JUDGMENT : V. NATH, J.:–Heard Mr. J.S. Arora, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the defendant-appellants and Mr. A.B. Ojha, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the plaintiff-respondents. 2. This second appeal has been filed assailing the judgment and decree passed by the appellate court below affirming the decree in the suit in favour of the plaintiff-respondents. 3. The plaintiffs instituted the T.S. No. 56 of 1994 praying for the relief of declaration of their title over the suit land described in schedule-Ka of the plaint and further for confirmation of their possession over the same and in alternative for recovery of possession if dispossessed during the pendency of the suit. Later on, by amendment in the plaint, the plaintiffs added the fact of their dispossession from the suit land by the defendants during the pendency of the suit. The consequential relief of permanent injunction restraining the defendants from interfering in peaceful possession of the plaintiffs over the suit land has also been prayed. 4. The facts are not in dispute between the parties that the plaintiffs were the title holders of the land described in schedule-Ka of the plaint and similarly the defendants were also title holders of the lands described in schedule-Kha of the plaint. The total area of land in schedule-Ka is 0.78 acres of village Dehri, P.S. Dinara, District-Rohtas. The total area of land described in schedule-Kha is also 0.78 acres out of which 10 decimal is situated in village-Dehri, P.S. Dinara, District-Rohtas and the remaining 68 decimals is situated in village-Agrerkhurd, P.S. Dawat, District-Rohtas. It is also admitted case between the parties that they agreed to exchange the aforesaid lands described in schedule-Ka and Kha in between them and two deeds of exchange dated 07.03.1987 have been executed and registered. By registered deed of exchange dated 07.03.1987, adduced in evidence as Ext. 2/a, the plaintiffs exchanged the schedule-Ka land described in the plaint with the defendants and similarly by registered deed of exchange dated 07.03.1987, adduced in evidence as Ext. 2 and also Ext. B, the defendants transferred their land mentioned in schedule-Kha of the plaint to the plaintiffs. 5. By registered deed of exchange dated 07.03.1987, adduced in evidence as Ext. 2/a, the plaintiffs exchanged the schedule-Ka land described in the plaint with the defendants and similarly by registered deed of exchange dated 07.03.1987, adduced in evidence as Ext. 2 and also Ext. B, the defendants transferred their land mentioned in schedule-Kha of the plaint to the plaintiffs. 5. The plaintiffs have asserted in the plaint that though the deeds of exchange were executed and registered by the parties but there was an agreement between them that the transaction of exchange would be deemed to have been cancelled if any of the parties would fail to acquire title and possession over the land given to them in exchange and in that case both the parties would be relegated to their original position over their respective lands. It was further case of the plaintiffs that both the parties agreed that the possession would be taken by the respective parties over their exchanged lands only after the possession over the Chak of the land in village-Agrerkhurd would be delivered by the Consolidation Department. It was however the case of the plaintiffs that no consolidation proceeding was initiated on 07.03.1987 with regard to the lands in village-Dehri but the consolidation proceeding was going on with regard to the lands in village-Agrerkhurd and there was thus statutory requirement to obtain permission before transfer of land in that village. The plaintiffs have alleged that the defendants by playing fraud on the plaintiffs got the exchange deed 07.03.1987 executed without obtaining the required permission from the consolidation officer and have further also alleged that the contents of the deed of exchange were never read over and explained to the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs’ further case is that they could not come in possession over the lands given to them in exchange as no possession was delivered over the newly formed Chaks by the Consolidation Department in village Agrer Khurd and similarly the defendants also could not get possession over the land transferred to them through exchange by the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs have thus asserted that the deeds of exchange have not been acted upon but the defendants dispossessed the plaintiffs from the suit land (schedule-Ka) on 25.07.1994. The plaintiffs have thus asserted that the deeds of exchange have not been acted upon but the defendants dispossessed the plaintiffs from the suit land (schedule-Ka) on 25.07.1994. The plaintiffs have however also stated that they have come to know 5-7 days before filing of the suit that the defendants have got their name mutated over the suit land (schedule-Ka) and have been paying rent and getting the rent receipts. 6. The defendants appeared in the suit and contested the case of the plaintiffs asserting their title and possession over schedule-Ka land of the plaint on the basis of the exchange deed executed in their favour by the plaintiffs. The defendants have specifically denied the agreement with the plaintiffs to the effect that the deeds of exchange would not come into operation until the possession over Chak was delivered by the Consolidation Department for the land in village-Agrerkhurd. They have also specifically denied the agreement that the deeds of exchange would automatically stand cancelled if no such possession was delivered. The defendants have asserted the valid execution and registration of the two deeds of exchange respectively after full deliberation and have further asserted that they have been, accordingly, put in possession of the suit land and are continuing in possession over the same. The case of the defendants thus is that the deeds of exchange have been fully operative and acted upon and the plaintiffs and defendants have acquired valid title and possession on that basis over the respective lands received by them through exchange. 7. Both the courts below have come to the concurrent finding that the deeds of exchange have not been acted upon and no valid title and possession have been acquired by the defendants over the schedule-Ka land of the plaintiffs in the suit. It has also been held that the exchange deed (Ext. 2) executed by the defendants was void for want of sanction from the consolidation authorities. Both the courts below have further also concluded that the suit was not barred by limitation as the deeds of exchange remained ineffective, were void and also not acted upon. The suit has therefore been decreed and the appeal thereafter has been dismissed by the impugned judgment and decree. 8. Both the courts below have further also concluded that the suit was not barred by limitation as the deeds of exchange remained ineffective, were void and also not acted upon. The suit has therefore been decreed and the appeal thereafter has been dismissed by the impugned judgment and decree. 8. This appeal has been admitted for hearing on the following substantial questions of law:— (1) Whether the want of permission from the consolidation authorities under Section 5 of the Bihar Consolidation of Holdings and Prevention of Fragmentation Act, will make the document void only qua the consolidation proceeding and not inter-partes and thus even if there is no permission as required, the document will retain its validity between the parties? (2) Whether when admittedly the deeds of exchange have been executed by the plaintiff and the defendant respectively with regard to their lands by executing registered documents in that regard, those documents prima facie will be presumed to be legal and valid in all respects and the plaintiff is required to seek a declaration with regard to those documents before getting the relief for declaration to his title? (3) Whether when it is the own case of the plaintiff that the deeds of exchange were to be given effect to only after the completion of the consolidation proceeding and delivery of possession thereof, the plaintiff was further required to file the suit within three years with necessary relief against the said documents and in any view of the matter, the suit will be barred either Article-59 of the Limitation Act or the residuary Article-58? 9. Mr. Arora, the learned counsel appearing for the appellants, at the out set, has urged that other substantial questions of law also arise for consideration in this appeal with regard to the finding by the courts below that the transaction of exchange was not acted upon which is against the facts and evidence on record and the relevant principles of law. Arora, the learned counsel appearing for the appellants, at the out set, has urged that other substantial questions of law also arise for consideration in this appeal with regard to the finding by the courts below that the transaction of exchange was not acted upon which is against the facts and evidence on record and the relevant principles of law. It has been also submitted that there has also been no evidence to support the requirement of permission under Section 5 of the Consolidation Act and in any view of the matter, the transaction of exchange could have been partially invalid for that reason only with regard to the part of the land which was under the consolidation proceeding and will remain valid with regard to the rest of the land subject matter of the transaction and the plaintiffs were entitled to sue for possession for the part of the land. The learned counsel has also submitted that the suit as framed was also not maintainable as the plaintiffs failed to seek relief against registered deeds of exchange before seeking the declaration of title and recovery of possession over the suit land. However, the learned counsel has further submitted that the substantial question of law no. 1 as framed is not being pressed in view of the full bench decision of this Court in the case of Panna Devi Vs. State of Bihar, 2010 (2) PLJR 1066 . 10. Mr. A. B. Ojha, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents, however, has submitted that the substantial questions of law proposed now as additional substantial questions of law do not arise for consideration in view of the concurrent findings by both the courts below on the material issues between the parties. 11. After considering the submissions of the parties, it is manifest that the plaintiffs have admitted in the plaint that they have executed the registered deed of exchange in favour of the defendants for the suit land but have further averred that in view of on going consolidation proceeding with regard to the part of the land transferred by the defendants in favour of the plaintiffs in exchange, the said deed executed by the defendants was a void transaction due to want of the required permission affecting the entire transaction of exchange. It is also further case of the plaintiffs that they could not get the possession over the exchanged land because the consolidation authorities did not deliver possession to the raiyats over the newly formed Chaks in the concerned village and thus the transaction of exchange could not be fructified and not acted upon. The defendants have denied the aforesaid assertions of the plaintiffs. However, both the courts below have decided the said issues in favour of the plaintiffs and therefore in the facts and circumstances of the case the following additional substantial questions of law are also framed for consideration:— (1) Whether the requirement of sanction by the consolidation authorities before the execution of the deed of exchange by defendants in favour of the plaintiffs has been established by the plaintiffs by bringing on record relevant material and cogent evidence in that regard and even otherwise also the said transaction of exchange could have been held to be partially invalid for that reason with regard to only the lands covered by the consolidation proceeding? (2) Whether the finding by the courts below that the transaction of exchange between the parties was not acted upon is against the facts and evidence on record as well as the established principles of law? 12. Assailing the legal pregnability of the impugned judgment and decree, Mr. Arora, the learned counsel for the appellants has submitted that in view of the admitted transaction of exchange evidenced by the deeds of exchange executed by the respective parties, the plaintiffs could not have been granted the relief for declaration of title and recovery of possession till those deeds of transfer stand. It has further been submitted that both on facts as well as in law the plaintiffs were required to seek necessary relief against the deeds of exchange but they deliberately omitted to do so as the said relief was barred by limitation on the date when the suit was filed. Elaborating his submissions, the learned counsel has propounded that the recitals in the deeds of exchange in question do not disclose that the passing of title has been made dependent upon any contingency to happen in future and the terms of the transaction of exchange are clear and unambiguous, when it has been recited therein that the title has passed to the transferees upon the execution of the deed. It has been pointed out by the learned counsel that the plaintiffs have introduced new terms and conditions relating to postponement of passing of title till the parties came in possession over their respective lands transferred to them which were never the agreed terms and conditions but both the courts below have committed illegality in accepting the evidence on behalf of the plaintiffs in that regard and thereafter concluding that the deeds of exchange were not acted upon as those conditions were not fulfilled. Criticizing the impugned judgment further the learned counsel has canvassed that even otherwise also the entire land situated in two villages were admittedly not under the consolidation proceeding and therefore also there was no need for permission for the lands in the village out side the consolidation proceeding and the whole transaction could not have been held to have vitiated for want of permission by the consolidation authorities. It has been further propounded that even after accepting the case of the plaintiffs that they could not get possession over the land in the village subject matter of the consolidation proceeding, the whole transaction would not become void as there is no case by the plaintiffs that they could not get possession over the part of the land which was not subject matter of consolidation and in these circumstances the plaintiffs were entitled only to sue for getting the possession over the other part land. It has also been submitted that the defendants have asserted their possession over the suit land on the basis of the deed of exchange executed in their favour by the plaintiffs but both the courts have concluded that the defendants took forcible possession as alleged by the plaintiffs, without recording any specific finding on the point of forcible entry and without appreciating that there was no evidence to corroborate the case of forcible dispossession of the plaintiffs rather even the plaintiffs’ material witnesses have deposed otherwise. 13. Mr. A.B. Ojha, the learned counsel appearing for the respondents, in reply, has at the out set submitted that the submissions advanced on behalf of the appellants were never raised in the courts below and therefore the appellants are precluded from raising the same at the second appellate stage. It has been propounded by Mr. 13. Mr. A.B. Ojha, the learned counsel appearing for the respondents, in reply, has at the out set submitted that the submissions advanced on behalf of the appellants were never raised in the courts below and therefore the appellants are precluded from raising the same at the second appellate stage. It has been propounded by Mr. Ojha that if a transfer of land is not accompanied by delivery of possession it will be a nullity and has further referred to the averment made in paragraph-6 of the plaint to support the contention that the parties in fact agreed that the transfers by exchange would become operative only after delivery of possession over the transferred land. It has been further argued that parole evidence is admissible to determine the true terms of the contract between the parties and from the evidence on record, it is clearly perceptible that the parties agreed to postpone the effect of the transfers by exchange till the possession was delivered over the lands in question. It has been further also submitted that the entire deed of transfer would become void for want of permission with regard to the part of the land subject matter of transfer. 14. The learned counsel for the parties have relied upon a number of decisions of this Court and the Apex Court which shall hereinafter be considered appropriately. The parties to this appeal shall also hereinafter, for convenience, be referred by the position held by them in the suit. 15. From the scan of the substantial questions of law as formulated at the time of admission of the appeal, except the substantial question of law no. 1 which has not been pressed, as well as the additional substantial questions of law framed later on at the stage of hearing of this appeal, it transpires that they broadly relate to maintainability of the suit as framed in absence of the relief against the deeds of exchange, the requirement for taking sanction by the consolidation authorities under the provision of the Bihar Consolidation of Holdings and Prevention of Fragmentation Act before the transaction of exchange and the effect of want of sanction on the transaction and the legality of the finding by the courts below that the transaction of sale was not acted upon by the parties. In view of the interrelated nature of the questions, all the substantial question of law are taken up together for consideration. 16. From the facts of the case of the rival parties as aforementioned, it is manifest that both plaintiffs and the defendants admittedly entered into a transaction whereby they exchanged an area of 78 decimal of land with each other. There is also no denial of the fact that both the plaintiffs and the defendants have respectively executed and registered two deeds of exchange on 07.03.1987. The deed of exchange executed by the plaintiffs in favour of the defendants has been brought on record as Ext. 2/a and the deed of exchange executed by the defendants in favour of the plaintiffs has been brought on record as Ext. 2 and also as Ext. B. It would be fruitful here to take into notice that by deed of exchange (Ext.2/a) altogether 78 decimal of land of village Dehri, P.S. Dinara, District-Rohtas has been transferred in favour of the defendants with the following relevant recitals:— ^^ --- --- --- pwWa eokth 78 fMlehy dk;eh etdqj eueksfdj dk gS tks e'kjQh eksfdj vysg dk gS --- --- --- blfy, eueksfdj o eksfdj vySg dk ckrphr ,jkth;r cnyS;k dk r; ik;k --- --- --- ,djkj djrs o fy[k nsrs gSa fd eueksfdj us eokth 78 fMlehy dk;eh etdwj okyk --- --- --- tks gj fdlh ds okjnsu ls ikdlkQ gS mldks fcy ,ot ds eokth 78 fMlehy dk;eh lkFk ekslkuk izHkal nwcs o ucko nwcs firk Lo0 fHk[kk nwcs ds lkFk cnyS;k fd;k o fy[k fn;k pkfg, fd eksfdu vySg ml ij ,jkth “kS; cnyS;k 'kqnk esa dkfct nkf[ky ekfyd eqLrfdy felytkr eueksfdj gksdj bUrtke o cUnkscLr mldk [kkg eksghn eryc vius fd;k djs --- --- --- tgk¡ & tgk¡ t:jr gks uke viuk eqLrjh etdqj ntZ djk ysos --- --- --- 'kS; cnyS;k 'kqnk ls fdlh fdLe dk dksbZ mtz o ,rjkt eueksfdj ds ekfdj vysg ds ckdh ugh gS u vkbZUns dHkh gksxk** 17. Similar recitals have been made in the exchange deed (Ext.2) executed by the defendants in favour of the plaintiffs and the relevant portions thereof are as follows:— ^^ --- --- --- pwWa eokth 78 fMlfey dk;eh etdwjs okyk eueksfdj dk gS tks e'kjQh eksfdj vysg gS --- --- --- blfy, eueksfdj o eksfdj vysg ckrphr ,jkth;kr cnyb;k ds r; ik;k --- --- --- ,djkj djrs o fy[k nsrs gSa ds eueksfdj us eokth 78 fMlfey etdwjs okyk --- --- --- tks gj fdlhe ds okjnsu ls ikd & lkQ gS mldks chy ,ot ds eokth 78 fMlfey dk;eh lkFk ekslkek fczteksgu ik.Ms; o lhrkjke ik.Ms; eksfdj vysg ds cnyS;k fd;k o fy[k fn;k pkfg, ds eksfdj vySg mij ,jkth 'kS; cnyS;k 'kqnk ds dkfct nkf[ky ekfyd eqLrfdy felytkr eueksfdj gksdj bUrtke o cUnkscLr bldk --- --- --- fd;k djs --- --- ---** 18. From the perusal of the recitals above noted in the two deeds of exchange executed by the plaintiffs and defendants in favour of each other, it does not appear that the parties had agreed to any condition e.g. delivery of possession etc. after which the transaction of exchange was to become operative. The terms and conditions mentioned therein predominantly disclose the existence of an executed contract as distinguished from an executory agreement between the parties. Moreover, there is no ambiguity in any manner in those terms and conditions from which it transpires that nothing else remained to be done for completing the transaction of exchange. Under this circumstance, it would be clearly overreaching the jurisdiction by a court by supplying some conditions in the garb of completing the intention of the parties. It would be fruitful to reminisce, the poignant passage in the case of Aspdin Vs. Austin, (1844) 3 QB (N.S.) 671 which has been quoted with approval by the judicial committee of the Privy Council in Pallikelagatha Marcar Vs. It would be fruitful to reminisce, the poignant passage in the case of Aspdin Vs. Austin, (1844) 3 QB (N.S.) 671 which has been quoted with approval by the judicial committee of the Privy Council in Pallikelagatha Marcar Vs. Jaun Gothfried Sigg, 7 I.A. 83 as follows:— “…..Where parties have entered into written engagements with expressed stipulations, it is manifestly not desirable to extend them by any implications; the presumption is that, having expressed some, they have expressed all conditions by which they intend to be bound under that instrument ……it is one thing for the Court to effectuate the intention of the parties to the extent to which they may have, even imperfectly, expressed themselves, and another to add to the instrument all such covenants as, upon a full consideration, the Court may deem fitting for completing the intentions of the parties, but which they, purposely or unintentionally, have omitted. The former is but the application of a rule of construction to that which is written; the latter adds to the obligations by which the parties have bound themselves, and is, of course, quite unauthorized, as well as liable to great practical injustice in the application…….” 19. It transpires from the averments made in the plaint that the plaintiffs have accepted to have entered into the transaction of exchange of their respective 78 decimal of land as evidenced by the two registered deeds of exchange ( Ext. 2/a and Ext. 2) executed by them respectively in favour of each other. However, in paragraph 6 of the plaint, the plaintiffs have come out with the case that one of the terms of the transaction of exchange was to the effect that the deeds of exchange would stand cancelled if the respective parties failed to get title and possession over the exchanged lands and in that case the parties would come into possession of their respective lands as before. The paragraph-6 of the plaint reads as follows:— ^^ --- --- ;g fd nksuksa QfjdSu olhdk gktk ds chp ;g r; gqvk fd ;fn fdlh Qjhd dks cnySu esa feys tehu ij gdh;r o n[ky&dCTk ugha gks ik;sxk rks cnySu dks jn~n le>k tk;sxk o olhds tkr cnySu o rkjh[k 07.3.1987 dks jn~n o uktk;t le>k tk;sxk o gj nksuksa QfjdSu olhdk gktk vius & vius tehu ij iqu% dkfct & nkf[ky gks tk;saxs o gj nksuksa QfjdSu olhdk gktk dk gdh;r vius & vius cnySu ds iwoZ ds tehu ij dk;e jgsxkA ;g Hkh nksuksa QfjdSu olhdk gktk ds chp r; gqvk gS fd ekStk vxjsj [kqnZ ds pd ds n[ky nsgkuh pdcUnh foHkkx }kjk fnyk nsus ds ckn gj nksuksa QfjdSu olhdk gktkk cnySu esa feys tehu ij dkfct nkf[ky gks tk;sasxsA--** 20. It is demonstrable from the recitals of the aforesaid two deeds of exchange that this term as mentioned by the plaintiffs in paragraph-6 of the plaint has not been mentioned there. It is nowhere the case of the plaintiffs that this vital and important term of the agreement which has the effect of postponing effectuation of the transaction has been fraudulently withheld by the defendants from being mentioned in the deed of exchange executed by them and there is also no explanation on behalf of the plaintiffs regarding the omission to mention this term even in the deed of exchange executed by them. It is manifest that this term is totally inconsistent and at variance with the intention of the parties as disclosed from the recitals in the deeds of exchange which are patently unambiguous. It is also vivid from the averments in the plaint that the plaintiffs have not alleged the deeds of transaction to be a sham transaction or a transaction never intended to be acted upon. In the backdrop of these facts it would be seemly to examine the legal acceptability of the statement made in paragraph-6 of the plaint in view of the provisions of Section 91 and 92 of the Evidence Act. It is no longer res integra that the provisions of Section 91 and 92 of the Evidence Act are in reality a declaration of doctrine of substantive law that certain kinds of facts are legally ineffective and cannot be proved at all. It is no longer res integra that the provisions of Section 91 and 92 of the Evidence Act are in reality a declaration of doctrine of substantive law that certain kinds of facts are legally ineffective and cannot be proved at all. It will be condign here to take into notice the dictum of the Apex Court in this regard in the case of Roop Kumar Vs. Mohan Thedani, A.I.R. 2003 SC 2418 which is as follows:— “…….Section 91 relates to evidence of terms of contract, grants and other disposition of properties reduced to form of document. This section merely forbids proving the contents of a writing otherwise than by writing itself: it is covered by the ordinary rule of law of evidence, applicable not merely to solemn writings of the sort named but to others known sometimes as the best evidence rule. It is in reality declaring a doctrine of the substantive law, namely, in the case of written contract, that of all proceedings and contemporaneous oral expressions of the thing are merged in the writing or displaced by it. …..What the rule does is to declare that certain kinds of facts are legally ineffective in the substantive law, and this of course (like any other ruling of substantive law) results in forbidding the fact to be proved at all…….” Their Lordships further have laid down:— “……….In other words, when a jural act is embodied in a single memorial all other utterances of the parties on the topic are legally immaterial for the purpose of determining what are the terms of their act………When persons express their agreements in writing, it is for the express purpose of getting rid of any indefiniteness and to put their ideas in such shape that there can be no misunderstanding, which so often occurs when reliance is placed upon oral statements. Written contracts presume deliberation on the part of the contracting parties and it is natural they should be treated with careful consideration by the Courts and with a disinclination to disturb the conditions of matters as embodied in them by the act of the parties…...” 21. Written contracts presume deliberation on the part of the contracting parties and it is natural they should be treated with careful consideration by the Courts and with a disinclination to disturb the conditions of matters as embodied in them by the act of the parties…...” 21. Tested on the anvil of the aforesaid principles the inevitable conclusion is that this statement made in paragraph-6 of the plaint cannot be legally countenanced by the courts which should have approached the matter with express disinclination to accept the term as mentioned in the said paragraph to be the part of the transaction of exchange between the parties, as it was at variance with the terms disclosed from the recitals in the deeds evidencing the terms of the said transaction. Both the courts below have definitely erred in law in approaching the controversy with acceptance of the term as mentioned in paragraph-6 of the plaint as the term agreed between the parties to the transaction of exchange ignoring the principles underlying Section 91 and 92 of the Evidence Act. The plaintiffs in view of the rule embodied in Section 91 and 92 of the Evidence Act were not legally entitled to come out with the case that the transaction of exchange was as per agreed terms not to become operative till the delivery of possession to the respective parties over the lands exchanged in their favour and more particularly till the delivery of possession was effected by the Consolidation Department over the exchanged land in village-Agrerkhurd. The principles of law laid down in the decisions of the Apex Court in the case of Abdulla Ahmed Vs. Animendra Kissen Mitter A.I.R. 1950 S.C. 15 and The Godhra Electricity Co. Ltd. Vs. The State of Gujarat A.I.R. 1975 S.C. 32 have been relied upon by Mr. Ojha, the learned counsel for the plaintiffs, to strengthen his submission that parol evidence can be admitted even with regard to a written contract in order to determine the true nature of the terms therein. The reliance on these two decisions is apparently misplaced in the facts of this case as their lordships have clearly maintained that it is only in the case of ambiguity in the terms of the contract or where there remains a doubt as to its true meaning, such course to allow extrinsic evidence is permissible. 22. The reliance on these two decisions is apparently misplaced in the facts of this case as their lordships have clearly maintained that it is only in the case of ambiguity in the terms of the contract or where there remains a doubt as to its true meaning, such course to allow extrinsic evidence is permissible. 22. Examining the facts and evidence further, it also transpires that the plaintiffs have accepted that at the time when the transaction of exchange was completed, a part of the land transferred in favour of the plaintiffs was under the consolidation proceeding. The plaintiffs in the plaint have themselves emphasized the fact that the part of the land transferred to them by the defendants was carved out in Chak plot no. 254 in village Agrerkhurd and though the consolidation khatiyan was distributed among the Raiyats but the delivery of possession was not effected by the Consolidation Department over the Chaks to the respective Raiyats. Thus, the plaintiffs had entered into the transaction of exchange with the knowledge of this fact and accepted in exchange the part of the land also which was under the consolidation proceeding and obviously subject to the orders passed by the consolidation authorities. It is nowhere the case of the plaintiffs that those lands did not belong to the defendants and there was any defect in the title of the defendants at the time when the transaction of exchange was completed. Instead, in paragraph-11 of the plaint, the plaintiffs themselves have stated that they could not get possession over the part of the land given to them in exchange because the Consolidation Department did not deliver possession over the new Chaks to the raiyats. This fact clearly shows that the reason due to which the plaintiffs could not come in possession over the said part of the land, was not at all attributable to the defendants. To the contrary, the facts clearly depict a circumstance where the plaintiffs, with open eyes and being conscious of the fact that the part of the land given to them in exchange was under consolidation proceeding, had entered into the transaction of exchange and completed it by executing the registered deeds of exchange. To the contrary, the facts clearly depict a circumstance where the plaintiffs, with open eyes and being conscious of the fact that the part of the land given to them in exchange was under consolidation proceeding, had entered into the transaction of exchange and completed it by executing the registered deeds of exchange. If one of the agreed terms was to postpone the effect of the transaction of exchange, as pleaded by the plaintiffs in paragraph-6 of the plaint, there is no further pleading as to why such vital term was omitted to be mentioned in the two deeds of exchange one of which has admittedly been executed by the plaintiffs. Both the courts below have not considered this aspect before concluding that the deeds of exchange were not acted upon as the parties did not come in possession over their respective exchanged lands because the possession over the part land, subject matter of exchange in favour of the plaintiffs, was not delivered by the consolidation authorities and therefore this conclusion is definitely vulnerable. 23. The transaction of exchange evidenced by the registered deeds of exchange is an admitted fact between the parties. By executing the deed of exchange (Ext. 2/a) the plaintiffs have transferred the title and possession over the lands mentioned in schedule-Ka of the plaint to the defendants. The suit has been filed by the plaintiffs for declaration of their title and recovery of possession over the suit land but there is no relief against the deed of exchange (Ext. 2/a) sought by the plaintiffs. Even after accepting the case of the plaintiffs that the deed of exchange (Ext. 2/a and Ext. 2) were not acted upon, it is still inconceivable to grant the declaration of title in favour of the plaintiffs over the suit land without cancelling or annulling the said document of title for the suit land standing in favour of the defendants. The said deed of exchange (Ext. 2/a) admittedly executed by the plaintiffs is a registered document and carries with it the prima facie validity in law as laid down by their lordships in the case of Prem Singh Vs. Birbal (2006) 5 SCC 353 . The said document cannot be said to be void ab initio and no “presumptive invalidity” can be attached to the transaction. 2/a) admittedly executed by the plaintiffs is a registered document and carries with it the prima facie validity in law as laid down by their lordships in the case of Prem Singh Vs. Birbal (2006) 5 SCC 353 . The said document cannot be said to be void ab initio and no “presumptive invalidity” can be attached to the transaction. Such a document comes within the category of documents which remain valid until the facts invalidating the same are established in a duly constituted suit. The plaintiffs were therefore required in law to seek the relief for cancellation of the said document or at least seek necessary declaration in order to avoid its legal effect within the prescribed period of limitation either under Article 59 or the residuary Article 58 of the Limitation Act. Under both these articles, the starting period of limitation is three years from the date when the facts entitling the plaintiffs to obtain the relief against the document by cancellation or setting aside the same first accrues. The plaintiffs were admittedly aware of the document (deed of exchange Ext. 2/a) and if according to them, it was not acted upon or stands invalidated for any reason they were still required in law to approach the court seeking necessary relief by declaration or cancellation of the same. At this juncture, it would be condign to refer to the principles in this regard as laid down by the Apex Court in the case of Md. Noorul Hoda Vs. Bibi Raifunnisa (1996) 7 SCC 767 as follows:— “ …..When the plaintiff seeks to establish his title to the property which cannot be established without avoiding the decree or an instrument that stands as an insurmountable obstacle in his way which otherwise binds him, though not a party, the plaintiff necessarily has to seek a declaration and have that decree, instrument or contract cancelled or set aside or rescinded. Section 31 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 regulates suits for cancellation of an instrument which lays down that any person against whom a written instrument is void or voidable and who has a reasonable apprehension that such instrument, if left outstanding, may cause him serious injury, can sue to have it adjudge void or voidable and court may in its discretion so adjudge it and other it to be delivered or cancelled……” 24. Moreover, from the statement made in paragraph-15 of the plaint also, it is transparent that the plaintiffs were aware of the fact that the deeds of exchange were definite obstacle to their title over the suit land and were required to be set aside or cancelled. It has been stated by the plaintiffs therein that ^^--- --- --- ;g fd mijksDr ckrksa ds tkudkjh gksus ds ckn eueqn;ku eqnky;gqe ls dbZ ckj dgs o dgyok;s fd dkuwuh lykg ysdj fdlh olhdk ds }kjk nksuksa olhdstkr cnySu o rkjh[k 07-3-1987 dksa jn~n o dSfUly dj fn;k tk, rkfd nksuksa QfjdSu dk viuk & viuk tehu vius & viu ftEes jg tk,A ijUrq eqnky;gqe dh uh;r [kke gks xbZ gS-- ---** Thus, there is substance in the submission on behalf of the appellants that the plaintiffs have deliberately not sought the relief against the deeds of exchange as the same relief had become barred by limitation in the year 1994 when the suit was filed. The other limb of submission by the learned counsel for the appellants in view of this fact, regarding the bar under Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act also deserves affirmation. The plaintiffs were definitely required and were in position to claim the necessary relief against the deeds of exchange but they have omitted to do so and thus would stand precluded from getting the relief with regard to the declaration of title as prayed. 25. The plaintiffs have also alleged in the plaint that the defendants fraudulently got the deeds of exchange executed and registered even when the contents were not read over and explained to the plaintiffs. It has also been asserted that the parties in fact agreed to get the deeds executed and registered after obtaining the permission from the consolidation authorities but the defendants in collusion with the scribe got the deeds executed and registered by the plaintiffs without obtaining the said permission. It has also been asserted that the parties in fact agreed to get the deeds executed and registered after obtaining the permission from the consolidation authorities but the defendants in collusion with the scribe got the deeds executed and registered by the plaintiffs without obtaining the said permission. The relevant statements in the plaint are as follows:— ^^--- --- ---ikjk 8 & ;g fd LoxhZ; ijegal nwcs isnj eqnky; ua0 1 ,oa 2 ls ;g r; gqvk fd pdcUnh inkf/kdkjh ls ijfe'ku ysdj olhdk cnySu rgjhj o jftLVjh gksxkA fcuk ijfe'ku fy, eqnky; ua0 4 o muds lxs HkkbZ ijegal frokjh vius esyh dkrhc ls clhdk rgjhj djkdj o eueqn;ku dks /kks[kk nsdj olhdk o rkjh[k 7.3.87 dk jftLVjh djk fy;k ftldh tkudkjh eueqnky; dks vc gqbZ gS vr% olhdk cnySu o rkjh[k 7.3.87 egt ,d xSjdkuwuh o Hkksvk,M MkWdqesUV gS--- --- ---** ^^--- --- --- isnj eqnky; ua0 1 vkSj 2 Lo0 ijegal nwcs tks ml le; vius btekyh ifjokj ds vQlj o drkZ Fks rFkk dkQh pyrk iwtkZ o eqdnekckt vkneh FksA Lo0 ijegal nwcs vius esyh dkfro ls nksuksa fdrs olhds tkr djk;sA dkrho Lo0 ijegal nwcs ds dgus ij etewu olhds tkr rS;kj fd;k o dkfro us tgk¡ tgk¡ dgk ,d fdrk olhdk cnySu o rkjh[k 07-3-1987 ij eueqn;ku vius & vius vaxwBs dk fu'kku cuk fn;k o gLrk{kj cuk fn;kA etewu olhdk gktk dks eueqn;ku dks i<+dj lquk;k oks le>k;k ugha x;k A--------------** 26. By these aforesaid statements, the plaintiffs have clearly alleged perpetration of fraud upon them by the defendants in getting the deeds of exchange executed and registered in collusion with the scribe. These allegations again would make the deeds in question evidencing a voidable transaction and the plaintiffs were required to establish those facts as pleaded in order to take away the legal effect of those deeds. 27. The plaintiffs have also alleged the deeds of exchange to be void for want of permission under the provisions of the Bihar Consolidation of Holdings and Prevention of Fragmentation Act. However, it is apparent from the averments made in the plaint itself that the consolidation proceeding was going on only with regard to the part of the land in village-Agrerkhurd which has admittedly been transferred in favour of the plaintiffs by the defendants. However, it is apparent from the averments made in the plaint itself that the consolidation proceeding was going on only with regard to the part of the land in village-Agrerkhurd which has admittedly been transferred in favour of the plaintiffs by the defendants. Though, the plaintiffs have asserted that the permission before transfer of the land in village-Agrerkhurd was required under the provision of the said Act but the said fact has been denied by the defendants stating that the plaintiffs themselves after inquiry had informed that no such permission from the consolidation authorities was required. From the impugned judgments by both the courts below, it does not appear that any finding has been recorded in this regard that the permission by the consolidation authorities was required before transfer of the land of village Agrerkhurd on 07.03.1987 when the deed of exchange (Ext. 2/a) was executed and registered. From the provisions of Section 5 of the Bihar Consolidation of Holdings and Prevention of Fragmentation Act, 1956, it is manifest that the requirement for obtaining the sanction for transfer of the land by the consolidation officer in the area notified under the proceeding arises only after the date of publication of register of lands and statement of principles under Sub section (1) of Section 10 of the said Act. A bench of this Court in the case of Ram Janam Singh Vs. The State of Bihar 2001 (4) PLJR 531 has also laid down while considering the applicability of Section 5 of the Act that the restrictions imposed by Section 5 gets attracted only after both the register of lands and the statement of principles are published and where the statement of principles is published later than the publication of the registers of lands, the later date will be the crucial date for applying the provision of Section 5 of the Act. In absence of the foundational facts in the plaint or any evidence aliunde adduced on behalf of the plaintiffs to show that the publication as required by Section 5 of the Act had been made before the execution of the deed in question, it is difficult to uphold the finding that such permission was required and the transfer of the land of village-Agrerkhurd by the deed of exchange in question has become void for want of such permission. This fact also assumes significance in view of the statement made by the plaintiff Brij Mohan Pandey, examined as P.W.-6, in paragraph-8 of his cross examination that the proceeding of consolidation was not going on and was closed on the date of the execution of the deeds of exchange. The findings by both the courts below in this regard that the deed of exchange which included the land of village Agrerkhurd was void for want of permission from the consolidation authority has been recorded ignoring the provision of law and absence of cogent material and evidence on record in this regard. The same is therefore not sustainable and accordingly overturned. Even otherwise also both the courts below have also failed to take into notice that the deed of exchange executed by the defendants in favour of the plaintiffs also included the lands of another village where admittedly the consolidation proceeding was not going on and therefore the transaction at the most could have become void only partially for want of sanction, if necessary. 28. The defendants in the written statement have asserted that they came in possession over the suit land (schedule-Ka of the plaint) and have also got their names mutated in register-II with regard to the same. The plaintiffs have also in the plaint accepted the mutation of the names of the defendants with regard to the suit land but have qualified the same with the assertion that they had earlier no knowledge of the same. It would be relevant to take into notice here that the plaintiffs filed the suit on 26.04.1994 and soon thereafter on 26.07.1994 they prayed for amendment of the plaint seeking to incorporate the fact of their forcible dispossession from the suit land by the defendants. The trial court has not specifically recorded any finding on the issue of forcible dispossession of the plaintiffs by the defendants from the suit land but the appellate court below without referring to any evidence has recorded the conclusion that the defendants have forcibly got possession over the suit land on 25.07.1994. The learned counsel appearing on behalf of the plaintiff-respondents in this appeal could not point out cogent evidence available on record of the case to establish the said fact of forcible dispossession of the plaintiffs by the defendants. The learned counsel appearing on behalf of the plaintiff-respondents in this appeal could not point out cogent evidence available on record of the case to establish the said fact of forcible dispossession of the plaintiffs by the defendants. On the other hand, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the defendant-appellants has submitted that even the witnesses of the plaintiffs have deposed otherwise in this regard. The learned counsel has pointed out that the P.W.-2 in his cross examination has stated “cnySu ds fnu ls JhdkUr ds tehu ij eqn~nbZ dk n[ky gS rFkk eqn~nbZ ds tehu ij JhdkUr dk n[ky gS” and further has also referred to the deposition of P.W.-4 who has stated in his examination-in-chief that “eqnky; yksx 4 lky iwoZ eqn~nbZ ds tehu dks tcjnLrh eqn~nbZ dk tehu dks Hkh tksrus yxs tks cnySu esa fn;k x;k” and in cross examination has stated that “nksuksa tehu vHkh eqnky; ds dCtk esa gS 4 o’kksZ ls --------------- mlls iwoZ eqn~nbZ viuh tehu tksrrs Fks** The learned counsel has also urged that the defendants’ title and possession over the suit land is also corroborated when the defendants have made the statement in the written statement regarding the transfer of part of the suit land by them and possession of the purchaser over the same which fact has not been denied by the plaintiffs or the witnesses. The cumulative effect of all these facts and circumstances lead to the unfailing conclusion that the plaintiffs have failed to establish their case of forcible dispossession from the suit land at the hands of the defendants. Both the courts below have erred in law in not considering the material pleading and evidence before granting the decree as prayed by the plaintiffs. The conclusion by the appellate court in particular that “it is settled law that if any deed is not acted upon and affected, that deed is void document and the same can be ignored without cancellation of the deed” is clearly presumptive and erroneous and rightly deserves to be overruled. 29. In view of the aforesaid reasons and conclusions, the substantial questions of law are answered in favour of the defendant-appellants and it is held that the plaintiff-respondents are not entitled to the reliefs as prayed in the suit. Accordingly, this appeal is allowed and the judgment and decree passed by both the courts below are set aside. 29. In view of the aforesaid reasons and conclusions, the substantial questions of law are answered in favour of the defendant-appellants and it is held that the plaintiff-respondents are not entitled to the reliefs as prayed in the suit. Accordingly, this appeal is allowed and the judgment and decree passed by both the courts below are set aside. The suit filed by the plaintiff-respondents is dismissed. In the facts and circumstances of the case there shall be no order as to costs. ?