A.M. Sapre, C.J. Heard Mr. J Roy, learned counsel for the petitioner. Also heard Mr. R Dubey, learned Standing Counsel, Excise Department for the respondent. 2. This is a writ petition filed by the petitioner under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India against the impugned order No.26/GHY/CE(A)GHY/2014 dated 12.02.2014 passed by the Tribunal. 3. By the order impugned, the Tribunal dismissed the appeal filed by the writ petitioner on the ground of limitation. Since the appeal was dismissed on the ground of limitation, the Tribunal did not examine the issue involved in the appeal on merits. The order of Tribunal reads as under: “1. This appeal is filed by M/s Pawan Enterprises, Abhaya Chandra Dutta Land, F.A.Road, Kumarpara, Bharalumukh, Guwahati – 781 001 (here-in-after referred to as the “appellant”) against the order-in-original No.21/Addl.Commr./ST/VNT/2010-11 dated 10.02.2011 (here-in-after referred to as the “impugned order”) passed by the Additional Commissioner, Central Excise & Service Tax, Guwahati (here-in-after referred to as the “adjudicating authority”). 2. The case was heard on 06.01.2014. Sri Rishi Gupta, Proprietor attended the hearing. The legal defects were brought to the notice of Shri Gupta that the appeal has been signed by a staff of the appellant and his (staff’s) illness cannot be accepted as a genuine cause in filing the delayed appeal, where upon he asked only to be considerate to him. It is observed that the impugned order dated 10.02.2011 was received by the appellant on 23.02.2011 and the appeal was filed on 12.08.2011 i.e. delayed by 2 months 19 days after the normal period of 3 months without proper justification for the delay. Also the appeal has not been signed by the aggrieved person as such it is non est. 3. In view of the above, the appeal is rejected as non est and filed late without justification of the late filing.” So the short question that arises in this writ petition is whether the Tribunal was justified in dismissing the writ petitioner’s appeal on the ground of limitation. 4. 3. In view of the above, the appeal is rejected as non est and filed late without justification of the late filing.” So the short question that arises in this writ petition is whether the Tribunal was justified in dismissing the writ petitioner’s appeal on the ground of limitation. 4. In our view, the proper remedy of writ petitioner in this case was to file an appeal under Section 35 G of the Central Excise and Salt Act to this Court against the impugned order of the Tribunal rather than the writ petition under Article 226/227 of Constitution because the impugned order was appealable to this Court under Section 35G of the Central Excise and Salt Act. 5. Be that as it may, since both can be filed in this court and hence we do not attach much significance to this technicality of choosing the forum except to mention this fact and clarify the legal position. 6. At the outset, we consider it apposite to remind ourselves of the classic observations made by learned Judge Viviah Bose, J in the case reported in AIR 1955 SC 425 (Sangram Singh –vs- Election Tribunal, Kotah and another). In his distinctive style of writing, the learned Judge speaking for the Bench held: “A Code of procedure must be regarded as such. It is procedure something designed to facilitate justice and further its ends; not a penal enactment for punishment and penalties; not a thing designed to trip people up. Too technical a construction of sections that leaves no room for reasonable elasticity of interpretation should therefore be guarded against (provided always that justice is done to both sides) lest the very means designed for the further laws of procedure are grounded on a principle of natural justice which requires that men should not be condemned unheard, that decisions should not be reached behind their backs, that proceedings that affect their lives and property should not continue in their absence and that they should not be precluded from participating in them. Of course, there must be exceptions and where they are clearly defined they must be given effect to. But taken by and large, and subject to that proviso, our laws of procedure should be construed, wherever that is reasonably possible, in the light of that principle.” 7. Of course, there must be exceptions and where they are clearly defined they must be given effect to. But taken by and large, and subject to that proviso, our laws of procedure should be construed, wherever that is reasonably possible, in the light of that principle.” 7. Keeping in view the aforesaid observation in mind, when we examine the fact of this case, we are of the considered opinion that the Tribunal should have condoned the delay in filing the appeal by the writ petitioner (appellant) instead of dismissing it on the ground of limitation. The delay in filing the appeal was hardly of 2 months and 19 days and keeping in view the ground stated in the present writ petition, we are inclined to hold that it constitutes sufficient cause within the meaning of Section 5 of the Limitation Act in filing the appeal beyond the statutory period prescribed for its filing. 8. In our view, condoning the delay always advances the cause of justice and afford opportunity to parties to contest their case on merits whereas; declining to condone results in depriving them of an opportunity of hearing on merits. By this expression, we do not mean to suggest that in every case the court should always condone the delay. All that we wish to say is that by and large, the approach of the court should be to ensure that substantial justice is done to parties by affording them an opportunity of hearing on the merits of the case. 9. Having regard to the nature of the controversy, the grounds taken for condonation in filing the appeal and lastly applying the observations made by the Supreme Court in Sangram Singh (supra) to the facts of this case, we are of the view that the delay in filing the appeal before the Tribunal should have been condoned. Since the Tribunal did not do it, we, on our own, condone the delay. So far as the other ground relating to signing of appeal by one staff member of the appellant etc. is concerned, the same too, in our view, should not have been made the basis to dismiss the appeal. In such circumstances also the Tribunal could have granted an opportunity to writ petitioners to rectify the defects. In the light of the foregoing discussion, we cannot concur with the reasoning and conclusion of the Tribunal. is concerned, the same too, in our view, should not have been made the basis to dismiss the appeal. In such circumstances also the Tribunal could have granted an opportunity to writ petitioners to rectify the defects. In the light of the foregoing discussion, we cannot concur with the reasoning and conclusion of the Tribunal. As a result, the writ petition succeeds and is hereby allowed. The impugned order is set aside. As a consequence, the appeal filed by the writ petitioner before the Tribunal is held to be within the time and is accordingly restored to its file for hearing on merits. Needless to say, the writ petitioner be allowed to make necessary amendment/compliance to make the appeal in conformity with the rules so that it can be heard on merits by the Tribunal in accordance with law. 10. The parties are directed to appear before the Tribunal on 16.06.2014 and produce a copy of this order to enable the Tribunal to decide the appeal, as directed. No cost.