Research › Search › Judgment

Madras High Court · body

2014 DIGILAW 527 (MAD)

Tamilselvan v. Inspector of Police

2014-02-27

ARUNA JAGADEESAN

body2014
Judgment : 1. This Criminal Appeal is filed against the judgment dated 26.06.2007 passed in SC. No. 163/2003 by the learned Principal Assistant Sessions Judge, Thanjavur, thereby (a) convicting and sentencing the Appellant for the offence under section 3(1) of TNPPD Act to undergo one year Rigorous Imprisonment, (b) convicting and sentencing the Appellant for the offence under section 332 of IPC to undergo three years Rigorous Imprisonment, (c) convicting and sentencing the Appellant for the offence under Section 392 to undergo 10 years Rigorous Imprisonment and to pay a fine of Rs.1000/- in default to undergo six months Simple Imprisonment, (d) convicting and sentencing the Appellant for the offence under section 506(2) of IPC to undergo seven years Rigorous Imprisonment and (e) ordering the sentences to run concurrently. 2. The case of the Prosecution is that on 29.7.2007 at about 8.00 p.m. at Pillaiyarpatti Village, the Appellant traveled in the bus bearing Reg.No.TN-49-0237 as passenger. He had quarrel with the driver of the said bus and he had damaged the wind screen worth about Rs.500/- and during the same course of occurrence, he robbed an amount of Rs.450/- from the driver of the said bus. Hence, the Appellant was charge sheeted under sections 332, 392 and 506 (ii) of IPC read with Section 3 of TN.PPD Act. 3. The Case was taken on file in SC.No.163/2003 by the Learned Principal Assistant Sessions Judge, Thanjavur and necessary charges were framed. In order to bring home the charges against the accused, the prosecution examined as many as 10 Witnesses (PW.1 to PW.10) and also marked Exs.P1 to P10 and Mos.1 to 2. On Completion of the evidence on the side of the prosecution, the accused was questioned under Section 313 Cr.Pc as to the incriminating circumstances found in the evidence of prosecution Witnesses and the accused has come with the version of total denial and stated that he has been falsely implicated in this case. The court below, after hearing the arguments advanced on either side and looking into the materials available on record, found the accused/appellant guilty and awarded punishments as referred to above, which is challenged in this Criminal Appeal. 4. Mr. The court below, after hearing the arguments advanced on either side and looking into the materials available on record, found the accused/appellant guilty and awarded punishments as referred to above, which is challenged in this Criminal Appeal. 4. Mr. M. Karunanidhi, the learned counsel for the Appellant would strenuously contend that the findings of the Trial Court that the Prosecution has proved the charge under Section 392 of IPC is unsustainable in the absence of any legal evidence and that too necessary ingredients are totally absent. The learned counsel would point out to the evidence of the driver and conductor, PW.1 and PW.2 that there was a quarrel between PW.1 and the Appellant/accused and when the latter dragged him in the course of the said quarrel, the money purse and identity card of PW.1 went into to the hands of the accused and therefore, the ingredients of Section 392 of IPC was not made out. 5. The learned counsel would contend that the driver of the Transport Corporation is not a public servant as defined under section 21 of IPC and hence, no offence under section 332 of IPC is attracted. It is contended that there is no evidence to indicate that the Appellant threatened the victim/PW.1 with an intent to cause any injury or alarm to him. He would contend that the offence of criminal intimidation was not made out and the Appellant would be entitled to the acquittal. It is further contended that the Prosecution failed to prove the damages caused to the bus and mere filing a letter by the Branch manager addressed to the Sub Inspector of Police is not sufficient to prove commission of an offence under Section 3 of the TNPPD Act. The learned counsel urged that on the evidence adduced in the case, no offence can be said to have been made against the accused. 6. Per contra, Mr. K.Anbarasam, the learned Government Advocate for the Respondent supported the judgment of conviction and sentence passed by the Trial Court. He would submit that the evidence of PW.1 is corroborated by the other witnesses as also medical evidence. The learned Government Advocate would further contend that the driver of a transport Corporation bus is responsible for proper care and maintenance of the vehicle in his charge. He would submit that the evidence of PW.1 is corroborated by the other witnesses as also medical evidence. The learned Government Advocate would further contend that the driver of a transport Corporation bus is responsible for proper care and maintenance of the vehicle in his charge. Thus, his duty is as a driver not only to drive the bus, but also to keep the vehicle under proper care and maintenance while he is in charge of it. He is therefore a public servant under the provisions of first part of clause (9) of section 21 of IPC. In any case, he is covered by the twelth clause which denotes every officer or employee in the service or pay of Government or remunerated by fees or commission for the performance of any public duty. 7. This Court heard the submissions of the learned counsel on either side and also perused the material records placed. 8. The Case of the Prosecution is that on 29.7.2007 at about 8.00 p.m. at Pillayarpatti Village, the Appellant/accused traveled in the bus bearing Reg.No.TN-49-0237 as a passenger driven by PW.1 and quarreled with the driver of the said bus and damaged the wind screen glass worth about Rs.450/-. PW.1 the driver of the bus has stated about the quarrel that ensued between him and the accused and breaking of wind screen glass by the accused in the course of the said quarrel. His evidence indicated that the accused was drunk at the time of occurrence. However, his evidence does not indicate that the accused robbed of the money from PW.1. It is not even the case of the Prosecution that the accused snatched away the money purse of PW.1. PW.1 has stated that the accused dragged PW.1 and in the said course of act, the money purse and identity card of PW.1 came into to the hands of the accused. The evidence of PW.2 is also on the same line. Therefore, the offence under Section 392 of IPC is not proved. 9. A bare perusal of section 506 of IPC makes it clear that Part II of the section deals with a graver form of the offence of criminal intimidation. There is no specific allegation against the accused in this case that he had threatened PW.1 with injury to his person, reputation or property. 9. A bare perusal of section 506 of IPC makes it clear that Part II of the section deals with a graver form of the offence of criminal intimidation. There is no specific allegation against the accused in this case that he had threatened PW.1 with injury to his person, reputation or property. He has not issued any threat to him so as to cause his death by grievous hurt. The evidence of PW.1 and PW.2 only indicated that the accused alighted the bus in Thanjavur old bus stop and was standing in the steps of the front entrance. It appears that PW.1 insisted him to get inside the bus and there was an altercation between him and the bus driver. While getting down from the bus, he broke the wind screen glass by his hands and dragged him down, during which, the shirt pocket of PW.1 was torn and the money purse and the identity card came into the hands of the accused. It is seen that in the pull and push, PW.1 is said to have sustained injury which according to the Doctor is only a simply injury. The above said facts are affirmed by PW.1 in his evidence. On a careful scrutiny of the evidence led by the Prosecution, I am of the opinion that mere outburst of accused at the time of altercation is not sufficient to hold that it would fall within the mischief of Section 506 (ii) of IPC. Mere threats given by the accused not with an intention to cause alarm to the complainant/PW.1, but interfering with what the accused believed to be his exclusive right of passage through the door would not constitute an offence of criminal intimidation. Therefore, I am of the view that the prosecution failed to prove the offence under Section 506 (ii) of IPC against the accused. 10. However, the evidence placed on record would prove that the accused despite the objection raised by the driver not to travel on the door steps, abused the driver and pushed him causing simply injury. Therefore, it has been proved that the driver in stopping the Appellant/accused was acting in discharge of his duties. 10. However, the evidence placed on record would prove that the accused despite the objection raised by the driver not to travel on the door steps, abused the driver and pushed him causing simply injury. Therefore, it has been proved that the driver in stopping the Appellant/accused was acting in discharge of his duties. While driving the bus or even while standing at the bus stand, the driver who was insisting the accused not to travel in the footsteps causing nuisance to the other passengers was undoubtedly was discharging his duties as a driver of the bus belonging to the Transport Corporation. 11. In this context, it is relevant to refer to a three judges bench decision of the Honourable Supreme Court reported in 1969-1-SCC-142 (Akhtar Alam Vs. State of Bihar) wherein it was held that under Clause 12 of Section 21 of IPC an officer in the service or pay of the Government or of a local authority or a Corporation established or owned by Government is liable as a public servant. 12. In yet another decision of the Honourable Supreme Court reported in AIR-1964-SC-492 (State of Maharashtra Vs. Jagat Singh Charan Singh Arora) the Honourable Supreme Court held that when an officer or servant of the Transport Corporation was acting or Purporting to act in Pursuance of any of the provisions of Transport Act or of any other law, he can be said to be a public servant within the meaning of section 21 of IPC. 13. Arising on similar facts and circumstances in the case of Manumiya Vs. State of Gujarat (1979-4-SCC717) the Honourable Supreme Court rejected the contention of the accused that as a driver of the bus belonging to the Transport department, if despite the attempt of the complainant, to stop the accused from entering the driver’s cabin the accused abused the complainant and gave him a kick which resulted in grievous injury, it cannot be said that section 333 has no application. The only difference between Section 332 and 333 is with regard to the nature of injury whether it is simple or grievous. 14. In the light of the decisions of the Honourable Supreme Court stated supra, the accused deterred the complainant/PW.1 driver of the Transport Corporation from discharging his official duty and caused simple injury to him and he is liable to be convicted under Section 332 of IPC. 14. In the light of the decisions of the Honourable Supreme Court stated supra, the accused deterred the complainant/PW.1 driver of the Transport Corporation from discharging his official duty and caused simple injury to him and he is liable to be convicted under Section 332 of IPC. It also appears from evidence that he has caused damages to the windscreen glass of the bus worth about Rs.450/- and hence, he is liable for conviction under section 332 of IPC and 3(1) of TNPPD Act. 15. The learned counsel for the Appellant submitted that a lenient view may be taken on the question of sentence. Considering the facts and circumstances of the case and taking into account the family circumstances of the Appellant, who would be ultimately affected by sending him to prison, the imprisonment of three years Rigorous Imprisonment for the offence under Sections 332 and Section 3(1) of TNPPD Act can be reduced to the period already undergone by him and a fine of Rs.1000/- can be imposed. 16. In the result, this criminal appeal is partly allowed and the impugned judgment of conviction and sentence passed against the Appellant under Sections 392 and 506(2) of IPC are set aside and the Appellant is acquitted of those charges. The conviction of the Appellant under Section 332 of IPC and Section 3 (1) of the TNPPD Act is confirmed, but the sentence is modified and reduced to the period already undergone by him. In addition, a fine of Rs.1000/- is imposed. The fine amount if any paid by the Appellant for the offence under Section 392 of IPC shall be set off for the fine imposed under section 3(1) of TNPPD Act. If fine not paid, he shall pay the fine.