Dr. Indira Shah, J.:- Heard Mr. S.S. Dey, learned counsel, appearing on behalf of the petitioner. Also heard Ms. Geeta Deka, learned Addl. Senior Government Advocate, appearing on behalf of State Respondents No. 1 to 4, as well as Mr. P.K. Tiwari, learned counsel, assisted by Mr. S. Mili, learned counsel, appearing on behalf of private Respondent No. 5. 2. By filing this writ petition, the petitioners are challenging the appointment of Respondent No. 5 to various offices who was originally appointed as an Assistant Engineer under the Public Works Department in the State of Arunachal Pradesh on Ad-hoc basis and whose services was regularized in the grade of Assistant Engineer (Civil) in the same Department. The Respondent No. 5, thus, holds a substantive post of Assistant Engineer under the Public Works Department. 3. Vide order dated 26.03.2007, issued by the Secretary, Urban Development & Housing, Government of Arunachal Pradesh, Itanagar, the Respondent No. 5 was appointed on officiating capacity as Deputy Director in the pay scale of Rs. 10,000-15,200/- in the Department of UD & Housing, Amnachal Pradesh. Again vide order dated 07.07.2008, the Respondent No. 5 was appointed as an Executive Magistrate and immediately, thereafter, vide order dated 20.10.2008, the Respondent No. 5 was appointed as an Additional District Magistrate. The same Respondent No. 5 was conferred with the powers of Judicial Magistrate, 1st Class, vide Notification dated 25.08.2009. 4. A post of Chief Estate Officer in the pay scale of Rs. 37,400 - 67,000/- was created vide order No. DAD-21/2011 dated 31.03.2011 issued by the Chief Secretary, Government of Arunachal Pradesh. The Respondent No. 5 has been appointed as the Chief Estate Officer. 5. According to the petitioners, the Respondent No. 5 who is the Civil Engineer (B.E.) is holding substantive post of Assistant Engineer under the Department of Public Works Department, was sent to the Urban Development & Housing, Government of Arunachal Pradesh, on temporary basis, and then brought under the control of Administration Department, without any sanction of law. The elevation of Respondent No. 5 from post to post and from pay scale of Rs. 10,000/- to pay scale of Rs. 37,400/- has not been through any publicly known or legally permissible mode of appointment/promotion or other known method of recruitment in public office. The elevation of Respondent No. 5 from post to post and from pay scale of Rs. 10,000/- to pay scale of Rs. 37,400/- has not been through any publicly known or legally permissible mode of appointment/promotion or other known method of recruitment in public office. Thus, the appointment of Respondent No. 5 in the post of Chief Estate Officer is illegal and liable to be set aside and quashed. 6. The Respondent No. 2, Secretary to the Government of Arunachal Pradesh, Law & Judicial Department, has averred that the impugned Notifications were merely administrative arrangement issued in the exigency of public interest for specific purpose. Therefore, this Court may not interfere invoking extra-ordinary jurisdiction. 7. The Respondent No. 5, Sri Talo Potom, has averred that the post of Chief Estate Officer is a cadre post and has no link with the cadre post of parent Department i.e. Assistant Engineer (EG). The post of Chief Estate Officer is clearly a substantive post and the Respondent No. 5 has been appointed to the said post by de-cadring from his original post of Deputy Director (Department of UD & Housing) in the Department of District Administration. This appointment is neither on deputation nor has he got it from seniority of earlier cadre post in the parent Department. The establishment of Chief Estate Officer was done as per the procedure followed by the State Government from time to time. This Department is new and Recruitment Rules is yet to be framed. 8. Preliminary objection has been raised by the respondents with regard to the maintainability of this writ petition. It is averred that the petitioner's right is not at all affected by the impugned order. The petitioners are neither borne in the same cadre/ promotional cadre with that of Respondent No. 5, nor this writ petition is a PIL, to challenge the impugned orders. The Petitioner No. 1 has been working as Land Revenue & Settlement Officer (LRSO) under the Deputy Commissioner, Papum Pare District, Yupia, in the Department of Land Management, and the other two petitioners are not the Government servants and not at all connected with the Department. 9. In the cited case of Rajesh Awasthi vs. Nandlal Jaiswal & ors., reported in (2013) 1 SCC 501 , it has been observed in Paragraphs No. 19, 30, 31, & 32, as under: "19. 9. In the cited case of Rajesh Awasthi vs. Nandlal Jaiswal & ors., reported in (2013) 1 SCC 501 , it has been observed in Paragraphs No. 19, 30, 31, & 32, as under: "19. A writ of quo warranto will lie when the appointment is made contrary to the statutory provisions. This Court in Mor Modern Coop. Transport Society Ltd. vs. Govt. of Haryana held that a writ of quo warranto can be issued when appointment is contrary to the statutory provisions. In B. Srinivasa Reddy, this Court has reiterated the legal position that the jurisdiction of the High Court to issue a writ of quo warranto is limited to one which can only be issued if the appointment is contrary to the statutory rules. The said position has been reiterated by this Court in Hari Bansh Lal wherein this Court has held that for the issuance of writ of quo warranto, the High Court has to satisfy itself that the appointment is contrary to the statutory rules. 30. In University of Mysore vs. C.D. Govinda Rao, while dealing with the nature of the writ of quo warranto, Gajendragadkar, J. has stated thus: (AIR p. 494, para 7) "7. ... Broadly stated, the quo warranto proceeding affords a judicial enquiry in which any person holding an independent substantive public office, or franchise, or liberty, is called upon to show by what right he holds the said office, franchise or liberty; if the inquiry leads to the finding that the holder of the office has no valid title to it, the issue of the writ of quo warranto ousts him from that office. In other words, the procedure of quo warranto confers jurisdiction and authority on the judiciary to control executive action in the matter of making appointments to public offices against the relevant statutory provisions; it also protects a citizen from being deprived of public office to which he may have a right. In other words, the procedure of quo warranto confers jurisdiction and authority on the judiciary to control executive action in the matter of making appointments to public offices against the relevant statutory provisions; it also protects a citizen from being deprived of public office to which he may have a right. It would thus be seen that if these proceedings are adopted subject to the conditions recognised in that behalf, they tend to protect the public from usurpers of public office; in some cases, persons not entitled to public office may be allowed to occupy them and to continue to hold them as a result of the connivance of the executive or with its active help, and in such cases, if the jurisdiction of the courts to issue writ of quo warranto is properly invoked, the usurper can be ousted and the person entitled to the post allowed to occupy it. It is thus clear that before a citizen can claim a writ of quo warranto, he must satisfy the court, inter alia, that the office in question is a public office and is held by usurper without legal authority, and that necessarily leads to the enquiry as to whether the appointment of the said alleged usurper has been made in accordance with law or not." 31. From the aforesaid pronouncements it is graphically clear that a citizen can claim a writ of quo warranto and he stands in the position of a relater. He need not have any special interest or personal interest. The real test is to see whether the person holding the office is authorised to hold the same as per law. Delay and laches do not constitute any impediment to deal with the lis on merits and it has been so stated in Kashinath G. Jalmi vs. Speaker. 32. In High Court of Gujarat vs. Gujarat Kishan Mazdoor Panchayat, it has been laid down by this Court that a writ of quo warranto can be issued when there is violation of statutory provisions/rules. The said principle has been reiterated in Retd. Armed Forces Medical Assn. vs. Union of India." 10. The Court cannot sit in the judgment over the wisdom of the Government in the choice of the person to be appointed, is a settled law. 11. Here, in this case, no Recruitment Rules has been framed for recruitment in establishment of Chief Estate Officer. Armed Forces Medical Assn. vs. Union of India." 10. The Court cannot sit in the judgment over the wisdom of the Government in the choice of the person to be appointed, is a settled law. 11. Here, in this case, no Recruitment Rules has been framed for recruitment in establishment of Chief Estate Officer. In the aforesaid cited case, an observation has been made that a writ of quo-warranto will lie when the appointment is made contrary to the statutory provisions. 12. Any citizen can claim a writ of quo-warranto, if he can satisfy the Court that the office, in question, is a pubic office and is held by a person without legal authority. In the case of University of Mysore vs. C.D. Govinda Rao, reported in AIR 1965 SC 491 , it was observed, in Paragraph No. 7, as under: “7.....the Quo Warranto proceeding affords a judicial enquiry in which any person holding an independent substantive public office, or franchise, or liberty, is called upon to show by what right he holds the said office, franchise or liberty; if the enquiry leads to the finding that the holder of the office has no valid title to it, the issue of the Writ of Quo Warranto ousts him from that office. In her words, the procedure of Quo Warranto confers jurisdiction and authority on the judiciary control to executive action in matter of making appointments to public offices against the relevant statutory provisions; it also protects a citizen from being deprived of public office to which he may have a right. It would thus be seen that if these proceedings are adopted subject to the conditions recognized in that behalf, they tend to protect the public from usurpers of public office; in some cases, person not entitled public to office may be allowed to occupy them and to continue to hold them as result of the connivance of the executive or with its active help, and in such cases, if the jurisdiction of the Courts to issue writ of Quo Warranto is properly invoked, the usurper can be ousted and the person entitled to the post allowed to occupy it. It is thus clear that before a citizen can claim a writ of Quo Warranto, he must satisfy the Court, inter alia, that the office in question is a public office and is held by usurper without legal authority, and that necessarily leads to the enquiry as to whether the appointment of the said usurper has been made in accordance with law or not." The said principle has been reiterated in case of Rajesh Awasthi vs. Nandlal Jaiswal, reported in (2013) 1 SCC 501 . 13. In the case of Retired Armed Forces Medical Association & ors. vs. Union of India & ors., reported in (2006) 11 SCC 731 (1), it was held, in Paragraph No. 51, as under: "51. It is settled law by a catena of decisions that the court cannot sit in judgment over the wisdom of the Government in the choice of the person to be appointed so long as the person chosen possesses the prescribed qualification and is otherwise eligible for appointment. This Court in R. K. Jain vs. Union of India was pleased to hold that the evaluation of the comparative merits of the candidates would not be gone into a public interest litigation and only in a proceeding initiated by an aggrieved person, may it be open to be considered. It was also held that in service jurisprudence it is settled law that it is for the aggrieved person, that is, the non-appointee to assail the legality or correctness of the action and that a third party has no locus standi to canvass the legality or correctness of the action. Further, it was declared that public law declaration would only be made at the behest of a public spirited person coming before the court as a petitioner. Having regard to the fact that neither respondents 1 and 2 were or could have been candidates for the post of Managing Director of the Board and the High Court could not have gone beyond the limits of quo warranto so very well delineated by a catena of decisions of this Court and applied the test which could not have been applied even in a certiorari proceedings brought before the Court by an aggrieved party who was a candidate for the post." 14. Thus before a Writ of Quo Warranto can be issued the following conditions must be satisfied: (i) The office must be a public office; (ii) The office must have been created by charter, statute or constitution; (iii) The office must be of a substantive character i.e. must be an independent office making the holder of Such Office an independent official and not merely a deputy or servant of others; (v) Permanency and continuity in the appointment; (vi) The holder of office is ineligible to hold office as he lacks the qualification laid down under law. 15. Learned counsel for the petitioners has cited the case of Dr. Kashinath G. Jalmi & anr. vs. The Speaker & ors. (1993) 2 SCC 703 ; Union Public Service Commission vs. Girish Jayantilal Vaghela & ors. (2006) 2 SCC 482 ; B. N. Nagranjan & ors. vs. State of Mysore & ors. (1996) 3 SCR 682; State of Haryana vs. The Haryana Cooperative Transport Ltd.(1977) I SCC 271; and Ashok Kr. Sonar vs. Union of India & ors. (2007) 4 SCC 54 . All the decisions cited on behalf of the petitioners relate to enforcement of personal rights wherein a writ of certiorari was claimed for quashing some decisions adverse to the petitioner or where some statutory provision was not adhered. 16. In this case, the Petitioner No. 1 is working as Land Revenue & Settlement Officer(LRSO) under the Deputy Commissioner, Yupia, in the Department of Land Management & ors., two petitioners are not the Government servant. The petitioners have not claimed any rights or protection guaranteed to them under the Constitution of India or under any other laws. 17. It is alleged in the affidavit-in-reply by Respondent No. 5 that the writ petitioners and their families are aggrieved by the lawful action taken against them for damaging the public property and public road. There are some cases where enquiry is pending against the Petitioner No. 1 for encroaching Right of Way (RoW) on the public road. Apprehending his conviction in pending cases against him and also being aggrieved with action taken against his brother where the request for release of his brother was refused by the Respondent No. 5, the writ Petitioner No. 1 in connivance with the Petitioners No. 2 and 3, have filed this writ petition along with other petitions before this Court, which are, as under: - 1. Criminal Petition No. 19 of 2013 (Techi Hitlar vs. State of Arunachal Pradesh) wherein he has challenged the legality of the proceeding in Case No. CR-040/13(Pt. iii) which was initiated against the petitioner at the instance of Respondent No. 5 in his capacity as Judicial Magistrate, 1st Class. 2. WP(c) 536/2013 (Techi Hitlar vs. State of Arunachal Pradesh & ors.) wherein the petitioner has challenged the proceedings initiated by the Respondent No. 5 in his capacity as Chief Estate Officer and Judicial Magistrate, 1st Class, against the petitioner under the provision of Section 4 of the Arunachal Pradesh Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorized Occupants) Act, 2003, and under Section 133 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, respectively. 18. According to Mr. Tiwari, learned counsel for the Respondent No. 5, it is, thus, evident from the records of Criminal Petition No. 19(AP) 2013 and WP(C) 536(AP) 2013 which were filed by the Petitioner No. 1 and the same are still pending disposal before this Court, that the Petitioner No. 1 is serving with the Government of Arunachal Pradesh as the Land Revenue & Settlement Officer (LRSO) under the Department of Land Management in the establishment of Deputy Commissioner, Papum Pare District, Yupia. 19. Notification dated 30.06.2011 published in the Official Gazette says that by virtue of powers conferred by Section 4 of the Arunachal Pradesh Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorized Occupants) Act, 2003, read with Section 2 of Section 20, sub-Section (1) of Section 32 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, the power of the Chief Estate Officer was conferred to private Respondent No. 5. The order dated 23.03.2011 shows that the Respondent No. 5 who was holding the post of Estate Officer-cum-Additional District Magistrate, was appointed as Chief Estate Officer, on officiating basis, against the newly created post of Chief Estate Officer vide Order No. DAD-21/2011 dated 21.03.2011. 20. Thus, the appointment order in respect of Respondent No. 5 depicts that the Respondent No. 5 was appointed on officiating basis. Article 370 of the Constitution of India, reads, as under: "370. Temporary provisions with respect to the State of Jammu and Kashmir. 20. Thus, the appointment order in respect of Respondent No. 5 depicts that the Respondent No. 5 was appointed on officiating basis. Article 370 of the Constitution of India, reads, as under: "370. Temporary provisions with respect to the State of Jammu and Kashmir. (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in this Constitution,— (a) The provisions of article 238 shall not apply in relation to the state of Jammu and Kashmir; (b) The power of Parliament to make laws for the said state shall be limited to- (i) Those matters in the Union List and the Concurrent List which, in consultation with the Government of the State, are declared by the President to correspond to matters specified in the Instrument of Accession governing the accession of the State to the Dominion of India as the matters with respect to which the Dominion Legislature may make laws for that State; and (ii) Such other matters in the said Lists as, with the concurrence of the Government of the State, the President may by order specify. Explanation: For the purpose of this article, the Government of the State means the person for the time being recognised by the President as the Maharaja of Jammu and Kashmir acting on the advice of the Council of Ministers for the time being in office under the Maharaja's Proclamation dated the fifth day of March, 1948; (c) The provisions of article 1 and of this article shall apply in relation to that State; (d) Such of the other provisions of this Constitution shall apply in relation to that State subject to such exceptions and modifications as the President may by order specify: Provided that no such order which relates to the matters specified in the Instrument of Accession of the State referred to in paragraph (i) of sub-clause (b) shall be issued except in consultation with the Government of the State: Provided further that no such order which relates to matters other than those referred to in the last preceding proviso shall be issued except with the concurrence of that Government. (2) If the concurrence of the Government of the State referred to in paragraph (ii) of sub-clause (b) of clause (1) or in the second proviso to sub-clause (d) of that clause be given before the Constituent Assembly for the purpose of framing the Constitution of the State is convened, it shall be placed before such Assembly for such decision as it may take thereon. (3) Notwithstanding anything in the foregoing provisions of this article, the President may, by public notification, declare that this article shall cease to be operative or shall be operative only with such exceptions and modifications and from such date as he may specify: Provided that the recommendation of the Constituent Assembly of the State referred to in clause (2) shall be necessary before the President issues such a notification." 21. In absence of any statutory rules, the burden heavily lies on the petitioners to establish that the appointment made by the Government includes any component of mala fides. There is no such allegation against the appointing authority. There is no bar for appointment to the post, in question, on officiating basis. It is settled law that writ of quo warranto does not lie if the alleged violation is not of a statutory provision. 22. It was further held at Paragraph No. 43 of AIR 2006 SC 3016, as under: "The finding recorded by the learned Single Judge that the appointment is bad for the reason that the appointment which was made on temporary basis has continued for nearly 2 years is wholly contrary to law particularly when the Act and the Rule do not stipulate maximum period of appointment. The High Court, in our view, gravely erred in issuing a Writ of Quo Warranto when there is no clear violation of law in the appointment of the appellant." 23. The challenge to the Notification dated 25.08.2009 i.e. conferring power to the Respondent No. 5 to hold office of the Judicial Magistrate, 1st Class, does not survive in view of the Notification dated 06.01.2014 and this is not pressed also. 24. The appointment of Respondent no. 5 as Chief Estate Officer, is also not tenable in quo warranto proceeding as discussed earlier as there is no element of permanency. 25. In view of the foregoing discussions and reasons, this writ petition is dismissed having no merit. Interim order, if any, shall stand vacated automatically. 26. 24. The appointment of Respondent no. 5 as Chief Estate Officer, is also not tenable in quo warranto proceeding as discussed earlier as there is no element of permanency. 25. In view of the foregoing discussions and reasons, this writ petition is dismissed having no merit. Interim order, if any, shall stand vacated automatically. 26. No cost.