Madhusudan Tiwary v. Project and Development India Ltd.
2014-04-25
APARESH KUMAR SINGH
body2014
DigiLaw.ai
Judgment By Court :- Heard learned counsel for the parties. 2. By the original order of punishment, which has been confirmed in appeal, the petitioner has been imposed with a penalty of deduction to the lower post and consequently to recover an amount of Rs. 1,21,083/-drawn by him towards medical reimbursement during the last two years. 3. The petitioner is said to have joined in the respondent-Company as Labour on 20.07.1977 and got promoted to the Record Keeper Grade-II. He was, however, placed under suspension vide order dated 24.06.2002 and thereafter charges were framed on 29.06.2002 inter alia alleging that for reimbursement of medical expenses for himself and for his family members he adopted malpractices on false and fictitious declaration/ statements regularly. He has claimed medical bills reimbursement prescription, which was neither prescribed by the Doctor nor signed by any Doctor. It was also alleged that Medical Superintendent asked him to go to Christian Medical College & Hospital (in short CMCH), Vellore, which is approved hospital by the company, but he got the matter referred to Patna Medical College & Hospital (in short PMCH), Patna only with mala fide intention. His explanation furnished on 04.07.2002 was found to be unsatisfactory and the charges were enquired through the Enquiry Officer appointed by the management. The Enquiry Officer found him guilty for the alleged charges. Thereafter on 23.01.2003, Annexure-12, passed by the Disciplinary Authority, the petitioner has been imposed with the impugned punishment. Incidentally the petitioner chose to challenge the original order of punishment in W.P. (S) No. 1946 of 2003, which, however, was disposed of as the appeal was pending before the Appellate Authority with a direction to the Appellate Authority to decide the appeal within a period of two months. The said order was passed on 23.08.2003, Annexure-19. In the meantime, the respondent-Company floated the scheme for voluntary separation, which was also challenged by several employees including the present petitioner in W. P. (S) No. 3233 of 2003. The said writ petition was referred to the learned Division Bench, which was finally dismissed vide judgment dated 25.02.2004 Annexure-R/I to the counter affidavit of the respondents rejecting the contention of the petitioners including the present petitioner that the scheme was vitiated by malafides.
The said writ petition was referred to the learned Division Bench, which was finally dismissed vide judgment dated 25.02.2004 Annexure-R/I to the counter affidavit of the respondents rejecting the contention of the petitioners including the present petitioner that the scheme was vitiated by malafides. It was also noticed that the company is under the Board for Industrial and Financial Reconstruction (in short BIFR) and the scheme has been offered to those, who have been identified as surplus. The learned Division Bench also found on the pleading on record that the writ petition was filed by two Unions and four individuals and further one of the writ petition was filed by 27 employees. However, the Division Bench observed that whether these are part of the staff found as surplus by the appropriate committee, is not revealed. It, therefore, observed that if the petitioners had any grievance in terms of the Industrial Disputes Act, they could move before the Authority under the Act. It was also observed that if they have got any grievance, which they are legally entitled to put forward before the BIFR, they can do that as well. The writ petition was, accordingly, dismissed. The petitioner admittedly applied for Voluntary Separation Scheme (in short VSS) in the meantime and was accepted on 01.09.2003 as is evident from Annexure-R/2 of the counter affidavit. Incidentally, the petitioner preferred a Contempt Petition as the Appellate Authority had not disposed of the appeal. Though, the appeal was disposed of in the mean time, but the learned Single Judge of this Court in the said Contempt Petition, gave a direction upon the Appellate Authority to pass a fresh reasoned order taking into consideration the Memorandum of Appeal and supplementary appeal preferred by the petitioner as the Court was not satisfied with the order of the Appellate Authority dated 22.04.2004 as it was not in conformity with the observations and directions of this Court and law. The said order was passed on 19.08.2004 in the Contempt Case (Civil) No. 96 of 2004 whereafter, the impugned appellate order, Annexure-21, has been passed by the Appellate Authority on 05.10.2004 upholding the original punishment. 4.
The said order was passed on 19.08.2004 in the Contempt Case (Civil) No. 96 of 2004 whereafter, the impugned appellate order, Annexure-21, has been passed by the Appellate Authority on 05.10.2004 upholding the original punishment. 4. Learned counsel for the petitioner has assailed the original appellate order inter alia on the ground that the same has been done without following the principles of natural justice as a second show cause notice has not been furnished by the Disciplinary Authority before passing the order of punishment. The petitioner was suffering from skin disease which the Disciplinary and Appellate Authority have not considered as that was the basis for seeking medical reimbursement of the bill. The Appellate Authority was required to give an opportunity of hearing to the petitioner. Learned counsel for the petitioner has tried to raise a point that perusal of the appellate order indicates that the original order was also passed by the Chairman-cum-Managing Director, who has passed the appellate order. However, though no such grounds have been raised in the writ petition a statement has been made in para-33 of the writ petition that the Disciplinary Authority has passed the penal order on the instruction of the Appellate Authority as is evident from the para-6 of the appellate order. 5. Learned counsel for the respondent-Company has, on the other hand, justified the impugned order, stating that the respondents have conducted the departmental proceeding on a serious charge against the petitioner of having procured medical reimbursement without following the prescribed procedure for the same. It has been further submitted that the petitioner was repeatedly asked to go a particular hospital, which is approved by the respondent-Company, but he insisted to get the matter referred to PMCH, Patna with ulterior motive. He has claimed reimbursement of medical bills and prescriptions, which were neither prescribed by the Doctors nor signed by any Doctors. The explanation of the petitioner was not found to be satisfactory and an Enquiry Officer was appointed to enquire into the charges, who found the charges levelled against the petitioner proved during the course of enquiry proceeding. The Disciplinary Authority, after considering the charge sheet, reply and the enquiry proceeding, has passed the impugned order of punishment The respondents have taken a specific plea that the petitioner had accepted VSS w.e.f. 01.09.2003 and ceased to the employee from 01.09.2003. 6.
The Disciplinary Authority, after considering the charge sheet, reply and the enquiry proceeding, has passed the impugned order of punishment The respondents have taken a specific plea that the petitioner had accepted VSS w.e.f. 01.09.2003 and ceased to the employee from 01.09.2003. 6. Learned counsel for the respondents has relied upon a judgment rendered in the case of A.K.Bindal and Anr. Vs. Union of India & Ors. reported in 2003 (5) SCC 163 in support of his contention that when option exercised under voluntary retirement scheme has been accepted and benefit thereof has been taken by the employees, those employees cannot be permitted to raise any grievance relating to revision in pay from retrospective date, even after he has opted for Voluntary Retirement Scheme and has accepted the amount paid to him as the whole purpose of introducing the scheme would be totally frustrated. 7. The said judgment is said to have been relied in the case of HEC Voluntary Retd. Employees Welfare Society and Anr. Vs. Heavy Engineering Corpn. Ltd. and Ors. reported in 2006 (3) SCC 708 . Learned counsel for the respondents has reiterated that acceptance of VRS is binding upon the parties and once an employee opts to retire voluntarily in terms of contract he cannot raise a claim thereafter for a period of his service. 8. I have heard learned counsel for the parties. The chronology of events as has been narrated in the pleadings and referred to in the earlier part of the judgment indicate that the petitioner has been proceeded against during the service and was punished also by the order passed on 23.01.2003 while he was in service. The petitioner had challenged the said order of punishment in a writ petition while at the same time pursuing the remedy of an appeal. In such circumstances, learned Single Bench of this Court disposed of the writ petition by the judgment passed on 23.08.2003 with a direction to the Appellate Authority to determine the appeal, if it has not yet been determined, within a period of two months from the date of receipt/production of a copy of this order. It appears that during the said time, Company had floated the VSS Scheme and the petitioner had opted for the said scheme and whose option was also accepted as is evident from the Annexure-R/2 to the counter affidavit.
It appears that during the said time, Company had floated the VSS Scheme and the petitioner had opted for the said scheme and whose option was also accepted as is evident from the Annexure-R/2 to the counter affidavit. It also appears that the petitioner himself had challenged the VSS Scheme apart from other petitioners before this Court. The petitioners' writ petition, W. P. (S) No. 3233 of 2003, was decided by the learned Division Bench on 25.02.2004 along with other analogous cases and is reported in 2004(2) JCR 545 (Jhr.) also enclosed as Annexure-R/1 to the counter affidavit. The contention of the petitioner and others for challenging the VSS Scheme was, however, refuted by the learned Division Bench of this Court which took into account that the company was under BIFR and High Power Committee had been constituted to identify surplus staffs in respect of which, the said VSS Scheme was offered. Though, the learned Division Bench, from the pleading on record, was not able to come to a definite conclusion as to whether the petitioners were part of the staffs, who were found to be surplus by the Appropriate Committee, but it appears that even before the day the judgment was passed on 25.02.2004, the petitioner himself had applied for and accepted VSS Scheme. The Memorandum dated 01.09.2003 showing the acceptance of the VSS application of the petitioner indicates that the management had accepted the VSS application of the petitioner without any precondition attached to it or without any endorsement that the petitioner would be entitled to pursue the pending litigation in respect of the impugned punishment imposed against the employer. It therefore appears that the employer and employee relationship had un-conditionally ended by acceptance of VSS application on 01.09.2003 of the petitioner by the respondent-Company. The judgment that has been relied upon by the respondent on the issue clearly indicates that upon acceptance of the VRS Scheme, the parties are bound by the terms of the contract of the voluntarily retirement. Once an employee opts to retire voluntarily in terms of contract, he is not entitled to raise the claim as the jural relationship between the employer and employee have come to an end. The respondents appeared to have passed appellate order in the meantime which however was not approved by the learned Single Judge of this Court in the Contempt Petition.
The respondents appeared to have passed appellate order in the meantime which however was not approved by the learned Single Judge of this Court in the Contempt Petition. Therefore, the respondents again chose to pass another appellate order re-confirming the original order of punishment. 9. Be that as it may, it appears that the petitioner himself had assailed the VSS Scheme before this Court in a separate proceeding and failed and also opted VSS Scheme in the meantime before passing of the judgment of the learned Division Bench of this Court. In effect, on acceptance of the VSS Scheme, the jural relationship between the employer and employee had come to an end. Therefore, the petitioner is not justified in challenging the impugned order of punishment and appellate order confirming the same after he had accepted voluntarily retirement from the respondent-Company. 10. In the circumstances, discussed hereinabove, this Court does not find any reason to interfere in the writ petition, which is, accordingly, dismissed.