Judgment Arindam Sinha, J. This application under Article 227 of the Constitution of India is directed against Order no.76 dated 13th August, 2013 made by the court of 2nd Civil Judge (Senior Division) at Contai in Title Appeal Case no.46 of 2007 whereby the petitioners/appellants’ applications dated 26th May, 2010 and 24th February, 2011 under Order 41 rule 27 of the Code of Civil Procedure were held not maintainable and, therefore, rejected at that stage. It appears from the record the petitioners/plaintiffs had filed a suit for declaration and injunction against the opposite parties/defendants claiming the suit property came to them from Baroda, the widow of Aghar who were childless. The petitioners claimed that upon the death of Aghar, Baroda came to be the owner of the property and transferred it to her brother Phani Bhusan who in turn sold it to the petitioner/plaintiff no.1. Baroda had also by further deeds transferred the property to the petitioners/plaintiffs. The opposite party/defendant no.1 contested the suit by filing written statement claiming to be the adoptive son of Aghar. In the written statement of the said opposite party the deeds by which Baroda had transferred the suit property to the petitioners were disputed. The suit was initially decreed in favour of the petitioners but on appeal therefrom the judgment and decree was set aside with a direction upon the learned Trial Court to give opportunity to the petitioners to mark documents as exhibits after deciding objection, if any, and also to adduce evidence as observed by the learned Appellate Court in its judgment, hear argument fresh and decide as earliest possible. The suit was heard once again on remand and this time the learned Trial Court by judgment dated 31st July, 2003 dismissed the suit on contest. The learned Trial Court held, inter alia, the petitioners in their plaint had not disclosed that a constituted attorney of Baroda had executed the deeds in favour of the petitioners. When the deeds were challenged by the opposite party/defendant no.1 as manufactured, forged, fictitious, void, etc. the Power of Attorney was not produced for inspection and inquiry by the court. The petitioners preferred an appeal in which they made their applications for production of additional evidence before the learned Appellate Court below. The concerned Power of Attorney was disclosed in such applications. the Power of Attorney was not produced for inspection and inquiry by the court. The petitioners preferred an appeal in which they made their applications for production of additional evidence before the learned Appellate Court below. The concerned Power of Attorney was disclosed in such applications. Authorities were cited before the said Court regarding the power of the Appellate Court to allow production of additional evidence as well as on the proposition that lacuna existing in the case of a party at trial cannot be filled up in appeal. Mr. S.P. Roychowdhury, learned Senior Advocate appearing on behalf of the petitioners relied on the decisions reported in AIR 1963 Supreme Court 1526 (K. Venkataramiah Vs. A. Seetharama Reddy & Ors.) and AIR 1986 Calcutta 403 (M/s Hindusthan Petroleum Corporation Ltd. Vs. M/s R.P. Agarwalla & Brothers Pvt. Ltd.) to submit the Appellate Court has the power to allow additional evidence not only if it requires such evidence to enable it to pronounce judgment but also for any other substantial cause. Mr. Nirmal Kr. De, learned Advocate appearing on behalf of the opposite party defendant no.1 submitted on the other hand that the attempt on the part of the petitioners to adduce additional evidence in appeal was made to fill up lacuna created by their omission to produce the alleged Power of Attorney before the learned Trial Court in the absence of which the said Court had lawfully drawn an adverse presumption. Furthermore, according to him, the petitioners were seeking to produce a document as evidence which was not pleaded and in any event, deliberately withheld by them twice in the trial of the suit. On perusal of the impugned order it does appear to this court that the learned Appellate Court below simply recorded the submissions of the parties to hold that the applications under Order 41 rule 27 of the Code filed by the petitioners were not maintainable and, therefore, both the applications were considered and rejected at that stage, fixing the next date for hearing of the appeal. The procedure adopted by the learned Appellate Court below cannot be faulted since it is only at the time of hearing of the appeal that any question regarding the necessity of production of additional evidence, whether to enable the learned Appellate Court to pronounce judgment or for any other substantial cause, can be considered. The procedure adopted by the learned Appellate Court below cannot be faulted since it is only at the time of hearing of the appeal that any question regarding the necessity of production of additional evidence, whether to enable the learned Appellate Court to pronounce judgment or for any other substantial cause, can be considered. The applications made by the petitioners had not been rejected outright and it is clearly implied from the impugned order that they are likely to be considered, if the occasion arises on the learned Appellate Court in hearing the appeal, finding, additional evidence is required. In view of the aforesaid the impugned order does not require any interference. In the hearing of the appeal the learned Appellate Court, if the question whether additional evidence is required arises, may consider either whether the petitioners have been able to establish that notwithstanding exercise of due diligence, additional evidence which they seek to produce by their applications was not within their knowledge or the said court requires those documents to be produced or any witness to be examined to enable it to pronounce judgment or for any other substantial cause. The opposite party/defendant no.1 of course in that event would be entitled to raise their objections and be heard. The application is disposed of.