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2014 DIGILAW 581 (CAL)

Kamal Chatterjee v. Sailen Sadhukhan

2014-07-03

ISHAN CHANDRA DAS, JYOTIRMAY BHATTACHARYA

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Judgment Jyotirmay Bhjattacharya, J. This first appeal is directed against the judgment and decree dated 31st May, 1997 passed by the Learned Judge 8th Bench of City Civil Court, Calcutta in Ejectment Suit No.1140 of 1984, at the instance of the defendant/appellant. Admittedly, the father of the plaintiff/respondent inducted the father of the defendants as tenant in respect of the suit premises. The suit premises consists of three rooms; one room on the ground floor, one room on the 1st Floor and one room on the 2nd floor together with one bath and privy on the ground floor. Rent of the suit Premises is Rs.50/- (Rupees fifty) only per month payable by the tenant. The suit premise is situated at the southern part of the Premises No.26A, Bhupen Bose Avenue, Calcutta in the heart of the city. The father of the plaintiff was the owner of two premises; one was premises No.26A, Bhupen Bose Avenue, and the other was Premises No. 28A, Bhupen Bose Avenue, Calcutta. The suit Premises being 26A, Bhupen Bose Avenue was gifted to the plaintiff by his father by a registered deed of gift executed on 10th April, 1972. The other Premises being Premises No.28A, Bhupen Bose Avenue was gifted to the plaintiff’s brother Sushil, by his father by a registered deed of gift. Thus, the plaintiff became the owner of the Premises No.26A, Bhupen Bose Avenue by virtue of the deed of gift executed and registered by his father. His name was mutated as owner of the said premises and he has been paying rates and taxes to the Municipal Authority in respect of the said premises, since the time when he acquired title in the said property by way of the said gift. The defendants claimed that after the death of their father, they jointly inherited the tenancy right in respect of the suit premises from their father. It is an admitted position that during the life time of the father, the Appellant (tenant), as per the instruction of the plaintiff’s father, started paying rent to the plaintiff in respect of the suit premises since the time when the said property was bequeathed to the plaintiff by his father. On the death of the defendant’s father being the original tenant, the defendant/appellant was accepted as a tenant under the plaintiff in respect of the suit premises. On the death of the defendant’s father being the original tenant, the defendant/appellant was accepted as a tenant under the plaintiff in respect of the suit premises. Earlier the plaintiff filed a suit being Ejectment Suit No.1253 of 1997 against the defendant/appellant for evicting him from the suit premises on the ground of his reasonable requirement. Though after a contested hearing, the learned Trial Judge held that the plaintiff is the owner of the suit property and he reasonably requires the suit property for his own use and occupation and for the occupation of his wife and they have no other reasonably suitable alternative accommodation elsewhere, but ultimately decree for eviction was not passed in the said suit as the Learned Trial Court found that the suit was not maintainable for defect of parties. According to the learned Trial Judge, on the death of the father of the defendant/appellant who was the original tenant in respect of the suit premises, his tenancy right in respect of the suit premises was inherited by all his legal heirs and representatives including the defendant/appellant. Since the other legal heirs and representatives of the original tenant were not impleaded as parties in the said suit, the said suit was ultimately dismissed for non-joinder of necessary party. Thereafter, again an ejectment notice under Section 13(6) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act 1956 was served upon the tenants/defendants but since the defendants/ tenants did not vacate the suit premises in compliance with the eviction notice, the instant suit was filed on the ground of reasonable requirement. In the suit, all the heirs and legal representatives of the original tenant were impleaded as defendants. The plaintiff’s family consists of two members, i.e., he himself and his wife. He claims that he became the owner of the suit premises by virtue of the deed of gift executed by his father in his favour. The said deed of gift was acted upon, his name was mutated as owner of the said premises in the Municipal records and taxes are regularly being paid by him in respect of the said premises. He stays along with his wife in one room at Premises No. 28A, Bhupen Bose Avenue, which was gifted to the plaintiff’s brother, namely, Sushil by his father. He stays along with his wife in one room at Premises No. 28A, Bhupen Bose Avenue, which was gifted to the plaintiff’s brother, namely, Sushil by his father. He claims that the room which they are occupying in his brother’s house at Premises No.28A, Bhupen Bose Avenue, is practically a drawing room of the plaintiff’s brother. He claims that he has no other reasonably suitable alternative accommodation elsewhere. He thus, claims that he reasonably requires one bed-room for himself and his wife, one drawing room, one dining room-cum-store room-cum-kitchen and one Thakur Ghar. The defendant No.1 to 3, who are the sisters of the defendant/appellant filed written statement in the said suit but they did not ultimately come forward to contest the said suit. Defendant No.5/appellant along with his other brother co-tenants contested this said suit by filing written statement as well as additional written statement in the said suit. They denied the material allegations contained in the plaint. Though they did not dispute the ownership of the plaintiff in respect of the said premises but they disputed the ownership of the plaintiff’s brother in respect of the Premises No.28A, Bhupen Bose Avenue, by contending, inter alia, that the deed of gift through which the plaintiff’s brother is claiming title in the said premises is invalid as the same was neither acted upon nor the same was accepted by the donee during the lifetime of the donor. They claimed that the title of the plaintiff’s father was not transferred to the plaintiff’s brother Sushil by virtue of the said deed of gift. They thus, claimed that on the death of the plaintiff’s father, the said Premises No.28A, Bhupen Bose Avenue, was inherited by the plaintiff and his brother Sushil jointly and they continued to stay in the said premises as member of the joint family having common mess. The defendants thus, denied that the plaintiff is staying in the said premises under his brother as a licensee. It is further alleged by them that since the plaintiff also has share in the said property, he is staying there as a co-owner and his possession in the said property cannot be held to be precarious and/or under the threat of eviction. It is further alleged by them that the suit premises being Premises No.26A, Bhupen Bose Avenue, consists of two parts, i.e., southern part and northern part. It is further alleged by them that the suit premises being Premises No.26A, Bhupen Bose Avenue, consists of two parts, i.e., southern part and northern part. The suit property, namely the defendant’s tenancy is situated on the southern part of the said premises. They claim that Kshetra Mohanbabu who was a tenant on the northern part of the said premises, vacated the said premises after surrendering his tenancy in favour of the plaintiff and he shifted his residence to a flat at Behala which he purchased. The defendants, thus, claim that after Kshetra Mohanbabu surrendered the said tenancy in the northern part of the said premises, the portion of the said premises became vacant where the plaintiff could have accommodated his family, but instead of occupying the said portion, he inducted a tenant, namely, Abani Babu in one room of the 2nd floor of the said premises keeping other portion of the said premises at his disposal. Thus, the defendants claimed that since the said accommodation is now available to the plaintiff and the said available accommodation is sufficient enough to satisfy the requirement of the plaintiff and the members of his family, eviction decree cannot be passed against the defendant on the ground of reasonable requirement. Local inspection was held by an Advocate Commissioner at Premises No.28A, Bhupen Bose Avenue, where the plaintiff is presently staying along with his wife. It is reported by the learned Advocate Commissioner that the room where the plaintiff and his wife are staying, appears to be a drawing room. No other room, save and except, the room where the plaintiff and his wife are staying in the said premises, was allowed to be inspected by the brother of the plaintiff. Parties laid their respective evidence in the said suit. The Learned Trial Judge, after considering the pleadings of the respective parties as well as their evidence, passed a decree for eviction on the ground of reasonable requirement after holding that the plaintiff is the owner of the suit property and he reasonably requires the suit property for his own use and occupation and he has no other reasonably suitable alternative accommodation elsewhere. The legality and/or validity of the said judgment and decree of the learned Trial Judge passed in the said eviction suit is under challenge in this appeal before us at the instance of the defendant No. 5/appellant. The legality and/or validity of the said judgment and decree of the learned Trial Judge passed in the said eviction suit is under challenge in this appeal before us at the instance of the defendant No. 5/appellant. The other defendants have not filed any appeal challenging the said judgment and decree of eviction passed by the learned Trial Court. They have also not joined themselves as appellants in the present appeal along with the defendant No.5/appellant. Mr. Bhattacharya, Learned Senior Counsel, appearing for the defendant No.5/appellant challenges the said judgment and decree of the learned Trial Judge on two fold grounds. Firstly, he contended that deed of gift being Ext.17 through which the plaintiff’s brother, namely, Sushil’s title in Premises No.28A, Bhupen Bose Avenue, was not valid deed due to lack of proper attestation. By referring to the said deed, he contended that in order to validate the deed of gift, the execution of the deed of gift by the donor must be attested by at least two attesting witnesses. By referring to the said deed, he pointed out that the plaintiff signed the said deed of gift as a witness therein. He further pointed out therefrom that the lawyer who drafted the said deed of gift though read over and explained the contents thereof to the executant but he has not signed the said deed of gift as an attesting witness in the presence of the executant. Thus, he contended that since it is apparent from the said deed of gift that though the execution thereof by the executant was not attested by two attesting witness as required under Section 123 of the Transfer of Property Act, the will is invalid and as such the plaintiff’s brother, namely, Sushil did not acquire any title in the said property by virtue of the said will. He thus, submitted that on the death of the plaintiff’s father, both the plaintiff and his brother Sushil jointly inherited the said premises and the plaintiff’s occupation in the said premises cannot be held to be on licence basis. In support of his aforesaid contention, he relied upon a decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Sethi Beni Chand (since dead) by L.R.S. Vs. Smt. Kamala Kunwar & Ors. In support of his aforesaid contention, he relied upon a decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Sethi Beni Chand (since dead) by L.R.S. Vs. Smt. Kamala Kunwar & Ors. reported in AIR 1977 SC 63 to demonstrate that the onus of proving due attestation of the donor’s execution of the deed of gift by the attesting witness, lies upon the plaintiff who is relying upon the said deed of gift. It is no doubt true that onus of proving due attestation of the execution of the deed of gift by the attesting witness is upon the donee who takes the benefit of the gift. Before entering into this question, we like to mention here that onus of proof of due attestation certainly lies upon the donee when the validity of the deed of gift is challenged either by the donor or by any person claiming under him, or by any person upon whom the donor’s title would have devolved by way of succession in the absence of such deed of gift. Here the donor did not challenge the deed of gift during his life time. Even after the demise of the donor, nobody claiming under him challenged the validity of such deed of gift. The deed of gift was acted upon. The donee’s name was mutated as owner in the Municipal records. He is paying the rates and taxes. The deed was produced in the suit by the donee and the same was exhibited as Ext.17. Now the question is as to whether a tenant under the donee’s brother in respect of the suit property can challenge the validity of such deed of gift due to improper attestation. The tenant does not claim any interest in the said property which was gifted by the donor in favour of the donee. He is not a party to the deed. As such, in our considered view, such a tenant cannot challenge the validity of the gift. That apart, it is also worth mentioning here that invalidity of the deed of gift due to want of proper attestation of the execution of the deed by the donor, was not even challenged by the defendants in their written statement. The defendants challenged the validity of the gift on the ground that the same was not acted upon. That apart, it is also worth mentioning here that invalidity of the deed of gift due to want of proper attestation of the execution of the deed by the donor, was not even challenged by the defendants in their written statement. The defendants challenged the validity of the gift on the ground that the same was not acted upon. However, in course of cross examination of the plaintiff’s witness, questions were put to him with regard to the defective attestation, and the witness answered these questions but by following the well settled principles of law that no amount of evidence beyond pleading can be looked into by the court, we hold that this part of the evidence of the plaintiff’s witness cannot be considered by this court. On the contrary, we have examined the said deed of gift with reference to the pleading and evidence of the parties in this regard and we find that the plaintiff succeeded in proving that the said deed of gift (Ext 17) was duly acted upon by the donee. On perusal of the said deed of gift we find that the acceptance of the gift by the donee was recorded in the deed itself. He got his name mutated in the Municipal records and has been exercising his right of ownership. Rates and taxes of the said premises are being paid by him. The deed was produced from his custody and was marked as exhibit No.17. As such we have no hesitation to hold that the deed of gift was acted upon and the plaintiff’s brother Sushil is the owner of the gifted property being 28A Bhupen Bose Avenue and his brother, namely the plaintiff herein, is residing in the said premises under his brother as a licensee. Possession of a licensee is no doubt precarious as he is always under the constant threat of eviction. That apart the local inspection report shows that the plaintiff is staying in one room in the premises No.28A, Bhupen Bose Avenue and the room where the plaintiff was allowed to stay is also used by the plaintiff’s brother as his drawing room. In our view, drawing room cannot be suitably used as a bed room of a married couple. That apart the local inspection report shows that the plaintiff is staying in one room in the premises No.28A, Bhupen Bose Avenue and the room where the plaintiff was allowed to stay is also used by the plaintiff’s brother as his drawing room. In our view, drawing room cannot be suitably used as a bed room of a married couple. Thus we hold that even if the plaintiff is not under the threat of eviction still then their accommodation in one room in his brother’s premises is not sufficient to his requirement. When a landlord owns a house, he cannot be compelled to stay in his brother’s house as a licensee. In this context, we are further required to consider as to whether, the plaintiff has any other alternative accommodation elsewhere to satisfy his requirement. It is contended by Mr. Bhattacharya, learned Senior Advocate that admittedly the suit property being premises No.26A, Bhupen Bose Avenue consists of two parts i.e., southern and northern. Suit property situates on the southern part of the said premises. He points out that despite his client categorically claimed in his pleading and evidence that the tenant in the northern portion has already vacated his tenancy and accommodation available to the plaintiff in the said premises is sufficient enough to meet his requirement, he has not taken any step to bring the extent of available accommodation therein on record. He thus, submitted that since the plaintiff has suppressed his available accommodation in the northern portion of the said premises, decree for eviction against the defendant should not be passed. To support such contention, he has relied upon a Division Bench Decision of this Hon’ble Court in the case of Lakshman Chandra Saha Vs. Smt. Bansari Mukherjee reported in AIR 1992 CAL 148 . Let us now consider as to how far the principles laid down in the said decision, can be applied in the present case. Here is the case where we find that the defendant is claiming that the tenant of the northern portion, namely, Kshetra Mohanbabu has vacated his tenancy and shifted to self acquired flat at Behala. To prove the said assertion, the defendant has proved the ration card of the said Kshetra Mohan wherefrom it appears that he now maintains a ration card at his address at Behala. To prove the said assertion, the defendant has proved the ration card of the said Kshetra Mohan wherefrom it appears that he now maintains a ration card at his address at Behala. The defendant has also proved the electoral roll of Behala constituency wherefrom it appears that the said Kshetra Mohan was shown as a voter of Behala constituency and his Behala address is mentioned therein. Mr. Bhattacharya has also drawn our attention to the evidence of Kshetra Mohanbabu (P.W. 3) wherein he admitted that his electric connection in the said tenancy had been disconnected. Mr. Bhattacharya thus, submitted that considering the chain of these events, the learned Court below ought to have held that some accommodation is available to the plaintiff in the northern portion of the said premises and the plaintiff having suppressed the availability of such accommodation at his disposal and further he having failed to bring on record the extent of accommodation available to him there by local inspection , he is not entitled to get any decree for eviction against the defendant. Mr. Chatterjee, Learned Senior Counsel appearing for the plaintiff/respondent refuted such submission of Mr. Bhattacharya by drawing our attention to the evidence of the said tenant Kshetra Mohanbabu (P.W. 3). He stated in his evidence that he had not surrendered his tenancy in the northern portion of the said premises. Admittedly, one of his brother viz., Abani is still there in the 2nd floor of the northern part of the said premises. Abani claimed that he inherited 1/3rd share in the said tenancy through his father. Admittedly, the father of Kshetra and Abani was the original tenant under the father of the plaintiff. Since a dispute has cropped up between Kshetra Mohanbabu and Abani as to who is the tenant in respect of the said portion of the premises, a suit was filed by Abani claiming his 1/3rd share in the said tenancy. However, the said suit was ultimately dismissed for default and after the death of Abani no step was taken for restoration of the said suit. Fact remains that a part of the northern portion of the said premises is still in occupation of the heirs of Abani. The defendant/appellant however, claims that after the tenancy was surrendered by Kshetra Mohanbabu, Abani was inducted by the plaintiff in a portion of the said premises. Fact remains that a part of the northern portion of the said premises is still in occupation of the heirs of Abani. The defendant/appellant however, claims that after the tenancy was surrendered by Kshetra Mohanbabu, Abani was inducted by the plaintiff in a portion of the said premises. As such they claim that the plaintiff’s claim for his reasonable requirement of the suit premises has been practically demolished as he himself inducted a new tenant in the northern portion of the said premises, without occupying the same. Mr. Bhattacharya, Learned Senior Advocate, thus contended that having regard to the stand taken by his client about the availability of such accommodation in the northern portion of the said premises, the plaintiff ought to have taken steps for holding a local inspection by the advocate Commissioner either to prove his claim that no accommodation is available to the plaintiff in the northern portion of the said premises or to disprove the claim of the defendant/appellant that additional accommodation is available to the plaintiff in the northern portion of the said premises and since the plaintiff has not taken such steps, adverse presumption should be drawn by this court against the Plaintiff/Respondent. Let us now consider the substance of such submission of Mr. Bhattacharya in the context of the pleadings and evidence of the parties. No doubt the defendant/appellant made positive claim regarding availability of an accommodation in the northern portion of the said premises at the disposal of the plaintiff and the plaintiff denied such claim of the defendant in his evidence. In such circumstances, normally such dispute could have been resolved by an inspection of the northern portion of the said premises by Advocate Commissioner and the such steps having not been taken by the plaintiff, adverse presumption could have been drawn against him, but the situation is something different here. In the present case the plaintiff not only denied the defendants’ claim for availability of an accommodation in the northern portion of the said premises at his disposal, but he examined the admitted tenant viz., Kshetra Mohanbabu as his witness (P.W 3) who not only claimed that he has not surrendered his tenancy and/or given up his possession thereof to the plaintiff but also proved his current rent receipts to show continuation of his tenancy in the northern portion of the said premises. Thus, even if it appears from the evidence of the parties that Kshetra Mohan shifted his residence to his flat at Behala and his electricity connection in his tenancy has been disconnected, still then after considering the evidence of Kshetra Mohanbabu we can safely hold that he has not surrendered his tenancy and/or given up his possession of the said tenancy in favour of the plaintiff. As such, we cannot agree with the contention of this defendants that the northern of the said premises, is at the disposal of the plaintiff. In our considered view, in such circumstances the burden to prove the defendant’s claim that the said northern portion is at the disposal of the plaintiff, was on the defendant who should have applied for local inspection to bring the truth on record, and since they filed to take such steps, adverse presumption should be drawn against them. Had it been a fact that any accommodation is available to the plaintiff, then the defendant should have taken steps for holding local inspection in respect of the northern portion of the said premises. Fact remains that they have neither taken any such step, nor even brought this fact to the notice of the court at the time when the plaintiff applied for local inspection to show his present possession in his brother’s house at premises No.28A, Bhupen Bose Avenue. If the defendant’s such contention was correct, they should have mentioned this fact in their objection filed against the plaintiff’s application for local inspection, so that the learned Court below could have applied his mind about the necessity of holding such inspection in the northern portion of the said premises. Interestingly, it may be mentioned herein that no such step even has been taken by the defendant in this appeal though the defendant/appellant has filed an application for taking note of additional evidence about the availability of an additional accommodation at the disposal of the plaintiff, in his father-in-law’s house which according to the defendants, was inherited by the wife of the plaintiff on the death of her father, being the owner of the said property. The plaintiff/respondent in his affidavit-in-opposition filed against the defendants’ application for additional evidence, stated that the father of the plaintiff’s wife left a will by giving his house to his son after making provision for her daughter’s stay in one room of the said premises so long as possession of the suit premises is not recovered from the defendant in due process of law. The said will has already been probated. The probate granted by the court has been annexed to the said affidavit. After considering the pleadings of the parties in this regard we can safely hold that availability of accommodation in one room of the said premises for a limited period, cannot be equated with reasonable alternative accommodation available to the plaintiff. We again hold that one room accommodation in the said premises is not sufficient to meet the requirement of the plaintiff. The plaintiff’s requirement of the suit premises has been proved in this suit. Even in the earlier suit, Learned Trial Court held that the plaintiff requires the suit premises for his own use and occupation. We feel that even though he is no longer in service as manager of the Yatra Company, still then he being a person belonging to a middle class family along with his wife require at least one bedroom for them, one drawing room for attending the guests and relatives, one dining room with kitchen. This is the minimum requirement of a person belonging to middle class family. The suit premises comprises of three rooms and a bath and privy. As such we hold that the learned Trial Judge rightly held that the plaintiff/Respondent reasonably requires the suit premises for his own use and occupation. We also hold that the Learned Trail Court rightly held that the plaintiff has no other reasonably suitable alternative accommodation elsewhere. Plaintiff’s ownership in the suit premises is not disputed. As such all the requirements for passing a decree for eviction against the defendants on the ground of reasonable requirement of the plaintiff/respondent, are satisfied in the instant case. Legality, validity and/or sufficiency of the ejectment notice upon the defendant are not under challenge in this appeal. No argument was advanced by Mr. Bhattacharya in this regard. We also do not find any infirmity in the judgment of the Learned Trial Judge with regard to the validity of the ejectment notice. Legality, validity and/or sufficiency of the ejectment notice upon the defendant are not under challenge in this appeal. No argument was advanced by Mr. Bhattacharya in this regard. We also do not find any infirmity in the judgment of the Learned Trial Judge with regard to the validity of the ejectment notice. Thus we hold that the appeal deserves no merit for consideration. The judgment and decree of the Learned Trail Court which is impugned in this appeal, is hereby affirmed. The application for additional evidence filed by the appellant, also stands dismissed. However, considering the fact that the defendants/appellants are staying in the said premises continuously for three generations and it is practically impossible for them to find out another alternative accommodation in the said locality which is located in the heart of the city, having all facilities and amenities of modern life including Metro Railway Service at his door stop at the rental of Rs.50/- (Rupees fifty) per month which the tenants are so long paying for the suit premises, we allow the appellant and the proforma respondents/defendants two months’ time to vacate the suit premises and deliver up vacant and peaceful possession thereof to the plaintiff/respondent, failing which the plaintiff/respondent will be at liberty to recover physical possession thereof by evicting the appellant/proforma respondents/ defendants therefrom in accordance with law. The appeal is thus dismissed with costs assessed at Rs.50,000.00 (Rupees fifty thousand) to be paid by the appellant/defendant to the plaintiff/respondent. Ishan Chandra Das, J. : I agree.