JUDGMENT : - Hon'ble JAIN, J.— Interim mandatory injunction was issued by the Addl. Civil Judge (Jr. Div.) No. 3, Bikaner on 20.7.2013 in Civil Misc. Case No.11/2010 titled as Smt. Indu Singhal vs. Manish Kumar in the following terms: ^^Jherh bUnq fla?ky iRuh Jh lR;iky tkfr fla?ky mez 76 o"kZ fuoklh 3 iksdj DokVj] tSyosy] chdkusj dh vksj ls izLrqr fd;k x;k izkFkZuk i= ckcr izkIr djus vLFkkbZ fu"ks/kkKk vUrxZr vkns'k 39 fu;e 1 o 2 lifBr /kkjk 151 O;-iz-la- fo:) vizkFkhZ euh"k dqekj iq= Jh tloUrflag tkfr jktiqjksfgr fuoklh 10 iksdj DokVj] tSyosy] chdkusj vkaf'kd :i ls Lohdkj fd;k tkdj tfj;s vLFkkbZ fu"ks/kkKk vizkFkhZ dks ikcan fd;k tkrk gS fd og oknxzLr xyh dh Nr ij j[kh ifV~V;ka gVk dj mls gok jks'kuh gsrq [kqyh j[ks rFkk izkFkhZuh ds f[kM+dh] jks'kunku] ukys rFkk ekfj;ksa bR;kfn esa dksbZ vojks/k mRiUu ugha djsaA izkFkhZuh ;g Under Taking U;k;ky; ds le{k fnukad 25-7-2013 rd is'k djsa fd og deh'kuj fjiksVZ esa n'kkZ;s vuqlkj f[kM+dh] jks'kunku] ukys o eksfj;k bR;kfn ds lkeus dh bUVs vius Lo;a ds [kpsZ ij gVok ysxhA rFkk okn dk izfrdwy fuLrkj.k gksus ij Lo;a ds [kpsZ ij mUgsa can djok nsxhA** 2. The aforesaid order was upheld in Civil Misc. Appeal No. 177/2013 (92/2013) titled as Manish Kumar vs. Smt. Indu Singhal by Additional District Judge No. 3, Bikaner on 21.11.2013. 3. Now, the present petition under Article 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India has been filed by Manish Kumar (Defendant in the trial court and appellant in the appellate court). In this petition, the petitioner has argued that interim mandatory injunction should not have been issued against him because at the time of preliminary stage, the final relief sought in the plaint could not have been granted by the courts below. The petitioner has relied upon the following rulings:- 1. Metro Marines vs. Bonus Watch Co. Pvt. Ltd., AIR 2005 Supreme Court 1444:- In the case, it was held that the interim mandatory injunction can be granted only in exceptional cases coming within the exceptions noticed in another cases of Hon'ble Supreme Court titled as Dorab Cawasji Warden vs. Coomi Sorab Warden, AIR, 1990 Supreme Court 867. 4. Metro Marines vs. Bonus Watch Co. Pvt. Ltd., AIR 2005 Supreme Court 1444:- In the case, it was held that the interim mandatory injunction can be granted only in exceptional cases coming within the exceptions noticed in another cases of Hon'ble Supreme Court titled as Dorab Cawasji Warden vs. Coomi Sorab Warden, AIR, 1990 Supreme Court 867. 4. In Dorab Cawasji Warden case of Hon'ble Supreme Court (supra), it was held that the relief of interlocutory mandatory injunctions may be granted generally to, preserve or restore the status quo of the last non-contested status which preceded the pending controversy until the final hearing when full relief may be granted or to compel the undoing of those acts that have been illegally done or the restoration of that which was wrongfully taken from the party complaining. But since the granting of such an injunction to a party who fails or would fail to establish his right at the trial may cause great injustice or irreparable harm to the party against whom it was granted or alternatively not granting of it to a party who succeeds or would succeed may equally cause great injustice or, irreparable harm, courts have evolved certain guidelines. Generally stated these guidelines are:- (1) The plaintiff has a strong case for trial. That is, it shall be of a higher standard than a prima facie case that is normally required for a prohibitory injunction. (2) It is necessary to prevent irreparable or serious injury which normally cannot be compensated in terms of money. (3) The balance of convenience is in favour of the one seeking such relief. 5. On the other hand, the respondent Smt. Indu Singhal has relied upon the following ruling:- Shalini Shyam Shetty vs. Rajendra Shankar Patil (2010) 8 SCC 329 :- In this case, it was held that in disputes between the private individuals and in cases of property rights, writ courts should not interfere unless there is any infraction of statute or it can be shown that the private individuals are acting in collusion with statutory authority. It was further held in this case that as a result of frequent interference by the High Courts either under Article 226 or under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, disposal of pending civil cases gets further impeded and thus, causing serious problems in the administration of justice. It was further held in this case that as a result of frequent interference by the High Courts either under Article 226 or under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, disposal of pending civil cases gets further impeded and thus, causing serious problems in the administration of justice. It was further held that it is only a writ of habeas Corpus which can be directed not only against the State but also against the private persons but other writs cannot be issued generally against private persons. In this case, the following principles on the exercise of High Court's jurisdiction under Article 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India were also formulated:- (a) A petition under Article 226 of the Constitution is different from a petition under Article 227. The mode of exercise of power by High Court under these two Articles is also different. (b) In any event, a petition under Article 227 cannot be called a writ petition. The history of the conferment of writ jurisdiction on High Courts is substantially different from the history of conferment of the power of Superintendence on the High Courts under Article 227 and have been discussed above. (c) High Courts cannot, at the drop of a hat, in exercise of its power of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution, interfere with the orders of tribunals or Courts inferior to it. Nor can it, in exercise of this power, act as a Court of appeal over the orders of Courts or tribunal subordinate to it. In cases where an alternative statutory mode of redressal has been provided, that would also operate as a restrain on the exercise of this power by the High Court. (d) The parameters of interference by High Courts in exercise of their power of superintendence have been repeatedly laid down by this Court. In this regard the High Court must be guided by the principles laid down by the Constitution Bench of this Court in Waryam Singh and the principles in Waryam Singh have been repeatedly followed by subsequent Constitution Benches and various other decisions of this Court. In this regard the High Court must be guided by the principles laid down by the Constitution Bench of this Court in Waryam Singh and the principles in Waryam Singh have been repeatedly followed by subsequent Constitution Benches and various other decisions of this Court. (e) According to the ratio in Waryam Singh followed in subsequent cases, the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction of superintendence can interfere in order only to keep the tribunals and Courts subordinate to it, within the bounds of their authority.' (f) In order to ensure that law is followed by such tribunals and Courts by exercising jurisdiction which is vested in them and by not declining to exercise the jurisdiction which is vested in them. (g) Apart from the situations pointed in (e) and (f), High Court can interfere in exercise of its power of superintendence when there has been a patent perversity in the orders of tribunals and Courts subordinate to it or where there has been a gross and manifest failure of justice or the basic principles of natural justice have been flouted. (h) In exercise of its power of superintendence High Court cannot interfere to correct mere errors of law or fact or just because another view than the one taken by the tribunals or Courts subordinate to it, is a possible view. In other words the jurisdiction has to be very sparingly exercised. (i) The High Court's power of superintendence under Article 227 cannot be curtailed by any statute. It has been declared a part of the basic structure of the Constitution by the Constitution Bench of this Court in L. Chandra Kumar vs. Union of India and therefore abridgement by a Constitutional amendment is also very doubtful. (j) It may be true that a statutory amendment of a father cognate provision, like Section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code by the Civil Procedure Code (Amendment) Act, 1999 does not and cannot cut down the ambit of High Court's power under Article 227. At the same time, it must be remembered that such statutory amendment does not correspondingly expand the High Court's jurisdiction of superintendence under Article 227. (k) The power is discretionary and has to be exercised on equitable principle. In an appropriate case, the power can be exercised suo motu. At the same time, it must be remembered that such statutory amendment does not correspondingly expand the High Court's jurisdiction of superintendence under Article 227. (k) The power is discretionary and has to be exercised on equitable principle. In an appropriate case, the power can be exercised suo motu. (l) On a proper appreciation of the wide and unfettered power of the High Court under Article 227, it transpires that the main object of this Article is to keep strict administrative and judicial control by the High Court on the administration of justice within its territory. (m) The object of superintendence, both administrative and judicial, is to maintain efficiency, smooth and orderly functioning of the entire machinery of justice in such a way as it does not bring it into any disrepute. The power of interference under this Article is to be kept to the minimum to ensure that the wheel of justice does not come to a halt and the fountain of justice remains pure and unpolluted in order to maintain public confidence in the functioning of the tribunals and Courts subordinate to High Court. (n) This reserve and exceptional power of judicial intervention is not to be exercised just for grant of relief in individual cases but should be directed for promotion of public confidence in the administration of justice in the larger public interest whereas Article 226 is meant for protection of individual grievance. Therefore, the power under Article 227 may be unfettered but its exercise is subject to high degree of judicial discipline pointed out above. (o) An improper and a frequent exercise of this power will be counter-productive and will divest this extraordinary power of its strength and vitality. 6. Following other rulings have also been relied upon by the respondent on the same point:- 1. Sameer Suresh Gupta vs. Rahul Kumar Agarwal (2013) 9 SCC 374 . 2. State of Haryana vs. Manoj Kumar, 2010 DNJ (SC) 366. 3. Abdul Razak (dead) through LRs. vs. Mangesh Rajaram Wagle & Ors., (2010) 2 SCC 432 = 2010(1) RLW 954 (SC). 4. Kokkanda B. Poondacha & Ors. vs. V.K.K. Ganapathi & Anr. Air 2011 SC 1353 = 2011(3) RLW 2321 (SC). 5. Sadhana Lodh vs. National Insurance Co. Ltd. & Anr. (2003) 3 SCC 524 . 6. Sanatan Dharm Shastri Sanskrit Mahavidhyalaya Lalsot (Shri) vs. State of Rajasthan & Ors. RLW 2005(1) Rajasthan 128. 7. 4. Kokkanda B. Poondacha & Ors. vs. V.K.K. Ganapathi & Anr. Air 2011 SC 1353 = 2011(3) RLW 2321 (SC). 5. Sadhana Lodh vs. National Insurance Co. Ltd. & Anr. (2003) 3 SCC 524 . 6. Sanatan Dharm Shastri Sanskrit Mahavidhyalaya Lalsot (Shri) vs. State of Rajasthan & Ors. RLW 2005(1) Rajasthan 128. 7. In the light of the principles propounded by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the aforesaid rulings, if we look into the facts of the case then the sale deed dated 2.11.1981, by which the suit property was sold for the first time by the then owner Krishan Kant which mentions as follows:- ^^-----iwoZ if'pe dh rjQ dh xfy;ksa ds gok jks'kuh ds vf/kdkjksa lfgr iw.kZ :i ls foØ; djrk gwa----** ^^bl DokVZj ls if'pe dh rjQ esjh [kqn dh ,d rhu QqV pkSM+h xyh gS bl xyh esa fpd Mksj xyh nks ckjh;k o ,d jlksbZ dk jks'kunku] jlksbZ dh nks bZaVksa dk tkyhnkj ckjh;sa [kqyrs gS o dejs dk ikuh fudklh ds fy, tks eks[kh;sa bl xyh esa gS oksg cnLrwj dk;e jgsxh o bl DokVZj dk ,d ijukyk bl xyh esa fxjrk gS ftlds }kjk Nr dk ikuh blh xyh esa ls cgsxk ijUrq [kjhnnkjk bl ijukys ds LFkku ij ikbZi viuh nhokj ds lgkjs uhps nks rjQ mrkj ysxk vkSj [kjhnnkjk bl xyh ls gok jks'kuh izkIr dj ldsxkA** 8. The report of the Commissioner is also in the file which states as follows:- ^^mlds iwoZ fn'kk esa izkFkhZuh ds edku dh rjQ ubZ fnokj cukbZ gqbZ gSA bl fnokj dks ekSdk fujh{k.k ds ds oDr ÅapkbZ 15 QqV rd fLFkr gS---** ^^izkfFkZuh edku ds fookfnr LFky dh rjQ [kqyus okyh f[kM+fd;ka o ukfy;ka vizkFkhZ }kjk uo fufeZr nhokj ls iw.kZr;k cUn gks x;s gSaA dSejk QksVks la[;k 5 o 6 esa cUn gqbZ f[kM+fd;ksa dk fn[kk;k x;k gSA izkfFkZuh edku ds f}rh; eafty ij fLFkr f[kM+fd;ka tks fookfnr LFky dh vksj [kqyrh gS mudks lhesUV o pqus ls cUn fd;k gqvk gS tks dSejk QksVks la[;k 3 o 4 esa Li"V fn[kkbZ ns jgs gSaA** 9. Looking to the concurrent finding of the facts by both the courts below and looking to the report of the Commissioner, in the light of the first available sale deed of the suit property, it cannot be said that the petitioner's case comes under the parameters formulated by the Hon'ble Apex Court in which interference by this Court by exercising powers under Article 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India should be made and accordingly, after hearing both the parties and after perusal of the documents submitted by both the parties before this court, I am of the firm view that this is not a case in which powers under Articles 226 & 227 of the Constitution of India should be exercised. Hence, the petition filed by Manish Kumar deserves to be dismissed, which is hereby dismissed and the impugned order is kept intact. A copy of this order be sent to both the courts below.