Judgment : 1. The petitioner claims the benefit of appointment under the dying-in-harness scheme framed under Rule 188A of the Kerala Co-operative Societies Rules. It is averred that the petitioner's father, while working as the Secretary of the 1st respondent-Cooperative Society, died in harness on 29.3.1974. After the petitioner attained the age of majority, she claimed appointment to a post under the dying-in-harness scheme on 4.8.1990 and later she submitted application to the 3rd respondent-Joint Registrar of Co-operative Societies, Thrissur, on 16.8.1990 to issue necessary directions to the 1st respondent-Co-operative Bank to appoint her in the next arising vacancy. When a retirement vacancy arose on 1.5.1993, her claim for appointment to that post was overlooked and the 1st respondent had appointed one Sri.Gopi to the said post. Thereupon, the petitioner was constrained to approach this Court by filing a Writ Petition, O.P.No. 5707/1993 for rederessing her grievances. A learned Single Judge of this Court by judgment dated 24.11.1999 finally disposed of O.P.No.5707/1993 (Ext.P1) by holding that the petitioner is eligible to get the said appointment under the dying-in-harness scheme even though she is married and directed the respondents to appoint the petitioner as Attender in the 1st respondent-society in the retirement vacancy that arose on 30.4.1993. 2. Aggrieved by Ext.P1 judgment rendered by the learned Single Judge in O.P.No.5707/1993, W.A.No.10/2000 was filed by the Co-operative Society and W.A.No.417/2000 was filed by one Sri.C.K.Gopi. The Division Bench held in Ext.P2 judgment that the said Sri.C.K.Gopi was waiting from 1980 onwards for the said appointment and was entitled to get regular appointment to that post as per the binding settlement. The Division Bench of this Court as per Ext.P2 judgment dated 11.11.2002 thus allowed the said writ appeals holding that this Court cannot issue a direction to the bank authorities to appoint the petitioner and, accordingly, dismissed O.P.No. 5707/1993. 3. Later when Ext.P3 notification dated 1 3.2.2003 was advertised in a newspaper calling for applications by the 1st respondent-Co-operative Society, to two posts of Peons, the petitioner staked her claim for appointment to one of the two posts, it is averred. The petitioner had submitted application for selection and appointment pursuant to Ext.P3 and also attended the test and interview and she had also submitted representations to respondents 1 to 3 staking her claim. The petitioner had submitted application for selection and appointment pursuant to Ext.P3 and also attended the test and interview and she had also submitted representations to respondents 1 to 3 staking her claim. Later she came to know that her claim was rejected and two other persons, viz., additional respondents 4 and 5, have been appointed against the said two posts notified as per Ext.P3 dated 1 3.2.2003. It is in the conspectus of these facts and circumstances that the petitioner has chosen to prefer this Original Petition with the following prayers: "i. To issue a writ, direction or order in the nature of mandamus commanding the respondents to pass suitable orders for appointing the petitioner as Peon in vacancy for which applications were invited by Exhibit P3 notice; ii. To declare that the petitioner is entitled to be appointed to the posts of Peon, for which applications were invited by Exhibit P3 notice." 4. The main contention of the petitioner is that she is entitled to be appointed to the post of Peon under the dying-in- harness scheme framed under Rule 1 88A of the Kerala Co-operative Societies Rules. The sheet anchor of her case is that all objections raised by the respondents have been considered in Ext.P1 judgment and that the said judgment has been interfered in the appellate judgment as per Ext.P2 only for the reason that there is another claimant to the said post of Peon. That now there are no other lawful claimants, therefore at least to one out of the two posts covered by Ext.P3 should have been utilized for accommodating the claim of the petitioner for appointment under the dying-in-harness scheme and only the other remaining one post covered by Ext.P3 should have been utilised for open market recruitment. It is contended by the petitioner that the 1st respondent has a statutory duty arising under Rule 188A of the Rules to appoint the petitioner to the said post. 5. The 1st respondent-Co-operative Society has filed a counter affidavit dated 7.4.2003 and additional respondents 4 and 5 have also filed a counter affidavit dated 8.10.2003. Both the above said respondents have resisted the pleas and contentions of the petitioner through their pleadings. 6. 5. The 1st respondent-Co-operative Society has filed a counter affidavit dated 7.4.2003 and additional respondents 4 and 5 have also filed a counter affidavit dated 8.10.2003. Both the above said respondents have resisted the pleas and contentions of the petitioner through their pleadings. 6. The 1st respondent-Co-operative Society would submit that the petitioner had no legal claim or right to get appointment in the bank under the dying-in-harness scheme as she is not a dependant of the deceased employee, since she is living separately with her husband. It is the main contention of the 1st respondent that Ext.P1 judgment rendered by the learned Single Judge has been set aside by the Division Bench in the appellate judgment as per Ext.P2 and the Original Petition covered by Ext.P1 judgment, itself has been dismissed by the Division Bench as per Ext.P2 judgment. Therefore, the petitioner cannot make any claim on the basis of Ext.P1 judgment and her Original Petition, which led to Ext.P1 judgment, itself has been dismissed by the Division Bench in terms of Ext.P2 writ appellate judgment. That as she is a married person, she cannot be said to be a dependant of a deceased employee, who died as early as on 29.7.1 974. That the bank had lawfully published Ext.P3 notification in the newspaper strictly in accordance with law and that consequent to Ext.P3 notification, the bank received 57 applications. The petitioner had also submitted application in pursuance of Ext.P3. 18 applications were defective and it was rejected. 39 candidates including the petitioner were called for the written test. But the petitioner did not prove her eligibility and merit in the written test. 10 candidates, who scored the highest marks in the written test, were short-listed on the basis of their performance in the written test and were selected to be called for the interview. The petitioner did not qualify in the written test. Thereafter, a rank list of five persons was prepared and from the said rank list, two persons, viz., the additional respondents 4 and 5, have been selected and appointed in the bank to the two vacancies of Peon covered by Ext.P3 notification. It is contented that the person like the petitioner, who participated in the selection proceedings pursuant to Ext.P3 is estopped from challenging the selection and appointment made in pursuance of Ext.P3. It is contented that the person like the petitioner, who participated in the selection proceedings pursuant to Ext.P3 is estopped from challenging the selection and appointment made in pursuance of Ext.P3. The allegation of the petitioner that the 2nd respondent has decided to appoint their own candidates as Peons in the bank is vehemently denied. As the earlier Original Petition filed by the petitioner, which led to Exts.P1 and P2 judgments have been dismissed by the Division Bench as per Ext.P2 judgment, the petitioner cannot make any claim on the basis of Ext.P1 judgment. The contesting respondents 4 and 5 also reiterated the submissions and contentions of the 1st respondent. 7. Heard Sri.P.B.Sahasranaman, the learned counsel for petitioner, Sri.M.P.Ashok Kumar, the learned counsel appearing for the 1st respondent, the learned Government Pleader for the 3rd respondent and Sri.C.E.Unnikrishnan, the learned counsel appearing for contesting respondents 4 and 5. 8. After giving anxious consideration of the rival contentions posed by the counsel on both sides, this Court is of the considered opinion that the petitioner cannot rely on Ext.P1 judgment for staking a claim for appointment under the dying-in-harness scheme, as O.P.No. 5707/1993, which led to Ext.P1 judgment, has been dismissed by the Division Bench as per Ext.P2 writ appellate judgment. This Court also finds that the petitioner is a married lady and at this distance of time, she cannot be treated as the dependent of a deceased employee, who died as early as on 29.3.1974. At any rate, the court should show maximum restraint in exercising its discretionary jurisdiction in favour of the petitioner on the basis of such a claim, especially considering the long lapse of time and also considering the fact that the petitioner is married and living separately with her husband. More importantly, the petitioner had applied in pursuance of Ext.P3 notification and she was unsuccessful in the selection process and respondents 4 and 5 proved their merit and secured the appointment. Therefore, the petitioner is estopped from turning around and challenging the selection process initiated pursuant to Ext.P3, which led to the selection of the contesting respondents, especially because she had willingly participated in the selection process. True that the petitioner has also staked a claim for appointment under the dying- in-harness scheme. Therefore, the petitioner is estopped from turning around and challenging the selection process initiated pursuant to Ext.P3, which led to the selection of the contesting respondents, especially because she had willingly participated in the selection process. True that the petitioner has also staked a claim for appointment under the dying- in-harness scheme. But the fact that the petitioner has voluntarily participated in the selection process will certainly be a ground of estoppel that should operate against her. Moreover, this Court is further of the considered opinion that the respondents are right in contending that the right conferred on the dependant of an employee, who die in harness, is neither unlimited nor absolute and that it is not a right capable of execution beyond a reasonable period, in view of the aspects stated hereinbelow. 9. In the case M.G.B.Gramin Bank v. Chakrawarti Singh reported in 2013 (6) SLR 227 (SC), the Apex Court held that the appointment under dying-in-harness scheme could not be claimed as a matter of right, as no right would vest with anybody on the death of an employee in harness. It was held that the mere death of an employee in harness would not enable a dependant to claim appointment on compassionate grounds as a matter of right and the entitlement would depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case and on the consideration as to whether, without providing an appointment on compassionate grounds, the family could tide over the immediate crisis. Further, in the case Union of India v. Susamma Chandy reported in 2013 (4) KLT SN 137 (Case No.148), a Division Bench of this Court was called upon to consider the question whether an appointment on compassionate grounds could be granted after many years since the death of the employee, who died in harness. The Division Bench therein held that a compassionate appointment could not be granted after a long number of years for a simple reason that the immediate crisis would then have been extinguished and giving such appointment would be against public policy, since the post could be offered to a candidate from the open market. The Division Bench therein held that a compassionate appointment could not be granted after a long number of years for a simple reason that the immediate crisis would then have been extinguished and giving such appointment would be against public policy, since the post could be offered to a candidate from the open market. The Bench held that such employment, in effect, is an exemption to the constitutional provisions contained in Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India and the appointment on compassionate grounds is brought in only with the object of providing immediate succour to the family of the deceased employee to overcome the sudden financial crisis and not with a view to confer any status of civil employment for the family. So, the question of entitlement or otherwise of the petitioner herein for the claim for appointment on compassionate grounds under Rule 188A of the Kerala Co-operative Societies Rules has to be considered in the light of the above stated legal position. As held by the Apex Court and various High Courts in an umpteen number of decisions, compassionate appointments to dependants of deceased employees can be given only with due regard to the object and purpose of giving such appointments to tide over the immediate financial difficulties of the hapless family members, who may otherwise be victimised of penury caused due to the death of the employee, who is the sole bread-winning member of the family. The courts so held that the benefit provided under the dying-in-harness scheme for compassionate employment cannot be equated to a reservation for appointment and the same cannot be claimed as a right of inheritance. The rationale behind the purpose and objective of the dying-in-harness scheme for compassionate employment is to give immediate relief to the bereaved family on the death of the bread-winner on whom the members of the family were depending and the said right should be recognized as capable of being exercised and executed only within a reasonable period of time and it cannot be kept alive for any number of years to come. Viewing the facts of this case, in the aforementioned legal framework, this Court cannot but accept the contention of the respondents that the petitioner, who is now settled with her husband, cannot claim the benefit of the dying-in- harness at this long distance of time. Viewing the facts of this case, in the aforementioned legal framework, this Court cannot but accept the contention of the respondents that the petitioner, who is now settled with her husband, cannot claim the benefit of the dying-in- harness at this long distance of time. At any rate, this Court is not inclined to exercise the discretionary jurisdiction in favour of the petitioner, who is settled with her husband and therefore, this Court, at this point of time, cannot treat the petitioner as the dependant of a deceased employee, who died as early as on 29.3.1974. In these circumstances, this Court is constrained to hold that the contentions and pleas of the petitioner are not tenable for invoking the public law remedy of judicial review proceedings in this case. Accordingly, the Original Petition stands dismissed. There will be no order as to costs.