JUDGMENT 1. - Appalled by the impugned verdict of the learned Central Administrative Tribunal, Bench at Jodhpur (for short, 'CAT') dated 31st of August 2005, rendered in Original Application No.17 of 2005, the petitioner (applicant) has preferred this writ petition. The learned CAT by the impugned order has turned down the challenge laid by the petitioner against the order of discharge dated 14.12.2004 passed by the Senior Superintendent of Post Offices, Udaipur. 2. The facts, apposite for the purpose of this writ petition, are that at Post Office Ghosundi there existed a vacancy of Gram Dak Sevak/Branch Post Master (for short GDS/BPM) in 2003 and name of the petitioner for the said post was sponsored by the employment exchange. Espousal of the name of the petitioner by the local employment exchange was acknowledged by the fourth respondent and in turn the petitioner was asked to fill up the application form vide communication dated 23rd of September 2003 intimating the last date for receipt of form as 23rd of October 2003. In response to the said communication, the petitioner offered his candidature by submitting his application form with requisite documents. On consideration of the application form of the petitioner, fourth respondent addressed an order/communication to the petitioner on 4th of February 2004 asking him to appear before the Udaipur Office with original documents on 10th of February 2004 at 10 AM. Laying emphasis on the recitals contained in order dated 4th of February 2014, the petitioner has pleaded in the Original Application that there was no stipulation in the aforesaid order to disclose pendency of criminal case/FIR for the addressee. Be that as it may the fact remains that in adherence of the order dated 10th of February 2004 the petitioner joined his duties on the post of BPM Ghosundi on 01.03.2004. Subsequent to his joining, the respondent department made endeavor to seek police verification about the character and other antecedents of the petitioner. In the process of police verification, the Station House Officer, Charbhuja divulged information to the respondent department that a First Information Report bearing No.98/2003 for offences punishable under Section 409, 420, 120-B IPC is lodged against the petitioner. When this fact was revealed to the respondent department, a communication dated 23rd of August 2004 was addressed to the petitioner soliciting details about the pending case against him. 3. When this fact was revealed to the respondent department, a communication dated 23rd of August 2004 was addressed to the petitioner soliciting details about the pending case against him. 3. It appears that the petitioner has not responded to the said communication and, therefore, yet another letter was sent to him on 23rd of November 2004, whereby he was again asked to submit complete details of the case pending against him within ten days with a clear stipulation that his failure to do so shall entail cancellation of his appointment order. In response to the communication dated 23rd of November 2004, petitioner submitted details about the pending case with his explanation. The explanation tendered by the petitioner was further followed by yet another application dated 13th of December 2004 furnishing information that next date in the criminal case is 14th of March 2005. Along with this application, the petitioner also enclosed copies of the order-sheets of the criminal case and prayed that as charges have not yet been framed he cannot be categorized as accused in the aforementioned case. A prayer was also made for allowing him to continue in services. 4. Subsequent to the communication dated 13th of December 2004, the fourth respondent vide its letter/order dated 14th of December 2004 served a notice of one month to the petitioner with a clear recital that on expiry of one month he shall be relieved/discharged from his employment. Assailing the 1 order dated 14th December 2004, the petitioner has urged precisely four grounds, viz., his services were never found wanting in any manner and before issuance of the termination order no enquiry was conducted against him. 5. Buttressing the plea that it was not necessary for him to disclose 5 pendency of a criminal case, the petitioner has questioned the order of termination by categorizing the order of termination as infirm. For questioning the order of termination, he has also pleaded that the same has been passed in clear negation of audi alterem partem. 6. 5. Buttressing the plea that it was not necessary for him to disclose 5 pendency of a criminal case, the petitioner has questioned the order of termination by categorizing the order of termination as infirm. For questioning the order of termination, he has also pleaded that the same has been passed in clear negation of audi alterem partem. 6. Contesting the Original Application of the petitioner, the respondents have submitted in the return that he was engaged purely on temporary basis pending police verification and when it was revealed during police verification that his character is under serious clouds, a fair opportunity was afforded to him by soliciting his reply/explanation and, therefore, there is no infirmity much less legal infirmity in the order of termination. The respondents have also harped on the availability of alternative departmental remedy and pleaded that on that count alone the petitioner is liable to be non-suited. 7. The learned CAT, after examining the matter threadbare, has recorded a categorical finding that the petitioner is not entitled for protection of Rule 8 of the GDS Conduct and Employment Rules. While considering the factum of pending FIR against the petitioner at the time of his entry in the services, the learned CAT has observed that the argument of the petitioner that he was not required to disclose pending FIR is per-se fallacious. The learned CAT has recorded a categorical finding that the alleged production of two character certificates by the petitioner from Gazetted Officers pre-supposes that the vital information about pending FIR was not even disclosed to these incumbents and that has in fact facilitated his appointment. For drawing this inference, the learned CAT has rightly held that no sane person much less a Gazetted Officer could have issued a character certificate to an incumbent who was charged under Sections 406, 420, 120-B IPC. 8. Learned counsel for the petitioner, Mr. Shreyansh Mardia, while reiterating submissions which were made before the learned CAT, has urged that the order of termination is punitive as it casts stigma on the character of the petitioner. Emphasising the criterion for differentiating between foundation and motive, Mr. Mardia would contend that foundation of the order of termination is clearly inferable from the order itself and on the face of it the order is punitive casting stigma on the character of the petitioner. Emphasising the criterion for differentiating between foundation and motive, Mr. Mardia would contend that foundation of the order of termination is clearly inferable from the order itself and on the face of it the order is punitive casting stigma on the character of the petitioner. He, therefore, submits that before passing this order, it was pre-requisite tor the respondents to conduct a departmental enquiry against the petitioner. 9. In support of his this contention learned counsel has placed reliance on Dipti Prakash Banerjee v. Satyendra Nath Bose National Centre for Basic Sciences, Calcutta & Ors. [ (1999) 3 SCC 60 ]. Learned counsel, Mr. Mardia, has also placed reliance on the decisiors in V.P. Ahuja v. State of Punjab & Ors. [ (2000) 3 SCC 239 ] and Nar Singh Pal v. Union of India & Ors. [ (2000) 3 SCC 588 ]. 10. Per contra, Mr. Falgun Buch for Mr. V.K. Mathur, learned counsel for the respondents has urged that the petitioner has concealed material information from the department at the time of verification of his documents and after police verification when the factum of pending FIR was revealed, the respondent department has acted in a very fair and transparent manner before issuing the termination order. Mr. Buch would contend that nondisclosure of the pending criminal case was a serious omission on the part of the petitioner as the same has reflected his character and other antecedents, and therefore, the learned CAT has rightly non-suited the petitioner by the impugned order. Mr. Buch has argued that the learned CAT has examined the matter thoroughly and thereafter has passed the impugned order with cogent reasons which calls for no interference. Repelling the contentions of learned counsel for the petitioner that order of termination is stigmatic, Mr. Buch would urge that from the recitals contained in the order itself it is amply clear that the same is a simple order of discharge casting no stigma on the character of the petitioner. He, therefore, submits that the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that order is punitive in nature is per-se hypothetical. 11. We have heard learned counsel for the rival parties and perused the materials available on record. 12. He, therefore, submits that the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that order is punitive in nature is per-se hypothetical. 11. We have heard learned counsel for the rival parties and perused the materials available on record. 12. Upon perusal of the impugned order of the learned CAT, we are convinced that the matter has been thrashed out in right perspective, more particularly, the true purport of the order of termination. The learned CAT while construing the offer of employment and factum of production of two character certificates by the petitioner, which were issued by the Gazetted Officers, has rightly concluded that while obtaining these certificates the petitioner has not apprised both the Gazetted Officers about the pendency of criminal case against him involving serious offences under Section 409, 420 and 120-B IPC. With this inference, the learned CAT has held that the petitioner has concealed material information pertaining to his character and other antecedents and as such the order of discharge cannot be interfered with. The reasons spelt out in the impugned order for non-suiting the petitioner in his pursuit are just and proper and, therefore, we are not persuaded to interfere with the impugned order passed by the learned CAT. 13. Although we fully concur with the impugned order and are dissuaded to interfere with the same in our limited scope of judicial review, however, we feel it desirable to examine the contention of the petitioner that the order is stigmatic in light of legal precedents on which heavy reliance is placed. The Hon'ble Apex Court, in Dipti Prakash Banerjee's case (supra), has examined the nature of termination order as to whether it is punitive or simplicitor in case of a probationer. In that case, the termination order was preceded by a communication addressed to the incumbent indicating serious deficiencies in the work and conduct and furthermore in the termination order also acts of omission and commission of the incumbent were pointed out to him. In that background, the Hon'ble Apex Court held that the foundation of the order of termination was misconduct, therefore, it has casted a stigma and as such it was necessary to hold departmental enquiry against the petitioner before his termination. The fact situations in the present case are 1 quite different and, therefore, ratio decidendi of this case cannot help the cause of the petitioner. 14. The fact situations in the present case are 1 quite different and, therefore, ratio decidendi of this case cannot help the cause of the petitioner. 14. In V.P. Ahuja's case (supra) also, in the order of termination it was mentioned that his performance is wanting administratively and technically and,therefore,in that background the Hon'ble Apex Court held that foundation ' of the order is punitive and, therefore, before its issuance a department enquiry was necessary. 15. The decision was rendered by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the backdrop of peculiar facts of the case and as such the same is of no assistance to the petitioner. In the last legal precedent i.e. Nar Singh Pal's i case(supra) in the order of termination the criminal act of the incumbent was over emphasised and on the face of it the foundation of the order was misconduct, and therefore, even in case of a casual labour acquiring temporary status the Hon'ble Apex Court has held that the order was punitive and passed in violation of principles of natural justice rendering the same vulnerable. The case is clearly distinguishable and as such is of no assistance to the petitioner. It may be recalled here that before issuance of the discharge order in the present case the petitioner was served a notice whereby he was called upon to furnish requisite explanation regarding the HR which was lodged against him and the offences attributed to him and after soliciting his explanation, the competent authority has issued the order of discharge while considering his character and other antecedents which were under serious cloud at the time of his entry in the services. 16. The contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that subsequently the petitioner has been acquitted of the criminal offences attributed to him, in our considered opinion, is of no significance for the reason that at the time of entry in the services he was facing the prosecution, which was not disclosed by him before his employer. We refrain ourselves from expressing any opinion on the verdict of acquittal as the same is not honourable acquittal but by extending benefit of doubt to the petitioner. 17. We refrain ourselves from expressing any opinion on the verdict of acquittal as the same is not honourable acquittal but by extending benefit of doubt to the petitioner. 17. Now, adverting to the issue as to whether misconduct was motive or foundation of the order, suffice it to say that the recitals contained in the order are quite innocuous and on the basis of these recitals no prudent man can draw this inference that the foundation of the order is misconduct. As a matter of fact, it clearly indicates the motive of the order, viz., the doubtful character and other antecedents of the petitioner. 18. In common parlance, motive is that which stimulates or incites an action; the mainspring of human action; some cause or reason that moves the will and induces action; the moving power which impels to actor. for a definite result. 19. Foundation, on the other hand, means the basis on which something is supported; especially, evidence or testimony that establishes the admissibility of other evidence (laying the foundation). 20. If the order of termination is construed properly then there remains no shadow of doubt that pendency of criminal case against the petitioner was the motive for issuance of the order and same cannot be categorized as foundation of the order. Even the language employed in the order is quite innocuous and the authority has shown benevolence in giving one month's notice to the petitioner which has further watered down the plea of the petitioner that foundation of the order is misconduct. In view of above, this contention of the petitioner fails and the same is accordingly overruled. 21. No other ground is raised by the petitioner which requires judicial scrutiny in this petition. 22. Upshot of the above discussion is that we find no merit in this writ petition and the same is accordingly dismissed. Costs are made easy.Writ Petition Dismissed. *******