice to the extent that the punishment imposed by the Enquiry Officer on the basis of the report of the Enquiry Officer and the disciplinary authority has not taken into account the reasons, that amounts to non-compliance of the procedure laid down under Rules and that itself an action taken by the disciplinary authority, which was without application of mind. In addition to that, the apex Court has held that power of judicial review can only be exercised under Articles 226 of the Constitution, if there is error of law apparent on the face of record in case of non-application of mind by the statutory authority or exercise of power by the statutory authority in a manner not provided in the Statute. There is no dispute with regard to the proposition laid down by the apex Court, but the same is not applicable in the present context. 25.So far as the reliance placed on Ranjit Thakur case (supra), it was a proceeding initiated under the Army Act and the apex Court held that irrationality and perversity are recognized grounds for judicial review and as such, judicial review generally speaking is not directed against decision, but is directed against “decision making process”. The question of choice and quantum of punishment is within the jurisdiction and discretion of the Court concerned, but the sentence has to suit the offence and the offender and it will not be vindictive and unduly harsh and it will not be so disproportionate to the offence as to shock the conscience and amount in itself to conclusive evidence of bias. But none of these contentions is available to be considered in the instant case. Therefore, the reliance placed on the said judgment has no application to the present case. But none of these contentions is available to be considered in the instant case. Therefore, the reliance placed on the said judgment has no application to the present case. 26.In Anant R.Kulkarni case (supra), it was held that a Division Bench of the High Court erred in granting liberty to the respondent to hold fresh enquiry when the Tribunal as well as the Single Bench of the High Court categorically found that the enquiry was not held in accordance with Rules, 1981 and exonerated the appellant-delinquent on merits as well, thereby the apex Court has held that the conclusion reached by the Division Bench that the Tribunal and the learned Single Judge had found that there was a defect in the matter in which the enquiry was held, and therefore, there was no question of it recording a finding on merit to the effect that the charges levelled against the appellant were not proved, is also not sustainable in law. In a departmental enquiry against the delinquent, the apex Court has held that the same is not only done with a view to establish the charge against the delinquent, but also to establish the truth of the matter, which may either result in establishing or vindicating his stand. Therefore, fair action on the part of the authority concerned, is one of the paramount importance. This judgment though has bene cited by the learned counsel for the petitioner, squarely applies to the learned counsel for the opposite parties as enquiry was done in conformity with the provisions of Rules by giving adequate opportunity in compliance with the principles of natural justice. This Court cannot take a different view from that taken by the apex Court. 27.In Chairman, LIC of India and others case (supra), the apex Court has framed guidelines to the effect that if enquiry proceeding itself is found vitiated what course has to be followed by the Courts and Tribunals. It has been held that reinstatement cannot be ordered if punishment order is set aside on account of infirmity in a disciplinary proceeding and it has further been held that employer should be granted opportunity to complete the enquiry from the point it stood vitiated or to initiate a fresh enquiry depending upon the gravity of the offence alleged and magnitude of the charges involved therein. Therefore, the matter should be remitted to the disciplinary authority for it to conduct enquiry from the point that stood vitiated and conclude the same. However, in the event the authorities decided to conduct fresh enquiry, it should be concluded expeditiously. Since this is not the case in hand, the law laid down by the apex Court is not applicable to the present case. 28.In Hardwari Lal case (supra), it is a case of non-examination of all material witnesses, thereby the apex Court held that enquiry is vitiated being in violation of principles of natural justice and directed reinstatement in service with 50% back wages. The said fact is not applicable to the present case. On the other hand, the Bant Singh case (supra) is squarely applicable to the present case. Considering the above law this Court is of the view that the apex Court have formulated the guidelines in the above case how to conduct disciplinary enquiry proceeding and for non-compliance thereof what should be the steps to be taken by the Court and what order is to be passed, for which guidelines have been provided for. There is no dispute over such propositions but it is to be considered whether such proposition is applicable to the case in hand with the fact governing the field. 29.In the considered opinion of this Court, since principles of natural justice were complied with and the enquiry was done in a free and fair manner in conformity with the provisions of 1982 Regulations and in compliance with the principles of natural justice. The judgments relied upon by the leanred counsel for the petitioner have no application to the facts of the present case. 30.In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances, this Court is of the view that since the punishment imposed by the appellate authority having been acted upon and the petitioner having got the benefit after such punishment, he is now estopped to challenge the same at this stage. Accordingly, this Court finds no merit in the writ petition, which is accordingly dismissed. Petition dismissed.