JUDGMENT : I. A. ANSARI, J.:–Under challenge, in the present appeals, are the judgment, dated 10.07.2009, passed, in Sessions Trial No. 654 of 2007, by learned Additional Sessions Judge, Fast Track Court No. 1, Banka, and the order, dated 20.07.2009, whereby various sentences have been passed against the accused-appellants. 2. By the impugned judgment, learned trial Court has convicted the accused-appellant, Ashwini Choudhary, under Section 302 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code and accused-appellant, Pawan Choudhary, under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code and Section 27 of the Arms Act, 1959. Following his conviction under Section 302 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, the accused-appellant, Ashwini Choudhary, has been sentenced to undergo imprisonment for life. Following his conviction under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code, the accused-appellant, Pawan Choudhary, too, has been sentenced to undergo imprisonment for life. This apart, consequent upon his conviction under Section 27 of the Arms Act, 1959, the accused-appellant, Pawan Choudhary, has been sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for three years. 3. The case of the prosecution, as unfolded at the trial, may, in brief, be described as under:— (i) The informant, Mithilesh Kumar Jha (PW 2), is the elder brother of deceased Awadhesh Kumar Jha @ Lal Babu, who used to work as a Security Guard, at Mumbai. On 20.12.2006, Lal Babu, younger brother of the informant, Mithilesh Kumar Jha, came, in the afternoon, to his native village, Singhnan, which falls within the territorial jurisdiction of Rajaun Police Station in the district of Banka. Telling his elder brother, Mithilesh Kumar Jha, that he (Lal Babu) would be returning home with dantman (i.e. branch of neem tree, which is used as tooth-brush), Lal Babu left home at about 07:30 PM. Within about five minutes of the departure of Lal Babu from his native house as mentioned hereinbefore, the informant (PW 2) heard hulla and when he (PW 2), along with his wife (PW 1), went out of his house, he, in the light of electricity as also in the torch-light, saw his co-villagers, namely, Kamleshwari Choudhary, Pawan Choudhary, Dilip Mandal, Mahesh Mandal, Ranvir Rai and Ashwini Choudhary, having altercation with Lal Babu, demanding rangdari (i.e. extortion money), which Lal Babu was refusing to pay. (ii) While the altercation was so going on, the informant, Mithilesh Kumar Jha, saw accused Pawan Choudhary opening fire from a country-made pistol, which he was holding in his hand, aiming at Lal Babu, and the bullet hit Lal Babu’s chest. On being so shot by bullet, while injured Lal Babu was running towards the house of Prahlad Sharma so as to save his life, accused Ranvir Rai, too, fired upon Lal Babu and the bullet, so fired by accused Ranvir Rai, also hit Lal Babu; but some-how, Lal Babu managed to enter into the house of Prahlad Sharma and fell in the aangan (i.e. courtyard). Thereafter, all the accused persons fled away. When the informant and his co-villagers went running to the house of Prahlad Sharma, they found Lal Babu lying dead in the aangan (i.e. courtyard). (iii) The reason, behind the occurrence, as already indicated above, was that the accused persons aforementioned were demanding rangdari (extortion money), but Lal Babu was refusing to pay anything and it was because of Lal Babu’s refusal to make payment of rangdari (extortion money) that all the accused persons had jointly killed him. (iv) On 20.12.2006, at about 08:30 PM, Officer-in-Charge, Rajaun Police Station (PW 5), received telephonic information that one person had been shot dead. In order to verify the correctness of the information, PW 5, accompanied by his team of policemen, reached village Singhnan and, on arriving there, they found Lal Babu’s dead body lying. Standing near the dead body of Lal Babu, his elder brother, Mithilesh Kumar Jha, gave his statement as to how his brother, Lal Babu, had died. This statement was recorded in the form of fardbayan with Mithilesh Kumar Jha, elder brother of the said deceased, as the first informant. (v) Treating the said information as First Information Report, Rajaun Police Station Case No. 137 of 2006, under Section 302/34 of the Indian Penal Code and Section 27 of the Arms Act, 1959, was registered against the present two accused-appellants, namely, Ashwini Choudhary and Pawan Choudhary, along with four other unknown accused persons. (vi) Inquest was held over Lal Babu’s dead body, which was also subjected to post mortem examination. (vi) Inquest was held over Lal Babu’s dead body, which was also subjected to post mortem examination. During investigation, the police inspected the place of occurrence, i.e. kaccha road, where Lal Babu had been allegedly shot by accused Pawan Choudhary, and, the place, where the dead body of Lal Babu had been found lying, the latter place being aangan of the house of Prahlad Sharma. (vii) On completion of investigation, a charge sheet, under Section 302 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code and Section 27 of the Arms Act, 1959, was laid against the two accused persons, namely, Ashwini Choudhary and Pawan Choudhary. 4. At the trial, when a charge, under Section 302 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, was framed against accused Ashwini Choudhary and accused Pawan Choudhary, both the accused aforementioned pleaded not guilty thereto. Yet another charge was framed under Section 27 of the Arms Act, 1959. To this charge, too, both the accused aforementioned pleaded not guilty. 5. In support of their case, prosecution examined altogether seven witnesses including the doctor and the Investigating Officer. The accused were, then, examined under Section 313 (1) (b) of the Code of Criminal Procedure and, in their examinations aforementioned, the accused denied that they had committed the offences, which were alleged to have been committed by them, the case of the defence being that of denial. No evidence was adduced by the defence. 6. Having, however, reached the finding that the two accused (who are appellants in the present appeals) were guilty of the offences as indicated above, learned trial Court has convicted them accordingly and, consequent thereupon, sentences have been passed against the two appellants as have been mentioned above. Aggrieved by their conviction and the sentences, which have been passed against them, the two accused aforementioned, as convicted persons, have preferred these appeals. 7. We have heard Mr. Surendra Singh, learned Senior Counsel for the appellants, and Mr. D. K. Singh, learned Additional Public Prosecutor, for the State. We have also heard Mr. Rajendra Kumar Jain, learned Counsel, appearing on behalf of the informant. 8. 7. We have heard Mr. Surendra Singh, learned Senior Counsel for the appellants, and Mr. D. K. Singh, learned Additional Public Prosecutor, for the State. We have also heard Mr. Rajendra Kumar Jain, learned Counsel, appearing on behalf of the informant. 8. While considering the present appeals, what attracts the attention, most prominently, is that according to the evidence of the Investigating Officer (PW 5), while (PW 5) was functioning as the Officer-in-Charge, Rajaun Police Station, he (PW 5) received information, on 20.12.2006, at 08:00 PM, on telephone, that one person had been killed in the firing and it was in order to verify the correctness of the information so received that he (PW 5) reached village Singhnan and came across the dead body of Lal Babu. 9. It is, thus, abundantly clear that even before the informant (PW 2) gave the fardbayan, which became basis for registration of the police case aforementioned, the police had already been informed of the commission of a cognizable offence of murder, though the identity of the deceased as well as the accused had not been known. Nonetheless, if we may repeat, PW 5 already stood informed that a person had been shot dead and it was to verify the correctness of this information that PW 5 visited the place of occurrence. 10. In the circumstances pointed out above, it is clear that investigation into the present case has commenced even before the statement (Exhibit-3), which Mithilesh Kumar Jha (PW 2) had given to the police, describing the occurrence, was recorded as fardbayan and treated by the police and the learned trial Court as the First Information Report. 11. What logically follows from the above discussion is that the information, which had been received by PW 5 (Officer-in-Charge, Rajaun Police Station), and set the machinery of law into motion for determination of the question as to who had been killed, how he had been killed and who had killed him, must be regarded to have given rise to investigation. Consequently, the statement of PW 2, which has been recorded as fardbayan, must be treated as PW 2’s statement recorded, under Section 161 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, during the course of investigation. 12. Consequently, the statement of PW 2, which has been recorded as fardbayan, must be treated as PW 2’s statement recorded, under Section 161 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, during the course of investigation. 12. In the light of what has been discussed above, it becomes abundantly clear that the telephonic information, received by the Investigating Officer (PW 5), ought to have been treated as the First Information Report and the informant?s statement (Exhibit-3), which has been treated as the First Information Report, ought to be regarded in law as a statement recorded under Section 161 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and can be used only for the purpose of contradiction by the defence and with, of course, leave of the Court, by the prosecution too. 13. Bearing the above legal aspect in mind, let us come to the evidence of the informant, namely, Mithilesh Kumar Jha (PW 2). We notice that according to his evidence, on hearing, at about 7:30 PM, on 20.12.2006, sound of some quarrel, he (PW 2), along with his wife (PW 1), went out of his house and when they reached the road near the house of Teznarain Jha, he (PW 2) saw Pawan Choudhary, Ashwini Choudhary, Ranvir Rai, Dilip Mandal, Mahesh Mandal and Kamleshwari Choudhary quarreling with his brother, Lal Babu (since deceased). This witness (PW 2) claims to have recognized the accused persons in the light of electricity and in light of torch. 14. It is in the evidence of PW 2 that accused Pawan Choudhary fired on Lal Babu, Lal Babu ran towards the house of Prahlad Sharma and, then, accused Ranvir Rai fired a second shot from behind and, on being so shot on his back, Lal Babu entered into the aangan of Prahlad Sharma and, then, the accused persons fled away meaning thereby that Lal Babu had sustained the second fire-arm injury before he (Lal Babu) entered into the courtyard of Prahlad Sharma. 15. PW 2 has deposed that his mother and co-villagers came rushing and, then, they all went to the house of Prahlad Sharma, where his brother was found lying dead. PW 2 has also deposed that all the accused persons were demanding rangdari (i.e., extortion money) from his brother, Lal Babu, and since his brother had not given rangdari, the occurrence took place. 16. PW 2 has also deposed that all the accused persons were demanding rangdari (i.e., extortion money) from his brother, Lal Babu, and since his brother had not given rangdari, the occurrence took place. 16. In his cross-examination, PW 2 has clarified that he had gone to the courtyard of Prahlad Sharma to see his younger brother, Lal Babu, and he met there Prahlad’s mother, wife and son and „asked them about the occurrence’. 17. It is reiterated by PW 2, in his cross-examination, that on hearing people quarreling, he (PW 2) and his wife (PW 1) went out of their house to the road and witnessed the firing. According to the evidence of PW 2, the distance between the place, where the said deceased was shot first, and the second place of shooting was about 30 feet. 18. It is the further evidence of PW 2 that on the first shot being fired at his brother, Lal Babu, blood oozed out and blood also oozed out on his sustaining the second shot by the bullet, which had been fired. PW 2 has claimed that blood had fallen not only at the first place of firing, but even at the second place of firing, though he admits, in his cross-examination, that he does not remember if the S.I. of Police had seized earth with blood stains or not. This, however, is an aspect of the evidence of PW 2, which we would revert to a little later. 19. Coming to the evidence of PW 1, who is wife of the informant, Mithilesh Kumar Jha (PW 2), we notice that she has deposed that on the day of the occurrence, at about 07:30 PM, she was at his house, she heard the voices of Lal Babu and of the accused quarreling and, on hearing them quarrel, when she went out of her house to the road with her husband, the quarrel continued for 2-3 minutes and, thereafter, accused Pawan Choudhary fired upon Lal Babu, who started running to save his life and entered into the house of Prahlad Sharma, but accused Ranvir Rai and other accused ran behind him and fired at Lal Babu, who had entered into the house of Prahlad Sharma. On being so shot by Ranvir, Lal Babu fell down in the courtyard of the house of Prahlad Sharma and all the accused fled away and, on the hulla being raised, co-villagers gathered there. 20. It is in the evidence of PW 1 that when they all went to the house of Prahlad Sharma, they found Lal Babu lying dead. PW 1 has clarified that she had recognized the accused persons in the light of electricity and also in the light of torch. Assigning the reasons for the occurrence, PW 1 has claimed that the occurrence took place, because of the fact that the accused persons had been demanding rangdari (i.e. extortion money) for one year before the occurrence and the same had not been paid by Lal Babu. 21. It is in the evidence of PW 1 that one bullet hit on the chest and another bullet hit on the back of Lal Babu and it was, thereafter, that Lal Babu entered into the house of Prahlad Sharma meaning thereby it was after having sustained the second shot from the bullet, which had been fired, that Lal Babu entered into the house of Prahlad Sharma. 22. In her cross-examination, PW 1 has deposed that she did not know whether the accused persons had been demanding rangdari or not. She had, of course, denied that she had not seen the occurrence. 23. So far as PW 4, son of the informant, namely, Nitin Kumar Jha, is concerned, his evidence is that on hearing the first shot being fired, he went out of his house and his parents, who were standing in front of the house of Tejnarain Jha, told him that the shot had been fired by accused Pawan Choudhary and the second shot was fired by Ranvir Rai, on his uncle, Lal Babu (since deceased) and that he (PW 4) saw Pawan Choudhary, Ranvir Rai, Ashwini Choudhary, Kamleshwari Choudhary, Dilip Mandal and Mahesh Mandal, running away and their co-villagers had arrived there after 2-3 minutes. PW 4 has conceded that the night was a dark night and at the house of Prahlad Sharma, his wife and son were present. When the night was dark, it is difficult to implicitly believe that PW 4 could have seen the assailants from behind, while they were running away, and could have recognized them. 24. PW 4 has conceded that the night was a dark night and at the house of Prahlad Sharma, his wife and son were present. When the night was dark, it is difficult to implicitly believe that PW 4 could have seen the assailants from behind, while they were running away, and could have recognized them. 24. Turning to the evidence of PW 3 (Anandi Devi), mother of deceased Lal Babu, we notice that according to her evidence, on the day of occurrence, at about 07:30 PM, she heard the sound of firing, she went out of her house and she heard yet another sound of firing and when she reached near her son and daughter-in-law, she was informed that Pawan Choudhary and Ranvir Rai had killed her son, Lal Babu, and that murder had been committed, because of demand of rangdari (extortion money). 25. What is crucial to note, in the evidence of PW 3, is that though she claimed, in her examination-in-chief, that on hearing the sound of firing, when she went out of her house to the road, she saw her son (PW 2) and her daughter-in-law (PW 1) and she was informed that Pawan Choudhary and Ranvir Rai had killed her son, Lal Babu, and that murder had been committed, because of demand of rangdari (extortion money), meaning thereby that PW 3 reached the road after her son, Lal Babu, had already been shot dead; whereas in her cross-examination, PW 3 has conceded that she and her son, Mithilesh Kumar Jha (PW 2), accompanied by her daughter-in-law (PW 1), and grandson, Nitin Kumar Jha (PW 4), had gone out of their house after hearing shots having been fired and, on seeing her son, Lal Babu, dead, she started crying and became unconscious. 26. 26. If the evidence of PW 3 is treated as touch-stone for testing the veracity of the evidence of PW 1, PW 2 and PW 4, it becomes abundantly clear that PW 1, PW 2 and PW 4 could not have seen the occurrence of firing inasmuch as the clear and specific evidence of PW 3, mother of the said deceased, in her cross-examination, is that they all went out of their house on hearing the sound of firing and if she (PW 3) had not seen the assailants shooting, PW 1, PW 2 and PW 4, who had come out of their house together with PW 3, could not have seen the occurrence; whereas it is the claim of PW 1 and PW 2 that the two shots had been fired in their presence, both the bullets had hit Lal Babu, one on his chest, from the front side, which was fired by Pawan Choudhary, and the other one, at his back, on being fired by Ranvir Rai. 27. In short, PW 1, PW 2 and PW 4 could not have seen bullets being fired by the two appellants, as alleged, when PW 3, mother of the said deceased, having come out (according to her own evidence) along with her son (PW 2), her daughter-in-law (PW 1) and grand-son (PW 4), had not seen the shooting meaning thereby that none of them had seen the said deceased being shot at. 28. Considering the fact that there is no reason for PW 3, mother of the said deceased, to speak lie in the Court, we have no option but to infer that notwithstanding the fact that she (PW 3) had claimed, in her examination-in-chief, that her son (PW 2) and her daughter-in-law (PW 1) were already on the road on having heard the firing taking place, she had crumbled, in her cross-examination, and conceded that not only she, but her son, daughter-in-law and grand-son, too, went out of her house on hearing the sound of firing and not on the sound of quarrel as has sought to be projected by PW 1 and PW 2. 29. A dispassionate examination of the evidence on record, thus, shows that none of the four witnesses, namely, PW 1, PW 2, PW 3 and PW 4 could have been treated as eye-witnesses to the occurrence. 30. 29. A dispassionate examination of the evidence on record, thus, shows that none of the four witnesses, namely, PW 1, PW 2, PW 3 and PW 4 could have been treated as eye-witnesses to the occurrence. 30. Coupled with the above, it needs to be noted, at the cost of repetition, which we have already indicated above, that it is the evidence of PW 2 that on the first shot being fired at his brother, Lal Babu, blood oozed out and blood also oozed out on his sustaining the second shot by the bullet, which had been fired. PW 2 has claimed that blood had fallen not only at the first place of firing, but even at the second place of firing, though he admits, in his cross-examination, that he does not remember if the S.I. of Police had seized earth with blood stains or not. 31. Belying, however, the above evidence of PW 2, the Investigating Officer (PW 5) has asserted that he had inspected the place of occurrence at 10:30 PM, the informant (PW 2) himself and the other witnesses pointed out to him the place of occurrence, the distance between the house of Prahlad Sharma from the place of occurrence may be 10-15 yards and that there is no house between the first place of occurrence and the house of Prahlad Sharma and, further, he did not find mark of blood between the first place of occurrence and the house of Prahlad Sharma and no material exhibit was seized from the place of occurrence. 32. Situated thus, it is clear that the Investigating Officer (PW 5), who is an independent witness, has belied the evidence of PW 2 and, in effect, the evidence of PW 1, too, inasmuch as blood clot ought to have been found at the two places of place of occurrence, i.e. at the first place, where the said deceased, Lal Babu, had been allegedly shot at and the second place, where he was, again, allegedly shot, as claimed by these two witnesses, if the evidence of PW 1 and PW 2 given, in this regard, were true. 33. 33. What logically follows from the above discussion of the evidence of PW 1, PW 2, PW 3 and PW 5 is that PW 1 and PW 2 have falsely claimed that they had gone out of their house on hearing the sound of quarrel and had witnessed the occurrence, which had allegedly taken place in the manner as described by them. 34. The above inference gets strengthened from the fact that in his cross-examination, PW 2 has conceded that he (PW 2) had gone to the house of Prahlad Sharma and, on meeting Prahlad Sharma’s mother, wife and son, ‘asked them about the occurrence’. Had PW 2 seen the occurrence, as claimed by him and his wife (PW 1), there was no reason for PW 2 to have inquired from the mother, wife and/or son of Prahlad Sharma about the occurrence. 35. The above inference gets re-inforced from the fact that the evidence of PW 7 (wife of Prahlad Sharma) is clear that the members of the family of the said deceased had not disclosed the names of the persons, who had killed the said deceased. 36. Situated thus, it is clear that had PW 1, PW 2, PW 3 and PW 4 had not known as to who had killed the said deceased, for, had they known, there was no reason for them to have not disclosed to anyone immediately after the occurrence as to who had killed Lal Babu; whereas no witness had turned up, at the trial, to claim that he had been reported about the name of any of the assailants of Lal Babu by the members of the family of the said deceased immediately after the occurrence. 37. The above aspect of the case becomes more pronounced and pertinent, when we notice that according to the evidence of the Investigating Officer (PW 5), who was at the relevant point of the time, Officer-in-Charge, Rajaun Police Station, he was merely informed, on telephone, at 08:30 PM, that one person had been killed by firing and the name of the assailant was thus not disclosed. It was only during investigation, as indicated above, that PW 2 claimed, on arrival of the police in their village, that the appellants, accompanied by Kamleshwari Choudhary, Dilip Mandal, Mahesh Mandal and Ranvir Rai, had killed Lal Babu. 38. It was only during investigation, as indicated above, that PW 2 claimed, on arrival of the police in their village, that the appellants, accompanied by Kamleshwari Choudhary, Dilip Mandal, Mahesh Mandal and Ranvir Rai, had killed Lal Babu. 38. In the backdrop of the thoroughly discredited evidence of PW 1, PW 2, PW 3 and PW 4, when we turn to the findings of the doctor (PW 6), we find that his evidence is that on 21.12.2006, he held post mortem examination on the dead body of Lal Babu and found as follows:— “(i). A circular wound of entry with blackening and tattooing and charring of the surrounding skin are having ½ “ in diameter on left side of the chest, 3½” below the left area of breast. On dissection of the wound, the surrounding tissues, blood vessels were damaged. Chest cavity was full of blood, heart was pierced. (ii) A wound of exit ½” diameter on right side of the back of the chest. On dissection of the wound, the surrounding tissues, blood vessels were damaged. The abdominal cavity was full of blood. 39. It is in the evidence of the doctor (PW 6) that the above mentioned injury was caused by a fire-arm, the fire-arm having been fired from a close distance. 40. In the opinion of the doctor (PW 6), hemorrhage and shock resulting from the fire-arm injury became the cause of death of the said deceased. 41. In his evidence, the doctor (PW 6) has clarified that there was only one gun-shot injury sustained by the said deceased and that the injury, which had been so sustained by the said deceased, would have disabled a person from moving beyond a few feet. It has also been clarified by the doctor (PW 6) that the injury, found on the said deceased, was possible to have been caused by a fire-arm from the front side and not from back side. 42. It has also been clarified by the doctor (PW 6) that the injury, found on the said deceased, was possible to have been caused by a fire-arm from the front side and not from back side. 42. Thus, the categorical finding of the doctor (PW 6) is to the effect that though there were two wounds, one on the chest and the other on the back of the said deceased, the injury, on the left side of the chest, was the entry wound and the injury, on the right side of his back, was the exit wound meaning thereby that one bullet, fired from a fire-arm, was sustained by the said deceased and the bullet, having entered into the chest, had pierced out of the back of the said deceased. 43. The findings of the doctor (PW 6) and his opinion with regard to the cause of death have not been in dispute at the trial. Even the learned trial Court did not question the doctor (PW 6) to show that the findings of the doctor (PW 6), were, in the light of the medical science, incorrect. 44. Having, thus, not questioned at all the correctness of the findings and the opinion of the doctor (PW 6), the learned trial Court could not have legally impeached the evidence of the doctor by holding that the findings of the doctor and his opinion were incorrect. 45. Be that as it may, the learned trial Court has observed, in the impugned judgment, that if a bullet fragments on impact, an exit wound may not occur inasmuch as the bullet may get reduced to granules and there may be difficulty in removing them from the body even when the granules are identified by X-ray. For reaching this conclusion, the learned trial Court has referred to Dr. K. S. Narayan Reddy’ book, “The Essentials of Forensic Medicine and Toxicology” (26th Edition), Chapter-VIII, page-195. 46. Based on the above observations made by Dr. K. S. Narayan Readdy, in his book titled as “The Essentials of Forensic Medicine and Toxicology” (26th Edition), learned trial Court has concluded that if the bullet was not found and was not recovered, it did not mean that both the injuries, found on the person of the deceased, were the result of one fire-arm injury. 47. K. S. Narayan Readdy, in his book titled as “The Essentials of Forensic Medicine and Toxicology” (26th Edition), learned trial Court has concluded that if the bullet was not found and was not recovered, it did not mean that both the injuries, found on the person of the deceased, were the result of one fire-arm injury. 47. What needs to be pointed out, while considering the above aspect of the case, is that if a bullet fired from a fire-arm is sustained by a person and there is no exit wound, the bullet shall, ordinarily, be found inside the body; but if the bullet, having entered into the body, pierces out of the body, the bullet would not be found and an exit wound be caused. In some cases, however, it is possible that the bullet may fragment on impact. An exit wound, in such a case, does not occur inasmuch as the bullet may get reduced to granules and there may be difficulty in removing them from the body even when identified by X-ray. 48. It needs to be borne in mind that the above conclusion of the learned trial Court that the said deceased sustained two bullet injuries is merely a possibility; whereas a trial Court has to reach a definite finding if the finding is required to be made the basis of conviction; or else, such a possibility would not rule out the positive evidence of the medical expert. 49. In other words, unless a Court can confidently hold, on an aspect of medical sciences, as to what had happened, such an indefinite finding cannot be made basis for rejecting the medical expert’s evidence. 50. Coupled with the above, what needs to be noted is that Dr. K. S. Narayan Reddy’s observations, which the learned trial Court has relied upon, speak merely of possibility and, hence, mere possibility cannot be a reason for rejecting the finding or opinion of a medical expert, when his evidence was not impeached, while he was being examined as a witness at the trial. There is not even a particle of evidence on record showing that granules were seen or found in the said dead body. When a bullet fragments, it would cause further injuries, because of the splinters. 51. There is not even a particle of evidence on record showing that granules were seen or found in the said dead body. When a bullet fragments, it would cause further injuries, because of the splinters. 51. In the present case, had the said deceased sustained two bullet injures, both bullets – if the reasoning of the learned trial Court is correct – had fragmented inside the body and would have caused further injuries inside the body of the said deceased. There was no such findings of the doctor (PW 6) and, in the complete absence of any such finding, the learned trial Court could not have opined, far less, concluded, that the bullet had fragmented inside the body of the said deceased. 52. For the purpose of, therefore, belying the findings of the doctor and his opinion, there ought to have been positive finding that the bullet had fragmented into granules. In the absence of such a positive finding, it could not have been opined by the learned trial Court, far less, held, that two bullets had been sustained by the said deceased and both the bullets had fragmented inside the body of the deceased. 53. Thus, for the findings, so arrived by the learned trial Court, as indicated above, there was no foundation in the evidence on record. 54. Coupled with the above, we do not notice anything inherently incorrect or improbable in the evidence given by the doctor (PW 6). It is not difficult, therefore, to hold, and we do hold, that Lal Babu received only one bullet injury sustained by him from the front, the bullet, having entered into his chest, had pierced out of his back and that there was no injury, which the said deceased had sustained on his being shot at his back. At any rate, when the evidence on record gives rise to two equally reasonable views, it is the view, which goes in favour of the appellant, needs to be adopted. Viewed from the angle, too, there can be no escape from the conclusion that Lal Babu had sustained only one bullet injury, the same having been fired from the front. 55. Viewed from the angle, too, there can be no escape from the conclusion that Lal Babu had sustained only one bullet injury, the same having been fired from the front. 55. In the face of the medical evidence on record, there can be no escape from the conclusion that Lal Babu had sustained only one gun shot injury on being fired from the front side and the shock and hemorrhage, which resulted from the injury so sustained, caused his death and that he had not been shot at his back. 56. In the face of the evidence of PW 3 and also in the face of the medical evidence on record, which proved that the said deceased had sustained only one bullet injury (i.e. the injury on the chest being the entry wound and the injury at the back being the exit wound, caused by the bullet, fired at, and sustained by Lal Babu), there can be no escape from the conclusion that the description of the occurrence, given by PW 1, PW 2, PW 3 and PW 4, is not safe to place reliance upon inasmuch as the evidence of these witnesses is nothing but ad-mixture of half-truth and untruth. This apart, the half-truth and untruth are so inextricably mixed with each other that it is impossible to disengage the truth from falsehoold. 57. In the circumstances indicated above, it was impossible to place implicit reliance on the evidence of PW 1, PW 2, PW 3 and PW 4. In the absence of any other evidence, supporting the description of the occurrence given by the eye-witnesses, one has no option, but to hold, and we do hold, that none of these witnesses, who have claimed themselves to be eye-witnesses, can be treated or held to be wholly reliable. Even if their evidence is not rejected by the Court as wholly unreliable, their evidence would fall, at best, in the category of those witnesses, who are neither wholly reliable nor wholly unreliable. 58. It is trite that the witnesses, ordinarily, fall into three distinct categories, namely, (i) wholly reliable, (ii) wholly unreliable and (iii) neither wholly reliable nor wholly unreliable. If the witness is wholly reliable, his evidence can be implicitly relied upon and such a witness’s testimony can be made basis for conviction of an accused. 58. It is trite that the witnesses, ordinarily, fall into three distinct categories, namely, (i) wholly reliable, (ii) wholly unreliable and (iii) neither wholly reliable nor wholly unreliable. If the witness is wholly reliable, his evidence can be implicitly relied upon and such a witness’s testimony can be made basis for conviction of an accused. Similarly, when a witness is found to be wholly unreliable, no reliance can at all be placed on his evidence and his evidence has to be rejected outright. When, however, a witness is found to be neither wholly reliable, nor wholly unreliable, his evidence cannot be accepted as true unless his evidence is found to have been corroborated by some credible independent evidence, direct or circumstantial. 59. The evidence of the eye-witnesses, which the prosecution has adduced in the present case, cannot be safely relied upon unless the same is found to have been corroborated by some credible independent evidence, direct or circumstantial. 60. It is also an undisputed position of law that one infirm witness cannot be treated to have corroborated the evidence of another infirm witness meaning thereby that witnesses of same brand cannot be taken to have corroborated each other. Thus, when a witness is neither wholly reliable nor wholly unreliable, his evidence cannot be taken to have been corroborated by a witness of the same brand, namely, a witness, who is neither wholly reliable nor wholly unreliable, for, evidence is not to be counted, but weighed. It is not the number of the witnesses, which determines the outcome of a trial; rather, it is the inherent falsity or truth of the evidence given by the witness, which decides the outcome of trial. If each one of a large number of witnesses is found to be wholly unreliable, their evidence cannot become acceptable as true merely because a large number of similar brand of witnesses has corroborated each other. 61. A reference, with regard to the above position of law, may be made to the case of Muluwa, S/o Binda and others Vs. The State of Madhya Pradesh, [ AIR 1976 SC 989 ], wherein the Supreme Court has observed as follows :— “It is elementary that the evidence of an infirm witness does not become reliable merely because it has been corroborated by a number of witnesses of the same brand; for, evidence is to be weighed not counted. The State of Madhya Pradesh, [ AIR 1976 SC 989 ], wherein the Supreme Court has observed as follows :— “It is elementary that the evidence of an infirm witness does not become reliable merely because it has been corroborated by a number of witnesses of the same brand; for, evidence is to be weighed not counted. Since the evidence of P.Ws. 5 and 6 suffered from the same infirmities as that of Smt. Jugatia, it cannot be said that the trial Judge had no basis, whatsoever, for _tigmatizing it as unreliable.” (Emphasis is added) 62. Situated thus, it is clear that merely because some persons, claiming themselves to be eye-witnesses, have given evidence describing the occurrence in tune with each other, their evidence cannot be made basis for holding them truthful witnesses, when their evidence is belied by the medical and other evidence on record unless their evidence is found to have been corroborated by credible independent evidence, direct or circumstantial. 63. Because of the nature of evidence, which is available on record, the least, which ought to have been done by the learned trial Court, was to accord benefit of reasonable doubt to the accused persons inasmuch as we are clearly of the view that in the light of the evidence on record, which we have discussed above, it was too hazardous to convict any of the accused-appellants, particularly, when we find that the evidence, which the prosecution has adduced, is an ad-mixture of half-truth and untruth and it is not only difficult, but wholly impossible to disengage the truth from the falsehood. The benefit of such a situation ought to have been given to the accused-appellants. 64. In the backdrop of what have been discussed and pointed out above, we are firmly of the view that the prosecution had failed, in the present case, to bring home the charges against the accused-appellants beyond reasonable doubt and that the accused-appellants were entitled to be accorded benefit of doubt. 65. In the result, and for the reasons discussed above, these appeals stand allowed. The impugned conviction of the accused-appellants and the sentences passed against them by the judgment and order, under appeal, shall accordingly stand set aside. All the accused-appellants are held not guilty of the offences, which they were charged with, and they are acquitted of the same under benefit of doubt. 66. The impugned conviction of the accused-appellants and the sentences passed against them by the judgment and order, under appeal, shall accordingly stand set aside. All the accused-appellants are held not guilty of the offences, which they were charged with, and they are acquitted of the same under benefit of doubt. 66. Because of what have been discussed and pointed out, these appeals need to be allowed. 67. In the result and for the foregoing reasons, we allow these appeals. The impugned conviction of the accused-appellants and the sentences passed against them by the judgment and order, under appeal, are hereby set aside. The accused-appellants are held not guilty of the offences, which they stand convicted of, and they are accordingly acquitted of the same under benefit of doubt. 68. Let accused-appellant, Pawan Choudhary, be set at liberty, forthwith, unless he is required to be detained in connection with any other case. 69. So far as accused-appellant Ashwini Choudhary, is concerned, he is already on bail. The bail bonds of the accused-appellant, Ashwini Choudhary, are hereby cancelled and his sureties shall stand discharged. 70. The Registry shall, forthwith, send a copy of this judgment and order to the learned trial Court along with the Lower Courts Record. S. P. SINGH, J.:–I agree.