JUDGMENT : G.S. Sandhawalia, J. The present writ petition has been filed challenging the award dated 10.01.2014 (Annexure P-3) passed by the Labour Court, Hisar. The case of the petitioner-workwoman was that she had worked from 1991 to 30.09.1998 in the Social Forestry Project at Tosham range. Thereafter, she worked from 01.10.1999 to 30.06.2009 at the Territorial Division, Tosham Range under the supervision of various Forest Guards. The last salary which she was drawing was Rs. 3,664/- per month. There was violation of the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (in short 'the Act') specifically Sections 25-F, 25-G and 25-H and accordingly reinstatement was prayed for. 2. The respondent-Department specifically took the plea that the Workwoman had never come to the respondent and never worked with the department and it was totally false and concocted story. Once the relationship was denied, the provisions of Sections 25-F and 25-G of the Act would not be applicable. 3. Before the Labour Court, the workwoman examined only herself as WW1 and the department examined Randhir Singh, Deputy Ranger, Tosham as MW-1. The workwoman also moved an application for issuance of directions to the respondents to produce the record regarding her employment. The record from 2000 onwards was produced and the Labour Court after perusing the record, came to the conclusion that the name of the petitioner was not mentioned from the year 2000 onwards. Accordingly, the reference was decided against the petitioner. The findings recorded by the Labour Court read thus: 10. To support her claim regarding continuous employment with the respondent for the period from the year 1991 to 30.06.2009, the petitioner moved an application for issuance of direction to the respondent to produce the record regarding employment of the petitioner in Social Forestry Project for the period from the year 1991 to 30.09.1998 and thereafter in Territorial Division for the period from 01.10.1999 to 2009. On the application, a direction was issued to the respondent to produce the record. The available record for the period upto the year 2000 was produced. In said record, the name of the petitioner was not found mentioned. After the year 2000 and muster rolls were issued only to those workers in their individual names who had either won their cases from courts or were in employment on account of settlement before the Labour-cum-Conciliation Officer or with the intervention of the labour unions. In said record, the name of the petitioner was not found mentioned. After the year 2000 and muster rolls were issued only to those workers in their individual names who had either won their cases from courts or were in employment on account of settlement before the Labour-cum-Conciliation Officer or with the intervention of the labour unions. During said period no muster roll in the name of the petitioner was issued. 11. In order to rebut the claim of the petitioner and to prove its claim, the respondent examined Sh. Randhir Singh, Deputy Ranger, Rosham as MW1. He tendered in evidence his affidavit Ex. MW1/A deposing on the lines of the case of the respondent. He stated that the petitioner was not employed on any post at any point of time and her claim regarding continuous employment with the respondent for the period from the year 1991 to 30.06.2009 and then termination of her services on 01.07.2009 was absolutely false. In cross-examination, it was suggested to him that the entire record was not produced by the department intentionally and had the entire record been produced it would have proved the claim of the petitioner regarding continuous employment with the respondent for the period from the year 1991 to 30.06.2009 which fact he denied. 12. From the evidence on the file, the claim of the petitioner regarding her continuous employment with the respondent for the period from the year 1991 to 30.06.2009 is not proved. Rather, from the evidence on the file, the claim of the respondent that the petitioner was not appointed on any post at any point of time is proved. It is true that the entire record for the period prior to the year 2000 was not produced, but the record for the period from 2000 onwards was produced and in said record the name of the petitioner was not found mentioned. It belied her claim regarding employment at least during the period from 2000 onwards. In such a situation, the claim of the petitioner regarding her employment with the respondent for the period prior to the year 2000 cannot be accepted on the ground that the entire record of the said period had not been produced. It belied her claim regarding employment at least during the period from 2000 onwards. In such a situation, the claim of the petitioner regarding her employment with the respondent for the period prior to the year 2000 cannot be accepted on the ground that the entire record of the said period had not been produced. Had the petitioner been able to prove her employment with the respondent for the period from 2000 onwards of which period the entire record was produced, then, of course, the claim of the petitioner regarding employment with the respondent for the period prior to the year 2000 could be accepted on the plea that the entire record of the said period had not been produced and had the entire record of said period been produced, it would have proved the claim of the petitioner regarding employment during said period too. 13. Since, the petitioner has failed to prove her employment with the respondent at any point of time, the question of violation of provisions contained under Sections 25-F, 25-G and 25-H of the Act does not arise. This issue is therefore, decided against the petitioner. 4. A perusal of the above reasoning which has been given would show that the petitioner failed to discharge the onus that she was employed with the respondent-department. It is settled principle of law that the initial onus is upon the workman. No effort was made by the workwoman to even produce somebody with whom she had worked in the alleged long tenure of service from 1991 to 2009. The Apex Court in R.M. Yellatti Vs. The Assistant Executive Engineer, (2006) 1 SCC 106 laid down the principles pertaining to the onus and the shifting of the same and when the adverse inference is to be drawn against the management. The following principles were laid down: Analyzing the above decisions of this court, it is clear that the provisions of the Evidence Act in terms do not apply to the proceedings u/s 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act. However, applying general principles and on reading the afore stated judgments, we find that this court has repeatedly taken the view that the burden of proof is on the claimant to show that he had worked for 240 days in a given year. This burden is discharged only upon the workman stepping in the witness box. However, applying general principles and on reading the afore stated judgments, we find that this court has repeatedly taken the view that the burden of proof is on the claimant to show that he had worked for 240 days in a given year. This burden is discharged only upon the workman stepping in the witness box. This burden is discharged upon the workman adducing cogent evidence, both oral and documentary. In cases of termination of services of daily waged earner, there will be no letter of appointment or termination. There will also be no receipt or proof of payment. Thus in most cases, the workman (claimant) can only call upon the employer to produce before the court the nominal muster roll for the given period, the letter of appointment or termination, if any, the wage register, the attendance register etc. Drawing of adverse inference ultimately would depend thereafter on facts of each case. The above decisions however make it clear that mere affidavits or self-serving statements made by the claimant/workman will not suffice in the matter of discharge of the burden placed by law on the workman to prove that he had worked for 240 days in a given year. The above judgments further lay down that mere non-production of muster rolls per se without any plea of suppression by the claimant workman will not be the ground for the tribunal to draw an adverse inference against the management. Lastly, the above judgments lay down the basic principle, namely, that the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution will not interfere with the concurrent findings of fact recorded by the labour court unless they are perverse. This exercise will depend upon facts of each case. 5. In the present case, as noticed, the record for 9 years had been produced before the Labour Court and perused by the Labour Court. The name of the petitioner did not find mention in the said record. The management had taken a categorical stand that there was no relationship of employer-employee and the petitioner-workwoman failed to dispel this stand and thus failed to discharge initial onus, which was upon her. In such circumstances, a factual finding of fact which has been recorded by the Labour Court, cannot be disturbed in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India and the present petition is dismissed in limine.