Judgment Tarlok Singh Chauhan, J. Challenge in this petition has been laid to the order dated 1.2.2014 (Annexure P-3) whereby the petitioner’s transfer to the Govt. Senior Secondary School Mandi (Girls) has been cancelled and he has been directed to join the place of earlier posting at GSSS, Rewalsar, District Mandi. 2. The petitioner is working as Lecturer in English and has challenged this order of transfer on the ground that the same has been passed within a short span of one month on account of political malafide and although the petitioner had already joined at GSSS, Mandi (Girls), however, in the impugned order of transfer, he is still shown to be under transfer from GSSS, Rewalsar to GSSS, Mandi (Girls). The petitioner has further contended that the order of transfer is based on extraneous reasons without considering the administrative exigency and not in public interest. 3. The respondent No.3 filed reply to the petition supporting the order of her appointment on extension at GSSS, Mandi (Girls) and it was alleged that the transfer order dated 2.1.2014 had in fact been obtained by the petitioner vide D.O. Note No. 110843 dated 26.12.2013 and, therefore, no indulgence was required to be shown in favour of the petitioner. It was further stated that the petitioner had been working as Lecturer in English within a radius of 25 KM since the year 2003. Be it stated that the respondent No.3 had in fact retired from service on 31.12.2013 from GSSS, Mandi (Girls) and on account of the vacancy caused by her retirement, the petitioner was transferred to the said post. The petitioner in fact had already joined on 1.1.2014. However, in the meanwhile, the respondent No.3 got extension in service w.e.f. 1.1.2014 to 31.12.2014 and was posted at GSSS, Mandi (Girls) resulting in the petitioner being sent back to his original place of posting i.e. GSSS, Rewalsar, District Mandi. 4. The respondents No. 1 and 2 filed their reply wherein it was stated in the preliminary submissions as under: “1. That the petitioner is a Lecturer (School Cadre) English and is borne in the State Cadre post. 4. The respondents No. 1 and 2 filed their reply wherein it was stated in the preliminary submissions as under: “1. That the petitioner is a Lecturer (School Cadre) English and is borne in the State Cadre post. As such, he can be transferred within the State of Himachal Pradesh in the exigency of service as well as in public interest where the respondent department has its administrative units/GSSS with Subject English stream against which no cause of action accrues to the incumbent petitioner being a mandatory service condition. Therefore, the petitioner is not entitled to file and maintain the present civil writ petition before this Hon’ble Court and the same may kindly be dismissed in the interest of justice on this ground alone. 2. That neither any legal and fundamental right of petitioner has ever been infringed in any manner nor any cause of action has accrued to him to file and maintain this petition. In fact the petitioner was transferred without TTA/Joining Time vide Annexure P-1 dated 31.12.2013 with the prior approval of the Competent Authority in condonation of short stay and in relaxation of ban on transfer against vacancy being caused due to the retirement of present incumbent i.e. respondent No.3. Accordingly, the petitioner joined at GSSS (Girls), Mandi on 1.1.2014, but the respondent No.3 got extension of one year in service vide order dated 29.1.2014 with the prior approval of competent authority on departmental file. Therefore, the transfer order dated 1.1.2014 was cancelled vide order dated 1.2.2014. It is pertinent to mention here that the post of lecturer English has also been filled at GSSS, Riwalsar, District Mandi due to promotion.” 5. The petitioner filed rejoinder to the reply filed by respondent No.3 wherein it was pointed out that vide notification No. Shiksha-11-Chha (10)-2/2009 dated 23rd September, 2010, the reemployment of teachers had been done away with by the previous government, however, the said notification had been cancelled by the present government which was absolutely illegal. It is further submitted that the respondent No.3 had remained posted at GSSS (Boys) Mandi for 11 years, 7 months and 5 days and thereafter 7 years and 10 months at GSSS (Girls), Mandi and thereafter has remained for major part of service at Mandi. 6. We have heard learned counsel for the parties. Mr. It is further submitted that the respondent No.3 had remained posted at GSSS (Boys) Mandi for 11 years, 7 months and 5 days and thereafter 7 years and 10 months at GSSS (Girls), Mandi and thereafter has remained for major part of service at Mandi. 6. We have heard learned counsel for the parties. Mr. M.L. Sharma, Senior Advocate, learned counsel for the petitioner has strenuously argued that the impugned order of transfer is nothing but a device to accommodate the respondent No. 3 that too at the cost of the petitioner. He further contended that the State had no authority to cancel the earlier notification whereby the Government had decided not to give extension or re-appointment to the retired teachers. It was further contended that the action of the respondents was arbitrary, malafide, illegal, ultra vires against the provisions of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India, being totally dehors the rules and regulations and against the transfer policy and natural justice. 7. On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondents contended that the order of transfer has been passed in accordance with law after taking into consideration the administrative exigency and public interest and there was no material whatsoever brought on record which may suggest even remotely that the order of transfer had in fact been passed to accommodate the respondent No.3, rather it was the petitioner himself, who had approached the political bosses and obtained a D.O. note on the basis of which he had been transferred from GSSS, Rewalsar to GSSS (Girls), Mandi. 8. We have given deep and thoughtful consideration to the arguments raised by the respective parties. 9. At the outset, it may be noticed, there is no challenge laid in the petition to the notification providing for grant of extension in service to the Government servant after retirement. Even otherwise, there is no such relief claimed in the petition as is clear from the relief clause which reads thus: “It is, therefore, most humbly prayed that this writ petition may kindly be allowed and the impugned order dated 1/2/2014 vide Annexure P-3 may kindly be ordered to be quashed in the interest of justice. It is further most humbly prayed that the petitioner may kindly be permitted to continue his services at his present place of posting i.e. GSSS, Girls, Mandi. It is further most humbly prayed that the petitioner may kindly be permitted to continue his services at his present place of posting i.e. GSSS, Girls, Mandi. Allow such other relief or pass such other orders as deemed fit and proper in the facts and circumstances of the case in favour of the petitioner and justice be done.” 10. Even otherwise it cannot be denied that it is for the State Government to frame policies with respect to grant or non-grant of extension in service and the Courts should be loathe to interfere unless and until the administrative policy decision is arbitrary, discriminatory, malafide or actuated by bias. The Government must have free hand in settling the terms of its policies. It must have reasonable play in its joints as necessary concomitant for an administrative body in an administrative sphere. The Court cannot strike down the terms of the policy merely because it feels that certain other terms would have been fair, wiser or logical. 11. In so far as the question of respondent No.3 having served in or around Mandi for large number of years is concerned, the same relates to a period when she was in the regular service of the respondents and, therefore, the same cannot now be clubbed with the appointment given by way of extension to the respondent No.3. Moreover, it is for the respondent to decide as to how, when, where and why a particular employee is required to be posted so long as the transfer has been effected in public interest and after taking into consideration the administrative exigency. 12. It is trite that transfer is an incidence of service and as long as the authority acts keeping in view the administrative exigency and taking into consideration the public interest as the paramount consideration, it has unfettered powers to effect transfer subject, of course to certain disciplines. In this regard, the reference can conveniently made to the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in E.P. Royappa vs. State of Tamil Nadu (1974) 4 SCC 3 wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court held as under: “It is accepted principle that in public service transfer is an incident of service. It is also an implied condition of service and appointing authority has a wide discretion in the matter. The government is the best judge to decide how to distribute and utilize the services of its employees. It is also an implied condition of service and appointing authority has a wide discretion in the matter. The government is the best judge to decide how to distribute and utilize the services of its employees. However, this power must be exercised honestly, bona fide and reasonably. It should be exercised in public interest. If the exercise of power is based on extraneous considerations or for achieving an alien purpose or an oblique motive it would amount to mala fide and colourable exercise of power. Frequent transfers, without sufficient reasons to justify such transfers, cannot, but be held as mala fide. A transfer is mala fide when it is made not for professed purpose, such as in normal course or in public or administrative interest or in the exigencies of service but for other purpose, that is to accommodate another person for undisclosed reasons. It is the basic principle of rule of law and good administration, that even administrative actions should be just and fair.” Though in the aforesaid judgment the expression “transfer is an implied condition of service” have been used. However, latter in the case of B. Varadha Rao vs. State of Karnataka (1986) 4 SCC 131 it was clarified that the reference to “condition of service” was in fact passing reference while the proposition of law as laid down in Royappa’s case (supra) was reiterated as under: “The observation that transfer is also an implied condition of service is just an observation in passing. It certainly cannot be relied upon in support of the contention that an order of transfer ipso facto varies to the disadvantage of a Government servant, any of his conditions of service making the impugned order appealable under Rule. 19(1)(a) of the Rules.” 13. Once it is admitted that the petitioner is State Government employee and holds transferable post then he is liable to be transferred from one place to the other within the District in case it is a District cadre post and throughout the State in case he holds a State cadre post. Therefore, transfer is an incidence of service and once made on administrative grounds or in public interest, cannot be interfered with unless there are strong and pressing grounds rendering the transfer order illegal on the ground of violation of statutory rules or on the ground of malafides. Therefore, transfer is an incidence of service and once made on administrative grounds or in public interest, cannot be interfered with unless there are strong and pressing grounds rendering the transfer order illegal on the ground of violation of statutory rules or on the ground of malafides. This has been so held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Union of India and others vs. H.N. Kirtania (1989) 3 SCC 445 as under: “The respondent being a Central Government employee held a transferable post and he was liable to be transferred from one place to the other in the country, he has no legal right to insist for his posting at Calcutta or at any other place of his choice. We do not approve of the cavalier manner in which the impugned orders have been issued without considering the correct legal position. Transfer of a public servant made on administrative grounds or in public interest should not be interfered with unless there are strong and pressing grounds rendering the transfer order illegal on the ground of violation of statutory rules or on ground of mala fides. There was no good ground for interfering with the respondent’s transfer.” 14. The above dictum was reiterated in Shilpi Bose (Mrs.) and others vs. State of Bihar and others 1991 Supp (2) SCC 659 wherein the Hon’ble Apex Court has held: “3. ……If the competent authority issued transfer orders with a view to accommodate a public servant to avoid hardship, the same cannot and should not be interfered by the court merely because the transfer orders were passed on the request of the employees concerned. The respondents have continued to be posted at their respective places for the last several years, they have no vested right to remain posted at one place. Since they hold transferable posts they are liable to be transferred from one place to the other. The transfer orders had been issued by the competent authority which did not violate any mandatory rule, therefore, the High Court had no jurisdiction to interfere with the transfer orders. 4. In our opinion, the courts should not interfere with a transfer order which is made in public interest and for administrative reasons unless the transfer orders are made in violation of any mandatory statutory rule or on the ground of mala fide. 4. In our opinion, the courts should not interfere with a transfer order which is made in public interest and for administrative reasons unless the transfer orders are made in violation of any mandatory statutory rule or on the ground of mala fide. A government servant holding a transferable post has no vested right to remain posted at one place or the other, he is liable to be transferred from one place to the other. Transfer orders issued by the competent authority do not violate any of his legal rights. Even if a transfer order is passed in violation of executive instructions or orders, the courts ordinarily should not interfere with the order instead affected party should approach the higher authorities in the department. If the courts continue to interfere with day-to-day transfer orders issued by the government and its subordinate authorities, there will be complete chaos in the administration which would not be conducive to public interest. The High Court overlooked these aspects in interfering with the transfer orders.” 15. Who should be transferred where and in what manner, is for the appropriate authority to decide and unless and until the order of transfer is vitiated by malafides or is made in violation of statutory provisions, the Courts cannot interfere. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Union of India and others vs. S.L. Abbas (1993) 4 SCC 357 has held as under: “6. An order of transfer is an incident of Government Service. Fundamental Rule 11 says that "the whole time of a Government servant is at the disposal of the Government which pays him and he may be employed in any manner required by proper authority." Fundamental Rule 15 says that "the President may transfer a Government servant from one post to another". That the respondent is liable to transfer anywhere in India is not in dispute. It is not the case of the respondent that the order of his transfer is vitiated by mala fides on the part of the authority making the order, - though the Tribunal does say so merely because certain guidelines issued by the Central Government are not followed, with which finding we shall deal later. The respondent attributed "mischief" to his immediate superior who had nothing to do with his transfer. The respondent attributed "mischief" to his immediate superior who had nothing to do with his transfer. All he says is that he should not be transferred because his wife is working at Shillong, his children are studying there and also because his health had suffered a set-back some time ago. He relies upon certain executive instructions issued by the Government in that behalf. Those instructions are in the nature of guidelines. They do not have statutory force. 7. Who should be transferred where, is a matter for the appropriate authority to decide. Unless the order of transfer is vitiated by mala fides or is made in violation of any statutory provisions, the Court cannot interfere with it. While ordering the transfer, there is no doubt, the authority must keep in mind the guidelines issued by the Government on the subject. Similarly if a person makes any representation with respect to his transfer, the appropriate authority must consider the same having regard to the exigencies of administration. The guidelines say that as far as possible, husband and wife must be posted at the same place. The said guideline however does not confer upon the Government employee a legally enforceable right. 8. The jurisdiction of the Central Administrative Tribunal is akin to the jurisdiction of the High Court under Art. 226 of the Constitution of India in service matters. This is evident from a perusal of Art. 323-A of the Constitution. The constraints and norms which the High Court observes while exercising the said jurisdiction apply equally to the Tribunal created under Art. 323-A. (We find it all the more surprising that the learned single Member who passed the impugned order is a former Judge of the High Court and is thus aware of the norms and constraints of the writ jurisdiction). The Administrative Tribunal is not an Appellate Authority sitting in judgment over the orders of transfer. It cannot substitute its own judgment for that of the authority competent to transfer. In this case the Tribunal has clearly exceeded its jurisdiction in interfering with the order of transfer. The order of the Tribunal reads as if it were sitting in appeal over the order of transfer made by the Senior Administrative Officer (competent authority).” 16. It cannot substitute its own judgment for that of the authority competent to transfer. In this case the Tribunal has clearly exceeded its jurisdiction in interfering with the order of transfer. The order of the Tribunal reads as if it were sitting in appeal over the order of transfer made by the Senior Administrative Officer (competent authority).” 16. No Government employee has legal right to insist for being posted at a particular place when he holds a transferable post and unless specifically provided in his service conditions, he has no choice in the matter of posting. This has been so held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Chief General Manager (Telecom) N.E. Telecom Circle and another vs. Rajendra CH. Bhattacharjee and others (1995) 2 SCC 532 : “7. It is needless to emphasis that a Government employee or any servant of a Public Undertaking has no legal right to insist for being posted at any particular place. It cannot be disputed that the respondent holds a transferable post and unless specifically provided in his service conditions, he has no choice in the matter of posting. Since the respondent has no legal or statutory right to claim his posting at Agartala and, therefore, there was no justification for the Tribunal to set aside the respondent's transfer to Dimapur.” 17. The Courts and Tribunals have repeatedly been warned by the Hon’ble Supreme Court not to interfere with the orders of transfers made on administrative grounds as they are not appellate forums to decide on the question of transfers. The Courts and Tribunals are not expected to interdict the working of the administrative system by transferring the officers to “proper place”. It is for the administration to take appropriate decision and such decisions can only be interfered with when they are vitiated either by malafides or by extraneous consideration without any factual background foundation. This has been so held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in State of M.P. and another vs. S.S. Kourav and others (1995) 3 SCC 270 wherein it has been held as under: “4. It is contended for the respondent that the respondent had already worked at Jagdalpur from 1982 to 1989 and when he was transferred to Bhopal, there was no justification to transfer him again to Jagdalpur. We cannot appreciate these grounds. It is contended for the respondent that the respondent had already worked at Jagdalpur from 1982 to 1989 and when he was transferred to Bhopal, there was no justification to transfer him again to Jagdalpur. We cannot appreciate these grounds. The Courts or Tribunals are not appellate forums to decide on transfer of officers on administrative grounds. The wheels of administration should be allowed to run smoothly and the Courts or Tribunals are not expected to interdict the working of the administrative system by transferring the officers to proper places. It is for the administration to take appropriate decision and such decisions shall stand unless they are vitiated either by mala fides or by extraneous consideration without any factual background foundation. In this case we have seen that on the administrative grounds the transfer orders came to be issued. Therefore, we cannot go into the expediency of posting an officer at a particular place.” 18. The aforesaid position of law was reiterated and restated by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Union of India and others vs. Ganesh Dass Singh 1995 Supp. (3) SCC 214, Abani Kanta Ray vs. State of Orissa and others 1995 Supp. (4) SCC 169, National Hydroelectric Power Corporation Ltd. vs. Shri Bhagwan and Shiv Prakash (2001) 8 SCC 574 and Public Services Tribunal Bar Association vs. State of U.P. and another (2003) 4 SCC 104 . 19. Whether the transfer is in the interest of public servant or not, is not within the domain of the High Court to adjudicate while exercising the jurisdiction under Article 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India. The Court would only interfere with the orders of transfer in case the transfer is shown to be an act of malafide exercise or said to be in violation of the statutory provisions prohibiting any such transfer. In Union of India and others vs. Janardhan Debanath and another (2004) 4 SCC 245 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court held as under: “9. ……..The High Court while exercising jurisdiction under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India had gone into the question as to whether the transfer was in the interest of public service. That would essentially require factual adjudication and invariably depend upon peculiar facts and circumstances of the case concerned. ……..The High Court while exercising jurisdiction under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India had gone into the question as to whether the transfer was in the interest of public service. That would essentially require factual adjudication and invariably depend upon peculiar facts and circumstances of the case concerned. No government servant or employee of a public undertaking has any legal right to be posted forever at any one particular place or place of his choice since transfer of a particular employee appointed to the class or category of transferable posts from one place to another is not only an incident, but a condition of service, necessary too in public interest and efficiency in the public administration. Unless an order of transfer is shown to be an outcome of mala fide exercise or stated to be in violation of statutory provisions prohibiting any such transfer, the courts or the tribunals normally cannot interfere with such orders as a matter of routine, as though they were the appellate authorities substituting their own decision for that of the employer/management, as against such orders passed in the interest of administrative exigencies of the service concerned. This position was highlighted by this Court in National Hydroelectric Power Corporation Ltd. v. Shri Bhagwan and Anr. ( 2001(8) SCC 574 ).” 20. In State of U.P. vs. Siya Ram (2004) 7 SCC 405 the proposition of law as settled in Janardhan Debanath’s (supra) was reiterated. 21. Even the administrative guidelines for regulating transfers or containing transfer policies at best may afford an opportunity to the officer or servant concerned to approach their higher authorities for redress but cannot have the consequence of depriving or denying the competent authority to transfer a particular officer/servant to any place in public interest and as is found necessitated by exigencies of service as long as the official status is not affected adversely and there is no infraction of any career prospects such as seniority, scale of pay and secured emoluments. Even if the order of transfer is made in transgression of administrative guidelines the same cannot be interfered with as it does not confer any legally enforceable rights, unless, the same is shown to have been vitiated by malafides or made in violation of any statutory provision. Even if the order of transfer is made in transgression of administrative guidelines the same cannot be interfered with as it does not confer any legally enforceable rights, unless, the same is shown to have been vitiated by malafides or made in violation of any statutory provision. This was so held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in State of U.P. and others vs. Gobardhan Lal (2004) 11 SCC 402 wherein it has been held as under: “7. It is too late in the day for any Government servant to contend that once appointed or posted in a particular place or position, he should continue in such place or position as long as he desires. Transfer of an employee is not only an incident inherent in the terms of appointment but also implicit as an essential condition of service in the absence of any specific indication to the contra in the law governing or conditions of service. Unless the order of transfer is shown to be an outcome of a mala fide exercise of power or violative of any statutory provision (an Act or Rule) or passed by an authority not competent to do so, an order of transfer cannot lightly be interfered with as a matter of course or routine for any or every type of grievance sought to be made. Even administrative guidelines for regulating transfers or containing transfer policies at best may afford an opportunity to the officer or servant concerned to approach their higher authorities for redress but cannot have the consequence of depriving or denying the competent authority to transfer a particular officer/servant to any place in public interest and as is found necessitated by exigencies of service as long as the official status is not affected adversely and there is no infraction of any career prospects such as seniority, scale of pay and secured emoluments. This Court has often reiterated that the order of transfer made even in transgression of administrative guidelines cannot also be interfered with, as they do not confer any legally enforceable rights, unless, as noticed supra, shown to be vitiated by mala fides or is made in violation of any statutory provision. 8. This Court has often reiterated that the order of transfer made even in transgression of administrative guidelines cannot also be interfered with, as they do not confer any legally enforceable rights, unless, as noticed supra, shown to be vitiated by mala fides or is made in violation of any statutory provision. 8. A challenge to an order of transfer should normally be eschewed and should not be countenanced by the Courts or Tribunals as though they are Appellate Authorities over such orders, which could assess the niceties of the administrative needs and requirements of the situation concerned. This is for the reason that Courts or Tribunals cannot substitute their own decisions in the matter of transfer for that of competent authorities of the State and even allegations of mala fides when made must be such as to inspire confidence in the Court or are based on concrete materials and ought not to be entertained on the mere making of it or on consideration borne out of conjectures or surmises and except for strong and convincing reasons, no interference could ordinarily be made with an order of transfer.” 22. All the aforesaid principles, as noticed hereinabove, were reiterated by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Kendriya Vidyalaya Sangathan vs. Damodar Prasad Pandey and others (2004) 12 SCC 299 , Somesh Tiwari vs. Union of India and others (2009) 2 SCC 592 , Union of India and others vs. Muralidhara Menon and another (2009) 9 SCC 304 and Rajendra Singh and others vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and others (2009) 15 SCC 178 . 23. It is otherwise settled law that matters of transfer are purely administrative matters and the Courts must not ordinarily interfere in administrative matters and should maintain judicial restraint. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in State of Haryana and others vs. Kashmir Singh and another (2010) 13 SCC 306 held as under: “12. Transfer ordinarily is an incidence of service, and the courts should be very reluctant to interfere in transfer orders as long as they are not clearly illegal. In particular, we are of the opinion that transfer and postings of policemen must be left in the discretion of the State authorities concerned which are in the best position to assess the necessities of the administrative requirements of the situation. In particular, we are of the opinion that transfer and postings of policemen must be left in the discretion of the State authorities concerned which are in the best position to assess the necessities of the administrative requirements of the situation. The administrative authorities concerned may be of the opinion that more policemen are required in any particular district and/or another range than in another, depending upon their assessment of the law and order situation and/or other considerations. These are purely administrative matters, and it is well settled that courts must not ordinarily interfere in administrative matters and should maintain judicial restraint, vide Tata Cellular v. Union of India (1994) 6 SCC 651 .” 24. The mere fact that the petitioner had already joined at GSSS (Girls), Mandi and while in the impugned order of transfer he is shown to be still under transfer is of no avail to the petitioner since it has no legal implication whatsoever. The petitioner’s having joined would otherwise not create in his favour an indefeasible right to claim any right to remain posted at GSSS (Girls), Mandi particularly when the petitioner has failed to establish and prove on record the factual or legal malafides or the transfer being based on extraneous consideration or against professed norms. Moreover, it is not the case of the petitioner that the order of transfer is in any manner punitive or in lieu of punishment. 25. In view of the clear cut exposition of law as repeatedly laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court for the last scores of years, we do not find this case to be falling in any one of the exceptions which may call for any interference by this Court. The transfer has been ordered in the administrative exigency and in public interest and the so called malafides have not been established and proved on record. The transfer otherwise is not in violation of any statutory provision. 26. Therefore, we find no merit in the writ petition and the same is accordingly dismissed, so also the pending application. The parties are left to bear their own costs.