JUDGMENT This is a writ petition that calls into question the distinction between suspension of sentence and that of conviction, and also whether dismissal from service is an invariable course of action for the employer in the event of the employee suffering conviction in a court of law. The petitioner joined as a Junior Assistant in the Telugu Academy Regional Centre, Tirupathi on 26.03.1993 and later got promoted as Senior Assistant in June, 2005. In course of time, the petitioner was transferred on administrative grounds to Telugu Academy Regional Centre, Visakhapatnam. When he was working in Visakhapatnam, on 18.02.2008 the then Director of the respondent Academy placed the petitioner under suspension on the allegation of certain financial irregularities said to have been committed by the petitioner when he was working in the Regional Centre at Tirupathi. The record reveals that the petitioner filed W.P.No.3872 of 2008 assailing the said suspension and eventually the writ petition was allowed on 31.10.2008. When the respondent Academy refused to reinstate the petitioner into service despite the order of this Court, the petitioner filed C.C.No.293 of 2009 arraigning the authority eo nominee. Eventually, on the pain of contempt, the petitioner is said to have been reinstated on 13.07.2009. In the interregnum, though the respondent Academy assailed the orders dated 31.10.2008 in intra-court appeal in W.A.No.1596 of 2009, a learned Division Bench of this Court dismissed the said Appeal through its judgment dated 13.11.2009. The record further reveals that on 27.07.2009, the petitioner was charge sheeted and was asked to submit his explanation on the enquiry report attached to the said charge sheet. Not satisfied with the explanation submitted by the petitioner, on 22.12.2009 the disciplinary authority issued a memo proposing to impose the penalty of dismissal from service. Once again, the petitioner approached this Court by filing W.P.No.28719 of 2009, once again arraying the Director of the respondent Academy eo nominee as a respondent, in the wake of mala fides and abuse of power pleaded against the said Director. In the said writ petition stay was granted. Since, for the present purpose, those writ proceedings may not have much bearing, I do not propose to elaborate further on them. In the said writ petition stay was granted. Since, for the present purpose, those writ proceedings may not have much bearing, I do not propose to elaborate further on them. Based on the allegations of misappropriation and defalcation of Academy’s funds, the authorities registered a crime against the petitioner in C.C.No.20 of 2009 on the file of the jurisdictional Judicial Magistrate of First Class at Tirupathi for the alleged offence under Section 409 of I.P.C. Pending the disposal of the said criminal case, on 16.01.2013, the incumbent Director of the respondent Academy is said to have directed the Accounts Department not to pay salary to the petitioner until further orders, ostensibly on the ground that the petitioner had been very frequently making his sorties from Visakhapatnam, the place of his working, to Tirupathi, the place where he has been facing criminal trial. Assailing the said directions of the Academy’s Director, the petitioner once again approached this Court by filing W.P.No.16031 of 2013. In any event, the respondent authorities withdrew those proceedings on 17.06.2013. Eventually, C.C.No.20 of 2009 ended in conviction of the petitioner through judgment dated 04.02.2014. In fact, the III Additional Judicial Magistrate of First Class, Tirupathi, finding the petitioner guilty for the offence under Section 409 of I.P.C., convicted him to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of two years, apart from a fine of Rs.10,000/-, in default of payment of which, the petitioner is required to undergo further simple imprisonment for a period of three months. The record reveals that on the very same day, the petitioner filed an application to have the sentence suspended by the trial Court to enable the petitioner to carry an appeal against the judgment of conviction. In fact, the trial Court did suspend the sentence on the same day, i.e., 04.02.2014 in Crl.M.P.No.573 of 2014. Thereafter on 06.02.2014, the petitioner made a representation to the Director of the respondent Academy to continue him in service in view of the suspension of conviction by the trial Court. The record further reveals that in Criminal Appeal No.16 of 2014, filed by the petitioner on the file of the V Additional District and Sessions Judge’s Court, Tirupathi, he also filed an application under Section 389(1) of Cr.P.C., to suspend the sentence and conviction passed by the trial Court against the petitioner. The record further reveals that in Criminal Appeal No.16 of 2014, filed by the petitioner on the file of the V Additional District and Sessions Judge’s Court, Tirupathi, he also filed an application under Section 389(1) of Cr.P.C., to suspend the sentence and conviction passed by the trial Court against the petitioner. Through an order dated 24.02.2014, in Crl.M.P.No.30 of 2014, the Appellate Court allowed the said criminal miscellaneous petition and suspended the conviction as well as the sentence of imprisonment imposed on the petitioner on his execution of personal bond for Rs.5,000/- with two sureties each for the like sum to the satisfaction of the trial Court. Despite the suspension of conviction as well as the sentence by the Appellate Court, the respondent Academy went ahead and issued the impugned proceedings No.05/TA/Admn/ 2014, dated 22.02.2014 holding that the conduct of the petitioner during the course of his employment has lead to his conviction, and as such, he has rendered himself unfit to be retained in public service. Accordingly, invoking the punitive powers conferred on the respondent authority under Clause (x) of Rule 9, r/w Rule 25(i) of the Andhra Pradesh Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1991, the respondent Academy dismissed the petitioner from service with immediate effect. Assailing the said order of dismissal, the present writ petition is filed by the petitioner. Sri P.Govind Reddy, learned counsel for the petitioner, has made elaborate submissions, mainly focusing on the mala fide and vindictive efforts of the respondent authorities in persecuting the petitioner, as a result of which the petitioner had been compelled to knock the doors of this Court on numerous occasions. That apart, adverting to the impugned proceedings of dismissal from service, the learned counsel has submitted that it is in gross violation of Rule 25(1) of C.C.A.Rules. He has further contended that legion are the precedents on the undesirability of dismissing the delinquent on a mere premise that the delinquent has earned a conviction in a criminal proceeding. Elaborating his submissions, the learned counsel has stated that Rule 14 of Railway Servants Rules 1968, is analogous to Rule 21 of C.C.A.Rules. He has further contended that legion are the precedents on the undesirability of dismissing the delinquent on a mere premise that the delinquent has earned a conviction in a criminal proceeding. Elaborating his submissions, the learned counsel has stated that Rule 14 of Railway Servants Rules 1968, is analogous to Rule 21 of C.C.A.Rules. Interpreting the said Rule 14, the Hon’ble Supreme Court, submitted the learned counsel, in The Divisional Personnel Officer Southern Railway and another v. T.R.Challappan ( AIR 1975 SC 2216 ), has definitively held that under all circumstances dismissal is not the panacea and that the said extraordinary power of terminating the services of the delinquent should be exercised sparingly duly taking into account not only the gravity of the alleged crime but also the attendant circumstances. The learned counsel has also placed reliance on a judgment of a learned Division Bench of this Court in Divisional Manager, South Central Railway, Hyderabad Division, Secunderabad and others v. P.Bhaskar Rao ( 2013(1) ALD 309 (DB). In essence, the learned counsel has stated that the respondent authorities have passed the order of dismissal in a very mechanical manner without observing the safeguards under Rule 25(1) of the C.C.A.Rules. He has stated that the impugned order is a product of non-application of mind, bordering on victimization. Per contra, the learned Standing Counsel for the respondent Academy, in tune with the averments made in the counter affidavit filed by the respondent Academy, has vehemently opposed the contentions of the petitioner. Repelling the submissions made by the learned counsel for the petitioner, the learned Standing Counsel for the Academy has drawn the attention of this Court to the impugned proceedings dated 22.02.2014 and has submitted that it is a detailed and speaking order. Elaborating on the said submission, the learned Standing Counsel has submitted that the authority concerned has, in fact, taken into account the legislative intent pervading Rule 25(1) of the C.C.A.Rules and has accordingly, exercising his discretion, directed the dismissal of the petitioner from service, given the gravity of the crime committed by the petitioner, as has been conclusively held by the Criminal Court. The learned Standing Counsel has also taken this Court through certain aspects of the judgment of the trial Court and has further made submissions touching upon the merits of the matter. The learned Standing Counsel has also taken this Court through certain aspects of the judgment of the trial Court and has further made submissions touching upon the merits of the matter. In any event, since the scope of the writ petition is confined to the legality of the proceedings dated 22.02.2014 passed by the respondent Academy dismissing the petitioner from service, this Court does not propose to examine those submissions on the part of either of the learned counsel touching upon the merits of the matter involving the core issue of misappropriation and defalcation. Adverting to the issue on hand, the learned Standing Counsel has submitted that it entirely lies within the discretion of the employer either to wait until the eventual conclusion of the criminal proceedings or to terminate the services of the delinquent forthwith. Expatiating further, the learned Standing Counsel has stated that mere suspension of sentence, even for that matter the very conviction, does not obliterate the guilt of the accused, inasmuch as the conviction is based on an elaborate trial and on merits, and as such, it is for the employer concerned to decide under the facts and circumstances either to continue the delinquent or to terminate his services forthwith, the latter being the course of action adopted by the respondent Academy. The learned Standing Counsel has also submitted that the petitioner before the Appellate Court filed an application under Section 389 of Cr.P.C. only for the purpose of suspension of the sentence, but the trial Court has strangely gone beyond the very prayer of the petitioner and ordered not only the suspension of sentence but also the suspension of the very conviction. He has also submitted that the respondent Academy has already initiated steps before this Court to assail the said order dated 24.02.2014 in Crl.M.P.No.30 of 2014. In support of his submissions, the learned Standing Counsel has placed reliance on: 1. State of Maharashtra through CBI, Anti Corruption Branch, Mumbai v. Balakrishna Dattatrya Kumbhar (2012) 12 SCC 384 ); 2. State of A.P. rep. by its Principal Secretary to Government, Municipal Administration and Urban Development Department and others v. P.Rajasekhar and others ( 2010(1) ALT 468 (DB) = 2010(1) ALD 595 (DB); 3. Municipal Corporation of Guntur, rep. State of Maharashtra through CBI, Anti Corruption Branch, Mumbai v. Balakrishna Dattatrya Kumbhar (2012) 12 SCC 384 ); 2. State of A.P. rep. by its Principal Secretary to Government, Municipal Administration and Urban Development Department and others v. P.Rajasekhar and others ( 2010(1) ALT 468 (DB) = 2010(1) ALD 595 (DB); 3. Municipal Corporation of Guntur, rep. by its Commissioner and others v. B.Syamala Kumari, Junior Assistant, Municipal Corporation of Guntur and others ( 2006(6) ALT 771 (DB); As it is an adjudication on the issue of suspension of conviction, I propose to have the discussion in strict confines. With that prefatory statement, I may proceed to examine the issue ever so briefly. It is profitable to extract Rule 25 of the C.C.A.Rules, which is as follows: "Rule 25. Special procedure in certain cases :-Notwithstanding anything contained in Rule 20 to Rule 24- (i) Where penalty is imposed on a Government Servant on the ground of conduct which has led to his conviction on a criminal charge, or (ii) Where the Disciplinary Authority is satisfied for reasons to be recorded by it in writing that it is not reasonably practicable to hold an inquiry in the manner provided in these rules, or (iii) Where the Governor is satisfied that in the interest of the security of the State, it is not expedient to hold any inquiry in the manner provided in these rules. The Disciplinary Authority may consider the circumstances of the case and make such orders thereon as it deems fit: Provided that the Commission shall be consulted, where such consultation is necessary, before any orders are made in any case under this rule. Provided further that no such consultation with the Commission is necessary before any orders are made under Clause (i) of this rule. Conviction in a Criminal Cast-Delinquent Employee has no Wight to Continue in Service/ Under Suspension Pending Criminal Appeal". Indeed, a perusal of the above rule amply indicates that the disciplinary authority is required to consider the circumstances of the case and make such orders thereof as it deems fit. The learned counsel for the petitioner has also placed on record Rule 14 of the Railway Servants (D & A) Rules 1968. A perusal of both the rules makes it manifestly clear that they are substantially similar, if not in parimateria. The learned counsel for the petitioner has also placed on record Rule 14 of the Railway Servants (D & A) Rules 1968. A perusal of both the rules makes it manifestly clear that they are substantially similar, if not in parimateria. Since the judicial pronouncement of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in T.R.Challappan (1 supra) deals with Rule 14 of the Railway Servants Rules, 1968, the learned counsel for the petitioner has placed the said rule on record so as to impress upon the Court that the said decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court has a presidential value insofar as the Rule 25(1) of the C.C.A.Rules is concerned. Accepting that both the Rules are substantially similar, it is profitable to examine the ratio of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the said judgment. In paragraph-21 of the said judgment, a Three Judge Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held: "This provision confers power on the disciplinary authority to decide whether in the facts and circumstances of a particular case what penalty if at all, should be imposed on the delinquent employee. It is obvious that in considering this matter the disciplinary authority will have to take into account the entire conduct of the delinquent employee, the gravity of the misconduct committed by him, the impact which his misconduct is likely to have on the administration and other extenuating circumstances or redeeming features if any present in the case and so on and so forth. It may be that the conviction of an accused may be for a trivial offence." In P.Bhaskar Rao (2 supra), a learned Division Bench of this Court, placing reliance on T.R.Challappan (1 supra), as well as other decisions of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, has held: "Thus it is clear that the disciplinary authority is bound to take into consideration the circumstances and apply his mind before imposing a penalty even under Rule 14(i) of the Rules on the ground that the Railway Servant is convicted on a criminal charge and under no circumstances the removal from service would be the automatic consequence of the conviction on a criminal charge." Before elaborating further, now I propose to examine the authorities relied on by the learned Standing Counsel for the respondent Academy in support of its submissions that the dismissal of the petitioner is entirely justified under the facts and circumstances of the case. In Balakrishna Dattatrya Kumbhar (3 supra), one of the three issues that fell for consideration was the desirability of suspending the conviction. Since this writ petition does not concern itself with the said aspect, it may not be necessary for this Court to consider the said proposition of law. In P.Rajasekhar (4 supra), a learned Division Bench of this Court has held that the suspension of sentence does not obliterate the suspension and conviction and mere pendency of Criminal Appeal/Revision does not preclude State/Disciplinary Authority from invoking the power under Rule 25(1) of the A.P.C.C.A.Rules. It is further held that the Court should not aid public servant, who stands convicted for corruption charges. At the threshold, it may have to be observed that this decision of the learned Division Bench has only dealt with the issue of the suspension of sentence and its impact on the authority’s exercising powers under Rule 25(1) of the Rules. Since it has not dealt with the situation arising out of suspension of the conviction, it may not have any precedential value for the present purpose. In B.Syamala Kumari (5 supra), a learned Division Bench of this Court has held: "As noted above, in cases where a penalty is imposed on a Government Servant on the ground of the conduct which has led to his conviction on a criminal charge, the Disciplinary Authority, under Rule 25(i) of the A.P.C.S. (C.C&A) Rules, 1991 may consider the circumstances of the case and make such orders thereon as it deems fit. It is, therefore, for the Disciplinary Authority to consider all the relevant facts and circumstances in relation to the conduct which led to the delinquent employee's conviction on a criminal charge and, thereafter, pass such orders as it deems fit. The power conferred under Rule 25(i) has to be exercised fairly, justly and reasonably (S. Nagoor Meera's case (supra)) and, while considering the matter, the Disciplinary Authority will have to take into account the entire conduct of the delinquent employee, the gravity of the misconduct committed by him, the impact which his misconduct is likely to have on the administration and other extenuating circumstances or redeeming features, if any, present in the case. (T.R. Chellappan's case (supra). (T.R. Chellappan's case (supra). Where the Disciplinary Authority come to know that a Government Servant has been convicted on a criminal charge, it must consider whether the conduct which has led to his conviction was such as to warrant imposition of a penalty and, if so, what is the penalty which should be imposed. For this purpose the Disciplinary Authority will have to peruse the judgment of the criminal Court, take into account all the circumstances of the case and the various factors set out in T.R. Chellappan's case (supra). (Tulsiram Patel's case (supra)). The factors, which the Disciplinary Authority may have to take into consideration, cannot be enumerated. The aforesaid factors are, but, instances and are merely illustrative and not exhaustive." On summation of the judicial precedents obtaining on the issue, the learned Division Bench has held that the disciplinary authority in its discretion can impose such penalty based on the conviction of the delinquent after considering the facts and circumstances of the case ex parte without any enquiry and without affording opportunity of hearing to the delinquent. In other words, their Lordships have laid down that the orders to be passed under Rule 25(1) of the Rules do not partake of adversial character and do not call for the rigmarole of issuance of notice, calling for objections and then pronouncing orders. Thus, on a subjective satisfaction of the authority concerned, the power can be exercised. In any event, a close reading of the said judgment, which is elaborate and exhaustive, also makes it clear that the authority concerned cannot pass orders on a mere conviction of the delinquent but only after taking into account all the circumstances, especially the conduct of the delinquent in his service rather than the very conviction while exercising power under Rule 25(1) of the Rules. Thus, even the said judgment in B.Syamala Kumari (5 supra) cannot be said to be an absolute proposition of law to hold that the delinquent can be dismissed from service despite the suspension of conviction. Having considered all the above precedents cited by either party to the proceedings, this Court is of the opinion that none of them directly deals with the situation arising from the suspension of conviction. Having considered all the above precedents cited by either party to the proceedings, this Court is of the opinion that none of them directly deals with the situation arising from the suspension of conviction. In Union of India v. Ramesh Kumar (1997) 7 SCC 514 at page 517), the Supreme Court, however, has held that: "A bare reading of Rule 19 shows that the disciplinary authority is empowered to take action against a government servant on the ground of misconduct which has led to his conviction on a criminal charge. The rules, however, do not provide that on suspension of execution of sentence by the appellate court the order of dismissal based on conviction stands obliterated and the dismissed government servant has to be treated under suspension till disposal of appeal by the appellate court. The rules also do not provide the disciplinary authority to await disposal of the appeal by the appellate court filed by a government servant for taking action against him on the ground of misconduct which has led to his conviction by a competent court of law. “Having regard to the provisions of the rules, the order dismissing the respondent from service on the ground of misconduct leading to his conviction by a competent court of law has not lost its sting merely because a criminal appeal was filed by the respondent against his conviction and the appellate court has suspended the execution of sentence and enlarged the respondent on bail. This matter may be examined from another angle. Under Section 389 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the appellate court has power to suspend the execution of sentence and to release an accused on bail. When the appellate court suspends the execution of sentence, and grants bail to an accused the effect of the order is that the sentence based on conviction is for the time being postponed, or kept in abeyance during the pendency of the appeal. In other words, by suspension of execution of sentence under Section 389 CrPC an accused avoids undergoing sentence pending criminal appeal. However, the conviction continues and is not obliterated and if the appellate court has suspended the execution of sentence. In other words, by suspension of execution of sentence under Section 389 CrPC an accused avoids undergoing sentence pending criminal appeal. However, the conviction continues and is not obliterated and if the appellate court has suspended the execution of sentence. Such being the position of law, the Administrative Tribunal fell into error in holding that by suspension of execution of sentence by the appellate court, the order of dismissal passed against the respondent was liable to be quashed and the respondent is to be treated under suspension till the disposal of criminal appeal by the High Court." (Emphasis added) In Lalsai Khunte v. Nirmal Sinha (2007) 9 SCC 330 at page 334), it is held that: "Recently, this Court in Ravikant S. Patil v. Sarvabhouma S. Bagali [ (2007) 1 SCC 673 : (2007) 1 SCC (Cri) 417 : (2006) 12 Scale 295 ] has clearly held that the Court has enough power to stay the conviction. It was held as under: 15. It deserves to be clarified that an order granting stay of conviction is not the rule but is an exception to be resorted to in rare cases depending upon the facts of a case. Where the execution stayed, the effect is that the conviction will not be operative from the date of stay. An order of stay, of course, does not render the conviction non-existent, but only non-operative. Be that as it may. Insofar as the present case is concerned, an application was filed specifically seeking stay of the order of conviction specifying the consequences if conviction was not stayed, that is, the appellant would incur disqualification to contest the election. The High Court after considering the special reason, granted the order staying the conviction. As the conviction itself is stayed in contrast to a stay of execution of the sentence, it is not possible to accept the contention of the respondent that the disqualification arising out of conviction continues to operate even after stay of conviction." (Emphasis added) Again recently in Navjot Singh Sidhu v. State of Punjab (2007) 2 SCC 574 : (2007) 1 SCC (Cri) 627 : JT (2007) 2 SC 382), the Hon'ble Supreme Court, while entertaining the appeal of the accused stayed the conviction. The relevant portion of the judgment reads as under: “21[13.1]. The relevant portion of the judgment reads as under: “21[13.1]. The Act provides not only the eligibility and qualification for membership of the House of People and Legislative Assembly but also for disqualification on conviction and other matters. Parliament in its wisdom having made a specific provision for disqualification on conviction by enacting Section 8, it is not for the Court to abridge or expand the same. The decisions of this Court rendered in Rama Narang v. Ramesh Narang [ (1995) 2 SCC 513 ] and Ravikant S. Patil v. Sarvabhouma S. Bagali [ (2007) 1 SCC 673 having recognised the power possessed by the court of appeal to suspend or stay an order of the conviction and having also laid down the parameters for exercise of such power, it is not possible to hold, as a matter of rule, or, to lay down, that in order to prevent any person who has committed an offence from entering Parliament or the Legislative Assembly the order of the conviction should not be suspended. The courts have to interpret the law as it stands and not on considerations which may be perceived to be morally more correct or ethical." (Emphasis added) The upshot of the above discussion is that the appellate court has the power to suspend the conviction, and if it did, then in that case, the conviction handed down by the trial court would not operate as a disqualification. But, however, simple suspension of sentence does not obliterate the conviction. The Supreme Court has, indeed, observed that stay or suspension of conviction will mean it is temporarily non-operative. The Hon’ble Supreme Court has indeed repeatedly held that the appellate court has the power to suspend the conviction and if it did, then in that case, the conviction handed down by the trial court would not operate as a disqualification. But simple suspension of the sentence, however, will not stop the flow of consequences of conviction. It is specifically mentioned that the stay of order of the conviction will mean it is temporarily non-operative. But simple suspension of the sentence, however, will not stop the flow of consequences of conviction. It is specifically mentioned that the stay of order of the conviction will mean it is temporarily non-operative. In the light of the above judicial pronouncements of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, it can safely be concluded that, since the very conviction has stood obliterated, atleast for the time being, in view of its suspension by the Appellate Court, by way of a legal fiction, it can be stated that the petitioner presently has not been under any disability, and as such, the invocation of Rule 25(1) of the Rules does not arise. The learned Standing Counsel for the respondent Academy has repeatedly stressed the aspect that the order of the appellate court suspending the conviction, unasked for, cannot be sustained and that the Academy is all set to challenge the said order. Accordingly, in anticipation of those proceedings sought to be taken against the order of appellate court, the learned Standing Counsel urges this Court to postpone adjudication of the present writ petition. It is needless to observe that this Court has dealt with the issue in the light of the suspension of conviction, which stands undisturbed to this day. In course of time, as has been contended by the learned standing counsel, if there is any change in the circumstances, it is entirely for the respondent authorities to act according to those changed circumstances, of course, well within the bounds of the law, though. In the above facts and circumstances, this Court is of the opinion that the impugned proceedings dated 22.02.2014 cannot be sustained and are accordingly set aside. As a natural corollary, the respondent Academy is directed to reinstate the petitioner into service. With the above observations and directions, this writ petition stands allowed. No costs. As a sequel, miscellaneous petitions, if any pending in this writ petition, shall stand closed.