Judgment S.C. PARIJA, J. These two appeals are directed against the orders dated 27.06.2014, passed by the learned District Judge, Cuttack, in I.A.No.03 of 2014, arising out of Arbitration Petition Nos.27 and 18 of 2014, respectively, rejecting the petition filed under Section 9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. 2. The facts of the case, as detailed in the two appeals are that the Ravenshaw University (respondent no.1) decided to undertake various professional courses with the participation of private service providers under self-financing mode and in furtherance of its objectives for providing such self-financing courses in collaboration with private service providers, Ravenshaw University sought the permission of the Department of Higher Education, Government of Odisha. The respondent no.1 in the Academic Council decided to undertake the three years degree course in Bachelor of Business Management (in short ‘BBA’), Bachelor of Science in Information Science and Telecommunication (in short “B.Sc. IST), Bachelor of Science in Information Technology Management (in short “B.Sc. ITM”) and two years Post Graduate Degree Course in Journalism and Mass Communication (in short “M.A. J.M.C.”) and two years Post Graduate Degree Course in Electronics and Telecommunication (in short “M.Sc. ETC”) in Ravenshaw University. The Department of Higher Education, Govt. of Odisha, in consideration of the proposal accorded permission to undertake such BBA, B.Sc. IST, B.Sc. ITM, M.A. JMC and M.Sc. ETC courses in collaboration with the appellants/service providers. 3. In pursuance of such decision, the respondent no.1 entered into two Bi-Partite Memorandum of Understandings (‘M0Us’ for short) with the appellants on 29th August, 2011, to conduct the aforesaid professional courses in Ravenshaw University on self financing mode in its premises, as per the course curriculum and syllabus approved by the Academic Council of Ravenshaw University. As per the MoUs, the parties thereto agreed inter alia that they shall conduct the aforesaid professional courses on self financing mode in the premises of Ravenshaw University, Cuttack, as per the course curriculum and syllabus approved by the Academic Council of Ravenshaw University and to utilize the infrastructure presently available with the Ravenshaw University to improve upon the human resource development, as per the requirement of international society and the University shall provide need based additional infrastructure for successful running of the programme. The MoUs were for a period of three years, i.e., three consecutive admission batches from the effective date and shall be renewed for three years in each occasion. The MoUs were for a period of three years, i.e., three consecutive admission batches from the effective date and shall be renewed for three years in each occasion. The effective date is the date of the execution of the MoUs. 4. The terms and conditions of the MoUs prohibited either party from assigning the MoUs to any other party without express consent of the other contracting party. It was further provided that the MoUs are terminable in the event of any breach of terms and conditions contained therein and if either party commits any breach, the aggrieved party may issue a notice by Regd. Post with A.D. to the other party calling upon to rectify such default or breach within 90 days and if either party fails to rectify the same within the stipulated period, the aggrieved party may issue notice for termination of the MoUs which shall take effect from 90 days after receipt of such second notice. 5. The appellants claim that from the date of execution of the MoUs, the appellants have been discharging their obligations in terms of the said MoUs. The appellant in ARBA No.31 of 2014, has successfully completed 12 batches of the BBA, B.Sc. IST, M.A. J.M.C., M.Sc. ETC and appellant in ARBA No.32 of 2014 has completed 11 batches of B.Sc. ITM under the erstwhile Ravenshaw College and both the appellants have completed 3 admission batches under the Ravenshaw University. The appellants have been successful in their endeavour to impart the courses and in placement of the students after completion of the courses. 6. As per the terms and conditions of the MoUs, it was the responsibilities of the Ravenshaw University for admission and to select candidates for admission as per the norms fixed by the Academic Council and Admission Committee set up by the University and it was also its responsibility to issue University registration number to the admitted students. 7. As per the course fee and commercial terms detailed in the MoUs,, the annual course fee of BBA was Rs.25,000/-, Rs.30,000/-for B.Sc. IST and Rs.30,000/-for B.Sc.ITM and Rs.20,000/-for MA JMC and Rs.35,000/-for M.Sc. ETC and the course fees to be collected by the University and out of the course fees collected, the appellants are to be paid 65% for the academic session 2011-12 and 60% from the next academic session 2012-13 onwards. 8. IST and Rs.30,000/-for B.Sc.ITM and Rs.20,000/-for MA JMC and Rs.35,000/-for M.Sc. ETC and the course fees to be collected by the University and out of the course fees collected, the appellants are to be paid 65% for the academic session 2011-12 and 60% from the next academic session 2012-13 onwards. 8. The appellants claim that the aforesaid professional courses have attained popularity because of its potentiality for employment, which fact is evident from the revenue earned by the Ravenshaw University, which is around Rs.6.00 crores, without incurring any expenditure. Whereas the appellants from out of their revenue share, have been meeting all expenditures towards advertisement cost of the courses, salary of the staff, establishment expenditure, electricity bill, phone, internet bill, maintenance of the library and purchasing of books etc. 9. It is the case of the appellants that while the matter stood thus, the appellants came to learn that the Vice-Chancellor of the Ravenshaw University (respondent no.2) has taken a decision not to renew the MoUs with the appellants for undertaking the aforesaid professional courses for further period. Apprehending premature termination of the MoUs, the appellants filed applications before the learned District Judge, Cuttack, under Section 9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (“the Act” for short), who vide order dated 10.02.2014, while directing issue of notice to the respondents, had passed the interim order restraining the respondents not to terminate the MoUs dated 29.08.2011 until further orders. 10. During the pendency of the proceedings under Section 9 of the Act, as the respondents did not take any steps for initiation of admission process for the academic session 2014-15, the appellants filed I.A.No.02 of 2014, before the learned District Judge, Cuttack, praying for a direction to the respondents to initiate the admission process by issuing advertisement for admission of students in the current academic session 2014-15. Learned District Judge, Cuttack, vide order dated 17.05.2014 allowed the interim application of the appellants (I.A.No.02 of 2014), directing the respondents to initiate admission process by issuing advertisement for admission of students in the current academic year 2014-15 for the aforesaid professional courses, if they intend to continue the said courses either directly by Ravenshaw University or by the PPP mode through the appellants. 11. 11. It is the case of the appellants that taking advantage of the said order passed by the learned District Judge, Cuttack, in I.A.No.02 of 2014, the respondents published press release indicating that the aforesaid professional courses would be imparted by the Ravenshaw University directly and not by PPP mode through the appellants. 12. Being aggrieved by the order of the learned District Judge, Cuttack, dated 17.05.2014, passed in I.A.No.02 of 2014 and the advertisement made by the respondents, the appellants preferred arbitration appeals, i.e. ARBA Nos.26 and 25 of 2014 respectively, for expunging the direction “if they intend to continue the said courses either directly by the University”, as had been reflected in the said order. 13. This Court by order dated 10.06.2014, in ARBA Nos.26 and 25 of 2014 respectively, directed that as an interim measure, the application for admission of the students in the current academic session in the aforesaid professional courses, as per the advertisement issued by the respondents may be processed but no final admission shall take place till the next date of listing. Subsequently, vide order dated 19.06.2014, this Court had given liberty to the respondents to finalise the admission of the students in the aforesaid professional courses for the current academic session 2014-15. 14. It is the case of the appellants that during the pendency of the aforesaid arbitration appeals, i.e. ARBA Nos.26 and 25 of 2014, the Ravenshaw University, issued a letter dated 27.05.2014, intimating the appellants that as per the order dated 17.05.2014, passed by the learned District Judge, Cuttack, in I.A.No.02 of 2014 (arising out of Arbitration Petition Nos.27 and 18 of 2014), it has been decided that the Ravenshaw University will run the aforesaid professional courses from the current academic session 2014-15 directly and not in PPP mode and therefore, the involvement of the appellants in teaching the aforesaid professional courses from the current admission batch 2014-15 is no more required. 15. Aggrieved by the termination and/or discontinuance of the MoUs, the appellants filed I.A.No.03 of 2014 before the learned District Judge, Cuttack, in Arbitration Petition Nos.27 and 18 of 2014, praying therein to restraint the respondents from giving effect to the letter dated 27.05.2014, issued by the Ravenshaw University, dispensing with the services of the appellants from running the aforesaid professional courses for the current academic session 2014-15. Learned District Judge, Cuttack, vide order dated 27.06.2014, dismissed the interim applications filed by the appellants, holding that there is dispute as to whether the MoUs dated 29.08.2011 will cover the current academic session 2014-15 and therefore the letter of termination issued by the Ravenshaw University for terminating the services of the appellants cannot be treated as violative of its earlier order dated 17.05.2014, passed in I.A.No.02 of 2014. 16. Being aggrieved by the order of the learned District Judge, Cuttack, dated 27.06.2014, passed in I.A.No.03 of 2014, arising out of Arbitration Petition Nos.27 and 18 of 2014, rejecting their application for interim injunction, the appellants have preferred the present appeals. 17. Learned counsel for the appellants submits that as the order of interim injunction dated 10.02.2014, passed by the learned District Judge, Cuttack, restraining the respondents from terminating the MoUs was in vogue, the impugned order of the respondents dated 27.05.2014, terminating the MoUs is wholly improper and illegal. Learned counsel for the appellants further submits that as the period of the MoUs was till August 2015, as per its terms and conditions, the action of the Ravenshaw University in terminating the same prior to its expiry is improper, illegal and without jurisdiction. In this regard, it is submitted that as the period of the MoUs was for three academic years (admission batches) and was subject to subsequent renewal, the process for which is to be initiated one year in advance and till the new MoUs are signed, the existing MoUs shall remain in force, the respondents had no authority to terminate and/or discontinue the MoUs. 18. Learned counsel for the appellants further submits that pursuant to the MoUs, as the appellants have invested huge amount for engagement of faculty members, staffs and purchase of equipments for imparting the aforesaid professional courses, the sudden termination and/or discontinuance of the MoUs unilaterally by the respondents is bound to cause irreparable financial loss and hardship to the appellants. It is further submitted that the MoUs can be terminated only in the event of any breach of its terms and conditions after due notice, calling upon the other party to rectify such default or breach and only in the event the other party fails to rectify the default or breach, the aggrieved party is entitled to terminate the MoUs. It is further submitted that the MoUs can be terminated only in the event of any breach of its terms and conditions after due notice, calling upon the other party to rectify such default or breach and only in the event the other party fails to rectify the default or breach, the aggrieved party is entitled to terminate the MoUs. It is submitted that in the present case as there is no allegation of any breach or default on the part of the appellants, it was not open for the respondents to terminate the MoUs unilaterally. 19. Learned counsel for the appellants have relied upon a decision of the apex Court in Transmission Corporation of A.P. Ltd. Vs. Lanco Kondapalli Power (P) Ltd., (2006) 1 S.C.C 540 , in support of its contention that as the appellants have a strong prima facie case with regard to the illegal termination of the MoUs, they are entitled to protection by way of mandatory injunction, for continuance of the MoUs till its expiry. 20. In response, learned counsel for the respondents submits that the Ravenshaw University had entered into two independent MoUs with the appellants on 29.08.2011, to run the aforesaid professional courses on PPP mode. The said MoUs were to remain valid and operative for a period of three years from its execution and therefore, the validity of the MoUs were due to expire on 29.08.2014. It is submitted that the University Grants Commission (‘UGC’ for short) issued public notice dated 27.06.2013, which was subsequently communicated to the Ravenshaw University by way of circular letter dated 23.08.2013, wherein it was clarified that “no University, whether central, state, private or deemed, can offer its programmes through franchising arrangement with private coaching institutions even for the purpose of conducting courses through distance mode”. 21. It is submitted that the Hon’ble Governor of Odisha, who is the Chancellor of the University, vide letter dated 10.04.2014, intimated the Ravenshaw University to take appropriate steps to adhere to the aforesaid directions of the UGC. On receipt of such clarifications/ directions from the UGC and the Hon’ble Chancellor, the Ravenshaw University decided to stop the practice of franchise programme by PPP mode through the appellants and accordingly it was decided not to renew the MoUs further, which were going to expire on 29.08.2014. 22. On receipt of such clarifications/ directions from the UGC and the Hon’ble Chancellor, the Ravenshaw University decided to stop the practice of franchise programme by PPP mode through the appellants and accordingly it was decided not to renew the MoUs further, which were going to expire on 29.08.2014. 22. It is further submitted that the Ravenshaw University has started teaching the 2nd year and 3rd year students, those who had taken admission in the aforesaid professional courses in the year 2012-13 and 2013-14, in view of the directives of the UGC and the Hon’ble Chancellor. It is submitted that in view of the clarifications/directions issued by the UGC, the respondents have no alternative but to discontinue the practice of imparting education in the aforesaid professional courses on PPP mode through the appellants, as otherwise they would be penalized, which may result in disaffiliation of Ravenshaw University and thereby jeopardizing the career of the students of the University. 23. It is submitted by the learned counsel for the respondents that the Ravenshaw University is forced to follow the directives/guidelines issued by the UGC and accordingly, it has already taken steps to engage additional faculty members and staffs for imparting education to the students of the aforesaid professional courses. It is submitted that any interim order of injunction allowing the continuance of the MoUs would adversely affect the interest of the University and the students. 24. It is further submitted that as the MoUs are determinable on the happening of certain events, no injunction can be granted, as per Section 14 of the Specific Relief Act. Further, being a determinable contract, the specific performance of the same is prohibited in law, as per Section 41 of the said Act. It is submitted that whether the termination of the MoUs is valid and justified is a matter to be adjudicated in the arbitration proceeding by the Arbitrator and ultimately if the same is decided in favour of the appellants, they can be adequately compensated. In support of his contentions, learned counsel for the respondents has relied upon two decisions of this Court in M/s Kalinga Mining Corporation and another Vs. M/s Arbind Construction Company Pvt. Ltd. and others, 2007(I) OLR 256 and Smt. Sunita Mohapatra Vs. In support of his contentions, learned counsel for the respondents has relied upon two decisions of this Court in M/s Kalinga Mining Corporation and another Vs. M/s Arbind Construction Company Pvt. Ltd. and others, 2007(I) OLR 256 and Smt. Sunita Mohapatra Vs. Suresh Dhanuka, 2009 (I) OLR 400 , where it has been held that a contract which is determinable in nature, cannot be specifically enforced and no injunction can be granted. 25. In reply, learned counsel for the appellants submits that the plea of the respondents that because of the directions of the UGC the MoUs have been terminated and/or discontinued is erroneous and misconceived, as the same is not applicable to the case of the appellants. It is submitted that the said direction of the UGC is applicable only to off campus franchise programmes conducted by private institution in the name of a University, which is not the case here. 26. The applications filed by the appellants, which have given rise to the instant appeals, were presented under Section 9 of the Act, which enables a party before or during arbitral proceedings or at anytime after the making of the arbitral award but before it is enforced in accordance with Section 36, to apply to a Court, amongst others, for an interim measure or protection in respect of any of the matters enumerated in clauses (a) to (e), one of which is such other interim measure or protection as may appear to the Court to be just and convenient. Section 9 of the Act says that the Court shall have the same power for making orders as it has for the purpose of and in relation to any proceedings before it. Section 9 of the Act says that the Court shall have the same power for making orders as it has for the purpose of and in relation to any proceedings before it. Section 9 of the Act reads as under:- “Interim measures, etc., by Court -A party may, before or during arbitral proceedings or at any time after the making of the arbitral award but before it is enforced in accordance with Section 36, apply to a Court :- (i) for the appointment of a guardian for a minor or a person of unsound mind for the purposes of arbitral proceedings; or (ii) for an interim measure of protection in respect of any of the following matters, namely:- (a) the preservation, interim custody or sale of any goods which are the subject matter of the arbitration agreement; (b) securing the amount in dispute in the arbitration; (c) the detention, preservation or inspection of any property or thing which is the subject matter of the dispute in arbitration, or as to which any question may arise therein and authorizing for any of the aforesaid purposes any person to enter upon any land or building in the possession of any party, or authorizing any samples to be taken or any observation to be made, or experiment to be tried, which may be necessary or expedient for the purpose of obtaining full information or evidence; (d) interim injunction or the appointment of a receiver; (e) such other interim measure of protection as may appear to the Court to be just and convenient, (f) and the Court shall have the same power for making orders as it has for the purpose of, and in relation to, any proceedings before it.” 27. It is true that Section 9 of the Act speaks of the Court by way of an interim measure passing an order for the protection, preservation, interim custody or sale of any goods, which are the subject matter of the arbitration agreement and such interim measure of protection as may appear to the Court to be just and convenient. The power of the Court is very limited under section 9 of the Act. The power of the Court is very limited under section 9 of the Act. The Court cannot enter into the area of dispute raised by the parties as those disputes are to be adjudicated by the Arbitral Tribunal and any opinion expressed by the Court in that regard would be premature and may cause prejudice to the parties during the arbitration proceedings. The only thing that Court can examine is whether interim arrangement till the finalization of the arbitration proceeding is required to be made by way of appointment of receiver or grant of injunction or maintenance of status quo etc. It is well settled that the principle which applies to the grant of temporary injunction under Order 39, Rules 1 and 2, Civil Procedure Code, in a civil proceeding, also applies to a proceeding under section 9 of the Act. Therefore, in order to obtain an interim arrangement under section 9 of the Act, the party seeking the interim arrangement must establish the three essential ingredients, namely, that he has a prima facie case in his favour; that the balance of convenience is in his favour; and that he will suffer irreparable loss if the interim measure prayed for is refused. 28. The effect of breach of a contract by a party seeking to specifically enforce the contract under the Indian law is enshrined in Section 16(c) read with Section 41(e) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963. Clause (e) of Section 41 of the Specific Relief Act provides that injunction cannot be granted to prevent the breach of contract, the performance of which would not be specifically enforced. Section 14 of the said Act enumerates the nature of contracts, which cannot be specifically enforced. Section 14(a) provides that a contract, for the non-performance of which compensation in money is an adequate relief cannot be specifically enforced. Clause (c) to sub-Section (1) of Section 14 says that a contract which is in its nature determinable cannot be specifically enforced. Therefore, if it is found that a contract which by its very nature is determinable, the same not only cannot be enforced but in respect of such a contract no injunction can also be granted for continuance of the same. Therefore, if it is found that a contract which by its very nature is determinable, the same not only cannot be enforced but in respect of such a contract no injunction can also be granted for continuance of the same. To put it in other words, specific performance will not be decreed, if the Court finds either that compensation of money would afford adequate relief, or the contract is one which cannot be specifically enforced as per Section 14(1) of the Specific Relief Act. 29. In Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. Vs. Amritsar Gas Service, 1991 (1) SCC 533 , the Supreme Court had an occasion to consider the terms of agreement of distributorship. The agreement could be terminated in accordance with the terms of the agreement as per Clauses 27 and 28 thereof. The Arbitrator had also held the distributorship to be revocable in accordance with Clauses 27 and 28 of the agreement. The distributorship agreement was held for indefinite period, namely, till the time it was terminated in accordance with the terms contained therein. It was the case of the respondent therein that since the contract had not been terminated in accordance with Clause 27 thereof, under which termination had been made, the firm was entitled to continuance of distributorship in the special circumstances of the case, which contention was upheld by the Arbitrator. Hon’ble Supreme Court held that granting the relief of restoration of the distributorship even on the finding that the breach was committed by the appellant-Corporation is contrary to the mandate in Section 14(1) of the Specific Relief Act and there is apparent error of law and therefore the award cannot be sustained. 30. In Rajasthan Breweries Ltd. v. Stroh Brewery Company, AIR 2000 Delhi 450, a Division Bench of the Delhi High Court, while dealing with a similar question regarding grant of mandatory injunction under Section 9 of the Act, for continuance of the contract, which is determinable in nature, has come to hold as under : “Even in the absence of specific clause authorizing and enabling either party to terminate the agreement in the event of happening of the events specified therein, from the very nature of the agreement, which is private commercial transaction, the same could be terminated even without assigning any reason by serving a reasonable notice. At the most, in case ultimately it is found that termination was bad in law or contrary to the terms of the agreement or of any understanding between the parties or for any other reason, the remedy of the appellants would be to seek compensation for wrongful termination but not a claim for specific performance of the agreements and for that view of the matter learned Single Judge was justified in coming to the conclusion that the appellant had sought for an injunction seeking to specifically enforce the agreement. Such an injunction is statutorily prohibited with respect of a contract, which is determinable in nature. The application being under the provisions of Section 9(ii)(e) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, relief was not granted in view of Section 14(1)(c) read with Section 41 of the Specific Relief Act. It was rightly held that other clauses of Section 9 of the Act shall not apply to the contract, which is otherwise determinable in respect of which the prayer is made specifically to enforce the same.” 31. The apex Court in Percept D’ Mark (India) Pvt.Ltd. Vs. Jaheer Khan and another, (2006)4 SCC 227 , has reiterated and reaffirmed the legal position that in a case of contract for a specific period or in a contract which is terminable on the happening of a particular event, it would be presumed that the contract has come to an end and interim arrangement or injunction would not normally be made after efflux of the period of contract or after happening of the events stipulated. Hon’ble Court has further observed that allowing specific performance of such a contract would amount to granting the whole or entire relief which may be claimed at the conclusion of the trial, which is not permissible in law. 32. In Adhunik Steels Ltd. v. Orissa Manganese and Minerals Pvt. Ltd., AIR 2007 S.C. 2563 , the apex Court was considering the question whether any interim mandatory injunction could be granted under Section 9 of the Act, directing continuance of the working of the contract. 32. In Adhunik Steels Ltd. v. Orissa Manganese and Minerals Pvt. Ltd., AIR 2007 S.C. 2563 , the apex Court was considering the question whether any interim mandatory injunction could be granted under Section 9 of the Act, directing continuance of the working of the contract. The Hon’ble Court, referring to various provisions of the Specific Relief Act has come to hold that the party, who is aggrieved by the termination of the contract, can be adequately compensated for termination of the contract, if he succeeds in the arbitration proceeding and in such a case, the aggrieved party is not entitled to any mandatory injunction, directing continuance of the working of the contract. 33. From the discussions made above, the legal position which emerges is that the scope and ambit of Section 9 of the Act do not envisage the restoration of a contract which has been terminated. The aggrieved party may challenge the validity of such termination by invoking the arbitration clause to claim damages, if any, suffered by him. It is not open for the Court to restore the contract in exercise of its powers under Section 9 of the Act, which is meant only for the purpose of preserving and maintaining the property and/or subject matter of the arbitration from being alienated or frittered away and cannot be used to enforce specific performance of contract as such. 34. If clauses (e) and (h) of Section 41 of the Specific Relief Act are read in juxtaposition with Section 14 of the said Act, then it would become clear that a contract cannot be specifically enforced where for the non-performance of the contract, compensation in money is an adequate relief and the contract is in its nature determinable. It may be reiterated that it is not a violation of every legal right which justifies the grant of an injunction. There must be some equitable ground for interference by injunction, for example:- (a) A necessity of preventing irreparable mischief, or (b) The injury apprehended must be of a character which cannot be adequately compensated by damages, or (c) The injury must be one which must occasion a constantly recurring grievance, which necessitates a preventive remedy in order to put an end to repeated perpetration of wrongs. The principal function of an injunction is to furnish preventive relief against irremediable mischief. The principal function of an injunction is to furnish preventive relief against irremediable mischief. An injury is deemed to be irreparable and the mischief is said to be irremediable, when, having regard to the nature of the act and the circumstances relating to the threatened harm, the apprehended damage cannot be adequately compensated with money. 35. In the present two appeals, it is not disputed that the MoUs are terminable by either parties on the happening of certain events specified therein. The question whether the termination was wrongful or not; the events have happened or not; are matters to be adjudicated in the arbitration proceeding by the Arbitrator. Any opinion expressed by this Court in that regard could prejudice either of the parties in the arbitration proceeding. 36. As regard the determination and/or quantification of the compensation for loss or damage due to the alleged breach of the contract, the terms of the MoUs clearly provides that the appellants shall receive 65% of the course fee for the academic session 2011-2012 and 60% for the subsequent academic session 2012-2013 onwards. Therefore, it is not a case where the damages that may be suffered by the appellants cannot be quantified at a future point of time in terms of money. 37. From the facts detailed above, the appellants may have succeeded in establishing a prima facie case in their favour with regard to the termination and/or discontinuance of the MoUs. However, the balance of convenience is against them, as allowing continuance of the MoUs will amount to granting the whole or the entire relief which may be claimed by the appellants at the conclusion of the arbitration proceeding and in that event, the respondents will be left without any remedy, even if they ultimately succeed. Moreover, any such continuance of the MoUs, allowing the appellants to continue imparting teaching of the aforementioned professional courses on PPP mode at this stage, would not be in the best interest of the students. As regard the irreparable loss to the appellants is concerned, they can be adequately compensated in terms of money, if the termination and/or discontinuance of the MoUs is ultimately found by the Arbitrator to be illegal and invalid. 38. As regard the irreparable loss to the appellants is concerned, they can be adequately compensated in terms of money, if the termination and/or discontinuance of the MoUs is ultimately found by the Arbitrator to be illegal and invalid. 38. For the reasons as aforestated, I do not find any infirmity in the impugned orders of the learned District Judge, Cuttack, declining to grant mandatory injunction, allowing continuance of the MoUs in favour of the appellants. 39. The appeals being devoid of merits, the same are accordingly dismissed. No costs.