JUDGMENT Mansoor Ahmad Mir, Acting Chief Justice: This appeal is directed against the award, dated 9th July, 2012, passed by the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal­II, Shimla, H.P. (hereinafter referred to as “the Tribunal”) in M.A.C. No. 57­S/2 of 2007, titled as Smt. Asha and others versus Sh. Moti Ram and others, whereby the claim petition filed by the claimants came to be dismissed (hereinafter referred to as “the impugned award”), on the grounds taken in the memo of appeal. 2. Respondent No. 1­owner­insured has also filed the cross­objections challenging the impugned award to the extent of saddling the liability upon the owner­insured of the offending vehicle. Brief facts: 3. Shri Hari Dass @ Hari Ram was carpenter by profession and was doing wood work in the house of Shri Sahi Ram of Village Halata, Tehsil Theog. On 2nd August, 2007, while returning from the said house, he hired a Bolero Camper bearing registration No. HP­63­2 166 for the purpose of taking the equipments to his house from the said destination. The said vehicle met with an accident at about 5.00­5.15 P.M. at Bagri Nullah, which was caused by driver­Suresh Kumar, while driving the vehicle rashly and negligently. Shri Hari Dass sustained injuries and was taken to PGI Chandigarh for treatment, where he succumbed to the injuries on 28th August, 2007. FIR No. 161 /2007 was registered at Police Station Theog. 4.The claimants, in the claim petition, have specifically pleaded that the deceased had hired the vehicle for carrying his tools­equipments back from the house of said Shri Sahi Ram to his own house. It is also averred that his monthly income was ‘ 10,000/­, which he was spending for the claimants, who were the dependents and have claimed compensation to the tune of ‘ ten lacs, as per the break­ups given in the claim petition. 5.The claim petition was resisted by the respondents on the grounds taken in the memo of objections. 6.It appears that during the pendency of the claim petition, the claimants have amended the claim petition and have presented the amended claim petition before the Tribunal. 7.The following issues were framed by the Tribunal on 22ndDecember, 2008: “1. Whether death of Hari Dass took place due to rash and negligent driving of vehicle No. HP­63 ­2166 by its driver? 6.It appears that during the pendency of the claim petition, the claimants have amended the claim petition and have presented the amended claim petition before the Tribunal. 7.The following issues were framed by the Tribunal on 22ndDecember, 2008: “1. Whether death of Hari Dass took place due to rash and negligent driving of vehicle No. HP­63 ­2166 by its driver? OPP 2.If issue No. 1 is proved, what amount of compensation the petitioners and proforma respondent are entitled to and from whom? OPP 3.Whether the deceased was a gratuitous passengers? OPR­2. 4.Whether the vehicle was being driven in violation of condition of policy and provisions of Motor Vehicles Act? OPR­2 5.Whether the petition is bad for non­joinder and mis­joinder of necessary parties? OPR­1 & 2.6. Relief.” 8. The claimants have examined four witnesses including Smt. Asha, one of the claimants. The respondents have also examined four witnesses in support of their case. 9. Before I deal with issues No. 1 to 4, I deem it proper to determine issue No. 5, whereby the claim petition came to be dismissed. Issue No.5: 10.The respondents have specifically pleaded that the claim petition was suffering from mis­joinder and non­joinder of necessary parties and was liable for dismissal. Precisely, the case of the respondents was that the claimants have not arrayed the driver of the offending vehicle as a party in the claim petition. 11.Admittedly, the driver of the offending vehicle has not been arrayed as a party in the array of respondents, but the question is – whether non­impleadment of the driver of the offending vehicle can be a ground for dismissing the claim petition despite the fact that the Tribunal has come to the conclusion that the accident was outcome of rashness and negligence of the driver and the claimants have lost their bread earner? The answer is in negative for the following reasons: 12. Granting of compensation is just to ameliorate the woes of the victims of the vehicular accidents and to save them from succumbing to the social evils. It is just a source of help to the victims/claimants/affected parties, who have lost their bread earner. The answer is in negative for the following reasons: 12. Granting of compensation is just to ameliorate the woes of the victims of the vehicular accidents and to save them from succumbing to the social evils. It is just a source of help to the victims/claimants/affected parties, who have lost their bread earner. 13.It is beaten law of land that granting of compensation is a welfare legislation and the hypertechnicalities, mystic maybes, procedural wrangles and tangles have no role to play and cannot be made ground to defeat the claim petitions and to defeat the social purpose of granting compensation. 14.My this view is fortified by the judgment of the Apex Court in the case titled as N.K.V. Bros. (P.) Ltd. versus M. Karumai Ammal and others etc., reported in AIR 1980 Supreme Court 1354. It is apt to reproduce relevant portion of para 3 of the judgment herein: “3. Road accidents are one of the top killers in our country, specifically when truck and bus drivers operate nocturnally. This proverbial recklessness often persuades the courts, as has been observed by us earlier in other cases, to draw an initial presumption in several cases based on the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. Accident Tribunals must take special care to see that innocent victims do not suffer and drivers and owners do not escape liability merely because of some doubt here or some obscurity there. Save in plain cases, culpability must be inferred from the circumstances where it is fairly reasonable. The court should not succumb to niceties, technicalities and mystic maybes. We are emphasising this aspect because we are often distressed by transport operators getting away with it thanks to judicial laxity, despite the fact that they do not exercise sufficient disciplinary control over the drivers in the matter of careful driving. The heavy economic impact of culpable driving of public transport must bring owner and driver to their responsibility to their “neighbour”. Indeed, the State must seriously consider no­fault liability by legislation. A second aspect which pains us is the inadequacy of the compensation or undue parcimony practised by tribunals. We must remember that judicial tribunals are State organs and Art. 41 of the Constitution lays the jurisprudential foundation for state relief against accidental disablement of citizens. There is no justification for niggardliness in compensation. A second aspect which pains us is the inadequacy of the compensation or undue parcimony practised by tribunals. We must remember that judicial tribunals are State organs and Art. 41 of the Constitution lays the jurisprudential foundation for state relief against accidental disablement of citizens. There is no justification for niggardliness in compensation. A third factor which is harrowing is the enormous delay in disposal of accident cases resulting in compensation, even if awarded, being postponed by several years. The States must appoint sufficient number of tribunals and the High Court should insist upon quick disposals so that the trauma and tragedy already sustained may not be magnified by the injustice of delayed justice. Many States are unjustly indifferent in this regard. Emphasis supplied” 15.The Jammu and Kashmir High Court in the case titled as Oriental Insurance Co. versus Mst. Zarifa and others, reported in AIR 1995 Jammu and Kashmir 81, held that the MV Act is Social Welfare Legislation and the procedural technicalities cannot be allowed to defeat the purpose of the Act. It is profitable to reproduce para 20 of the judgment herein: “20. Before concluding, it is also observed that it is a social welfare legislation under which the compensation is provided by way ofAward to the people who sustain bodily injuries or get killed in the vehicular accident. These people who sustain injuries or whose kith and kins are killed, are necessarily to be provided such relief in a short span of time and the procedural technicalities cannot be allowed to defeat the just purpose of the Act, under which such compensation is to be paid to such claimants.” 16.It is also apt to reproduce relevant portion of para 12 of the judgment of the Apex Court in the case titled as Sohan Lal Passi versus P. Sesh Reddy and others, reported in AIR 1996 Supreme Court 2627, herein: “12. While interpreting the contract of insurance, the Tribunals and Courts have to be conscious of the fact that right to claim compensation by heirs and legal representatives of the victims of the accident is not defeated on technical grounds. While interpreting the contract of insurance, the Tribunals and Courts have to be conscious of the fact that right to claim compensation by heirs and legal representatives of the victims of the accident is not defeated on technical grounds. Unless it is established on the materials on record that it was the insured who had wilfully violated the condition of the policy by allowing a person not duly licensed to drive the vehicle when the accident took place, the insurer shall be deemed to be a judgment­debtor in respect of the liability in view of sub­section (1) of Section 96 of the Act. It need not be pointed out that the whole concept of getting the vehicle insured by an insurance company is to provide an easy mode of getting compensation by the claimants, otherwise in normal course they had to pursue their claim against the owner from one forum to the other and ultimately to execute the order of the Accident Claims Tribunal for realisation of such amount by sale of properties of the owner of the vehicle. The procedure and result of the execution of the decree is well known.” 17.The Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (hereinafter referred to as “the MV Act”) has gone through a sea change in the year 1994 by amendment in terms of Act 54 of 1994. Amendment was made in Sections 158 and 166 of the MV Act. Sub­section (6) has been added to Section 158 of the MVAct, which reads as under: “158. Production of certain certificates, licence and permit in certain cases. Amendment was made in Sections 158 and 166 of the MV Act. Sub­section (6) has been added to Section 158 of the MVAct, which reads as under: “158. Production of certain certificates, licence and permit in certain cases. ­ (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)As soon as any information regarding any accident involving death or bodily injury to any person is recorded or report under this section is completed by a police officer, the officer incharge of the police station shall forward a copy of the same within thirty days from the date of recording of information or, as the case may be, on completion of such report to the Claims Tribunal having jurisdiction and a copy thereof to the concerned insurer, and where a copy is made available to the owner, he shall also within thirty days of receipt of such report, forward the same to such Claims Tribunal and Insurer.” 18.It provides that it is the duty of the police officer to send a copy of the final report to the Claims Tribunal having jurisdiction and that report is to be treated as a claim petition in terms of Section 166, sub­section (4), which too was added in terms of the amendment by Act 54 of 1994 in the MV Act. It is apt to reproduce Sub­section (4) of Section 166 herein: “166. Application for compensation. ­ (1) (2) (3) (4) The Claims Tribunal shall treat any report of accidents forwarded to it under sub­section (6) of Section 158 as an application for compensation under this Act.” 19. It is nowhere provided in Section 166, sub­section (4) that it should contain all the particulars of claimants, owner­ insured, driver or the insurer. The purpose is just to achieve the purpose of granting compensation in order to save the claimants from social evils. 20.Section 165 of the MV Act provides how Claims Tribunal can be constituted and Section 166 of the MV Act provides how application can be made. While going through Section 166 of the MV Act, it is nowhere provided that the driver is a necessary party. What is required is that the claimant has to plead and prove that the application for compensation has arisen out of an accident of the nature specified in sub­section (1) of Section 165 of the MV Act. While going through Section 166 of the MV Act, it is nowhere provided that the driver is a necessary party. What is required is that the claimant has to plead and prove that the application for compensation has arisen out of an accident of the nature specified in sub­section (1) of Section 165 of the MV Act. Sub­section (1) of Section 165 of the MVAct also nowhere provides that it should be mentioned in the claim petition that who has caused the accident. 21.What is the sine qua non for entertaining petitions under section 166 of the MV Act is rashness and negligence of the driver of the offending vehicle. But, it is nowhere provided that the driver of the offending vehicle is a necessary party. 22.The Government of Himachal Pradesh framed Himachal Pradesh Motor Vehicles Rules, 1999 (hereinafter referred to as “the Rules”). Rule 215 of the Rules provides that every application for claims of compensation to be made under Section 166 of the MV Act shall be in HP Form LII­MACT­A. The said form contains 24 columns and it is nowhere prescribed that the driver of the offending vehicle is to be arrayed as a party and his particulars are to be given. Thus, it can be safely held that the driver is not a necessary party, may be a proper party. 23.I deem it proper to record herein that I have dealt with a case of like nature as Judge of the Jammu and Kashmir High Court at Srinagar titled as Union of India and another versus Ghulam Nabi Dar, reported in 2010 ACJ 23 , and held that driver is not a necessary party but a proper party and a claim petition can be filed and determined without arraying the driver as a party; non­impleadment of the driver cannot be a ground for dismissal of the claim petition. 24.The Apex Court in a case titled as Machindranath Kernath Kasar versus D.S. Mylarappa & Ors., reported in AIR 2008 Supreme Court 2545, held that driver is not a necessary party, but may be arrayed as a party in order to fix the liability and in case, he is not arrayed as a party, the claim petition cannot be dismissed when the owner­insured is already party. It is apt to reproduce para 18 of the judgment herein: “18. It is apt to reproduce para 18 of the judgment herein: “18. The Karnataka Rules, therefore, were required to be construed having regard to the appropriate interpretative principles applicable thereto. Common law principles were therefor required to be kept in mind. In this case, we are not required to lay down a law that even in absence of any rule, impleadment of the driver would be imperative. It is however, of some interest to note the provisions of Section 168 of the Motor Vehicles Act. In terms of this aforementioned provision, the Tribunal is mandatorily required to specify the amount which shall be paid by the owner or driver of the vehicle involved in the accident or by or any of them. As it is imperative on the part of the Tribunal to specify the amount payable inter alia by the driver of the vehicle, afortiori he should be impleaded as a party in the proceeding. He may not, however, be a necessary party in the sense that in his absence, the entire proceeding shall not be vitiated as the owner of the vehicle was a party in his capacity as a joint tortfeasor.” “13. It is an undisputed fact that the son of the appellant died in a motor vehicle accident on 12.6.1998, who was the sole earning member of the family. The respondent driver and insurer were initially impleaded as parties but notice could not be served to the driver despite repeated efforts. The driver was therefore later on deleted from the array of parties on the basis of the decisions of various High Courts including Delhi High Court wherein it was held that non­impleadment of driver of the offending vehicle is not fatal to the proceedings in view of the fact25. The Apex Court in a latest judgment in the case titled Josphine James versus United India Insurance Co. Ltd. & Anr., reported in 2013 AIR SCW 6633, also held that non­impleadment of the driver of the offending vehicle is not fatal to the proceedings and claim petition cannot be dismissed for the said reason. It is apt t reproduce para 13 of the judgment herein: that the liability of the owner and the insurer of the offending vehicle is joint and several. It is apt t reproduce para 13 of the judgment herein: that the liability of the owner and the insurer of the offending vehicle is joint and several. The insured was placed ex­parte since he remained absent despite the service of notice upon him in the proceeding whereas the Insurance Company filed written statement wherein it has admitted that on the date of accident the offending truck stood duly insured with it and the insured was respondent No. 2 in the proceedings before the Tribunal.” 26.Having said so, the Tribunal has fallen in grave error in deciding issue No. 5 against the claimants. Accordingly, the findings returned by the Tribunal on issue No. 5 are set aside and decided in favour of the claimants and against the respondents. Issue No. 1: 27.The owner­insured and the insurer, i.e. the respondents, have not questioned the findings recorded by the Tribunal on other issues. However, respondent No. 1­owner has questioned the impugned award so far it relates to the findings returned whereby he has been saddled with liability. Thus, all the findings recorded by the Tribunal on this issue are not disputed. However, I have gone through the record. The claimants have proved by leading oral as well as documentary evidence that the driver has driven the offending vehicle­Bolero Camper, bearing registration No. HP­63­2 166, rashly and negligently and has caused the accident on 2nd August, 2007, at Bagri Nullah, in which deceased­Hari Dass sustained injuries and succumbed to the injuries. Thus, the findings recorded on issue No. 1 are upheld. Issues No. 3 and 4: 28.Respondent No. 2­Bajaj Alliance General Insurance Company had to prove issues No. 3 and 4, which it failed to do so. Respondent No. 2 has not led any evidence to prove that the driver was not having valid licence or the vehicle was being driven in violation of the registration certificate or the terms and conditions of the insurance policy, but tried to project a case that the deceased was travelling in the said vehicle as a gratuitous passenger, which is not correct as per the pleadings and evidence led. 29. The claimants have specifically pleaded that the deceased was a carpenter by profession and he was doing the finishing work of wood in the house of one Shri Sahi Ram. 29. The claimants have specifically pleaded that the deceased was a carpenter by profession and he was doing the finishing work of wood in the house of one Shri Sahi Ram. On completion of the said work, he had to return to his home with all equipments including planer and in order to carry the equipments, he hired the offending vehicle and loaded the said equipments in the vehicle. 30. Learned counsel for the respondents have cross­ examined the witnesses, had not been able to shatter the said evidence. Thus, there is ample evidence on the file that the offending vehicle was hired by the deceased for carrying equipments­goods and the deceased was travelling in the said vehicle alongwith equipments­goods as owner of the equipments­ goods. It is also corroborated by the contents contained in the FIR. 31. Thus, it has not been proved that the deceased was a gratuitous passenger and the owner has committed the breach. It was for the insurer­respondent No. 2 to plead and prove that the breach, if any committed, was willful. There is no evidence available on the file to this extent. 32. It is apt to reproduce relevant portion of para 105 of the judgment rendered by the Apex Court in the case titled as National Insurance Co. Ltd. versus Swaran Singh & others, reported in AIR 2004 Supreme Court 1531, herein:“105. (i) (ii) (iii)The breach of policy condition e.g. disqualification of driver or invalid driving licence of the driver, as contained in sub­section (2) (a) (ii) of Section 149, have to be proved to have been committed by the insured for avoiding liability by the insurer. Mere absence, fake or invalid driving licence or disqualification of the driver for driving at the relevant time, are not in themselves defences available to the insurer against either the insured or the third parties. Mere absence, fake or invalid driving licence or disqualification of the driver for driving at the relevant time, are not in themselves defences available to the insurer against either the insured or the third parties. To avoid its liability towards insured, the insurer has to prove that the insured was guilty of negligence and failed to exercise reasonable care in the matter of fulfilling the condition of the policy regarding use of vehicles by duly licensed driver or one who was not disqualified to drive at the relevant time.(iv) The insurance companies are, however, with a view to avoid their liability, must not only establish the available defence(s) raised in the said proceedings but must also establish ‘breach’ on the part of the owner of the vehicle; the burden of proof wherefore would be on them.(v) (vi) Even where the insurer is able to prove breach on the part of the insured concerning the policy condition regarding holding of a valid licence by the driver or his qualification to drive during the relevant period, the insurer would not be allowed to avoid its liability towards insured unless the said breach or breaches on the condition of driving licence is/are so fundamental as are found to have contributed to the cause of the accident. The Tribunals in interpreting the policy conditions would apply “the rule of main purpose” and the concept of “fundamental breach” to allow defences available to the insured under Section 149 (2) of theAct.” 33.Having said so, the findings returned by the Tribunal on issues No. 3 and 4 are set aside and it is held that respondent No. 1 has not committed any breach and deceased was not travelling in the offending vehicle as a gratuitous passenger, but had hired the said vehicle and was travelling in the said vehicle as owner of the equipments­goods. Issue No.2: 34. There is no dispute about the adequacy of the compensation as neither the owner nor the insurer has questioned the same. However, I have gone through the impugned award. Issue No.2: 34. There is no dispute about the adequacy of the compensation as neither the owner nor the insurer has questioned the same. However, I have gone through the impugned award. An amount of ‘ 5,24,000/­ has been assessed as compensation by taking the monthly income of the deceased as ‘ 4,000/­, loss of dependency as ‘ 3,000/­ per month, though it is pleaded and proved that the deceased was earning ‘ 10,000/­ per month as carpenter and it is a hard fact that now­a­days, a carpenter is earning not less than ‘ 500/ ­ per day. Keeping in view the age of the deceased, multiplier of 14 was correctly applied. Accordingly, the amount assessed, i.e. ‘ 5,24,000/­ is adequate compensation. 35. Having glance of the discussions made hereinabove, the appeal is allowed and compensation to the tune of ‘ 5,24,000/­ is awarded in favour of the claimants and against the respondents and respondent No. 2­insurer is saddled with liability. The amount of compensation shall be distributed amongst the claimants as per the apportionment made by the Tribunal vide para 21 of the impugned award. The cross­objections are also disposed of accordingly. 36.Send down the records after placing copy of the judgment on record.