JUDGMENT 1. - Mr. Ajay Gupta, appearing on behalf of the applicant Baroda Rajasthan Kshetriya Gramin Bank, Bharatpur after arguing for a while seeks liberty to withdraw the application (3586/8-2-13) under Order 1, Rule 10 CPC and take his remedy as otherwise available in law. 2. Consequently the application for impleadment is dismissed as withdrawn with liberty prayed for. 3. Heard the miscellaneous appeal on merits and perused the impugned order dated 15-2-2007. 4. This misc. appeal under Order 43, Rule 1 (d) CPC has been filed by the appellant-defendant (hereinafter `the defendant') against the order dated 15-2-2007 passed by the Additional District Judge (Fast Track) No.2 Bharatpur, whereby the application filed by the defendant under Order 9, Rule 13 CPC seeking to have set aside the ex-parte decree dated 17-8-2005 in a money suit laid by the plaintiff-respondent Ninua Ram (hereinafter `the plaintiff') was dismissed. 5. From the facts on record it transpires that a money suit was laid by the plaintiff Ninua Ram. The defendant was admittedly served. On 23-7-2005 the defendant himself without his counsel appeared before the trial court, whereupon the trial court on consideration of the matter then before it as to take on record the written statement belatedly filed, refused to take on record the written statement. No challenge was made to the said order. Thereafter on non-appearance of the defendant or his counsel, proceedings in the suit were set ex parte. The matter was fixed for plaintiff's evidence. Evidence of plaintiff was then taken and the ex-parte decree was passed on 17-8-2005. 6. Learned counsel for the appellant defendant submitted that the impugned order dated 15-2-2007 is unfortunately founded upon the order-sheet of 23-7-2005, according to which the defendant was present. He submitted that the defendant's appearance was only per chance when he had gone to attend another case. It was submitted that the counsel engaged by the defendant was negligent for which the defendant should not be made to suffer the consequence under an ex-parte decree. It was submitted that initially the defendant could not file written statement within the time provided for under Order 8, Rule 1 CPC in the first instance because of his counsel's negligence, and thereafter the counsel did not attend the case before the trial court leading to plaintiff's money suit being made ex-parte and thereafter being so decreed. It was submitted that initially the defendant could not file written statement within the time provided for under Order 8, Rule 1 CPC in the first instance because of his counsel's negligence, and thereafter the counsel did not attend the case before the trial court leading to plaintiff's money suit being made ex-parte and thereafter being so decreed. Reliance has been placed on Rafiq v. Munshilal, AIR 1981 SC 1400 M.K. Prasad v. Arumugam, AIR 2001 SC 2497 Collector Land Acquisition, Anantnag v. Mst.Katiji, AIR 1987 SC 1353 Bhagmal v. Kunwar Lal, (2010) 12 SCC 159 K.G. Purushothama Rai v. K.G. Uthaya, (2011) 14 SCC 86 Rais Ahmad v. Mohd. Siddique, (2010) 15 SCC 416 , and Om Prakash Vijay v. State of Rajasthan, 2011 W.L.C. (Raj.) UC 684 to submit that a litigant should not be made to suffer for the negligence or inaction of counsel. 7. The broad principle that a litigant should not be made to suffer for the negligence of his counsel is well settled. However this principle does not apply to the facts of the present case, inasmuch as admittedly on 23-7-2005 the defendant himself appeared before the trial court in absence of his counsel and the court below disallowed the taking on record the written statement which had been filed beyond the period provided for under Order 8, Rule 1 CPC. The case was fixed for plaintiff's evidence on 17-8-2005. The defendant did not challenge the said order dated 23-7-2005. Aside of the inaction of the counsel for the defendant before the trial court as alleged, the order dated 23-7-2005 was passed in presence of the defendant, and in spite of being in his knowledge no action was taken against the counsel, nor another counsel engaged to try and get back the defendant's case back on rail. In my considered opinion, in the facts obtaining, the conduct of the defendant was not only palpably negligent if not obstructive of proceedings in the money suit. That could not have been countenanced by the trial court. 8. Aside of aforesaid, the application under Order 9, Rule 13 CPC was filed by the defendant on 12-12-2012, much beyond the period of limitation otherwise provided for i.e. 30 days under Article 123 of the Limitation Act,1963. That could not have been countenanced by the trial court. 8. Aside of aforesaid, the application under Order 9, Rule 13 CPC was filed by the defendant on 12-12-2012, much beyond the period of limitation otherwise provided for i.e. 30 days under Article 123 of the Limitation Act,1963. I find no substance in the submission of learned counsel for the defendant that limitation should be computed only from 3-12-2005 when the defendant allegedly came to know of the ex-parte decree dated 17-8-2005. Article 123 of the Limitation Act, 1963 provides that application for setting aside a decree passed ex-parte is to be filed within thirty days, commencing the date of the decree where summons or notices were served and thirty days from the date of knowledge where the summons in the suit were not served. In the instant case the defendant was admittedly served, had appeared and was having knowledge of the suit pendency. In my considered opinion, the period of limitation for setting aside the ex parte decreed dated 17-8-2005 in the facts of the case commenced from 17-8-2005 and application under Order 9, Rule 13 CPC could have been filed within limitation by 16-9-2005. The application was however filed on 12-12-2005. No sufficient reasons were preferred by the defendant for filing the application under Order 9, Rule 13 CPC belatedly. 9. I therefore find no error in the impugned order dated 15-2-2007 passed by the court below dismissing the application under Order 9, Rule 13 CPC. It is trite that orders of lower court to be interfered with, must be shown to suffer perversity, error apparent on record or misdirection in law. I find no such lacunae in the impugned order dated 15-2-2007.In the facts obtaining, I find no force in the miscellaneous appeal and the same is dismissed.Stay order dated 25-4-2007 stands vacated and stay application dismissed.Appeal dismissed. *******