JUDGMENT Deepak Gupta, J.:- The only ground raised in this appeal by the Insurance Company is that the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal had no jurisdiction to decide the matter. The undisputed facts are that the deceased was travelling in the vehicle belonging to Sri Samarjit Datta and insured with the appellant-Insurance Company. This vehicle was attacked by a group of extremists on 04-06-2001 and in the firing the deceased died. The claimants led evidence and two witnesses stated that the driver took the vehicle into a terrorist infested area without arranging for proper police escort. 2. The question whether in such a case the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal has jurisdiction or not is no longer res integra. The issue involved in the present case has been the subject matter of a number of decisions. 3. The Apex Court in Shivaji Dayanu Patil and another v. Smt. Vatchala Uttam More ( AIR 1991 SC 1769 ) was dealing with a matter in which a collision had taken place between a petrol tanker and truck. The petrol tanker turned turtle and was lying on its side at some distance from the road. It was not moving. But some inflammable liquid leaked out of the motor vehicle. The inflammable liquid caught fire due to the negligence of some other party and the Apex Court in these circumstances held that the word used has a vital connotation to cover the period when the vehicle is not moving and is stationary and the use of a vehicle does not cease on account of the vehicle having been rendered immobile on account of brake down or mechanical defect or accident. It held that even in such circumstances, the accident had arisen out of the use of the motor vehicle. 4. The Himachal Pradesh High Court in the case of a bomb blast in Himachal Road Trans. Corpn. and Ors. v. Om Prakash and others (1992 ACJ 40) held that the accident arose out of the use of a motor vehicle since the duty lay upon the driver and the conductor to ensure the safety of the passengers. 5. 4. The Himachal Pradesh High Court in the case of a bomb blast in Himachal Road Trans. Corpn. and Ors. v. Om Prakash and others (1992 ACJ 40) held that the accident arose out of the use of a motor vehicle since the duty lay upon the driver and the conductor to ensure the safety of the passengers. 5. A Division Bench of the Kerala High Court in Babu v. Remesan and others (AIR 1996 Kerala 95) dealing with the word 'use' held as follows: Such use need not necessarily be so intimate and closely direct as to make it 'a motor accident' in the sense in which that expression is used in common parlance. The expression employed by the Legislature is employed by the legislature is 'accident arising out of the use of a motor vehicle' in the place of 'accident caused by the use of a motor vehicle'. Evidently the Legislature wanted to enlarge the scope of the word 'use' and not to restrict it for denying compensation in deserving cases. The test should be whether the accident was reasonably proximate to the use of a motor vehicle, whether or not the motor vehicle was in motion then. After all the provisions for dealing with the compensation case are intended for a sublime social objective. We are, therefore, not inclined to adopt a restrictive interpretation for the word 'use' in the present context. 6. The Andhra Pradesh High Court in Medikonda Narasamma and others v. Shaik Basheer Ahmed and others ( AIR 2001 AP 114 ) dealing with the word 'use' held as follows: The word 'use' should be given a wider connotation to cover the period when the vehicle is not moving and is stationary and the use of a vehicle does not cease on account of the vehicle having been rendered immobile on account of a breakdown or mechanical defect or an accident such 'use' need not necessarily be so intimate and closely direct as to make it a motor accident in the sense in which that expression is used in common parlance. The expression employed by the Legislature is 'accident arising out of a motor vehicle' in the place of 'accident caused by the use of a motor vehicle'. So, the Legislature intended to enlarge the scope of the word 'use' and it should not be given a restrictive meaning. The expression employed by the Legislature is 'accident arising out of a motor vehicle' in the place of 'accident caused by the use of a motor vehicle'. So, the Legislature intended to enlarge the scope of the word 'use' and it should not be given a restrictive meaning. As such, the expression use of the vehicle should reasonably mean proximate to use of the motor vehicle whether or not the vehicle was in motion. [Para.10]. 7. A learned single Judge of the Agartala Bench of the Gauhati High Court by a judgment in Smt. Basu Mati Debbarma and Ors. v. Smt. Anita Debbarma and Ors. (Mac. App. No. 26 of 2001) etc. held that in the cases where vehicles are taken into extremist ridden areas third parties cannot be denied compensation on the ground that the accident had not arisen out of the use of the motor vehicle. I am in respectful agreement with the judgment delivered by the learned single Judge of the Gauhati High Court, Agartala Bench following the law laid down by the High Court of Himachal Pradesh and the Apex Court and hold that even in a case arising out of extremist violence where the person is travelling in a vehicle the accident arises out of the use of a motor vehicle. 8. The next question which arises is whether there was any negligence on the part of the driver. The Apex Court in Samir Chanda v. Managing Director, Assam State Transport Corporation, [1998 ACJ 1351] was dealing with the case where passengers travelling in the Road Transport Corporation's bus sustained injuries when they were alighting from a stationary bus at the bus stop and a bomb blast took place. The Gauhati High Court dismissed the claim petition. The claimants went to the Apex Court which came to the conclusion that since the explosion had taken place inside the bus and the police escort was not there, the Transport Corporation would be fastened with the liability to pay compensation since it was negligent in the performance of its duty of ensuring the safety of the passengers. 9. The claimants went to the Apex Court which came to the conclusion that since the explosion had taken place inside the bus and the police escort was not there, the Transport Corporation would be fastened with the liability to pay compensation since it was negligent in the performance of its duty of ensuring the safety of the passengers. 9. A Division Bench of the Gauhati High Court, Agartala Bench in Bipal Bashi Das v. Oriental Insurance Company Ltd. & Another, [2005 (3) GLT 407], decided a case in which the deceased died as a result of an extremist attack when the extremists attacked and fired upon the vehicle in which the deceased was travelling. The Division Bench following the Samir Chanda's case came to the conclusion that the Amarpur-Teliamura road, at the relevant time, was infested with extremists and, therefore, the driver and owner should have been vigilant and should have taken precautions to ensure that such an attack does not take place. 10. A "duty to take care" lies upon the person who ferries passengers in his vehicle. This duty not only extends to driving but as held in Om Prakash's case (supra) by the Division Bench of the Himachal High Court, it extends to ensuring that no unidentified object is kept in the bus. It is a well-known fact that the State of was in the grip of terrorism at the relevant time. This fact was known to all and judicial notice of the same can be taken. The driver was also aware that he was passing through an area which was infested with extremists. It was his duty to have ensured that there was sufficient protection to the vehicle and its passengers. There is evidence on record that the passengers had requested the driver to wait for a police escort but as I have said earlier, even if there was no such request this did not relieve the driver of his own duty to ensure that the lives of the passengers in his vehicle were not put to risk. The negligence is, therefore, writ large since the driver took his vehicle without taking any safety measures. The claimants are, therefore, entitled to compensation under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988. 11. In view of the above discussion, I find no merit in this appeal which is accordingly dismissed. Send down the lower court records forthwith.