JUDGMENT : Hasnain Massodi, J. 1. Civil First Appeal on hand is directed against judgment dated 15th December, 2005 of Learned Principal District Judge, Baramulla, in arbitration petition titled Zamindars of Ushkara & Ors. v. Collector. Before dilating on the grounds urged in the appeal, it would be appropriate to have an overview of background facts. 2. Union of India-appellant herein, way back in 1947, occupied an area of land measuring 1477 Kanals and 11/2 Marias, comprising 64 properties, at Ushkura, Khawajabagh, Khanpora and Gutyar, Baramulla, for use of Armed Forces. Sometime after the land was taken over, it was decided to requisition land under the Jammu & Kashmir Requisition and Acquisition of Immovable Property Act, 1968, (RAIP Act, 1968), for defence purposes. The appellant thereafter decided to acquire the land under Jammu & Kashmir Land Acquisition Act. Accordingly 128 Kanals & 9 Marias of land, comprising of 19 properties, were acquired in 1999/2000 and compensation at the rate of Rs. 2 Lakhs per kanal and Rs. 1.65 Lakhs per kanal with 15% solatium was ordered to be paid to estate holder. Rest of the land i.e. 1348 Kanals 121/2 Marias, comprising of 45 properties, though initially requisitioned under aforementioned Act was later also acquired under said Act. The acquisition was followed by an exercise to find out the compensation per kanal to be paid to the estate holders. Though attempts were made to strike a deal, the efforts did not bear any fruit. 3. The State Government confronted with disagreement between the parties, decided to get the matter resolved through arbitration. The deliberations in this regard culminated in SRO 276 of 1995 (No. Home (CL) 93/79, dated 18th October, 1995). The Deputy Commissioner in terms of SRO was conferred power to appoint an arbitrator and refer the dispute to arbitrator so appointed for settlement. Deputy Commissioner, Baramulla, vide No. DCB/LA/Bla-42(2)/96, dated 07.03.1996 referred the matter for arbitration to District & Sessions Judge, Baramulla. The arbitrator was asked to make an award in respect of the above detailed land, acquired under RAPI Act. The communications No. DCB/LA/Bla-42(2)/96, dated 07.03.1996, DCB/LA/Bla-42(2)/96, dated 19.08.1996 as also SRO 276 of 1995 are extracted in extenso in the impugned judgment/award and need not to be reproduced. 4. The arbitrator was asked to make an award in respect of the above detailed land, acquired under RAPI Act. The communications No. DCB/LA/Bla-42(2)/96, dated 07.03.1996, DCB/LA/Bla-42(2)/96, dated 19.08.1996 as also SRO 276 of 1995 are extracted in extenso in the impugned judgment/award and need not to be reproduced. 4. Learned Principal District Judge, Baramulla, entered reference, allowed parties to submit their statements and settled following issues: (i) What is the adequate compensation to which land owners are entitled to? OPP (ii) Relief? 5. However, no significant progress could be made because of litigation emanating from order dated 8th November, 1997, whereby preliminary issue was decided in favour of respondents against the appellants. The parties could pick-up threads after OWP No. 1429/1997, throwing challenge to the order dated 8th November, 1997, was dismissed. Parties were afforded opportunity to adduce evidence in support of their rival stands. 6. The estate holders examined as many as 22 witnesses to substantiate their claim. Appellant on the other hand examined two witnesses to rebut the evidence adduced by the respondents and also to lend support to their claim. 7. The learned District Judge (Arbitrator under Section 8(b) of RAIP Act, 1968) on scanning the evidence adduced by the parties, classified the acquired property under four heads i.e. (i) Plain land within one kilometer from National Highway and other roads, (ii) Plain land beyond one kilometer from National Highway and other roads, (iii) Labroo land within one kilometer from National Highway and other roads and (iv) Labroo land beyond one kilometer from National Highway. Learned judge proceeded to award compensation as under:- (i) Plain Land within one kilometer from National Highway and other roads @ Rs. 2.65 lakhs per kanal. (ii) Plain land beyond one kilometer from National Highway and other roads @ Rs. 2.30 lakhs per kanal. (iii) Labroo land within one kilometer from National Highway and other roads @ Rs. 2.20 lakhs per kanal. (iv) Labroo land beyond one kilometer from National Highway and other roads @ Rs. 2.00 lakhs per kanal. 8. The compensation assessed was to apply to land of all the four localities i.e. Ushkara, Khawajabagh, Khanpora and Gutyar (Baramulla). The reference was answered accordingly. 9. 2.20 lakhs per kanal. (iv) Labroo land beyond one kilometer from National Highway and other roads @ Rs. 2.00 lakhs per kanal. 8. The compensation assessed was to apply to land of all the four localities i.e. Ushkara, Khawajabagh, Khanpora and Gutyar (Baramulla). The reference was answered accordingly. 9. The award dated 15th December, 2005, is questioned in present civil first appeal on the grounds; that the arbitrator has not taken into account the deed of acquisition reflected in Form 'J' notification while assessing compensation. It is stated that as the notification was issued in the year 1988, the compensation was to be assessed having regard to market value of the acquired property on the date of notification. It is next contended that learned judge while dealing with the matter failed to appreciate that area acquired in the present case was huge and the compensation was not to be assessed on the basis of transactions involving small chunks of the land. It is urged that as the Government in case of acquisition is not in bargaining position, compensation is, not to be assessed exclusively on the basis of transactions involving hectic bargaining between parties. Learned judge is said to have relied upon testimony of interested witnesses while assessing compensation. Award is also questioned on the ground that acquisition under the RAIP Act, 1968, is not to be treated at par with acquisition under the Jammu & Kashmir Land Acquisition Act, 1990, and therefore, compensation paid in respect of 128 kanals 9 marlas (19 properties) acquired under Jammu & Kashmir Land Acquisition Act, 1990, would not be applicable in the present case. It is also denied that land acquired under the Jammu & Kashmir Land Acquisition Act, 1990 (19 properties) and the land in question are different in character and quality. The award is labeled as one passed in hot haste, unjustified and illegal. 10. I have gone through the memo of appeal, record available on the file. I have heard learned counsel for the parties at length. 11. Learned counsel for the respondents take threshold objection to maintainability of the appeal on the ground that the present appellant was neither a party before the arbitrator nor is to be taken as a person 'aggrieved' with the award. It is pointed out that if anyone could be aggrieved with the award, is the State Government and its functionaries. 12. Learned counsel for the respondents take threshold objection to maintainability of the appeal on the ground that the present appellant was neither a party before the arbitrator nor is to be taken as a person 'aggrieved' with the award. It is pointed out that if anyone could be aggrieved with the award, is the State Government and its functionaries. 12. The objection, aforesaid, is not sustainable for the reason that land in question has been acquired for defence purposes. In other words, land stands acquired for use by the appellant and the compensation whatever assessed is to be paid by the appellant. The land has been requisitioned and later acquired under RAIP Act, 1968, at the request of the appellant. The appellant, therefore, is a person aggrieved within the meaning of Section 10 of RAIP Act, 1968. To be a person aggrieved with the award, it is not necessary that such person should have been party to the arbitral proceedings. To maintain an appeal against award in terms of Section 10 of RAIP Act, 1968, it is sufficient to show that his interests are affected by the award. In the present case, the impugned award, undoubtedly, affects the appellant and, therefore, appellant is within his rights to fall back upon Section 10 of the RAIP Act, 1968, and throw challenge to the award. The Apex Court, though in a different context, dealt with the matter in Adi Pherozshah Gandhi v. H.M. Seervai, 1970 (2) SCC 484 , and it was held that the order impugned must be legal grievance and not a grievance about material matters. It was further held that legal grievance must have tendency to injure the person proposing to question the order. The court proceeded to observe 'generally speaking, a person can be said to be aggrieved by an order which is to his detriment, pecuniary or otherwise or causes him some prejudice in some form or other'. As the remedy available to one 'aggrieved' with the award is statutory appeal in terms of Section 10 of the RAIP Act, 1968, it is to be governed by the conditions laid down in the provision providing for such appeal. Section 10 of the RAIP Act, 1968, does not require grant of leave by the court to file the appeal in case of a person 'aggrieved' though not party to arbitral proceeding. 13. Section 10 of the RAIP Act, 1968, does not require grant of leave by the court to file the appeal in case of a person 'aggrieved' though not party to arbitral proceeding. 13. The compensation to be assessed by the arbitrator in terms of Section 8(1)(E) of the RAIP Act, 1968, is to be what appears to arbitrator to be just. It, as laid down in Section 8(3), is to be the price which the requisitioned property would have fetched in the open market if it had remained in the same condition as it was at the time of requisitioning and had been sold on the date of acquisition. The relevant date for determining the compensation is, therefore, date of requisition and not date of acquisition or entry into the requisitioned land as is being proposed by learned counsel for the appellant. The arbitrator has to assume that the requisitioned property remained in same condition as it was on the day it was occupied, on the date of acquisition and thereafter to determine the price it would fetch in open market on the date of acquisition. The law makers have been alive to the fact that the property requisitioned or taken over may suffer damage after it is occupied and may not fetch same price in market, it would have otherwise got had it not been occupied or requisitioned. 14. The land in question, as the record would reveal, has been acquired in 1995 though decision in this regard was taken in the year 1988. It appears that the Government initially issued notification (Notice 'J') vide No. Home/CL-93/79, dated 18.01.1988 yet no steps beyond issuance of notification were taken till 1995. The corrigendum issued vide No. Home/CL-93/79, dated 27.03.1995 set proceedings into motion. SRO 276 of 1995, appointing Districting Judge, Baramulla, as arbitrator, was issued on 18.10.1995. Against said backdrop, the order of acquisition would be 1995 and not 1988 as claimed by counsel for the appellant. 15. The estate holders, as already pointed out, to substantiate their stand as regards market value of the property examined 22 witnesses. The witnesses examined include a few of the estate holders, the person who had entered into sale transactions of immovable property in vicinity of land in question either as vendors or vendees and the officers/officials who were associated with acquisition of land in the area for different public purposes. The witnesses examined include a few of the estate holders, the person who had entered into sale transactions of immovable property in vicinity of land in question either as vendors or vendees and the officers/officials who were associated with acquisition of land in the area for different public purposes. The witnesses also include the revenue officers at different levels who had a role in attesting mutation on the sale transactions or were aware in their official capacity of the market value of the land. 16. Learned District Judge, while appreciating the evidence noticed the acquisition of immovable property made by the functionaries of the State Government during the period 1986 to 2004. Learned judge has taken pains to tabulate such transactions in the judgment. In the year 1999, i.e. some time after the land in question was acquired, compensation was assessed at the rate of Rs. 02 Lakhs per kanal with 15% solatium. The amount of compensation worked out as Rs. 2,24,112/- per kanal. It is pertinent to point out that while in case of property requisitioned or otherwise, acquired under the J & K Land Acquisition Act, scope is left for solatium (Jabrana) and no amount on that count is to be added in acquisition of requisitioned property under the RAIP Act, 1968. In case of acquisition made in same area a few years after the acquisition in question, compensation has been assessed at Rs. 6.96 lakhs per kanal in 1999/2001. In case of land belonging to migrants acquired for a public purpose compensation has been assessed at Rs. 3.50 to 4.50 lakhs per kanal. The argument that learned District Judge ought not to have taken into account compensation assessed in respect of 128 Kanals and 9 Marias (19 properties) while determining the compensation is devoid of any force. It is pertinent to point out that 128 Kanals 9 Marias (19 properties) was part of land measuring 1477 kanals 1-1/2 marlas initially taken over by the Army in 1947 and later requisitioned at its instance. The appellant, thereafter, for the reasons best known to it, acquired 128 kanals 9 marlas (19 properties) from the rest of the land and decided to acquire it under the Jammu & Kashmir Land Acquisition Act, 1990. Rest of property i.e. 1348 Kanals 12-1/2 marlas (45 properties) was left out and proceedings initiated for its acquisition under the J & K RAIP Act, 1968. Rest of property i.e. 1348 Kanals 12-1/2 marlas (45 properties) was left out and proceedings initiated for its acquisition under the J & K RAIP Act, 1968. 17. There is no substance in argument advanced by Mr. Makroo, ASGI, that compensation awarded in case of 128 kanals 9 marlas (19 properties) should not have been taken into account while assessing/determining compensation for rest of the land i.e. 1348 kanals 12-1/2 marlas (45 properties). 18. Learned District Judge had to fulfill the mandate of Section 8(3) and was free in this regard to rely on all the inputs and material that would help him to find out the price, the acquired requisitioned property would fetch in the market on the date of the acquisition. It would be otherwise an argument that the State would be free to acquire part of the requisitioned property employing the Land Acquisition Act and rest of the property employing the RAIP Act, 1968. It would be impermissible to insist that compensation determined by the Collector under the J & K Land Acquisition Act should have no bearing on the compensation to be assessed by the arbitrator. Such an interpretation would be in conflict with mandate of Article 14 Constitution of India. 19. The ground urged in the petition that learned District Judge has taken into account the sale price of small parcels of land while compensation is to be paid for a large area of land, is bereft of any substance. Learned District Judge has not only taken into account the sale transactions involving small parcels of land but also such transactions involving bigger areas and the compensation assessed under the J & K Land Acquisition Act for the land acquired for public purpose. This defeats the argument advanced by learned counsel for the appellant that as the Government does not engage in hectic negotiations and bargaining like parties in private sale transactions, the price fixed in such transaction should not have been considered by the learned arbitrator while assessing compensation. Reliance on Parvesh Kumari & Ors. v. Union of India, 2004 (2) JKJ 145 [HC], State of J & K v. Mohd. Mateen Wani & Ors. : 2010 (5) JKJ 582 [SC] : AIR 1998 SC 2470 and Special Dy. Collector v. Kurra Sambasiva Rao : AIR 1997 SC 2625 is, therefore, grossly misplaced. 20. Reliance on Parvesh Kumari & Ors. v. Union of India, 2004 (2) JKJ 145 [HC], State of J & K v. Mohd. Mateen Wani & Ors. : 2010 (5) JKJ 582 [SC] : AIR 1998 SC 2470 and Special Dy. Collector v. Kurra Sambasiva Rao : AIR 1997 SC 2625 is, therefore, grossly misplaced. 20. The witnesses examined by respondents have faced cross examination and their testimony has remained un-impeached. Their testimony supports the conclusions arrived at by learned District Judge. This apart even the witnesses examined by the opposite party before arbitrator have supported the evidence adduced by the respondents in essential details. Both Mr. B.S. Sahani, Army Defense Estate Officer (ADEO) and Mr. S.L. Bhutt, who have appeared in the witness box have admitted that the land in question is in the center of Baramulla town within territorial limits of Municipality and on the either side of National Highway and at a prime location. Learned District Judge, therefore, cannot be faulted for answering issue No. 1 in the manner it has been answered in the impugned order. Learned District Judge has meticulously dealt with each and every aspect of case in a lucid and well written judgment, and taken care of all the issues raised before him. Learned judge has not rushed to award compensation irrespective of nature, quality, character and location of the land. The very fact that he has classified the acquired land in four different groups would indicate that his effort has been to deal with the matter in an objective manner on the anvil of evidence brought on record. He has classified acquired land in four different groups and proceeded to determine compensation separately for land falling under each of the groups so classified. The award in the circumstances does not warrant any interference. For the reasons discussed, I don't find any reason to overset award impugned in the appeal. Resultantly, appeal is dismissed. Let the compensation amount, if any, deposited in the Registry or lying with the authorities be paid to the estate holders in accordance with rules and after observing all the codal formalities. Appeal dismissed.