ORDER (Per: HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE NAVIN SINHA) I.A. No. 4195 of 2013 has been filed to condone delay of 368 days in filing the Appeal. 2. The Bihar Urban Development Agency under the Department of Urban Development, Government of Bihar, invited expression of interest for solid waste management in the town of Patna. After competitive bidding agreement was signed on 9.1.2010 between the respondent Company and the Appellant Municipal Corporation. The agreement inter alia provided for payment of 75% claim of monthly bills within ten working days and the remaining 25% after verification within a period of twenty days from the former payment. Bills were raised by the respondent from January 2010 till July 2011 for works done. The respondent Company is stated to have deposited Rs.10,83,59,873.53p as government taxes for the works in question. No payments whatsoever having been made it stopped further works on 20.6.2011. The writ petition was then filed for payment of Rs. 7,62,65,817.00 with 18% interest. The learned Single Judge allowed the claim with 8% interest. Hence the appeal by the Municipal Corporation. 3. Learned Counsel for the Municipal Corporation fairly stated that the respondent Company did work under the contract from January 2010 till July 2011. The agreement was not terminated for failure or inability to discharge obligations. But the respondent was entitled to payment of legitimate dues only. The bills raised were found to be exaggerated. It is entitled to payments only as admitted by the Corporation. The Corporation has examined the bills, assessed the legitimate dues and by a detailed note has forwarded it to the State Government in the Urban Development Department for approval on 23.7.2011. As soon as approval is received due payments shall be made. Since the amount claimed under the contract was denied and disputed by the Corporation the Learned Single Judge, in Writ jurisdiction could not have allowed payment beyond that admitted. The contract also contains an arbitration clause without availing which the writ petition had been filed and allowed. 4. Since the approval for payment was pending before the Department of Urban Development, it was also officially debated if appeal be filed after decision is taken by the Urban development Department. The High Court Rules have been amended. It is mandatory for the appellant to file complete two legible sets of all the pleadings filed by the parties along with annexures before the Writ Court. The High Court Rules have been amended. It is mandatory for the appellant to file complete two legible sets of all the pleadings filed by the parties along with annexures before the Writ Court. The complete brief of the Writ Court was voluminous and runs into approximately 800 pages. Collation of all pleadings, verification to ensure their being legible, study of the same again to file the appeal therefore took some time. The delay in filing the appeal was therefore bonafide as administrative decisions had to be taken. Since a very large amount of public money is involved it is only proper that the delay be condoned and the matter heard on merits. No prejudice shall be caused to the respondent Company since the Municipal Corporation does not deny liability to pay and is in the process of quantification of the dues to be paid for which necessary action has already been taken. 5. Learned Senior Counsel for the respondent Company opposes condonation of delay. It is submitted that there is no explanation worth the name much less has day to day delay been explained. The appeal was filed only after the respondent filed the Contempt application. Relying on (2009) 3 SCC 525 (Commissioner, Nagar Parishad, Bhilwara v. Labour Court) it is submitted that unless delay is condoned, the merits of the case cannot be looked into. Reliance is next placed on (2012) 3 SCC 563 (Post Master General v. Living Media India Limited) to submit that no special latitude can be given to the Municipal Corporation merely because it is a government department. Reference was also made to (2013) 4 SCC 52 (Amalendu Kumar Bera V. State of West Bengal in support of the same. Reliance was further placed on (2013) 14 SCC 81 (Basawaraj v. Special Land Acquisition Officer) in support of the proposition that the words “sufficient cause” means that the party did not act negligently and there was no want of bonafides. Unless a satisfactory explanation is furnished delay should not be condoned. Even if a liberal interpretation be given, cases of negligence and lack of bonafides brook no interference. Limitation is founded on public policy to shorten litigation. 6. We have considered the submissions of the parties. Judicial precedents lay down that there is no rigid yardstick or mathematical formula to condone or not to condone delay. Even if a liberal interpretation be given, cases of negligence and lack of bonafides brook no interference. Limitation is founded on public policy to shorten litigation. 6. We have considered the submissions of the parties. Judicial precedents lay down that there is no rigid yardstick or mathematical formula to condone or not to condone delay. The consideration cannot be with rigidity but has to be with flexibility on the facts of each case. The exercise of power by the Court is discretionary, but judicious, guided by the beacon light of justice. While in some cases even a short delay may not be condoned, in others delay of fifteen years has been condoned in (2011) 5 SCC 607 (Shankara Coop. Housing Society Ltd. v. M.Prabhakar). 7. In Commissioner, Nagar Parishad, Bhilwara (supra) relied upon by the respondents it was held that in fact there was sufficient explanation for the delay of 178 days. In Post Master General (supra) the delay was of 427 days and in Amalendu Kumar Bera (supra) for inordinately long four years. No absolute proposition was laid down that the government is not entitled to any latitude whatsoever and must be placed at par with individuals in matters regarding limitation under all circumstances. On the contrary in the former it has been observed as follows :- “19. Though the learned ASG heavily relied on the abovesaid decisions and the principles laid down, on going through all the factual details, we are of the view that there is no quarrel about the propositions inferred therein. However, considering the peculiar facts and circumstances of each case, this Court either condoned the delay or upheld the order of the High Court condoning the delay in filing appeal by the State.” 8. In Basawaraj (supra) the delay of 5 ½ years was declined to be condoned observing that “sufficient cause” must be given liberal interpretation but not in cases of negligence and want of bonafides. 9. Existence of “Sufficient cause” is the pre-condition to condonation or denial of the same. The word has been the subject of repeated judicial interpretation. Again it cannot be given a fixed connotation or tested with rigidity. Its meaning and interpretation will depend on the facts and circumstances of each case. The consideration of “sufficient cause” cannot be confined to the number of days delay or the availability or non-availability of day to day explanation only. Again it cannot be given a fixed connotation or tested with rigidity. Its meaning and interpretation will depend on the facts and circumstances of each case. The consideration of “sufficient cause” cannot be confined to the number of days delay or the availability or non-availability of day to day explanation only. It has to be considered along with all surrounding circumstances, the settled law on the subject and larger public interest as also considerations of equity and justice. 10. The law of limitation cannot be considered as a procedural sword to be wielded at will or a weapon to defeat what may be legitimate claims merely on the ground of accrued rights or finality to litigation. The larger public interest involved is an important aspect for judicious exercise of discretion. This exercise of discretion by the Court must display adequate consideration of mind to the whole gamut of issues involved and a myopic approach based on the number of days of the delay or absence of day to day explanation shall not be proper exercise of discretion. At times even a short delay may not warrant condonation for absence of “sufficient cause” while at times longer delay may require exercise of discretion to condone. Complete lack of bonafides and negligence are issues which stand apart. 11. There has to be difference in interpreting “sufficient cause” when the litigation is qua private parties for private rights only. It will be different when one party is the government, the effect being confined to individual claims not affecting larger public interest. Where larger public interest is involved beyond the individual or it has effect beyond the immediate case considerations will have to be very different. Government, is an impersonal body where no individual has a personal interest but pursues matters in litigation as part of official duty. The desire in the Bureaucracy not to singularly accept responsibility for decision making is another factor which delays the decision making process as the proposal moves from one level to another and approval is required from more than one person. Matters involving very large sums of public money cannot be weighed on the golden scales of limitation without considering issues with regard to public money generated at the tax payers expense. Different considerations may arise when the amount involved is reasonable or small. 12. Matters involving very large sums of public money cannot be weighed on the golden scales of limitation without considering issues with regard to public money generated at the tax payers expense. Different considerations may arise when the amount involved is reasonable or small. 12. In A.I.R 1968 SC 222 ( Sarpanch, Lonand Grampanchayat v. Ramgiri Gosavi) explaining the manner in which the power is to be exercised it was observed as follows : “4……. In Krishna v. Chathappan the Madras High Court indicated in the following passage how the discretion under Section 5 should be exercised: “We think that Section 5 gives the Courts a discretion which in respect of jurisdiction is to be exercised in the way in which judicial power and discretion ought to be exercised upon principles which are well understood; the words „sufficient cause' receiving a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice when no negligence nor inaction nor want of bona fides is imputable to the appellant.” 13. In (1987) 2 SCC 720 (Union of India v. Cynamide India Ltd.) it was observed at paragraph 39 that in matters of serious concern to the public interest, delay must be condoned. 14. The aspect of public importance of issues as a reason to condone delay was noticed in 1991 Supp (2) SCC 286 (State of Rajasthan v. Jaimal) observing as follows : - “4…….When appeals by the State are lost for default on account of the inaction of the officials, nobody individually suffers but, in the ultimate analysis, it is the public interest that suffers in all such cases…..” 15. In (1996) 3 SCC 132 (State of Haryana v. Chandra Mani) it was observed that impersonal machinery, bureaucratic methodology, file pushing, passing-on-the-buck, all need to be considered with pragmatism observing at paragraph 11 as follows:- “11. It is notorious and common knowledge that delay in more than 60 per cent of the cases filed in this Court — be it by private party or the State — are barred by limitation and this Court generally adopts liberal approach in condonation of delay finding somewhat sufficient cause to decide the appeal on merits. It is equally common knowledge that litigants including the State are accorded the same treatment and the law is administered in an even-handed manner. It is equally common knowledge that litigants including the State are accorded the same treatment and the law is administered in an even-handed manner. When the State is an applicant, praying for condonation of delay, it is common knowledge that on account of impersonal machinery and the inherited bureaucratic methodology imbued with the note-making, file-pushing, and passing-on-the-buck ethos, delay on the part of the State is less difficult to understand though more difficult to approve, but the State represents collective cause of the community. It is axiomatic that decisions are taken by officers/agencies proverbially at slow pace and encumbered process of pushing the files from table to table and keeping it on table for considerable time causing delay — intentional or otherwise — is a routine. Considerable delay of procedural red-tape in the process of their making decision is a common feature. Therefore, certain amount of latitude is not impermissible. If the appeals brought by the State are lost for such default no person is individually affected but what in the ultimate analysis suffers, is public interest. The expression “sufficient cause” should, therefore, be considered with pragmatism in justice-oriented approach rather than the technical detection of sufficient cause for explaining every day?s delay. The factors which are peculiar to and characteristic of the functioning of the governmental conditions would be cognizant to and requires adoption of pragmatic approach in justice-oriented process. The court should decide the matters on merits unless the case is hopelessly without merit. No separate standards to determine the cause laid by the State vis-à-vis private litigant could be laid to prove strict standards of sufficient cause. The Government at appropriate level should constitute legal cells to examine the cases whether any legal principles are involved for decision by the courts or whether cases require adjustment and should authorise the officers to take a decision or give appropriate permission for settlement. In the event of decision to file appeal needed prompt action should be pursued by the officer responsible to file the appeal and he should be made personally responsible for lapses, if any. Equally, the State cannot be put on the same footing as an individual. In the event of decision to file appeal needed prompt action should be pursued by the officer responsible to file the appeal and he should be made personally responsible for lapses, if any. Equally, the State cannot be put on the same footing as an individual. The individual would always be quick in taking the decision whether he would pursue the remedy by way of an appeal or application since he is a person legally injured while State is an impersonal machinery working through its officers or servants…..” 16. The manner and factors on which discretion has to be exercised with pragmatism to enhance substantial justice was explained in (1987) 2 SCC 107 , (Collector (LA) v. Katiji) observing :- “3. The legislature has conferred the power to condone delay by enacting Section 5 of the Indian Limitation Act of 1963 in order to enable the courts to do substantial justice to parties by disposing of matters on ”merits”. The expression “sufficient cause” employed by the legislature is adequately elastic to enable the courts to apply the law in a meaningful manner which subserves the ends of justice — that being the life-purpose for the existence of the institution of courts. It is common knowledge that this Court has been making a justifiably liberal approach in matters instituted in this Court. But the message does not appear to have percolated down to all the other courts in the hierarchy. And such a liberal approach is adopted on principle as it is realized that:- “1. Ordinarily a litigant does not stand to benefit by lodging an appeal late. 2. Refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown out at the very threshold and cause of justice being defeated. As against this when delay is condoned the highest that can happen is that a cause would be decided on merits after hearing the parties. 3. “Every day’s delay must be explained” does not mean that a pedantic approach should be made. Why not every hour’s delay, every second’s delay? The doctrine must be applied in a rational common sense pragmatic manner. 4. When substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred for the other side cannot claim to have vested right in injustice being done because of a non-deliberate delay. 5. Why not every hour’s delay, every second’s delay? The doctrine must be applied in a rational common sense pragmatic manner. 4. When substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred for the other side cannot claim to have vested right in injustice being done because of a non-deliberate delay. 5. There is no presumption that delay is occasioned deliberately, or on account of culpable negligence, or on account of mala fides. A litigant does not stand to benefit by resorting to delay. In fact he runs a serious risk. 6. It must be grasped that judiciary is respected not on account of its power to legalize injustice on technical grounds but because it is capable of removing injustice and is expected to do so. Making a justice-oriented approach from this perspective, there was sufficient cause for condoning the delay in the institution of the appeal. The fact that it was the “State” which was seeking condonation and not a private party was altogether irrelevant. The doctrine of equality before law demands that all litigants, including the State as a litigant, are accorded the same treatment and the law is administered in an even-handed manner. There is no warrant for according a step-motherly treatment when the “State” is the applicant praying for condonation of delay. In fact experience shows that on account of an impersonal machinery (no one in charge of the matter is directly hit or hurt by the judgment sought to be subjected to appeal) and the inherited bureaucratic methodology imbued with the note-making, file-pushing and passing-on-the-buck ethos, delay on its part is less difficult to understand though more difficult to approve. In any event, the State which represents the collective cause of the community, does not deserve a litigant-non-grata status. The courts therefore have to be informed with the spirit and philosophy of the provision in the course of the interpretation of the expression “sufficient cause”. So also the same approach has to be evidenced in its application to matters at hand with the end in view to do even-handed justice on merits in preference to the approach which scuttles a decision on merits. Turning to the facts of the matter giving rise to the present appeal, we are satisfied that sufficient cause exists for the delay. Turning to the facts of the matter giving rise to the present appeal, we are satisfied that sufficient cause exists for the delay. The order of the High Court dismissing the appeal before it as time-barred, is therefore, set aside. Delay is condoned. And the matter is remitted to the High Court. The High Court will now dispose of the appeal on merits after affording reasonable opportunity of hearing to both the sides….” 17. Relying on Katiji (supra) in (1988) 2 SCC 142 (G. Ramegowda Major v. Special Land Acquisition Officer) interference was declined with the order of the High Court condoning delay of approximately one and half years observing that “sufficient cause” must receive liberal construction to advance substantial justice observing as follows:- “15. In litigations to which Government is a party there is yet another aspect which, perhaps, cannot be ignored. If appeals brought by Government are lost for such defaults, no person is individually affected; but what, in the ultimate analysis, suffers is public interest. The decisions of Government are collective and institutional decisions and do not share the characteristics of decisions of private individuals.” 17. Therefore, in assessing what, in a particular case, constitutes “sufficient cause” for purposes of Section 5, it might, perhaps, be somewhat unrealistic to exclude from the considerations that go into the judicial verdict, these factors which are peculiar to and characteristic of the functioning of the government. Governmental decisions are proverbially slow encumbered, as they are, by a considerable degree of procedural red tape in the process of their making. A certain amount of latitude is, therefore, not impermissible. It is rightly said that those who bear responsibility of Government must have “a little play at the joints”. Due recognition of these limitations on governmental functioning — of course, within reasonable limits — is necessary if the judicial approach is not to be rendered unrealistic. It would, perhaps, be unfair and unrealistic to put government and private parties on the same footing in all respects in such matters. Implicit in the very nature of governmental functioning is procedural delay incidental to the decision-making process….” 18. The issue for large amount of public money being involved as a ground to condone delay was considered in (1998) 7 SCC 141 (State of Andhra Pradesh v. I. Chandra Sekhara Reddy) observing as follows:- “8. Implicit in the very nature of governmental functioning is procedural delay incidental to the decision-making process….” 18. The issue for large amount of public money being involved as a ground to condone delay was considered in (1998) 7 SCC 141 (State of Andhra Pradesh v. I. Chandra Sekhara Reddy) observing as follows:- “8. …… In either case, we would have been inclined to condone the delay in the interest of justice as a huge amount of public money is involved.” 19. Similar view was expressed in (2013) 14 SCC 370 (State of Karnataka v. Vivekananda M. Hallur) holding as follows: “11. ….But after going through the reasons stated therein and in the light of the issues to be considered by the Division Bench as well as the financial implication on the State Exchequer, we are of the view that the reasons stated for the delay cannot be rejected as unacceptable.” 20. In (2005) 3 SCC 752 (State of Nagaland v. Lipok A.O.) considering the proverbial delay in decision making condoning the delay holding that it would be unfair and unrealistic to put government and private parties on the same footing. It was observed at paragraph 15 as follows:- “15. It is axiomatic that decisions are taken by officers/agencies proverbially at a slow pace and encumbered process of pushing the files from table to table and keeping it on the table for considerable time causing delay — intentional or otherwise — is a routine. Considerable delay of procedural red tape in the process of their making decision is a common feature. Therefore, certain amount of latitude is not impermissible. If the appeals brought by the State are lost for such default no person is individually affected but what in the ultimate analysis suffers, is public interest. The expression “sufficient cause” should, therefore, be considered with pragmatism in a justice-oriented approach rather than the technical detection of sufficient cause for explaining every days delay. The factors which are peculiar to and characteristic of the functioning of the governmental conditions would be cognizant to and requires adoption of pragmatic approach in justice-oriented process. The court should decide the matters on merits unless the case is hopelessly without merit. No separate standards to determine the cause laid by the State vis-à-vis private litigant could be laid to prove strict standards of sufficient cause. The court should decide the matters on merits unless the case is hopelessly without merit. No separate standards to determine the cause laid by the State vis-à-vis private litigant could be laid to prove strict standards of sufficient cause. The Government at appropriate level should constitute legal cells to examine the cases whether any legal principles are involved for decision by the courts or whether cases require adjustment and should authorise the officers to take a decision or give appropriate permission for settlement. In the event of decision to file appeal, needed prompt action should be pursued by the officer responsible to file the appeal and he should be made personally responsible for lapses, if any. Equally, the State cannot be put on the same footing as an individual. The individual would always be quick in taking the decision whether he would pursue the remedy by way of an appeal or application since he is a person legally injured while the State is an impersonal machinery working through its officers or servants.” 21. The subjective test in each case based on facts to condone or not to condone delay was considered in (2009) 2 SCC 689 (R.B. Ramlingam v. R.B. Bhvaneswari) observing : “6. A large number of judgments were cited before us by learned counsel. It is not necessary at this stage to discuss each and every judgment cited before us for the simple reason that Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 does not lay down any standard or objective test. The test of “sufficient cause” is purely an individualistic test. It is not an objective test. Therefore, no two cases can be treated alike. The statute of limitation has left the concept of “sufficient cause” delightfully undefined, thereby leaving to the court a well-intentioned discretion to decide the individual cases whether circumstances exist establishing sufficient cause. There are no categories of sufficient cause. The categories of sufficient cause are never exhausted. Each case spells out a unique experience to be dealt with by the court as such. 22. In (2009) 15 SCC 177 (State of J&K v. Mohd. There are no categories of sufficient cause. The categories of sufficient cause are never exhausted. Each case spells out a unique experience to be dealt with by the court as such. 22. In (2009) 15 SCC 177 (State of J&K v. Mohd. Maqbool Sofi) it was observed : “3…It is well settled that for the purpose of filing an appeal, the file has to be routed through different departments of the State which require some time to take a final decision whether the letters patent appeal shall be filed against the order of the learned Single Judge.” 23. That some latitude had to be given to government bodies because of the decision making process and the injury to public interest was noticed in (2012) 5 SCC 157 (Maniben Devraj Sah v. Municipal Corporation of Brihan Mumbai) observing at paragraph 25 as follows:- “25. In cases involving the State and its agencies/instrumentalities, the court can take note of the fact that sufficient time is taken in the decision-making process but no premium can be given for total lethargy or utter negligence on the part of the officers of the State and/or its agencies/instrumentalities and the applications filed by them for condonation of delay cannot be allowed as a matter of course by accepting the plea that dismissal of the matter on the ground of bar of limitation will cause injury to the public interest.” 24. Official delay fell for consideration in (2010) 5 SCC 459 (Oriental Aroma Chemical Industries Ltd. v. Gujarat Industrial Development Corpn.). After consideration of past precedents it was observed as follows :- “14. We have considered the respective submissions. The law of limitation is founded on public policy. The legislature does not prescribe limitation with the object of destroying the rights of the parties but to ensure that they do not resort to dilatory tactics and seek remedy without delay. The idea is that every legal remedy must be kept alive for a period fixed by the legislature. To put it differently, the law of limitation prescribes a period within which legal remedy can be availed for redress of the legal injury. At the same time, the courts are bestowed with the power to condone the delay, if sufficient cause is shown for not availing the remedy within the stipulated time. 16. To put it differently, the law of limitation prescribes a period within which legal remedy can be availed for redress of the legal injury. At the same time, the courts are bestowed with the power to condone the delay, if sufficient cause is shown for not availing the remedy within the stipulated time. 16. In dealing with the applications for condonation of delay filed on behalf of the State and its agencies/instrumentalities this Court has, while emphasising that same yardstick should be applied for deciding the applications for condonation of delay filed by private individuals and the State, observed that certain amount of latitude is not impermissible in the latter case because the State represents collective cause of the community and the decisions are taken by the officers/agencies at a slow pace and encumbered process of pushing the files from table to table consumes considerable time causing delay..” 25. The guiding principles for condonation of delay collated from judicial precedents has been considered in 2014 (9) PLJR (SC) 290 (Esha Bhattacharjee v. Managing Committee of Raghunathpur Nafar Academy & ors) as follows :- “15. From the aforesaid authorities the principles that can broadly be culled out are: (i) There should be a liberal, pragmatic, justiceoriented, non-pedantic approach while dealing with an application for condonation of delay, for the courts are not supposed to legalise injustice but are obliged to remove injustice. (ii) The terms “sufficient cause” should be understood in their proper spirit, philosophy and purposeregard being had to the fact that these terms are basically elastic and are to be applied in proper perspective to the obtaining fact-situation. (iii) Substantial justice being paramount and pivotal the technical considerations should not be given undue and uncalled for emphasis. (vi) It is to be kept in mind that adherence to strict proof should not affect public justice and cause public mischief because the courts are required to be vigilant so that in the ultimate eventuate there is no real failure of justice. (xii) The entire gamut of facts are to be carefully scrutinized and the approach should be based on the paradigm of judicial discretion which is founded on objective reasoning and not on individual perception. (xiii) The State or a public body or an entity representing a collective cause should be given some acceptable latitude.” 26. (xii) The entire gamut of facts are to be carefully scrutinized and the approach should be based on the paradigm of judicial discretion which is founded on objective reasoning and not on individual perception. (xiii) The State or a public body or an entity representing a collective cause should be given some acceptable latitude.” 26. The Corporation had already sent a proposal for payment to the Urban Development Department and was awaiting approval. The submission that delay was also occasioned on that account in decision to file the appeal after the government decision cannot be said to be frivolous or unwarranted considering the manner in which government works. Under the amended High Court Rules, the entire brief of the Writ Court had to be filed afresh in two copies along with the memo of appeal. The fact that the original brief was already available with the Court is not relevant. The entire brief of the Writ Court ran into approximately over 800 pages. The contours of the limit of powers of the Writ Court in contractual matters especially relating to payment, when disputed, are well settled precedents. The presence of an arbitration clause in the contract and reducing the arena of conflict after approval by the Urban Development Department, and last but not the least that a very large sum of public money was involved, the institution and pendency of a Vigilance Case are all matters considered collectively satisfy us that the delay needs to be condoned. Nothing has been demonstrated by the respondents how the claim for condonation was not bonafide but motivated by considerations. We order accordingly and allow the I.A. application for condonation. 27. Put up after four weeks for admission on merits. Vikash Jain, J. - I agree.