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2014 DIGILAW 58 (ALL)

VINOD v. STATE OF U. P.

2014-01-08

ADITYA NATH MITTAL

body2014
JUDGMENT Hon’ble Aditya Nath Mittal, J.—Heard learned counsel for the revisionist, learned A.G.A., learned counsel appearing for opposite party No. 2 and perused the record. 2. This criminal revision has been filed against order dated 26.5.2012 passed by learned Additional District & Sessions Judge, Court No. 5, Meerut, by which he has allowed the Criminal Appeal No. 2 of 2011 and thereby has declared the opposite party No. 2 as juvenile. 3. Learned counsel for the revisionist has submitted that the Juvenile Justice Board has also considered the said evidence and the Juvenile Justice Board, Meerut by his order dated 21.12.2010 has not found that the opposite party No. 2 was a juvenile on the date of incident but learned Appellate Court has wrongly interpreted the provisions of Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000 and has wrongly relied upon the High-school certificate. It has also been submitted that as per entry of first school attended, the date of birth of the opposite party No. 2 is 5.6.1991 and in the family register he has mentioned the year of birth is 1990. The witnesses have also stated in their statements that the said school had started in the year 1995, therefore, there was no occasion for the opposite party No. 2 to have taken admission at such an early age of about two years. It has also been submitted that the record of first school attended has been duly proved. It has also been submitted that in heinous crimes, the person should not be declared as juvenile merely on the contradictory evidence. 4. Learned A.G.A. and learned counsel appearing for the opposite party No. 2 have defended the impugned order and have submitted that the High-school certificate cannot be disbelieved and there is no illegality in the said appellate order. It has also been submitted that there were contradictions in the statements of Manager of the school and the witnesses, therefore, learned Appellate Court has not committed any error in relying upon the High-school certificate. 5. The father/natural guardian of opposite party No. 2 had moved an application before the Juvenile Justice Board, Meerut alleging that the opposite party No. 2 has passed his High-school examination in the year 2007 in which his date of birth has been mentioned as 9.3.1993, therefore, he should be declared juvenile. 5. The father/natural guardian of opposite party No. 2 had moved an application before the Juvenile Justice Board, Meerut alleging that the opposite party No. 2 has passed his High-school examination in the year 2007 in which his date of birth has been mentioned as 9.3.1993, therefore, he should be declared juvenile. During the course of enquiry, statements of the witnesses were recorded and after considering the evidence on record, the Juvenile Justice Board came to the conclusion that as per record of first school attended, the opposite party No. 2 was not a juvenile. The Board has also considered the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Rules, 2007 made by the Central Government as well as the Rules of 2004 made by the State of U.P. 6. The aforesaid order dated 21.12.2010 was challenged in Criminal Appeal No. 2 of 2011 before the Sessions Judge, Meerut and the Sessions Judge, Meerut after re-scrutinising the matter, came to the conclusion that date of birth of the opposite party No. 2 is 9.3.1993 and, therefore, he was juvenile on the date of incident i.e. on 5.3.2010. 7. In the said process of determination of age of the opposite party No. 2, there are three entries of date of birth. First entry is contained in the Parivar Register in which year of birth has been mentioned as 1990 but that Parivar Register was not proved during the course of enquiry, therefore, the entries of Parivar Register have been rightly discarded. 8. Now there remains the other dates of birth which is 5.6.1991 as per the first school attended and the another date is 9.3.1993 as per entries of Class-2, Class-6 as well as High-school certificate. The main consideration before the Courts below was to accept the date of birth as 5.6.1991 or 9.3.1993. 9. Rule 22(5) of U.P. Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Rules, 2004 provides as under : “22. ........... The main consideration before the Courts below was to accept the date of birth as 5.6.1991 or 9.3.1993. 9. Rule 22(5) of U.P. Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Rules, 2004 provides as under : “22. ........... (5) In every case concerning a juvenile or child, the Board shall either obtain: (i) a birth certificate given by a corporation or a municipal authority; or (ii) a date of birth certificate from the school first attended; or (iii) matriculation or equivalent certificates, if available; and (iv) in the absence of (i) to (iii) above, the medical opinion by a duly constituted Medical Board, subject to a margin of one year, in deserving cases for the reasons to be recorded by such Medical Board, regarding his age; and, when passing orders in such case shall, after taking into consideration such evidence as may be available or the medical opinion, as the case may be, record a finding in respect of his age.” 10. There are Central Rules of 2007 in this regard also and Rule 12(3) of Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Rules, 2007 provides as under : “12. ........... (3) In every case concerning a child or juvenile in conflict with law, the age determination inquiry shall be conducted by the Court or the Board or, as the case may be, the Committee by seeking evidence by obtaining - (a) (i) the matriculation or equivalent certificates, if available; and in the absence whereof; (ii) the date of birth certificate from the school (other than a play school) first attended; and in the absence whereof; (iii) the birth certificate given by a corporation or a municipal authority or a panchayat; (b) and only in the absence of either (i), (ii) or (iii) of clause (a) above, the medical opinion will be sought from a duly constituted Medical Board, which will declare the age of the juvenile or child. In case exact assessment of the age cannot be done, the Court or the Board or, as the case may be, the Committee, for the reasons to be recorded by them, may, if considered necessary, give benefit to the child or juvenile by considering his/her age on lower side within the margin of one year. In case exact assessment of the age cannot be done, the Court or the Board or, as the case may be, the Committee, for the reasons to be recorded by them, may, if considered necessary, give benefit to the child or juvenile by considering his/her age on lower side within the margin of one year. and, while passing orders in such case shall, after taking into consideration such evidence as may be available, or the medical opinion, as the case may be, record a finding in respect of his age and either of the evidence specified in any of the clauses (a)(i), (ii), (iii) or in the absence whereof, clause (b) shall be the conclusive proof of the age as regards such child or the juvenile in conflict with law.” 11. Section 68(1) of Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000 provides as under : “(1) The State Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, make rules to carry out the purposes of this Act. [Provided that the Central Government may, frame model rules in respect of all or any of the matters with respect to which the state Government may make rules under this section, and where any such model rules have been framed in respect of that any such matter, they shall apply to the state until the rules in respect of that matter is made by the state Government and while making any such rules, so far as is practicable, they confirm to such model rules.]” 12. The aforesaid proviso to Section 68(1) specifically provides that the model Rules framed by Central Government shall apply to the State until the Rules in respect of the matter is made by the State Government. The State of U.P. has framed the Rules in the year 2004 which have came into force on 1.5.2004. Accordingly, the U.P. Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Rules, 2004 will apply in the present matter. 13. Learned counsel for the revisionist has relied upon Jyoti Prakash Rai @ Jyoti Prakash v. State of Bihar, (2008) 15 SCC 223 , in which Hon’ble the Apex Court has held as under : “The 2000 Act is indisputably a beneficial legislation. 13. Learned counsel for the revisionist has relied upon Jyoti Prakash Rai @ Jyoti Prakash v. State of Bihar, (2008) 15 SCC 223 , in which Hon’ble the Apex Court has held as under : “The 2000 Act is indisputably a beneficial legislation. Principles of beneficial legislation, however, are to be applied only for the purpose of interpretation of the statute and not for arriving at a conclusion as to whether a person is juvenile or not. Whether an offender was a juvenile on the date of commission of the offence or not is essentially a question of fact which is required to be determined on the basis of the materials brought on records by the parties. In absence of any evidence which is relevant for the said purpose as envisaged under Section 35 of the Indian Evidence Act, the same must be determined keeping in view the factual matrix involved in each case. For the said purpose, not only relevant materials are required to be considered, the orders passed by the Court on earlier occasions would also be relevant. The Court has to determine the age keeping in view a large number of factors. It is in that context it was opined in Birad Mal Singhvi v. Anand Purohit, 1988 Supp SCC 604 : “To render a document admissible under Section 35, three conditions must be satisfied, firstly, entry that is relied on must be one in a public or other official book, register or record; secondly, it must be an entry stating a fact in issue or relevant fact; and thirdly, it must be made by a public servant in discharge of his official duty, or any other person in performance of a duty specially enjoined by law. An entry relating to date of birth made in the school register is relevant and admissible under Section 35 of the Act but the entry regarding the age of a person in a school register is of not much evidentiary value to prove the age of the person in the absence of the material on which the age was recorded.” In Ravinder Singh Gorkhi v. State of U.P., (2006) 5 SCC 584 , it was held : “21. Determination of the date of birth of a person before a Court of law, whether in a civil proceeding or a criminal proceeding, would depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case. Such a date of birth has to be determined on the basis of the materials on records. It will be a matter of appreciation of evidence adduced by the parties. Different standards having regard to the provision of Section 35 of the Evidence Act cannot be applied in a civil case or a criminal case.” It was furthermore held : “38. The age of a person as recorded in the school register or otherwise may be used for various purposes, namely, for obtaining admission; for obtaining an appointment; for contesting election; registration of marriage; obtaining a separate unit under the ceiling laws; and even for the purpose of litigating before a civil forum e.g. necessity of being represented in a Court of law by a guardian or where a suit is filed on the ground that the plaintiff being a minor he was not appropriately represented therein or any transaction made on his behalf was void as he was a minor. A Court of law for the purpose of determining the age of a party to the lis, having regard to the provisions of Section 35 of the Evidence Act will have to apply the same standard. No different standard can be applied in case of an accused as in a case of abduction or rape, or similar offence where the victim or the prosecutrix although might have consented with the accused, if on the basis of the entries made in the register maintained by the school, a judgment of conviction is recorded, the accused would be deprived of his constitutional right under Article 21 of the Constitution, as in that case the accused may unjustly be convicted.” 14. Learned counsel for the revisionist has further relied upon Babloo Pasi v. State of Jharkhand and another, (2008) 13 SCC 133 , in which Hon’ble the Apex Court has held as under : “Insofar as the Board is concerned, it is evident that it has mechanically accepted the entry in Voters List as conclusive without appreciating its probative value in terms of the provisions of Section 35 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. Section 35 of the said Act lays down that an entry in any public or other official book, register, record, stating a fact in issue or relevant fact made by a public servant in the discharge of his official duty especially enjoined by the law of the country is itself a relevant fact. It is trite that to render a document admissible under Section 35, three conditions have to be satisfied, namely: (i) entry that is relied on must be one in a public or other official book, register or record; (ii) it must be an entry stating a fact in issue or a relevant fact, and (iii) it must be made by a public servant in discharge of his official duties, or in performance of his duty especially enjoined by law. An entry relating to date of birth made in the school register is relevant and admissible under Section 35 of the Act but the entry regarding the age of a person in a school register is of not much evidentiary value to prove the age of the person in the absence of the material on which the age was recorded. (See: Birad Mal Singhvi v. Anand Purohit) Therefore, on facts at hand, in the absence of evidence to show on what material the entry in the Voters List in the name of the accused was made, a mere production of a copy of the Voters List, though a public document, in terms of Section 35, was not sufficient to prove the age of the accused. Similarly, though a reference to the report of the Medical Board, showing the age of the accused as 17-18 years, has been made but there is no indication in the order whether the Board had summoned any of the members of the Medical Board and recorded their statement. It also appears that the physical appearance of the accused, has weighed with the Board in coming to the afore-noted conclusion, which again may not be a decisive factor to determine the age of a delinquent.” 15. The reliance has also been placed upon Jabar Singh v. Dinesh and another, (2010) 3 SCC 757 , in which Hon’ble the Apex Court has held as under : “We are of the considered opinion that the High Court was not at all right in reversing the findings of the trial Court in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction. The reliance has also been placed upon Jabar Singh v. Dinesh and another, (2010) 3 SCC 757 , in which Hon’ble the Apex Court has held as under : “We are of the considered opinion that the High Court was not at all right in reversing the findings of the trial Court in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction. The entry of date of birth of Respondent No. 1 in the admission form, the school records and transfer certificates did not satisfy the conditions laid down in Section 35 of the Evidence Act inasmuch as the entry was not in any public or official register and was not made either by a public servant in the discharge of his official duty or by any person in performance of a duty specially enjoined by the law of the country and, therefore, the entry was not relevant under Section 35 of the Evidence Act for the purpose of determining the age of Respondent No. 1 at the time of commission of the alleged offence. As has been held by this Court in Ravinder Singh Gorkhi and Jyoti Prakash (supra) the age of Respondent No. 1 was a question of fact, which was to be decided on the evidence brought on record before the Court and it was for the trial Court to appreciate the evidence and determine the age of Respondent No. 1 at the time of commission of the alleged offence and in this case, the trial Court has arrived at the finding that the claim of Respondent No. 1 that he was less than 18 years at the time of commission of the alleged offence, was not believable. While arriving at this finding of fact, the trial Court had not only considered the evidence produced by Respondent No. 1 but also considered the fact that either in the earlier cases or during the investigation of the present case, the Respondent No. 1 had not raised this plea. While arriving at this finding of fact, the trial Court had also considered the physical appearance of Respondent No. 1. Such determination on a question of fact made by the trial Court on the basis of the evidence or material before it and other relevant factors could not be disturbed by the High Court in exercise of its revisional powers.” 16. Such determination on a question of fact made by the trial Court on the basis of the evidence or material before it and other relevant factors could not be disturbed by the High Court in exercise of its revisional powers.” 16. Learned counsel for the revisionist has further relied upon Ram Suresh Singh v. Prabhat Singh @ Chhotu Singh and another, (2009) 6 SCC 681 , in which Hon’ble the Apex Court has held as under : “Determination of age of a person sometimes poses a difficult question. In the absence of any statutory rule having been framed, no doubt, the provisions of Section 35 of the Evidence Act were required to be strictly complied with. The condition laid down in Section 35 of the Evidence Act for proving an entry pertaining to the age of a student in a school admission register is to be considered for the purpose of determining the relevance thereof. But in this case, the said condition must be held to have been satisfied. An entry in a school register may not be a public document and, thus, must be proved in accordance with law, as has been held by this Court in the case of Birad Mal Singhvi (supra), but, in this case the said entry has been proved.” 17. Learned counsel for the revisionist has further relied upon Om Prakash v. State of Rajasthan and another, (2012) 5 SCC 201 , in which Hon’ble the Apex Court has held as under : “We are unable to appreciate and accept the aforesaid contention of learned counsel for the respondent since the age of the accused could not be proved merely on the basis of the school record as the Courts below inspite of its scrutiny could not record a finding of fact that the accused, in fact, was a minor on the date of the incident. Hence, in a situation when the school record itself is not free from ambiguity and conclusively prove the minority of the accused, medical opinion cannot be allowed to be overlooked or treated to be of no consequence. Hence, in a situation when the school record itself is not free from ambiguity and conclusively prove the minority of the accused, medical opinion cannot be allowed to be overlooked or treated to be of no consequence. It is no doubt true that if there is a clear and unambiguous case in favour of the juvenile accused that he was a minor below the age of 18 years on the date of the incident and the documentary evidence at least prima facie proves the same, he would be entitled for this special protection under the Juvenile Justice Act. But when an accused commits a grave and heinous offence and thereafter attempts to take statutory shelter under the guise of being a minor, a casual or cavalier approach while recording as to whether an accused is a juvenile or not cannot be permitted as the Courts are enjoined upon to perform their duties with the object of protecting the confidence of common man in the institution entrusted with the administration of justice. The benefit of the principle of benevolent legislation attached to Juvenile Justice Act would thus apply to only such cases wherein the accused is held to be a juvenile on the basis of at least prima facie evidence regarding his minority as the benefit of the possibilities of two views in regard to the age of the alleged accused who is involved in grave and serious offence which he committed and gave effect to it in a well planned manner reflecting his maturity of mind rather than innocence indicating that his plea of juvenility is more in the nature of a shield to dodge or dupe the arms of law, cannot be allowed to come to his rescue. Hence if the plea of juvenility or the fact that he had not attained the age of discretion so as to understand the consequence of his heinous act is not free from ambiguity or doubt, the said plea cannot be allowed to be raised merely on doubtful school admission record and in the event it is doubtful, the medical evidence will have to be given due weightage while determining the age of the accused. Adverting to the facts of this case we have noticed that the trial Court inspite of the evidence led on behalf of the accused, was itself not satisfied that the accused was a juvenile as none of the school records relied upon by the respondent-accused could be held to be free from doubt so as to form a logical and legal basis for the purpose of deciding the correct date of birth of the accused indicating that the accused was a minor/juvenile on the date of the incident. Similarly, if the conduct of an accused or the method and manner of commission of the offence indicates an evil and a well planned design of the accused committing the offence which indicates more towards the matured skill of an accused than that of an innocent child, then in the absence of reliable documentary evidence in support of the age of the accused, medical evidence indicating that the accused was a major cannot be allowed to be ignored taking shelter of the principle of benevolent legislation like the Juvenile Justice Act, subverting the course of justice as statutory protection of the Juvenile Justice Act is meant for minors who are innocent law breakers and not accused of matured mind who uses the plea of minority as a ploy or shield to protect himself from the sentence of the offence committed by him.” 18. It is relevant to mention that the Rules of 2007 made by Central Government are much exhaustive as compared to Rules framed by State of U.P. Sub rule 5 of Rule 22 of U.P. Rules, 2004 has not given any preference but has used the word “either” which means that either of the documents mentioned in sub clause I to IV may be obtained while the Central Rules, 2007 makes it very clear that the first preference shall be given to matriculation or equivalent certificate and in absence whereof the date of birth certificate from the school first attended may be obtained and in absence whereof birth certificate given by the Corporation or a Municipality and in absence of all the above three, the medical opinion shall be taken into consideration. 19. In the present case, the entries of Parivar Register have been rightly discarded as they were neither proved nor had any basis of such entries. 19. In the present case, the entries of Parivar Register have been rightly discarded as they were neither proved nor had any basis of such entries. Moreover it is settled law that entries in the Parivar Register denotes only the numbers of family members and they are not authenticated proof of age or date of birth. 20. There is conflict between the two dates namely 5.6.1991 which is said to be entered at the time of first school attended and the another date is 9.3.1993 which is entered into all other subsequent schools attended by the opposite party No. 2 The C.W.-2 Indrapal Singh has proved the aforesaid entry of 5.6.1991 and again the same witness examined as C.W.-3 has proved that when the opposite party No. 2 has taken admission in his college in Class-7 then as per the student’s roll, his date of birth was 9.3.1993. It is relevant to mention that C.W.-5 is again the same witness Indrapal Singh who has proved that the opposite party No. 2 was admitted in Class-2 and his date of birth was 9.3.1993. In this way the Indrapal Singh has again been examined as C.W.-3 and same Indrapal Singh has been examined as C.W.-5 who has stated the dates of birth at the time of admission in Class-2 and Class-7 which is 9.3.1993. Undisputedly as per High-school certificate, the date of birth has been mentioned as 9.3.1993. Bavita Tomar, C.W.-4 has stated that the opposite party No. 2 has taken admission in Class-6 and his date of birth as per school record is 9.3.193, therefore, the date of birth as mentioned in the school records at the time of taking admission in Class-2, Class-6, Class-7 and High-school are constantly 9.3.1993. The date of birth mentioned at the time of admission in Nursery Class is 5.6.1991 which has not been further carried out as such. 21. It is not disputed that the opposite party No. 2 had attended the first school as Prince Public School, Meerut and the date of admission was 19.7.1995. The date of birth mentioned at the time of admission in Nursery Class is 5.6.1991 which has not been further carried out as such. 21. It is not disputed that the opposite party No. 2 had attended the first school as Prince Public School, Meerut and the date of admission was 19.7.1995. In the first school attended scholars register the date of birth is mentioned as 5.6.1991 and the said extract has been issued by the same Principal Sudha Devi who has issued the another extract of the same School in which the opposite party No. 2 had received education from Class-2 to Class-5 but in this, the date of birth has been mentioned as 9.3.1993. It appears that after passing the classes of Nursery, K.G. and 1st standard, the date of birth has been changed from 5.6.1991 to 9.3.1993. It is general tendency of the parents that they use to mention the lesser age at the subsequent available opportunity with a view to get more benefit in the Government job and other purposes. In India, this practice is not uncommon that such reduction in the age is made for such ulterior purposes. No doubt that since Class-2 to High-school the date of birth has been found to be 9.3.1993 but at the same time the date of birth mentioned at the time of school first attended and studied for three consecutive years, the date has been mentioned as 5.6.1991. Thus it is clear that subsequently the date has been changed for some ulterior purposes like longer length of service in case of Government job or for appearing in entrance tests for higher education or for other purposes. Thus it is clear that subsequently the date has been changed for some ulterior purposes like longer length of service in case of Government job or for appearing in entrance tests for higher education or for other purposes. At this stage para 27 of Om Prakash v. State of Rajasthan and another (supra) is again reproduced as under : “The benefit of the principle of benevolent legislation attached to Juvenile Justice Act would thus apply to only such cases wherein the accused is held to be a juvenile on the basis of at least prima facie evidence regarding his minority as the benefit of the possibilities of two views in regard to the age of the alleged accused who is involved in grave and serious offence which he committed and gave effect to it in a well planned manner reflecting his maturity of mind rather than innocence indicating that his plea of juvenility is more in the nature of a shield to dodge or dupe the arms of law, cannot be allowed to come to his rescue. Hence if the plea of juvenility or the fact that he had not attained the age of discretion so as to understand the consequence of his heinous act is not free from ambiguity or doubt, the said plea cannot be allowed to be raised merely on doubtful school admission record and in the event it is doubtful, the medical evidence will have to be given due weightage while determining the age of the accused.” 22. The U.P. Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Rules, 2004 also recognises the date of birth certificate from the school first attended and i.e. in preference to matriculation or equivalent certificate if available. Nothing has come on record that how the date of birth as 5.6.1991 was entered in the Prince Public School at the time of admission on 19.7.1995. Moreover it is not disputed that the opposite party No. 2 has taken admission on 19.7.1995 at Prince Public School. If his date of birth is presumed to be 9.3.1993 then he was aged about two years and four months. A child of two years and four months has no competence to receive the education at a public school and it cannot be believed that he has passed the Nursery Class just within three years of birth. If his date of birth is presumed to be 9.3.1993 then he was aged about two years and four months. A child of two years and four months has no competence to receive the education at a public school and it cannot be believed that he has passed the Nursery Class just within three years of birth. Apparently the dates mentioned in the subsequent certificates from Class-2 to High-school appears to be false on the face of it because in the subsequent entries which are of the same educational institution, the basis of entering the said date of birth of 9.3.1993 has not been mentioned. Certainly the admission in Class-2 should have been taken on the basis of either previous record or on the basis of school leaving certificate. The school leaving certificate after passing out Class-I, should have contained the date of birth as 5.6.1991. The entries of first attended school are not doubtful in any way while the entries of subsequent attended school from Class-2 appears to be incorrect. 23. Section 35 of Indian Evidence Act lays down the following three conditions regarding the entry in any public or other official book, register or record; (i) Entries i.e. relied upon must be recorded in a public or other official book, register or record. (ii) It must be in an entry in any public or other official book, register or record, stating a fact in issue or relevant fact, and (iii) It must be made by a public servant in the discharge of his official duty, or by any other person in performance of a duty specially enjoined by the law. 24. Hon’ble the Apex Court in Babloo Pasi v. State of Jharkhand and another (supra) has held that the entries relating to date of birth made in the school register is relevant and admissible under Section 35 of the Act but the entries regarding the age of a person in a school register is of not much evidentiary value to prove the age of the person in absence of material on which the age was recorded. 25. It is also relevant to mention that no one at the entry level of Nursery Class will mention a higher age group because that may be detrimental to his whole career. 25. It is also relevant to mention that no one at the entry level of Nursery Class will mention a higher age group because that may be detrimental to his whole career. The date of birth of opposite party No. 2 as mentioned in Prince Public School’s Scholars Register on the date of admission i.e. on 19.7.1995 appears to be more correct as compared to subsequent dates of birth which appears to be manipulated for ulterior purposes. 26. Learned Juvenile Justice Board after considering the evidence on record has determined the date of birth as 5.6.1991 and has not declared the opposite party No. 2 as juvenile. Learned Additional Sessions Judge, Court No. 5, Meerut has relied upon the subsequent dates of birth i.e. 9.3.1993 on the basis of statements of witnesses. In deciding any matter the quality of evidence is to be seen and not the quantity of evidence. Merely because the date of birth of the opposite party No. 2 has been written 9.3.1993 constantly after the 2nd Class studies, cannot falsify the actual date of birth of 5.6.1991 which has been mentioned in the records of first attended school for the basic reason that a child of two years and four months cannot attend a Nursery Class and the entries made at the time of first admission on 19.7.1995 are more reliable. 27. For the facts and circumstances mentioned above, the order dated 26.5.2012 passed by learned Additional District & Sessions Judge, Court No. 5, Meerut suffers from manifest errors and cannot be sustained. 28. The revision is allowed. The order dated 26.5.2012 passed by Additional District & Sessions Judge, Court No. 5, Meerut is set-aside and the order dated 21.12.2010 passed by Juvenile Justice Board, Meerut is restored.