Judgment: Jyotirmay Bhattacharya, J. These two First Miscellaneous Appeals are directed against the common judgment and/or common order being No.32 dated 12th February, 2013 passed by Learned Judge, 4th Bench, City Civil Court at Calcutta in Title Suit No.1767 of 2012 at the instance of the defendant No.3/appellant. By the said common order, two applications namely, one for temporary injunction filed by the plaintiff and the other for vacating the ad interim order of injunction filed by the defendant No.3, were disposed of by the Learned Trial Judge. The plaintiff’s application for temporary injunction was allowed. The parties were directed to maintain status quo with regard to the nature, character and possession of the parties in the suit property till the disposal of the suit. The defendant’s application under Order 39, Rule 4 of the Code of Civil Procedure which was filed for vacating the ad interim order of injunction was rejected by the Learned Trial Judge by the impugned order. Hence, two First Miscellaneous Appeals were filed by the defendant No.3/appellant. One of such First Miscellaneous Appeals is directed against the order of grant of temporary injunction by the Learned Trial Judge and the other First Miscellaneous Appeal is directed against an order by which the defendant’s application for vacating the ad interim order of injunction was rejected by the Learned Trial Judge. Since both the appeals are directed against common order and the fate of one of such appeals is dependent on the other, this court, for avoiding conflict of decisions heard both the aforesaid appeals analogously and has decided to dispose of both the aforesaid appeals by a common judgment. Let us now consider the merit of the aforesaid appeals in the facts of the instant case. Admittedly, the defendant Nos. 1 and 2 were the owners of a flat identified as flat No.1W, situated on the Western side of the 1st Floor of Premises No.13, Chapel Road, P.S. Hastings together with car parking space in the ground floor of the said building, having half share each therein (hereinafter referred to as the said property). The defendant No.1 was in absolute khas possession and enjoyment in the half share of the said property having heritable and transferable estate. The said defendant offered to sell his share in the said property to his other co-sharer, namely, defendant No.2. The defendant No.1 was in absolute khas possession and enjoyment in the half share of the said property having heritable and transferable estate. The said defendant offered to sell his share in the said property to his other co-sharer, namely, defendant No.2. Since the defendant No.2 refused to purchase the half share of the defendant No.1’s share in the said property, the defendant No.1 started negotiating for sale of his interest in the said property with the plaintiff. The Plaintiff agreed to purchase the share of the defendant No.1 in the said property. Accordingly, an agreement and/or memorandum of understanding was executed between the plaintiff and the defendant No.1 containing the terms and conditions for sale of the interest of the defendant No.1 in the said property in favour of the plaintiff. It was agreed upon between the parties that the interest of the defendant No.1 in the said property would be sold to the plaintiff for a consideration of Rs.9,75,000/-; out of which a sum of Rs. 1,25,000/- was paid by the plaintiff to the defendant No.1 in cash by way of an earnest money and/or part payment of the consideration money. The acknowledgement of the defendant No.1 about receipt of the earnest money was also recorded in the said agreement and/or memorandum of appeal. As per the said agreement for sale, it was agreed between the parties that the transaction should be completed within 45 days from the date of agreement and/or the said memorandum of understanding. Subsequently, the plaintiff found that a legal notice was published in daily newspaper, namely, The Telegraph as well as Sanmarg, both dated 28th November, 2012 wherein it was mentioned by Jhunjhunwala and Company Advocates, that their client was desirous of purchasing the flat being flat No.1W at 13 Chapel Road, P.S. Hastings on the 1st Floor together with one covered car parking space in the said building from the defendant Nos.1 and 2 and any person having any claim or interest in the said property was requested to intimate the said advocate within a specified time . After coming to know about the said notice, the plaintiff by his letter dated 14th December, 2012 intimated the said M/s. Jhunjhunwala and Company Advocates about the agreement which the plaintiff entered into with the defendant No.1 for purchasing his interest in the said flat and the garage. After coming to know about the said notice, the plaintiff by his letter dated 14th December, 2012 intimated the said M/s. Jhunjhunwala and Company Advocates about the agreement which the plaintiff entered into with the defendant No.1 for purchasing his interest in the said flat and the garage. Subsequently, the plaintiff came to know on 18th December, 2012 that on 3rd December, 2012 the defendant Nos. 1 and 2 purported to have sold the said flat and the garage to the defendant No.3 for valuable consideration. The plaintiff, thus, claims that the defendant No.1 has practised fraud upon the plaintiff by offering to sell his interest in the said flat and the garage in favour of the defendant No.3 without disclosing the existing agreement for sale which the said defendant entered into with the plaintiff for sale of his interest in the said flat and the garage in favour of the plaintiff. The plaintiff claims that he was ready and willing and/or is still ready and willing to purchase the interest of the defendant No.1 in the said flat and garage. The plaintiff claims that since such sale was made by the defendant No.1 in favour of the defendant No.3 during the subsistence of valid and legally enforceable contract for sale which was executed between the plaintiff and the defendant No.1 for sale of the defendant No.1’s interest in the said flat and the garage, the sale which was made by the defendant No.1 in favour of the defendant No.3 is a void sale and his right to enforce the agreement against the defendant No.1 remains unaffected by such sale made by the defendant No.1 in favour of the defendant No.3. The plaintiff, thus, filed a suit for Specific Performance of Contract with an alternative claim for refund of the earnest money, in case his prayer for specific performance of contract is not allowed. The plaintiff has also prayed for declaration that the sale which was made by the defendant No.1 of his share in the said flat and the garage to the defendant No.3 is a void transaction and the defendant No.3 has not acquired any title by virtue of such purchase of the defendant No. 1’s interest in the said property. The plaintiff has also prayed for declaration that the sale which was made by the defendant No.1 of his share in the said flat and the garage to the defendant No.3 is a void transaction and the defendant No.3 has not acquired any title by virtue of such purchase of the defendant No. 1’s interest in the said property. Permanent injunction has also been sought for restraining the defendants, their men, agents and assigns from dealing with, disposing of, transferring and/or alienating and handing over possession of the undivided one half part share of the defendant No.1 in flat No.1W together with the benefit of one car parking space in the ground floor of the said Premises No.13, Chapel Road, P.S. Hastings, Kolkata to any person or persons other than the plaintiff. Some other incidental reliefs were also prayed for in the said suit. After filing the said suit, the plaintiff filed an application under Order 39, Rule 1 and 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure, inter alia, praying for temporary injunction for restraining the defendants, their agents and assigns from in any way dealing with and/or transferring and/or alienating and/or handing over possession of the said property in any manner whatsoever, to any person other than the plaintiff during the pendency of the suit and ad interim order of injunction in similar form was also prayed for by the plaintiff in the said injunction application. The Learned Trial Judge by his order being No. 2 dated 11th December, 2012 was pleased to pass an ad interim order of injunction by directing the parties to maintain status quo in respect of the nature, character and possession of the suit property till the disposal of the injunction application. On receipt of notice communicating the said ad interim order of injunction passed by the Learned Trial Judge in the said suit, the defendant No.3 being the purchaser of the said flat filed an application under Order 39, Rule 4 of the Code of Civil Procedure, praying for vacating the said ad interim order of injunction. The said defendant also contested the plaintiffs’ application for temporary injunction by filing objection thereto. The said defendant also contested the plaintiffs’ application for temporary injunction by filing objection thereto. It was contended by the said defendant that the said defendant is a bona fide purchaser for value without notice of the alleged agreement for sale entered into between the plaintiff and the defendant No.1 and as such his purchase of the suit property is protected under law. It is contended therein that even before purchasing the said property, the said defendant through his advocate and solicitor published a legal notice in daily issue of Telegraph and Sanmarg on 28th November, 2012 recording therein that the said defendant is desirous of purchasing the said flat and the covered garage on the ground floor of premises No.13, Chapel Road, P.S. Hastings from the defendant No.1 and 2. By the said publication of legal notice, public at large was invited to intimate the said advocate and solicitor of the defendant No.3 as to whether anyone has any interest in the said property within a specified time. In pursuance of the said legal notice published in the newspaper, nobody intimated the defendant’s said solicitor about his or her claim in the said property within the specified time. The plaintiff also never informed the defendant’s said solicitor/advocate within the specified time as to the execution of the purported agreement between the plaintiff and the defendant No. 1 for transfer of the defendant No. 1’s half share in the said flat and the garage on the ground floor of the said building. After expiry of the notice period, the said defendant purchased the said flat and the garage from the defendant Nos. 1 and 2 for a consideration of Rs.1,45,00,000/-. He further claims that he has also purchased the fitings and fixtures of the said flat from those two defendant Nos. 1 and 2 on payment of a further sum of Rs.5,00,000/- to the said defendants. He, thus, claims the protection which is available to a bona fide purchaser for valuable consideration without notice of the agreement for sale purported to have been entered into between the plaintiff and the defendant No.1. It is however, an admitted position that after purchasing the said flat from the defendant Nos. 1 and 2 the said flat was let out to the defendant No.1 at a rental of Rs.75,000/-per month. It is however, an admitted position that after purchasing the said flat from the defendant Nos. 1 and 2 the said flat was let out to the defendant No.1 at a rental of Rs.75,000/-per month. The said defendant, thus, claims that the plaintiff’s prayer for temporary injunction cannot be allowed as neither he has been able to make out any strong prima facie case nor the balance of convenience and inconvenience is in his favour for grant of injunction. The said defendant also prayed for vacating the ad interim order of injunction, on identical grounds. The defendant Nos. 1 and 2 also contested the plaintiff’s such application for temporary injunction by filling written objection by denying the material allegations contained in the plaintiff’s application for temporary injunction. Execution of the agreement for sale by the defendant No.1 as alleged by the plaintiff was denied by the said defendant. Receipt of a sum of Rs.1, 25,000/- by way of earnest money was also denied by him. It was further contended therein that they having purchased the said flat and the garage from the erstwhile owner on 26th June, 2003 for a consideration of Rs.33,76,118/-, it is absurd to contend that the defendant No.1 agreed to sell his half share in the said flat and the garage to the plaintiff in 2012 for a consideration of Rs.9,75,000/- only. They also contended that the injunction application is a mala fide one and same should be rejected. After considering the respective pleadings of the parties, the Learned Trial Judge held that this is not an appropriate stage when the issue regarding creation of the agreement for sale by way of forgery by the plaintiff, is to be decided as such an issue regarding creation of the said agreement for sale by the plaintiff by forgery can only be decided after recording evidence in the suit. The Learned Trial Judge also held that if any finding is made at this stage on the said dispute regarding creation of the agreement by way of forgery by the plaintiff then such adjudication will certainly affect the merit of the suit and as such the Learned Trial Judge refrained himself from adjudicating the said issue at the stage of consideration of the plaintiff’s injunction application. The Learned Trial Judge, without making any effort to find out as to whether the plaintiff succeeded in making out a prima facie case for going for trial and/or whether balance of convenience and inconvenience was in favour of grant of injunction or not and further as to whether injunction as prayed for by the plaintiff can be granted in the context of the relief claimed by the plaintiff for refund of the earnest money or not, mechanically disposed of the plaintiff’s application for temporary injunction by granting certain interim relief to the plaintiff which was not even prayed for by the plaintiff. The Learned Trial Judge ultimately held that justice will be sub-served if both the parties are restrained from changing the nature, character and possession of the suit property till the disposal of the suit. Accordingly, the plaintiff’s application for temporary injunction was disposed of by directing the parties to maintain status quo as it is existing now till the disposal of the suit in the light of the observation made in the said order. The legality and/or propriety of the said order is under challenge in these two appeals at the instance of the defendant No.3/appellant. Learned Advocate of the respective parties made elaborate arguments either in support of the impugned order or by challenging the legality thereof. Learned advocates appearing for the appellants and the respondent Nos. 2 and 3 challenged the impugned order by contending that the agreement for sale which is sought to be enforced by the plaintiff by way of Specific Performance of Contract is a forged one. The defendant No.1 never executed the said agreement and no payment was received by the said defendant towards earnest money in terms of the purported agreement for sale. It is further contended that having regard to the fact that the said property was purchased by the defendant Nos. 1 and 2 on 26th June, 2003 for consideration of Rs.33,76,118/-, it is absurd to suggest that the said defendant agreed to sell his half share in the said flat and the garage to the plaintiff for a sum of Rs.9,75,000/- only in the year 2012. It was further contended by the learned advocates appearing for the defendants that the suit is not maintainable as sufficient court fees has not been paid by the plaintiff. It was further contended by the learned advocates appearing for the defendants that the suit is not maintainable as sufficient court fees has not been paid by the plaintiff. It is also contended by them that since the plaintiff has sought for a declaration to the effect that the deed of sale executed and registered by the defendant Nos. 1 and 2 for transfer of his right, title and interest in favour of defendant No. 3 is a void one and prayed for cancellation thereof, the plaintiff was required to pay ad valorem court fees on the valuation of the suit property which having not been done, the suit cannot be maintained. It was further contended by them that the agreement of sale was not duly stamped and as such the said agreement cannot be considered even at the interlocutory stage. According to them, the plaintiff has failed to make out a prima facie case for going for trial and the balance of convenience and inconvenience is against grant of injunction. Learned advocate appearing for the appellant/defendant No.3 submits in addition to such submission that his client is a bona fide purchaser for value without notice of the purported agreement alleged to have been executed between the plaintiff and defendant No.1 and further the plaintiff, having not responded to the legal notice within the specified time, he cannot claim any relief in the suit and as such his prayer for interim relief should also be rejected. He further contends that since the plaintiff has prayed for refund of the earnest money, his claim can be satisfied by securing the payment which he demanded by way of refund of the earnest money and as such in such circumstances temporary injunction as prayed for, should be refused. Mr. He further contends that since the plaintiff has prayed for refund of the earnest money, his claim can be satisfied by securing the payment which he demanded by way of refund of the earnest money and as such in such circumstances temporary injunction as prayed for, should be refused. Mr. Roy Chowdhury, learned Senior Advocate appearing for the plaintiff/respondent No.1 refuted such submission of the learned advocate appearing for the appellant and the defendant Nos.1 and 2 by contending, inter alia, that it is not a stage where the court is required to consider the objection regarding maintainability of the suit for non-payment of adequate court fees on the plaint as the defendants’ prayer for rejection of the plaint which he claimed by filing an application under Order 7, Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure on the very said ground was rejected by the Learned Trial Judge and the said order of the Learned Trial Judge rejecting the defendants’ application under Order 7, Rule 11 CPC still remains unchallenged. He further contended that insufficiency of stamp on agreement for sale does neither makes the document inadmissible in evidence nor affects the validity of the transaction embodied therein. He supported his submission by relying upon a Division Bench decision of this court in the case of GTZ (India Private Limited) Vs. Power Electronic Engineers & Ors. reported in 2009 (4) CHN 415 . He further contended that if the court finds that the plaintiff has made out a case to go for trial and the balance of convenience and inconvenience is in favour of the plaintiff, then the court can very well pass an interim injunction in aid of the ultimate relief despite the agreement for sale is insufficiently stamped, as such an insufficiently stamped document can be regularized by the court, on realization of proper stamp duty from the defaulting party, who wants to rely on such document at the time when such document will be admitted in evidence. He has also relied upon another Division Bench decision of this Hon’ble Court in the case of Sm. Muktakesi Dawn and others Vs. Haripada Majumdar and Anr. He has also relied upon another Division Bench decision of this Hon’ble Court in the case of Sm. Muktakesi Dawn and others Vs. Haripada Majumdar and Anr. reported in AIR 1988 Calcutta 25 wherein it was held that notwithstanding some protection granted under Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act in respect of pendente lite transfers, injunction restraining pendente lite transfer can be granted to the party in appropriate cases. By relying upon a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Maharwal Khewaji Trust (Regd), Faridkot Vs. Baldev Dass reported in 2004 (8) SCC 488 , he submitted that for preventing multiplicity of proceeding, injunction can be granted particularly when court finds that alienation or transfer of property during pendency of the suit, may lead to loss or damage being caused to the party who may ultimately succeed in the suit. By referring to the pleadings of the respective parties, he contended that here is a case where the plaintiff has brought on record an agreement which is signed by the plaintiff and the defendant No.1 wherein agreement of both the parties regarding transfer of half share of the defendant No.1 in the suit property to the plaintiff was recorded. He further points out from the said agreement for sale that even acceptance of a sum of Rs.1,25,000/- in cash by way of earnest money from the plaintiff was acknowledged by the defendant No.1 in the said agreement. Thus, he contended that since the agreement is valid and legally enforceable and further since the plaintiff was ready and willing and is still ready and willing to purchase the said property in compliance with the terms and conditions of the said agreement, it cannot be said that the plaintiff has failed to make out a strong prima facie case for going for trial. He further contended that if interim transfer and/or pendente lite transfer to the third party is allowed then there will be multiplicity of proceedings and the relief which the plaintiff has claimed in the suit may ultimately be frustrated. To show the bona fides of his client to purchase the said flat, Mr. Roy Chowdhury further drew our attention to the fact that his client has invested a sum of Rs.15,00,000/-in fixed deposit and submitted the said deposit receipt in the court of the Learned Trial Judge as per direction of this Hon’ble Court. To show the bona fides of his client to purchase the said flat, Mr. Roy Chowdhury further drew our attention to the fact that his client has invested a sum of Rs.15,00,000/-in fixed deposit and submitted the said deposit receipt in the court of the Learned Trial Judge as per direction of this Hon’ble Court. As such according to Mr. Roy Chowdhury, his client’s bona fides in completing the said transaction, cannot be doubted. He, thus, supported the interim order of injunction and prayed for dismissal of both the appeals. Let us now consider the merit of these two appeals in the context of the submissions made by the learned Advocates of the parties. We have already indicated above that the plaintiff prayed for a temporary injunction in his suit for Specific Performance of Contract so that the defendants cannot create any third party interest either by alienation and/or transfer of the suit property in favour of any stranger during the pendency of the suit. He claimed such relief by contending that he has come to know that the defendants are now making an attempt to transfer the said property in favour of the stranger. No case has been made out by the plaintiff that the defendant is making any attempt to change the nature, character and possession of the suit property. Despite no relief was claimed by the plaintiff by way of injunction for restraining the defendants from changing the nature, character and possession of the suit property and such relief is also not based on any foundation in its pleading, the Learned Trial Judge passed an order of injunction directing both the parties to maintain status quo as regards nature, character and possession of the property till the disposal of the suit. No relief was granted to the plaintiff by way of injunction for restraining the defendants from creating any third party interest by way of alienation and/or transfer of the suit property during the pendency of the suit, though the plaintiff claimed the said relief in the said injunction application and his such claim is based on necessary pleading made out in the plaint and in the injunction application in this regard. However, the said relief was not granted to the plaintiff by the Learned Trial Judge while disposing of the plaintiff’s application for injunction. However, the said relief was not granted to the plaintiff by the Learned Trial Judge while disposing of the plaintiff’s application for injunction. When the relief which was claimed by the plaintiff by way of interim injunction in the suit was not granted by the Learned Trial Judge, and the said order having not been challenged by the plaintiff in appeal, we can safely hold that the relief for injunction as prayed for by the plaintiff for restraining the defendants from making any pendente lite transfer cannot be granted in this appeal filed by the defendants. At the same time we have no hesitation to hold that the interim injunction which was passed by the Learned Trial Judge by directing the parties to maintain status quo as regards nature, character and possession of the suit property also cannot be maintained as such relief was neither claimed by the plaintiff in their application nor there was any foundation of such claim in the plaintiff’s pleading for which such an injunction could have been granted in the suit. As such we have no hesitation to hold that the temporary injunction which was passed by the Learned Trial Judge cannot be retained on record, even though we do agree with the general proposition of law enunciated by the Hon’ble Supreme Court and this Hon’ble Court in the decisions cited by Mr. Roy Chowdhury. The impugned order, thus, stands set aside. It is, however, made clear that in case the defendant No.3 transfers the said property during the pendency of the suit he will not only disclose the pendency of this suit to the intending purchaser but also will mention the pendency of the suit in the deed of transfer and will intimate the Learned Trial Judge the particulars of such transfer; such as the name and address of the purchaser, the consideration price, etc. so that the parties may know about such transaction and may take effective steps in the suit so that their ultimate relief is not frustrated. The Learned Trial Judge is, thus, requested to expedite the hearing of the suit and to make all endeavor to dispose of the said suit as early as possible but preferably within a year from the date of communication of this order. The Learned Trial Judge is, thus, requested to expedite the hearing of the suit and to make all endeavor to dispose of the said suit as early as possible but preferably within a year from the date of communication of this order. Let the fixed deposit which was deposited by the plaintiff with the Learned Trial Court be kept with the Trial Court and the said fixed deposit receipt will be kept renewed from time to time during the pendency of the suit and the fate of such deposit will ultimately abide by the result of the suit. Both the appeals and connected applications are, thus, disposed of.