JUDGMENT : MANSOOR AHMAD MIR, J. 1. This judgment will lift the veil of the civil suit, which was instituted by plaintiff Shri Chiragu Deen on 15th December, 1988, and came to be decreed by the Sub Judge 1st Class, Shimla, District Shimla (hereinafter referred to as "the trial Court") vide judgment and decree, dated 24th February, 1995. Defendant No. 1Shri Ranjeet Khanna, feeling aggrieved, questioned the same before the Additional District Judge, Shimla (hereinafter referred to as "the First Appellate Court") by the medium of Civil Appeal in terms of the mandate of Section 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure (hereinafter referred to as "CPC"), was dismissed vide judgment and dated 11th January, 2001, confirmed the findings recorded by the trial Court. 2. Defendant No. 1 Appellant has invoked the jurisdiction of this Court in terms of Section 100 of the CPC, i.e. Civil Second Appeal, which is on the Board of this Court right from 27th April, 2001. Notice was issued to the respondents and operation of the impugned judgment and decree was stayed. The appellant-defendant No. 1 has questioned the judgments and decrees passed by both the Courts below on the grounds taken in the memo of Second Appeal. 3. Precisely, the case of the appellant-defendant No. 1 put forth in the memo of Civil Second Appeal is that the application for amendment filed by him was rejected by the First Appellate Court illegally and mechanically, that too on the ground of delay. Further contended that the trial Court as well as the First Appellate Court has also wrongly relied upon the report of the Commissioner. It has been further contended by the appellant that he had moved an application under Order 26 Rule 10 CPC read with Order 41 Rule 27 and Section 151 CPC before the First Appellate Court for summoning the Commissioner and permitting the appellant-defendant No. 1 to cross-examine him, which was rejected. It is also averred that both the Courts below have discussed the evidence erroneously and based the findings on report of the Commissioner, which is inadmissible. The demarcation conducted by the Commissioner was not in accordance with law, thus, both the judgments suffer from non-application of mind, are perverse. The appellant defendant No. 1 has also annexed separately the memo of substantial questions of law, which contains eight substantial questions of law. The demarcation conducted by the Commissioner was not in accordance with law, thus, both the judgments suffer from non-application of mind, are perverse. The appellant defendant No. 1 has also annexed separately the memo of substantial questions of law, which contains eight substantial questions of law. This Court, while hearing the learned counsel for the parties, admitted the appeal and framed the following three substantial questions of law vide order, dated 3rd August, 2001: "1. Whether the lower appellate court has wrongly rejected the application for amendment of the written statement filed by the defendant-appellant" 2. Whether the lower appellate court has wrongly rejected the application made under Order 26 Rule 10 read with Order 41 Rule 27, of the Code of Civil Procedure" 3. Whether the defendant-appellant is entitled to protection under Section 60 of the Easement Act" 4. This file has remained on dockets of this Court for the last more than thirteen years and came up for consideration before this Bench on 7th March, 2014 and following additional substantial question of law was framed in terms of the proviso to Section 100 CPC and the parties were directed to argue on the said substantial question of law also: "4. Whether the findings recorded by the trial Court and the First Appellate Court are perverse?" 5. I have heard learned counsel for the parties at length. 6. It is profitable to give brief resume of the case of the plaintiff-respondent No. 1 before it is held whether any substantial question of law is involved and whether the interference is required. 7. The plaintiff-respondent No. 1 had filed a suit for permanent injunction and mandatory injunction with the prayer that the defendant No. 1 appellant be restrained from causing interference with the possession of the plaintiff-respondent No.1 over the land falling in khasra No. 102/E, measuring 20229 sq. yards situated at Station Ward Chhota Shimla (hereinafter referred to as "the suit land") owned by defendant No. 2 Punjab Wakf Board. 8. Precisely, the case of the plaintiff-respondent No. 1 was that he was inducted as a tenant by Punjab Wakf Board defendant No. 2 on the suit land on the rent of Rs. 75/per month with effect from 1st July, 1983 and was in peaceful possession of the same till filing of the suit. 8. Precisely, the case of the plaintiff-respondent No. 1 was that he was inducted as a tenant by Punjab Wakf Board defendant No. 2 on the suit land on the rent of Rs. 75/per month with effect from 1st July, 1983 and was in peaceful possession of the same till filing of the suit. Being a Government employee, he was performing his duties at Primary School Bramu, Tehsil Kotkhai, District Shimla and was oftenly remaining out of station. On 8th December, 1988, when he came to Shimla, he noticed that appellant-defendant No. 1 was collecting material to raise construction on the said land without any right, title or interest and on enquiry, the appellant-defendant No. 1 threatened respondent No. 1 plaintiff, constraining him to file a suit. 9. On the pleadings of the parties, seven issues were framed by the trial Court. 10. After framing of the issues, the plaintiff-respondent No. 1 moved an application under Order 26 Rule 9 CPC for appointment of Local Commissioner to demarcate the suit land. The defendants, i.e. appellant and respondent No. 2, resisted the said application by way of filing objections to the same. In the meantime, another application under Order 6 Rule 17 CPC seeking amendment of the plaint on the ground that during the pendency of the suit, the appellant-defendant No. 1 had constructed a shed over a portion of suit land, was allowed by the trial Court vide order, dated 15th March, 1990. Two additional issues were framed on 14th September, 1990. 11. The application for appointment of Local Commissioner was also granted vide order, dated 14th September, 1990 and the Tehsildar (Settlement) was appointed as Local Commissioner, who carried out the demarcation of the suit land and submitted the report before the trial Court on 16th December, 1990. The parties were asked to file objections, if any, to the said report, but none of the parties have raised their finger(s) and even chose not to file objections, vide order, dated 8th May, 1991. 12. It is apt to reproduce the relevant portion of order, dated 8th May, 1991 herein: "No objection on L.C. report intended to be filed by defendant. Hence, the case is fixed for evidence of plaintiff for 19.6.91. the list of PWs , PF, DM etc. be filed within 7 days." 13. 12. It is apt to reproduce the relevant portion of order, dated 8th May, 1991 herein: "No objection on L.C. report intended to be filed by defendant. Hence, the case is fixed for evidence of plaintiff for 19.6.91. the list of PWs , PF, DM etc. be filed within 7 days." 13. On noticing the report of the Commissioner, the plaintiff-respondent No. 1 moved another application for amendment in terms of Order 6 Rule 17 CPC, which was granted vide order, dated 4th August, 1992, though strongly resisted by the defendants-respondents therein. Thereafter, two other additional issues were framed by the trial Court on 6th January, 1993. 14. Thus, the following issues were framed by the trial Court vide orders, dated 12th July, 1989; 14th September, 1990 and 6th January, 1993: "1. Whether the plaintiff is possession of the suit land as a tenant on payment of rent? OPP 2. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to the relief of permanent injunction as prayed? OPP 3. Whether the suit is not maintainable? OPD 4. Whether the plaintiff has no cause of action? OPD 5. Whether the plaintiff is estopped to file the present suit due to his own act and conduct as alleged? OPD 6. Whether the plaintiff has no locus standi to file present suit? OPD 7. Whether the defendant has constructed a shed on a portion of suit land. If so, what is extent of encroachment? OPD 8. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to the relief of mandatory injunction? OPP 8A. Whether the land allotted to the plaintiff and defendant No. 1 by the defendant No. 2 is the same, if so whether the plaintiff is entitled to remain in possession of the said land? OPP 8B. Whether the allotment of suit land in favour of the defendant No. 1 by defendant No. 2 is void as alleged? OPP 9. Relief." 15. The parties led evidence and after scanning the evidence and hearing the learned counsel for the parties, the trial Court decreed the suit. OPP 8B. Whether the allotment of suit land in favour of the defendant No. 1 by defendant No. 2 is void as alleged? OPP 9. Relief." 15. The parties led evidence and after scanning the evidence and hearing the learned counsel for the parties, the trial Court decreed the suit. It appears that the trial Court, while scanning the evidence of both the parties and while taking note of the report of the Commissioner, came to the conclusion that the suit land was given on rent to the plaintiff-respondent No. 1 by defendant No. 2 respondent No. 2 and held that the plaintiff-respondent No. 1 has proved that he was in possession of the suit land, has a legal right over the same and accordingly, decided issue No. 1 in favour of the plaintiff-respondent No. 1. 16. The trial Court has rightly decided issues No. 3 to 6 because the appellant-defendant No. 1 had failed to prove all the said issues. Even otherwise, all these issues are not subject matter of Civil Second Appeal and no substantial question of law on these issues was either taken in the memo of appeal or framed by this Court. 17. Issues No. 1, 8A and 8B are interlinked and there is ample evidence on the file and also concurrent findings of fact by the trial Court and the First Appellate Court that the suit land was rented out to the plaintiff and he had a right over the same; defendant No. 1 appellant had no right or interest whatsoever over the said land and the allotment by defendant No. 2 Punjab Wakf Board in favour of defendant No. 1 appellant was illegal. 18. There is also concurrent finding of fact that despite exparte restraint order made by the trial Court, vide order dated 16th December, 1988, defendant No. 1 appellant has committed breach and tried to raise some construction, constraining the plaintiff-respondent No. 1 to seek amendment, which was granted on 15th March, 1990. Thereafter, after noticing the report of the Commissioner, i.e. Tehsildar (Settlement), the plaintiff-respondent No. 1 had filed another application for amendment, which was granted vide order, dated 4th August, 1992. The appellant-defendant No. 1 has not questioned the said orders before the trial Court, First Appellate Court or before this Court. 19. Thereafter, after noticing the report of the Commissioner, i.e. Tehsildar (Settlement), the plaintiff-respondent No. 1 had filed another application for amendment, which was granted vide order, dated 4th August, 1992. The appellant-defendant No. 1 has not questioned the said orders before the trial Court, First Appellate Court or before this Court. 19. It is profitable to record herein that defendant No. 1 appellant had made an application for grant of amendment before the First Appellate Court, which was rejected on the ground that the said application has been filed at a belated stage, came to be rightly rejected in view of the judgments of the Apex Court in cases titled as S. Malla Reddy v. M/s. Future Builders Cooperative Housing Society and Ors., reported in 2013 AIR SCW 2405 : AIR 2013 SC 3693 and Mashyak Grihnirman Sahakari Sanstha Maryadit v. Usman Habib Dhuka & Ors., reported in 2013 AIR SCW 3430 : AIR 2013 SC 3158. 20. The amendment sought by the appellant-defendant No. 1 was that defendant No. 2 Punjab Wakf Board be directed to allot another piece of land out of khasra No. 102 to the plaintiff-respondent No. 1 and the suit be dismissed in view of the provisions of Section 81 of the Wakf Act. 21. While going through the contents of the said application, it appears that the defendant No. 1 appellant has accepted the contention and right of the plaintiff-respondent No. 1 over the suit land. The plea that the notice in terms of Section 81 of the Wakf Act was not served upon defendant No. 2 Punjab Wakf Board, was not taken by the defendants before the trial Court. 22. Defendant No. 2 respondent No. 2 has not questioned the impugned judgments, but has accepted the same. Learned counsel for respondent No. 2 defendant No. 2 has also not raised the issue of the said notice while addressing the arguments, but has supported the impugned judgments. 23. Rejection of application under Order 6 Rule 17 CPC on the ground that it is belated was a question of facts, cannot be gone into in the second appeal unless it is indicated that order is perverse. 24. The appellant-defendant No. 1 has moved another application under Order 26 Rule 10 CPC read with Order 41 Rule 27 and Section 151 CPC before the First Appellate Court that the Commissioner be called for cross-examination. 24. The appellant-defendant No. 1 has moved another application under Order 26 Rule 10 CPC read with Order 41 Rule 27 and Section 151 CPC before the First Appellate Court that the Commissioner be called for cross-examination. That application was also rejected by the First Appellate Court on the ground that he has not raised any objection to the report submitted by the Commissioner despite the fact that the trial Court has granted various opportunities to the parties to file objections to the said report, but the parties failed to avail the same and virtually accepted the report, as discussed hereinabove, thus could not be pressed into service before the First Appellate Court, that too, after a long delay. 25. The Apex Court has laid down the same proposition of law in the case titled as Haryana State Industrial Development Corporation v. M/s. Cork Manufacturing Co., reported in 2007 AIR SCW 6084 : AIR 2008 SC 56 It is apt to reproduce relevant portion of para 17 herein: "17. ..In any view of the matter, Order 41 Rule 27 of the CPC also does not empower an appellate court to accept additional evidence on the ground that such evidence could not be produced or filed either before the trial court or before the first appellate court due to inadvertence or lack of proper legal advice. Mr. Mohan, learned Additional Solicitor General however sought to argue that the pleadings made in the application for acceptance of additional evidence would come within the meaning of "substantial cause" under Order 41 Rule 27 (1)(b) of the CPC which would require the appellate court to accept the legal notice in order to pronounce its judgment. We are unable to accept this submission of Mr. Mohan. In our view, lack of proper legal advice or inadvertence to produce the legal notice in evidence is not a ground to hold that there was substantial cause for acceptance of the additional evidence. Mr. Mohan, Learned Additional Solicitor General further sought to argue that the importance of the legal notice was not realised and it was due to inadvertence and lack of proper legal advice that the same could not be produced before the courts below. Mr. Mohan, Learned Additional Solicitor General further sought to argue that the importance of the legal notice was not realised and it was due to inadvertence and lack of proper legal advice that the same could not be produced before the courts below. In our view, we do not think that non realisation of the importance of the documents due to inadvertence or lack of proper legal advice as noted hereinabove also would bring the case within the expression "other substantial cause" in Order 41 Rule 27 of the CPC" 26. The orders qua applications for leave to amend, leading secondary evidence and summoning the Commissioner are discretionary orders, cannot be ground for second appeal unless it is shown that discretion has not been exercised in judicial manner and in accordance with the legal principles. 27. The appellant-defendant No. 1 has also taken other grounds, i.e. perversity and erroneous findings, and has tried to carve out a case for interference. 28. The main ground projected by the appellant-defendant No. 1 is that the question of identification of land was involved and should not have been decided by the trial Court in terms of the report of the Commissioner, that too without examining him and without proving the contents of the report of the Commissioner, is an afterthought and not legally tenable in view of the conduct of the defendant No. 1 appellant before the trial Court. 29. The appellant-defendant No. 1 has not made an effort to call the Commissioner as a witness and to throw challenge to the said report before the trial Court. It appears that he came out of the deep slumber after more than ten years when application was moved before the First Appellate Court. 30. While going through Order 26 Rule 10 CPC, one comes to inescapable conclusion that the Commissioner's report is a part of evidence, is admissible and can be relied upon while discussing the other evidence, in the given circumstances of the case. 31. The Andhra Pradesh High Court in the case titled as Vemusetti Appayyamma v. Lakshman Sahu, reported in AIR 1973 Andhra Pradesh 168, laid down the same proposition. It is apt to reproduce para 6 of the judgment herein: "6. The learned counsel for the appellant however, objects to the Commissioner's report being accepted and acted upon without its being marked and without the Commissioner being examined. It is apt to reproduce para 6 of the judgment herein: "6. The learned counsel for the appellant however, objects to the Commissioner's report being accepted and acted upon without its being marked and without the Commissioner being examined. But when the Court appoints a Commissioner under Order 26, Rule 9 , Civil Procedure Code for making a local inspection and to submit a report, the Commissioner is given the discretion to make a local inspection and record evidence if necessary and submit a report together with such evidence as he thinks fit. Under sub-rule (2) of Rule 10 Order 26, C.P.C., the report of the Commissioner and the evidence taken by him form part of the record. When the Rule lays down that it forms part of the record irrespective of whether it is marked or not, the Court is bound to take that evidence into consideration. The failure to mark it as a document on behalf of the parties does not exclude it from the record. Sub-rule (2), however, lays down that either the Court or any of the parties may examine the Commissioner but if the Commissioner is not examined, the report submitted by him does not cease to form part of the record. It is nowhere laid down that unless the Commissioner is examined and through him his report is marked as an exhibit, the report of the Commissioner cannot be acted upon. That being so, the lower Appellate Court was right in considering the Commissioner's report and in accepting the defendant's evidence and rejecting that of the plaintiff's witnesses in the light of that. The finding whether the plaintiff is in possession of the plaint schedule site or not is a finding of fact which is supported by the evidence on record and is binding on this Court in Second Appeal." 32. The same question came up for consideration before Patna High Court in the year 1962 in the case titled as Ramautar Gope and others v. Sheonandan Mistri and others, reported in AIR 1962 Patna 273 and it was held that the fact that the Local Commissioner has not been examined at the trial cannot, in law, make his report inadmissible in evidence. It is apt to reproduce para 4 of the judgment herein: " (4). Then comes the criticism against the report of the Commissioner. It is apt to reproduce para 4 of the judgment herein: " (4). Then comes the criticism against the report of the Commissioner. It appears that at the trial, the Court had appointed a commissioner for measuring the land in dispute, and, in pursuance of that order, the commissioner had submitted a report. T hat report in law is obviously admissible, and, in fact, forms part of the case, as provided in Rule 10 (2) of Order 26 of the Code of Civil Procedure. It is, however, stated by Mr. Chatterji that though an application had been filed on behalf of the appellants to examine that commissioner as a witness in the case in support of the objections raised on their behalf, he was ultimately not examined as by the time the case was taken up for trial, he was dead. In my opinion, the fact that the commissioner was not examined at the trial cannot, in law, make his report inadmissible in evidence. Secondly, no such objection was raised against the report of the commissioner either at the trial or in the lower appellate Court. On the contrary, it appears, as stated by the lower appellate Court, that on the 10th July, 1958, the lawyers of both the parties prayed before the trial Court that the report of the commissioner should be considered at the time of the hearing of the suit along with other evidence on the record. Therefore, in my opinion, it is too belated on the part of the appellants to submit now that simple because the commissioner could not be examined at the trial due to his death, his report should not have been admitted in evidence. Thus the second point also fails." 33. The objection to the report submitted by the Commissioner has been raised later in point of time, which was rightly rejected by the First Appellate Court. Case with similar facts came up for consideration before the Kerala High Court in State of Kerala v. Kottammal Mammeeriyakutty and others, reported in AIR 1985 Kerala 109. It is apt to reproduce para 5 of the judgment herein: "5. Case with similar facts came up for consideration before the Kerala High Court in State of Kerala v. Kottammal Mammeeriyakutty and others, reported in AIR 1985 Kerala 109. It is apt to reproduce para 5 of the judgment herein: "5. The Advocate General then contended that, if, for the reason that the Engineer who was the author of the valuation statement was not examined in court, the court below was not prepared to accept the valuation made by him, for the same reason the valuation found in Exts. X1 and Ext. X2 reports made by the Commissioner who also was not examined in court, ought not to have been accepted by the court below. This submission, in our view, overlooks the provisions of Order 26 R. 10 C.P.C. Sub-rule (2) of Rule 10 Order 26 reads as follows: "Report and depositions to be evidence in suit Commissioner may be examined in person the report of the Commissioner and the evidence taken by him (but not the evidence without the report) shall be evidence in the suit and shall form part of the records; but the Court or, with the permission of the Court, any of the parties to the suit may examine the Commissioner personally in open Court touching any of the matters referred to him or mentioned in his report, or as to his report or as to the manner in which he has made the investigation." There could be no doubt that the court below was perfectly justified in placing reliance on the materials found in Exts. X1 and X2, which formed part of the records, and which is evidence in the case. Of course, if the opposite side had any objection to any of the matters mentioned in the reports, or the manner in which he (the Commissioner) made the investigation, what that party ought to have done was to have the Commissioner examined with the leave of the court and elicit such information as it required. Not having been chosen to do that, the appellant State could not at this distance of time make a submission that the court below ought not to have relied on Exts. X1 and X2 reports submitted by the Commissioner which, as already noticed, would be evidence in the case, and would form part of the record in the case." 34. Not having been chosen to do that, the appellant State could not at this distance of time make a submission that the court below ought not to have relied on Exts. X1 and X2 reports submitted by the Commissioner which, as already noticed, would be evidence in the case, and would form part of the record in the case." 34. The Privy Council in the year 1940 has laid down the same proposition in the case titled as Chandan Mull Indra Kumar and others v. Chiman Lal Girdhar Das Parekh and another, reported in AIR 1940 Privy Council 3. 35. The Apex Court in the cases titled as Shreepat v. Rajendra Prasad & Ors., reported in JT 2000 (7) SC 379; Subhaga & Ors. v. Shobha & Ors., reported in 2006 AIR SCW 4855 and Haryana Waqf Board v. Shanti Sarup & Ors., reported in AIR 2008 SC (Supp) 616 laid down the same proposition. It is apt to reproduce para 6 of the judgment in Subhaga's case (supra) herein: "6. The High Court has also upheld the title claimed by the plaintiff over the plot, Plot No. 1301/1 Ba. Once we accept the identification made by the Commissioner as was done by the first appellate court, it is clear that the plaintiff has the right to have the disputed construction removed and the well filled up. That a property can be identified either by boundary or by any other specific description is well established. Here the attempt had been to identify the suit property with reference to the boundaries and the Commissioner has identified that property with reference to such boundaries. Even if there was any discrepancy, normally, the boundaries should prevail. There was no occasion to spin a theory that it was necessary in this suit to survey all the adjacent lands to find out whether an encroachment was made in the land belonging to the plaintiff. In this situation, we are satisfied that the judgment and decree of the High Court calls for interference. We are also satisfied that the lower appellate court was justified in affirming the decree granted in favour of the plaintiff on the pleadings and the evidence in the case." 36. According to the learned counsel for the appellant-defendant No. 1, it is a erroneous finding. We are also satisfied that the lower appellate court was justified in affirming the decree granted in favour of the plaintiff on the pleadings and the evidence in the case." 36. According to the learned counsel for the appellant-defendant No. 1, it is a erroneous finding. Firstly, the argument is devoid of any force and secondly, even if it can be said to be an erroneous finding, no interference is required in second appeal in view of the law laid down by the Apex Court in the cases titled as The State of U.P. v. Ram Chandra Trivedi, reported in AIR 1976 Supreme Court 2547 and Deity Pattabhiramaswamy v. S. Hanymayya and others, reported in AIR 1959 Supreme Court 57. It is profitable to reproduce relevant portion of para 13 of the judgment in Deity Pattabhiramaswamy's case (supra) herein: "13. ....................... Nor does the fact that the finding of the first appellate Court is based upon some documentary evidence make it any the less a finding of fact (See ILR 11 Lah 199: (AIR1930 PC 91). But, notwithstanding such clear & authoritative pronouncements on the scope of the provisions of Section 100, Civil Procedure Code, some learned Judges of the High Courts are disposing of Second Appeals as if they were first appeals. This introduces, apart from the fact that the High Court assumes & exercises a jurisdiction which it does not possess, a gambling element in the litigation & confusion in the mind of the litigant public. This case affords a typical illustration of such interference by a Judge of the High Court in excess of his jurisdiction under S. 100, Civil Procedure Code. We have, therefore, no alternative but to set aside the decree of the High Court on the simple ground that the learned Judge of the High Court had no jurisdiction to interfere in second appeal with the findings of fact given by the first appellate Court based upon an appreciation of the relevant evidence. In the result, the decree of the High Court is set aside and the appeal is allowed with costs throughout." 37. The trial Court as well as the First Appellate Court has also held that the plaintiff-respondent No. 1 was allotted the plot as a tenant on rental basis and thus, is a question of fact and cannot be ground for interference in Second Appeal. 38. The trial Court as well as the First Appellate Court has also held that the plaintiff-respondent No. 1 was allotted the plot as a tenant on rental basis and thus, is a question of fact and cannot be ground for interference in Second Appeal. 38. The Lahore High Court in the case titled as Karam Chand v. Amar Nath Mohsan, reported in AIR 1933 Lahore 377, held that a finding of fact cannot be interfered with in second appeal. The same view was taken by the Privy Council in the case titled as H.A. Morine v. London Loan Assets, Ltd. and others, reported in AIR 1934 Privy Council 127. 39. The Apex Court in a case titled Municipal Committee, Hoshiarpur v. Punjab State Electricity Board and others, reported in (2010) 13 Supreme Court Cases 216 : 2010 AIR SCW 7020, held that the Court cannot entertain second appeal unless a substantial question of law is involved, as the second appeal does not lie on the ground of erroneous findings of facts based on an appreciation of the relevant evidence. It is apt to reproduce para 16 the judgment herein: "16. Thus, it is evident from the above that the right to appeal is a creation of statute and it cannot be created by acquiescence of the parties or by the order of the court. Jurisdiction cannot be conferred by mere acceptance, acquiescence, consent or by any other means as it can be conferred only by the legislature and conferring a court or authority with jurisdiction, is a legislative function. Thus, being a substantive statutory right, it has to be regulated in accordance with the law in force, ensuring full compliance with the conditions mentioned in the provision that creates it. Therefore, the Court has no power to enlarge the scope of those grounds mentioned in the statutory provisions. A second appeal cannot be decided merely on equitable grounds as it lies only on a substantial question of law, which is something distinct from a substantial question of fact. The court cannot entertain a second appeal unless a substantial question of law is involved, as the second appeal does not lie on the ground of erroneous finding of fact based on an appreciation of the relevant evidence. The court cannot entertain a second appeal unless a substantial question of law is involved, as the second appeal does not lie on the ground of erroneous finding of fact based on an appreciation of the relevant evidence. The existence of a substantial question of law is a condition precedent for entertaining the second appeal; on failure to do so, the judgment cannot be maintained. The existence of a substantial question of law is a sine qua non for the exercise of jurisdiction under the provisions of Section 100 CPC. It is the obligation on the court to further clear the intent of the legislator and not to frustrate it by ignoring the same." 40. The Apex Court in the cases titled as Kshitish Chandra Bose v. Commissioner of Ranchi, reported in (1981) 2 Supreme Court Cases 103 : AIR 1981 SC 707 , Gurdev Kaur & Ors. v. Kaki & Ors., reported in 2006 AIR SCW 2404 : AIR 2006 SC 1975 and M. Nadar Kesavan Nadar v. Narayanan Nadar Kunjan Nadar, reported in (2000) 10 Supreme Court Cases 244, laid down the same principle. 41. Having said so, I am of the considered view that both the Courts below have passed well reasoned judgments, need no interference, cannot be said to be erroneous or perverse in any way and no substantial question of law is involved. 42. Viewed thus, the impugned judgments and decrees are upheld and the appeal is dismissed alongwith all pending applications.